[EAI Commentary No. 32] North Korea's 2014 Maze Navigation: An Hermeneutics of the New Year's Address

Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University, currently serves as a member of the Presidential Advisory Council on National Security. He holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Washington.

Having concluded 2013 with the execution of Jang Song-thaek, Kim Jong-un, the First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, began the Year of the Horse with the delivery of his New Year's address. While the North Korean populace was engrossed in studying the address, the North Korean authorities strongly demanded the cessation of the ROK-U.S. military exercises scheduled for mid-January to February, proposing an end to slander and hostile acts and the prevention of nuclear catastrophe, thereby sparking controversy over a "deceptive peace offensive." Government officials in South Korea and related countries, as well as North Korea experts at home and abroad, are wandering through the 2014 North Korean maze amidst subjective confusion between pessimism and optimism. To escape these difficulties and properly grasp Kim Jong-un's blueprint for 2014, and to formulate desirable countermeasures, it is paramount to read the New Year's address correctly.

North Korea's New Year's address is not mere propaganda. In his 2014 New Year's address, Kim Jong-un analyzes the difficult current situation, shaped by the influence of past perspectives, and seeks his own solutions through a limited future perspective. Therefore, rather than superficially skimming the address, which was carefully drafted according to guidelines likely established after Jang Song-thaek's purge, using rudimentary methods such as content analysis, we must gain a deep understanding of the meanings between the lines with the aid of hermeneutics, specifically the concept of "fusion of horizons."

North Korean New Year's Address Discourse Structure: 1-1-4-1-1

The first step in understanding the 2014 New Year's address is to interpret its discourse structure. North Korea's New Year's addresses have long maintained a 1-1-4-1-1 structure. The first '1' evaluates the past year, the second '1' presents the New Year's state policy directives, the third '4' emphasizes the strengthening of domestic revolutionary capabilities in the four major fronts of socialist construction—political ideology, military, economy, and culture. The fourth '1' outlines the strengthening of South Korean revolutionary capabilities for national reunification, and the final '1' discusses the strengthening of international revolutionary capabilities to combat the U.S. imperialists' hostile policy toward North Korea. This perspective has overwhelmingly influenced the reality perspective of North Korean political leaders since Chairman Kim Il-sung presented the strengthening of the three revolutionary capabilities as a new political line in February 1964, replacing the military line of the Korean War in the 1950s.

The 2014 New Year's address maintains the 1-1-4-1-1 structure, reflecting the line of strengthening the three revolutionary capabilities. The sustained influence of the discourse structure signifies that there has been no change in the fundamental perspective through which the Kim Jong-un regime views the realities of the domestic situation, the Korean Peninsula, and the international arena. In other words, North Korea's basic perspective of viewing the world has not changed from the standpoint of enhancing the three revolutionary capabilities. While the specific actions in the Korean Peninsula situation in 2014 may change depending on the stage, the broad framework of the production is already set due to the limitations of this perspective.

Evaluation of 2013: The Year of the New Byungjin Line

Following the review of the New Year's address discourse structure, it is necessary to examine each item of the 1-1-4-1-1 structure in detail. The evaluation of the past year, corresponding to the first '1', holds significantly greater meaning than in previous years due to the Jang Song-thaek incident. There is still considerable confusion regarding how to understand the Kim Jong-un-centric meaning of the Jang Song-thaek purge. The New Year's address, prepared immediately after the brutal execution of Jang Song-thaek, who was known as the second-in-command of North Korea's political power, best reflects Kim Jong-un's perspective on the Jang Song-thaek incident.

The New Year's address summarizes 2013 by stating, "Last year was a glorious year in which the entire party, the entire army, and all the people upheld the new Byungjin line put forth by the Party and waged an all-out offensive, achieving brilliant victories in the construction of a socialist powerful nation and the defense of socialism." The fact that First Secretary Kim Jong-un evaluates 2013 as the year of the new Byungjin line signifies that Kim Jong-un was at the center of the selection and promotion of this "line," and it also implies that this "line" will continue to have a core influence on North Korea in 2014. Furthermore, the Jang Song-thaek incident is dealt with at a lower level than the selection and promotion of the Byungjin line, summarized as follows: "Last year, our Party took decisive measures to eliminate sectarian impurities that had festered within the Party. By detecting and purging the anti-Party, anti-revolutionary faction at a critical juncture with a timely and accurate decision, our Party has further solidified the ranks of the Party and the revolution, and our single-minded unity has been magnified a hundredfold." This is an explanation by First Secretary Kim Jong-un that the detection and purging of anti-Party and anti-revolutionary factions during the promotion of the Byungjin line in 2013 was the Jang Song-thaek incident. Kim Jong-un views the purge of Jang Song-thaek not as a difference in opinion on fundamental national strategic lines like the Byungjin line, but from the perspective of consolidating the political-ideological front, one of the four major fronts for strengthening domestic revolutionary capabilities. Precisely understanding the significance of the Jang Song-thaek incident is directly linked to foreseeing the future of the Kim Jong-un regime. Although Jang Song-thaek's death shocked the North Korean populace and the international community, it has not caused any significant qualitative changes in the short term to the fundamental perspective of the Kim Jong-un regime or the Byungjin line.

New Year's State Policy Directives: The Era of Prosperity for Military-First Korea

Let us now explore the meaning of the New Year's state policy directives, corresponding to the second '1'. North Korea's 2014 maze navigation presents three potential entrances: Military-First, Byungjin, and Reform and Opening. Regardless of which entrance is chosen, the New Year's address indicates that North Korea's choice is an "Era of Prosperity for Military-First Korea," even though the goal of a "prosperous Korea" is not easily visible.

The interpretation of this directive, which simultaneously includes Military-First and prosperity, requires caution. Calling the second year of the Byungjin line the "Era of Prosperity for Military-First Korea" signifies, first, that North Korea will not abandon and will defend the military front of nuclear armament construction, which was built with total effort during the Military-First era. Second, it implies that on the foundation of the political-ideological front, solidified by the purge of Jang Song-thaek, along with the nuclear military front, North Korea will build a strong economic front to usher in an era of prosperity. Therefore, the "Era of Prosperity for Military-First Korea" in 2014 substantively encompasses both the economy and nuclear weapons. However, it avoids the direct expression of nuclear armament construction used in the Byungjin line.

The Four Major Fronts: Economy-Culture-Military-Political Ideology

The New Year's address, as its third component, discusses the theory of the four major fronts for the "Era of Prosperity for Military-First Korea," giving particular emphasis and the most space to the economic front. Agriculture, construction, and science and technology are highlighted as leading sectors that will carry the "torch of innovation." Subsequently, the economic front is detailed with tasks to be undertaken in sectors such as metallurgy, chemicals, power, coal, railway transportation, light industry, fisheries, and resources. This is followed by the cultural front, including education and sports; the military front, emphasizing the strengthening of the People's Army and national defense industry; and finally, the consolidation of the political-ideological front.

The theory of the four major fronts concludes by stating, "The political-ideological front is the decisive stronghold that determines the victory or defeat in the struggle to defend socialism, and strengthening the revolutionary ranks politically and ideologically is the most important task before us." Following the purge of Jang Song-thaek, it is stated, "This year, we must consolidate the Party organizationally and ideologically, firmly prepare all members of society as Kimilsungists-Kimjongilists, and further strengthen the single-minded unity of the revolutionary ranks."

Inter-Korean Relations: Three Principles of National Reunification, Struggle for Security and Peace, Improvement of Relations

The section on inter-Korean relations in the New Year's address, which follows the discussion of domestic capabilities, is viewed by conservatives as a deceptive peace offensive with nothing new, while progressives see a need to explore at least the possibility of new changes. To read the New Year's address correctly, it is necessary to hermeneutically illuminate the Kim Jong-un regime's perspective beyond the subjective interpretations of conservatives and progressives.

The discussion of unification issues in the New Year's address consists of three elements. First, it clarifies the basic stance of emphasizing the Three Principles of National Reunification—independence from external forces, peaceful reunification, and great national unity—which have been stressed since the 1970s. "To resolve the issue of national unification in accordance with the aspirations and demands of our people, we must firmly adhere to the principle of independence from external forces and the position of our nation itself. [...] The North and the South must adhere to the principle of independence as declared in the Three Principles of National Reunification and the North-South Joint Declaration, firmly stand on the position of our nation itself, respect the joint declarations, and faithfully implement them."

Next, it states, "We must actively struggle to defend the security and peace of the nation," strongly criticizing the ROK-U.S. military exercises and arguing that "if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, it will bring about immense nuclear catastrophe," thus demanding the "prevention and frustration of the confrontation and war schemes of internal and external warmongers."

As the final component, the New Year's address addresses the improvement of inter-Korean relations as follows: "We must create an atmosphere for improving North-South relations. It is heartbreaking enough that our nation is divided and living apart due to external forces, but it is unacceptable for compatriots to slander and antagonize each other, as this only benefits those who do not desire the unification of Korea. The time has come to end the utterly futile slander and defamation, and we must no longer do things that hinder reconciliation and unity. [...] We will move forward with anyone who values the nation and desires unification, regardless of their past, and will continue to actively strive for the improvement of North-South relations."

The "Let Us Open a Path for the Improvement of North-South Relations Through the United Strength of Our Nation," a significant proposal announced by the North Korean National Defense Commission on January 16, concretizes the content of inter-Korean relations in the New Year's address by proposing an end to slander, a halt to military hostile acts, and the prevention of nuclear disasters. This proposal has led to a debate among ROK and North Korean officials regarding a "deceptive peace offensive." Among the three items proposed for inter-Korean relations in the New Year's address, North Korea emphasizes only the third item, while South Korea focuses on the first and second items, which follow the third. Therefore, if North Korea's proposal is genuinely new and not a deceptive peace offensive, North Korea must demonstrate a change in perspective regarding the existing first and second items. South Korea, rather than simply dismissing the North Korean proposal as a deceptive peace offensive, should present a concrete "genuine peace proposal" that can sufficiently reveal whether it is deceptive or not.

International Relations: Anti-Imperialist Struggle

The international relations section of the 2014 New Year's address clearly demonstrates that it has not deviated from the past perspective emphasizing the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea. "Last year, on the international stage, the interference and war schemes of imperialists, who threaten the sovereignty of sovereign states and the survival of humanity, continued incessantly. In particular, on the Korean Peninsula, the world's most volatile hotspot, the danger of war was imminent due to the nuclear war schemes of hostile forces aimed at crushing our Republic, seriously threatening the peace and security of the region and the world." Therefore, it emphasizes, "We will defend the sovereignty and peace of our nation with strong self-reliant power and firmly protect the dignity of our nation."

Although North Korea avoids directly stating its intention to build nuclear weapons, it expresses its resolve not to abandon nuclear weapons—its "strong self-reliant power"—by emphasizing the risk of nuclear war. The 2014 New Year's address does not indicate any possibility of North Korea embracing a new security perspective without nuclear weapons. For North Korea, nuclear weapons remain the "ultimate sword" for survival.

Internal Contradictions in the 2014 New Year's Address

Despite the 2014 New Year's address placing the greatest emphasis on strengthening the domestic economic front for the "Era of Prosperity for Military-First Korea," it exhibits internal contradictions by not departing from traditional past perspectives in its discussions of inter-Korean and international relations. Based on the Three Principles of National Reunification, while simultaneously struggling for the nation's security and peace, the proposal to create an atmosphere for improving inter-Korean relations from North Korea's limited perspective of "self-reliance" and "nation" is not realistically acceptable to South Korea. Therefore, the New Year's address's policy toward South Korea is bound to contradict its economic development.

Furthermore, the Kim Jong-un regime's limited perspective in international relations, which continues to confront the U.S. imperialists' hostile policy toward North Korea with the "ultimate sword" of nuclear weapons, while simultaneously hoping to strengthen the domestic economic front, is unrealistic. Unless the sincerity of denuclearization is internationally recognized, North Korea will have to continue its arduous march toward building its economic front without international assistance.

In terms of strengthening domestic capabilities, the possibility of a challenge to Kim Jong-un within the political-ideological front in the near future is low due to the purge of Jang Song-thaek. Additionally, the military front has been secured at a minimum level through the development of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. However, even with maximum internal efforts to build the economic front to usher in the "Era of Prosperity for Military-First Korea," it will be difficult to achieve the expected results without proper improvement in inter-Korean and international relations. While Kim Jong-un may hope that the 2015 New Year's address will describe 2014 as a "glorious year that ushered in the Era of Prosperity for Military-First Korea," the outlook is bleak.

Navigating the Korean Peninsula Maze

In October of last year, the East Asia Institute (EAI) emphasized in its report <Proposals for a New North Korea Policy: Towards the Evolution of the Trust Process> that North Korea must evolve beyond its self-contradictory current economic-nuclear Byungjin line to a Byungjin 2.0 line that pursues economic construction and non-nuclear security. Furthermore, to support such a change in North Korea, it proposed a comprehensive North Korea strategy encompassing the phases of "deterrence-engagement-trust" for the development of South Korea's new North Korea policy.

The Kim Jong-un regime has cautiously presented the "Era of Prosperity for Military-First Korea" for 2014 as its official state policy directive, replacing the economic-nuclear Byungjin line of 2013. However, nuclear weapons have not disappeared from North Korea's perspective. For North Korea to truly usher in an "Era of Prosperity for a Developed Korea," it must demonstrate sincerity in denuclearization and earnestly embark on the path of "peaceful economic construction and improvement of people's livelihoods." A North Korean-style theory of peaceful development is needed.

North Korea's New Year's address must be rewritten. Strengthening domestic capabilities should prioritize the construction of the economic front based on the Byungjin 2.0 line of economic construction and non-nuclear security, while establishing a non-nuclear security system in the military front and reinforcing the political-ideological front to pursue Byungjin 2.0. Inter-Korean relations should present a new South Korean policy toward the North, rather than a peace offensive based on the Three Principles of National Reunification. International relations must also overcome the perspective of anti-U.S. struggle as soon as possible and demonstrate a more evolved vision of international relations based on "autonomous coexistence."

South Korea's North Korea policy should focus on supporting North Korea's choice and implementation of the new Byungjin 2.0 line. In her contribution to Project Syndicate on December 30, 2013, titled "A Journey Toward a New Inter-Korean Relationship," President Park Geun-hye summarized the future direction of North Korea policy as "maintaining strong deterrence," "upgrading the Korean Peninsula Trust Process," and "joint development of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia through North Korea's denuclearization."

To escape the escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula without further deterioration, maintaining and strengthening deterrence against North Korea must be the primary principle of South Korea's North Korea policy. North Korea will dedicate all its efforts to strengthening its economic front throughout 2014, but it will be difficult to achieve the expected results without sincerity in improving inter-Korean relations or denuclearization. Therefore, North Korea's only breakthrough lies in Byungjin 2.0, the parallel pursuit of economy and non-nuclear security. It is difficult for Kim Jong-un to make a decision to change his strategic line based on "upgrading trust" measures such as humanitarian aid, family reunions, and resolving the issues of Prisoners of War and abductees. A peace and prosperity system for the Korean Peninsula and East Asia that can guarantee North Korea's non-nuclear security is necessary. The second principle of South Korea's North Korea policy should be to support North Korea's strategic line change, such as choosing Byungjin 2.0, by more actively pursuing this peace and prosperity system. The third principle of South Korea's North Korea policy is international cooperation, closely coordinating with relevant parties, including the United States and China, to establish such a peace and prosperity system. Finally, the fourth principle is to prepare phased trust-building measures corresponding to the unfolding situation to enable the Korean Peninsula to move from the current crisis phase through a transitional phase into a negotiation phase. ■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) receives financial support for its research on middle power diplomacy from The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. [EAI Commentary] aims to provide in-depth analysis and practical alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. When quoting [EAI Commentary], please be sure to cite the source.