[EAI Commentary No. 30] How to Untangle the Troubled Korea-Japan Relations?: Proposals for Building a New 21st Century Partnership

Dr. Shin Kak-soo received a doctorate in law from Seoul National University and has served as the First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Second Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Japan.

The Current State of Korea-Japan Relations

This summer, while the globe is suffering from the heatwave of global warming, a chilling cold front has uniquely flowed through Korea-Japan relations. At the beginning of this year, with the launch of new governments in both countries, there were expectations for the restoration of relations, which had significantly deteriorated in the latter half of last year. However, unfortunately, eight months later, the sentiments of the people in both countries are tangled, and high-level exchanges between the governments have almost ceased, giving the undeniable impression of further regression. Relations between Korea and Japan began to drift apart at the beginning of last year, and as time passes, they are caught in a vicious cycle, drifting without finding the momentum to break the chain of this cycle.

In fact, despite twists and turns over the past half-century, Korea-Japan relations have steadily developed. The bilateral relationship has expanded and deepened from government-led interactions to a multi-layered relationship encompassing civil society. Elements of Japanese culture, such as manga, anime, fashion, architecture, and Japanese cuisine, have long taken root in Korea. Korean culture, led by dramas, films, K-pop, musicals, and Korean cuisine, began to establish itself in Japan in the early 2000s and is now enjoying considerable popularity. The exchange of people between the two countries has exceeded 5.5 million annually, with 670 flights flying between the two countries every week. In parallel, economic relations have steadily progressed in the form of industrial division of labor in terms of trade and investment, developing to a stage where extensive cooperative projects are undertaken in third countries.

However, the strengthening of relations in these non-political areas, while serving as a safety net to prevent extreme deterioration when political issues arise, as seen in recent Korea-Japan relations, is not a sufficiently strong foundation to overcome such challenges. The development of Korea-Japan relations still repeats the phenomenon of regression, much like the myth of Sisyphus. This is also evidence that a relationship of mutual trust has not yet been achieved. To build sound and stable Korea-Japan relations, fundamental solutions are needed for the issues that hinder the long-term development of bilateral ties.

The strategic environment in Northeast Asia has seen a significant increase in fluidity and uncertainty due to factors such as the North Korean issue, the rise of China, and the U.S. policy of prioritizing Asia. In this transitional period, the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations is a 'lose-lose' situation that benefits no country in the Northeast Asian region. As the only two OECD member countries in Asia, South Korea and Japan are positioned to play a central role in resolving the 'Asian Paradox,' where diplomatic and security tensions coexist with economic interdependence. In this regard, it is urgent to build a new 21st-century Korea-Japan partnership based on mutual benefit and common prosperity by rapidly restoring bilateral relations. In this context, we will examine the background of the recent deterioration of Korea-Japan relations, and review the prospects for future relations as well as measures for their restoration and strengthening.

Background of Relations Deterioration

What are the factors that have led to the recent deterioration of Korea-Japan relations? For convenience, we will examine this from both the Korean and Japanese perspectives.

First, from the Korean perspective, the most fundamental factor exacerbating Korea-Japan relations is Japan's regressive stance on historical issues. The Abe administration initially appeared to be making efforts to restore relations, but from April onwards, it began to take regressive actions such as stating that "the definition of aggression has not been established," hinting at revisions to the Murayama and Kono Statements, and having senior ministers visit Yasukuni Shrine. These statements, actions, and measures directly contradict the positions previously announced by the Japanese government regarding historical issues, representing an anti-historical move that turns back the clock and jeopardizes the foundation of Korea-Japan relations. These actions by Japan aggravate anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans by reopening the emotional wounds of the victims, and they narrow the room for maneuver for the South Korean government, which hopes for improved relations. Koreans are concerned that the Japanese society is increasingly dominated by a generation that did not experience the pre-war era and has a weak understanding of history, while progressive forces actively engaged in post-war atonement are in decline, making it likely that regressive attitudes towards historical issues will persist.

Second, there is strong concern in South Korea about Japan's rightward shift, aiming for a 'strong Japan.' The rightward shift in Japan has been rapidly progressing since the Abe administration took office. Domestically, the desire within Japanese society to escape from the 'economy without growth' caused by two decades of deflation and the political instability resulting from the 'turtling phenomenon' (where control of the Upper and Lower Houses was split between ruling and opposition parties for several years) has created an environment conducive to rightward shifts. Externally, the shift in power dynamics in Northeast Asia, where Japan lost its position as the world's second-largest economy to China in 2010, and its security anxieties regarding China's rapidly increasing military spending and anti-access/area denial (A2AD) strategies, also facilitate the promotion of a rightward course. However, attempts to revise the pacifist constitution and establish a national defense force are perceived by Koreans, who suffered from Japanese militarism in the 20th century, as a threat of the resurgence of a militaristic Japan. Koreans, seeing a 'Japan returning to the past,' harbor strong distrust towards the series of actions being pursued under the guise of becoming a 'normal country.'

Next, we examine the factors behind the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations from the Japanese perspective. First, there is a sense of fatigue regarding historical issues prevalent in Japan. The perception is spreading that no matter how much reflection and apology is made regarding historical issues, Korea's demands are endless, leading to a widening gap in perceptions between the peoples of the two countries. In particular, recent rulings by Korean courts concerning historical issues appear to have had an impact.

Second, Japan's perception of Korea has changed due to shifts in the dynamics of Korea-Japan relations. Until the 2000s, South Korea lagged behind Japan in almost all aspects and consistently pursued the goal of catching up with Japan. As a result of these efforts, South Korea has become equal to or has surpassed Japan in some areas. In this process, a perception has grown among Japanese people that South Korea disregards Japan, which has acted as a negative factor in interpreting South Korea's policies toward Japan. The recent phenomenon of journalists and academics who have experienced Korea engaging in 'Korea-bashing' within Japan can be seen as an expression of this perception. However, Japan needs to adopt a positive interpretation that the growth of South Korea's national strength has created favorable conditions for building diverse partnerships between the two countries, and South Korea needs to carefully examine why Japan holds such negative perceptions and address them.

Third, there is a strong perception in Japan that South Korea has shifted its traditional pro-Japan stance towards prioritizing China. This is due to the fact that the new South Korean president, unlike his predecessors, visited China before Japan, and while the strategic cooperative relationship between South Korea and China has deepened, Korea-Japan relations have remained stagnant. However, this is a product of misunderstanding, as while Korea-China relations and Korea-Japan relations do influence each other, they are not necessarily a zero-sum game. What this flawed perspective overlooks is that South Korea is strengthening its strategic relationship with China in terms of the Chinese market and the North Korean issue; therefore, even if Korea-China relations strengthen, there is no reason for South Korea to neglect its relationship with Japan, which involves its own strategic interests.

Future Prospects

What direction will Korea-Japan relations take in the future? The South Korean government has already clearly expressed its emphasis on Korea-Japan relations, as stated by President Park Geun-hye in her Liberation Day address on August 15th. Furthermore, she proposed that if Japan demonstrates a willingness to confront its past, not only will relations improve, but both countries will cooperate to realize the vision of a Northeast Asian peace and cooperation framework. This address, with its more restrained tone compared to the March 1st address, highlighted the importance of Korea-Japan relations and urged sincerity from the Japanese side to develop them. Therefore, the improvement of Korea-Japan relations hinges on the future policy direction of the Japanese government.

While various variables exist, the key factor is how Prime Minister Abe, who is pursuing a foreign policy led by the Prime Minister's Office, will set the direction, given that the fundamental cause of the problem lies in the Abe administration's regressive stance on historical issues. Having won the Upper House election in July, the Abe administration can govern stably for the next two to three years. Therefore, how the Abe administration utilizes the political capital gained from overcoming the 'turtling phenomenon' is expected to significantly influence Korea-Japan relations.

The immediate task for the Abe administration is the success of Abenomics, which forms the basis of its support. While the first two arrows of Abenomics—monetary easing and fiscal investment and lending—are showing relatively quick effects, the most crucial element, growth policy, requires considerable political capital to be invested due to the need for coordination of various interests. Therefore, there are expected to be certain limitations in pursuing policies that cause friction with neighboring countries in terms of foreign policy. Furthermore, the Komeito party, a coalition partner, maintains an opposing stance on historical issues and rightward shift policies, thus expectations are high for its role in checking and balancing the Liberal Democratic Party. While the opposition parties will also play a certain role in checks and balances, the Democratic Party and other opposition parties are currently fragmented and at a significant disadvantage in terms of parliamentary representation, making it difficult to place high hopes on them.

In addition, the role of the United States will also have a significant impact. The U.S. has reportedly already urged Japan to exercise restraint, as the regional tensions triggered by Japan's regressive historical perceptions conflict with the strategic interests the U.S. pursues in Northeast Asia. In particular, the Obama administration, which cannot afford to divert its attention from the Middle East due to factors such as the Egyptian military's ousting and suppression of Morsi, the Iranian nuclear issue, Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, the Syrian civil war, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the rise of Al-Qaeda, cannot help but be more conscious of the increased burden on its Asia policy resulting from Japan's revisionist historical views. As the victor of World War II and the architect of the post-war order, the U.S. cannot easily overlook Japan, a defeated nation, shaking the fundamental framework of the post-war order with distorted historical perceptions. For the U.S. to realize its strategic framework in Northeast Asia, it is crucial for Japan to move forward in a future-oriented manner based on reflection of its past, rather than being past-oriented, and the U.S. playing a more active role is the way to reduce the costs associated with a regressive Japan.

Changes in the strategic environment in Northeast Asia are also expected to influence Japan's rightward shift. The more unstable the strategic environment in Northeast Asia becomes, the more public opinion supporting rightward shifts will increase within Japan. In this regard, whether the Japan-China relationship, which is at its worst since the establishment of diplomatic ties due to the Senkaku (Diaoyu Islands) dispute, can improve is also an important variable. However, judging from recent trends, it seems unlikely to expect a rapid recovery of Japan-China relations in the near future. In such a case, as the possibility of various forms of conflict between Japan and China increases, extreme arguments within Japan will gain strength. Meanwhile, although the possibility of nuclear tests or missile launches has decreased in light of North Korea's recent actions, the security anxieties posed by North Korea's nuclear and missile programs also fuel conservative and right-wing movements within Japan, thus they must be considered as variables.

Solutions

Based on the background of deteriorating Korea-Japan relations and future prospects discussed above, we will examine how to restore bilateral relations promptly and build more stable and desirable relations.

First, there is a saying, "When things are difficult, stick to the basics." This applies to the current state of Korea-Japan relations. Above all, trust between Korea and Japan has been broken. Restoring trust as soon as possible is the first step toward the recovery and advancement of bilateral relations. Above all, Japan must clearly demonstrate a willingness to face its history and prevent the recurrence of the history of division and conflict of the 20th century. South Korea also needs to strengthen dialogue and communication with Japan through various channels. We must prevent Korea-Japan relations from being caught in a vortex of deterioration to the point of no return. While urging Japan to face its history, a balanced approach is needed that positively evaluates Japan's contributions to peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia under its post-war pacifist constitution.

Second, efforts should be made for the prompt resolution of the comfort women issue, which is the most significant pending issue related to historical problems. Given that the average age of the surviving comfort women is 87 and there are only 57 survivors left, and considering the high symbolism of this issue, both countries must urgently seek a solution. Historical issues require an approach from a medium- to long-term perspective, with Japan acting in accordance with the wording and spirit of the statements it has previously made. The third phase of the suspended Korea-Japan History Joint Committee should be launched promptly, and the work of compiling a joint Korean-Japanese history textbook should be pursued steadily. Consideration should be given to the fact that Germany engaged in this work with its neighboring countries, France and Poland, over a long period.

Third, it is necessary to approach Japanese politicians and the Japanese public separately. While it is true that Japanese society is becoming more conservative, the self-awareness of peace and prosperity cultivated through the post-war pacifist constitution will not disappear so easily. Recent opinion polls showing considerable opposition to revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and changing the name of the Self-Defense Forces to the National Defense Force support this. Of course, there are problems such as the winner-take-all small constituency system, the fragmentation of opposition parties, a weak civil society, and collectivist tendencies, which prevent such public opinion from being well reflected in Japanese politics. However, if we do not respond coolly, we risk weakening the forces of restraint within Japan and instead empowering the right-wing forces, leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy. In this context, the restrained response shown by our government regarding historical issues in the recent August 15th address is commendable.

Fourth, instead of broadly categorizing all of Japan's policies under the abstract frame of 'rightward shift,' it is necessary to calmly respond based on national interest by closely examining the content of specific actions and measures. Criticizing responses to changes in the Northeast Asian security environment as right-wing policies risks losing the legitimacy of criticism against truly right-wing policies. Japan must also make efforts to gain the understanding of neighboring countries, including South Korea, by maintaining transparency in its security-related policy initiatives. Above all, if Japan does not show a willingness to face history, its 'intentions' behind security strategy shifts will inevitably be doubted, ultimately undermining trust, a point Japan must keep in mind.

Fifth, even if Korea-Japan relations are politically stagnant, both countries should make mutual efforts to ensure that cooperative projects that are underway or should be pursued are not disrupted. Traditionally, even when Korea-Japan relations were politically tense, the phenomenon of 'political coldness, economic warmth' was maintained; however, recently, political tensions have begun to affect non-political areas as well. As is the case everywhere in the world, it is difficult for Korea and Japan to avoid periods of tension arising from relations between neighboring countries. Therefore, both countries must cultivate a mature attitude of calmly maintaining exchanges and cooperation in other areas, even when relations temporarily become difficult. Furthermore, a counter-intuitive approach of resolving problems through cooperation is required.

Sixth, the governments of both countries should focus on avoiding strategic misunderstandings. As mentioned earlier, a portion of the causes for the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations stems from misunderstandings of each other. Given that these misunderstandings have the potential to create a chain reaction, strategic dialogues should be strengthened through various channels. It is also important to prevent the media in both countries from spreading these strategic misunderstandings. In particular, given the increasing frequency of the dissemination of false or distorted information through social media, it is necessary to block it with swift responses. The pursuit of forums or dialogues by the Korean and Japanese governments as part of public diplomacy could also help prevent misunderstandings and enhance mutual understanding.

Seventh, efforts should not be spared in seeking a medium- to long-term direction for the development of Korea-Japan relations. First, in preparation for the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations in 2015, we must take stock of Korea-Japan relations comprehensively and lay the groundwork for the next 50 years. Above all, we should seek to conclude a comprehensive exchange agreement comparable to the Elysée Treaty of 1963 between Germany and France, which enabled European integration beyond historical reconciliation between Germany and France. Through this, we should aim to institutionalize and vitalize exchange and cooperation projects between the governments and peoples of both countries, particularly youth exchanges and local exchanges. Mutual understanding and trust between the peoples of both countries will be the foundation for designing the long-term future of Korea-Japan relations.

Eighth, when dealing with Korea-Japan relations, it is necessary to approach them from a broader perspective of Northeast Asia, beyond the bilateral viewpoint. Korea-Japan relations are closely linked to the overall dynamics of Northeast Asia, extending beyond the bilateral dimension. Without fully considering the implications of Korea-Japan relations for relations with the U.S., China, Russia, and North Korea, a balanced response cannot be achieved. By addressing Korea-Japan relations with a complex perspective that takes into account the changing trends in the overall Northeast Asian landscape, more effective policies can be implemented.

Ninth, in the same vein, South Korea must strengthen its role as a facilitator to further accelerate regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. It is true that the deterioration of Japan-China relations has made the holding of a trilateral summit between Korea, Japan, and China uncertain this year, creating difficult circumstances for trilateral cooperation. However, the South Korean government must redouble its diplomatic efforts to serve as a bridge, ensuring that the deterioration of bilateral relations does not affect trilateral cooperation. This is because there is no task more important than regional cooperation in Northeast Asia for the peaceful management of the power transition process in the region.

Korea-Japan relations are currently at a critical juncture, deciding whether to move forward or retreat. However, there is no shortcut to rapidly restoring Korea-Japan relations. The governments and peoples of both countries must quickly break the vicious cycle of emotional confrontation and maintain a cool-headed stance based on mutual respect and the strategic interests of both nations. The wisdom and action to seize the current crisis in Korea-Japan relations as an important opportunity to create a new paradigm for 21st-century bilateral ties are more urgently needed than ever before. ■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is financially supported by the MacArthur Foundation. [EAI Commentary] aims to provide in-depth analysis and practical alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting [EAI Commentary].