[EAI Commentary] Embedded Transformational Leadership: A Study of Yasuhiro Nakasone's Political Leadership

EAI Japan Studies Panel Report No. 7

Author

Choi Hee-sik, Assistant Professor, School of International Studies, Kookmin University. He graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in Political Science and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from Keio University, Japan. His recent publications include "The Normalization of Relations between Korea and Japan as History II: Decolonization" (co-authored), "Rethinking ROK-Japan Relations during the Park Chung-hee Era" (co-authored), "A Study on the Formation Process of the Concept of Open Regionalism in Japan," "Problems and Solutions of the Bicameral System in the Stalemate of Japan's Divided Diet," "Japan's Post-War Asian Diplomacy Strategy: From an Internal to an External Approach," and "The Structure of Post-War ROK-Japan Relations and ROK-Japan Relations under the Democratic Party Government."

I. Introduction

The parliamentary cabinet system, which was expected to foster strong leadership through 'institutional effects' like the British Westminster model, has exhibited the opposite phenomenon in Japan. This was due to the decentralization of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) caused by factional politics, the underdeveloped functions of the Prime Minister's Official Residence, and the constraints on the Prime Minister's leadership imposed by bureaucratic politics, the influence of 'zoku giin' (career politicians), and the LDP's preliminary legal review system. While strong leadership was indeed exercised in politicized foreign policy issues such as the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty under the Kishi cabinet, the return of Okinawa under the Sato cabinet, and the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China under the Tanaka cabinet, the general view is that the political leadership of Japanese prime ministers in the post-war era has been characterized by 'weak' leadership (Ito Mitsutoshi 2007; Tatebayashi Masahiko 2007; Lee Won-deok 2007).

In contrast, Yasuhiro Nakasone (中曽根康弘) demonstrated strong leadership, earning him the moniker 'Presidential Prime Minister.' His cabinet brought about significant changes in both domestic politics and foreign policy, including the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the abolition of the GNP 1% limit on defense spending, and the exceptional application of the Three Principles on Arms Exports to the United States. This was the first time since the Yoshida cabinet that such substantial shifts had occurred. Given that there were no fundamental changes in the institutional factors that constrain the leadership of a prime minister, how was it possible for Nakasone, who hailed from a minor faction, to exert strong leadership? This is the central question of this paper.

Previous research has emphasized three aspects. First, it highlights Nakasone's personal qualities. For example, his rhetorical politics, adept at performance, and his exceptional political acumen honed through navigating factional politics as a member of a minor faction are identified as causes of his strong leadership. Second, the behavioral aspects of Nakasone's leadership are cited as major causes, including his utilization of factional politics through council politics (or advisory politics, brain politics), alliances with influential factions, and co-optation of key figures within the party, as well as his use of 'zoku giin' and the construction of 'influence coalitions.' Third, it emphasizes the congruence between structural factors and his political ideology. The argument is that his strong leadership was enabled by the alignment of his neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies with the global trend and the domestic trend of fiscal and administrative reform.

However, this paper proposes the perspective that his leadership was an 'embedded transformational leadership,' which exhibited a reformist drive to transform the existing system while simultaneously being embedded within it. This allowed him to avoid direct confrontation with the existing system and, instead, leverage specific aspects of the existing framework to ensure policy implementation.

Political leadership is generally classified into reform leadership and revolutionary leadership based on its political objectives. James MacGregor Burns categorized the relationship between leaders and followers in political leadership into transactional leadership and transformational leadership. According to Burns, reform and revolutionary leadership correspond to transformational leadership, as they aim to achieve political goals by unifying followers through the leader's charisma, intellectual stimulation, and other means (Burns 1979, 169-240). However, this paper focuses on analyzing the political objectives and ideology rather than the relationship between leaders and followers. Therefore, transformational leadership is defined here as political leadership that seeks to achieve systemic transformation, encompassing both reform and revolutionary leadership.

Fundamentally, transformational leadership inherently possesses a resonance outside the system, as it seeks to reform the system itself. Consequently, this often leads to direct confrontation with the existing system and failure due to multifaceted opposition (Jang Dal-joong 2007). Nakasone's leadership, however, as will be discussed later, was deeply rooted in the existing system he sought to transform, and possessed a strong tendency to sow seeds of change through it. A prime example is his acknowledgment of the value of 'international liberalism,' cultivated by the post-war system, while simultaneously negating the post-war system itself and seeking to utilize that value. Thus, his leadership was transformational yet also possessed the flexibility to utilize the system itself.

This embedded transformational leadership differs from the 'restorationism' that Tetsuo Najita used to describe Japanese political leadership. Restorationism, in reaction to 'bureaucratism,' is closer to an idealism that sought radical transformation of the existing system based on cultural idealism or retrogressivism (Najita T. 1992, 19-35). While Nakasone's political ideology did contain strong elements of idealism and retrogressivism, such as a return to tradition, it differed in that it lacked the radicalism to completely negate and dismantle the existing system due to a dual evaluation of the existing system, and instead sought to leverage its positive aspects.

At the same time, embedded transformational leadership is distinct from 'realist idealism' or 'opportunism.' Realist idealism merely involves adjusting the priority and intensity of reform to realize idealistic policy content, making it vulnerable to challenges from both forces that absolutize idealism and those that oppose it. Opportunism, lacking a firm policy ideology, involves ambivalent responses to conflicting policies, thus lacking reformist character. In contrast, embedded transformational leadership fully actualizes reformist character through a systematic reform agenda, while its dual evaluation of the target of transformation provides the flexibility to encompass both reformist and opposing factions or to mitigate their challenges.

This paper argues that 'embedded transformational leadership' is a key characteristic of Nakasone's political leadership and that this attribute enabled strong policy implementation. It is not denied that domestic and international structural and institutional factors in the 1980s were significant contributors to strengthening Nakasone's political leadership. What this paper aims to point out is that even these structural factors could be transformed into a basis for strong leadership due to 'embedded transformational leadership.' This is because leadership is what transforms situational variables such as structure and institutions into resources of power (Samuels 2003, 6).

II. The Post-War System and Nakasone: Nakasone's Leadership in Terms of Political Ideology

Japan's 'post-war system' was built upon two pillars: the pacifist constitution and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The pacifist constitution, a product of the so-called 'Yalta System,' served as an institution guaranteeing the demilitarization and democratization policies of the initial occupation. In contrast, the 'asymmetrical' Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, premised on the stationing of large numbers of U.S. forces in Japan involved in East Asian security and the U.S. acquisition of administrative rights over Okinawa, was a product of the 'Cold War system' and served as a mechanism guaranteeing Japan's 'base country' status in support of U.S. East Asian policy (Nam Ki-jung 2001; Pyle 2007, 372-381).

In this sense, the conservative-progressive confrontation structure, known as the '1955 System,' can be seen as having internalized the post-war system domestically within Japan (Dower 1993, 4-5). Indeed, the progressive forces grew within the demilitarization and democratization policies of the U.S. occupation, represented by the pacifist constitution, and conversely, made the protection of this pacifist constitution their most important political objective. Conversely, the conservative forces succeeded in regaining their footing within the 'reverse course' represented by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and, in turn, made anti-communism and liberalism their core policy values. In this sense, the 1955 System was the domestic political structure that sustained the post-war system.

Concurrently, the 'Yoshida Doctrine,' a policy reflection of the post-war system, became established with key elements of security dependence on the United States, limited rearmament, and economic mercantilism. The Yoshida Doctrine had a strong aspect of being an 'unavoidable choice' aimed at securing political stability by absorbing the policy orientations of the progressive groups within the conservative-progressive confrontation structure. In other words, the Yoshida Doctrine was a policy choice aimed at reconciling the contradictions between the pacifist constitution and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Soeya Yoshihide 2005, 32-35).

This post-war system became a target of attack for the right-wing forces within the LDP. To them, the post-war system appeared as imposed democracy and a loss of subjectivity. Consequently, their activities focused on revising the constitution and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, aiming directly at the collapse of the post-war system. However, the efforts of the Hatoyama and Kishi groups in this regard encountered the solid wall of the post-war system and tended to converge towards the Yoshida Doctrine. This was because the two elements constituting the post-war system were so firmly internalized by the 1955 System that reforming them was nearly impossible (Iokibe Makoto 2010, 290-291).

Nakasone also sought to dismantle the post-war system by advocating for constitutional revision and self-reliant defense. However, Nakasone's political orientation, based on a dual evaluation of the pacifist constitution and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, allowed him to secure a high degree of flexibility.

In the 1940s and 1950s, Nakasone advocated for the complete negation of the pacifist constitution and the establishment of a sovereign constitution. However, by the 1960s, he clearly expressed high regard for the fundamental values of the pacifist constitution, such as pacifism and democracy, and committed to their inheritance. What he questioned was that the constitution, representing the collective will of the people, was enacted due to American 'coercion,' leading to a loss of Japanese subjectivity. Simultaneously, the possession of military forces and the right to wage war, negated by the constitution, undermined Japan's subjectivity by making its security dependent on the United States (He Liqun 2005, 133-134). Therefore, when public opposition to constitutional revision was high, constitutional revision faded as a long-term goal, and the values of the pacifist constitution could be emphasized to appease the criticism from progressive forces. Conversely, when the atmosphere was deemed ripe, it served as a concrete policy objective.

Nakasone's advocacy for self-reliant defense in the 1950s and 1960s involved substantial reduction of U.S. forces in Japan and the establishment of an alliance comparable to the Anglo-American alliance, even suggesting the possibility of independent power consolidation. However, through his experience as Director-General of the Defense Agency in the 1970s, his stance shifted towards a Japan-U.S. security burden-sharing framework premised on the presence of U.S. forces in Japan (Nakajima Takuma 2002; Nakajima Takuma 2005). This was due to his dual evaluation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. He recognized the Japan-U.S. alliance as a 'value alliance' sharing fundamental values, which was crucial for Japan. However, he was concerned that Japan's autonomy would be undermined by complete dependence on the United States for its security. Therefore, his advocacy for self-reliant defense could function as an active Japan-U.S. cooperation line emphasizing Japan's role-sharing, and simultaneously, due to his nationalistic tendencies, it possessed a logical structure that could be transformed into a strategy of 'relative positioning of the Japan-U.S. alliance' or a strategy for Japan's 'independent power consolidation.'... (continued)