[EAI Commentary No. 24] The Future of the Kim Jong-un Regime and South Korea's Strategy: A Full-fledged Pursuit of Coevolution Strategy

North Korea in 20 Years: 2032

The year 2012 marks the beginning of the "Strong and Prosperous Nation" era led by Kim Jong-un, following the end of the Kim Jong-il regime. For the past 17 years, North Korea under Kim Jong-il adhered to the nuclear-military-first ideology and its own brand of socialism, seeking regime survival and security. However, this resulted in international isolation, economic hardship, and excessive dependence on China. It was a lost 17 years. While the short-term future of North Korea following Kim Jong-il's sudden death is naturally a subject of interest, it is more crucial to consider what preparations are needed for North Korea at least 20 years from now.

The Kim Jong-un regime, launching in 2012, will inevitably maintain strong continuity with the Kim Jong-il regime due to the urgent need for domestic political stability. It will pursue regime security through continued nuclear possession, seek economic benefits through nuclear negotiations, and attempt to gain political legitimacy by promoting economic recovery under the banner of a "strong and prosperous nation." However, the Kim Jong-un regime will soon face unavoidable contradictions. Security through nuclear weapons will lead to international isolation and economic difficulties, and these economic challenges will precipitate a comprehensive regime crisis for the Kim Jong-un regime, which has a fragile basis for legitimacy. This presents a triple dilemma where domestic politics, diplomacy, and the economy mutually hinder each other.

Going forward, the Kim Jong-un regime must handle current issues with a long-term strategy encompassing three phases to be reborn as a new North Korea that keeps pace with 21st-century civilization and international changes. Phase 1 is the phase of seeking policy transition. During the period of ruling by legacy, a strategic choice must be made to abandon nuclear weapons and shift from a military-first to an economy-first policy. This is a difficult decision but also an opportunity to prove Kim Jong-un's leadership domestically and internationally. The next ten years will be Phase 2, the phase of implementation and reform. In this phase, which requires walking a new path of evolution toward peaceful development on the foundation of a guiding leader regime, the assistance of South Korea and the international community is absolutely essential. We must guide North Korea away from its obsession with excessive security through nuclear weapons towards a path of denuclearized security, while simultaneously working together to craft a blueprint for North Korean-style reform and opening.

We must move beyond focusing on short-term changes in North Korea or pursuing a path of unilateral evolution that demands decisions from only one side—North Korea, South Korea, or the international community. It is time to recognize the holistic nature of the North Korean issue and seek a path of coevolution, sharing a grand vision for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia.

The Kim Jong-un Regime: Stagnation Without Evolution

In 2012, North Korea is demonstrating the appearance of a prepared regime transition. The New Year's joint editorial, "Let Us Make 2012, the Year of Glorious Victory, a Flourishing Era of Strong and Prosperous Nation Building, Following the Legacy of the Great Leader Kim Jong-il," indicates that the Kim Jong-un regime, ruling by legacy, intends to resolve domestic political, economic, social, cultural, and military issues, as well as inter-Korean and international affairs, based on his father's military-first ideology.

Following Kim Jong-il's death, Kim Jong-un (28) has already shown leadership as a dual commander, leading the party centered around figures like Jang Song-thaek (65), Director of the Administrative Department; Kim Kyong-hui (65), Member of the Politburo; Choe Ryong-hae (62), Member of the Central Military Commission; Kim Ki-nam (85), Secretary; and Choe Thae-bok (81), Secretary. He has also demonstrated command over the military, centered around figures such as Ri Yong-ho (69), Chief of the General Staff; Kim Kyong-gak (70), First Vice Director of the General Political Bureau; Kim Yong-chun (76), Minister of People's Armed Forces; and O Kuk-ryol (69), First Vice Director of the State Security Department. On December 29, at the central memorial service, he was designated "the Respected Comrade, Vice Chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Military Commission and the Supreme Leader of the Workers' Party of Korea, the State, and the Army." On December 30, the Political Bureau of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Committee appointed him Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army "in accordance with the October 8th legacy of Kim Jong-il." Furthermore, Kim Yong-nam's eulogy officially formalized the succession system and its central objectives, stating, "We will uphold Comrade Kim Jong-un as another General, the Supreme Leader, and complete the cause of the military-first revolution and the construction of a strong socialist nation to the end." North Korea's political trajectory since Kim Jong-il's death suggests that the Kim Jong-un regime is exhibiting short-term stability and that Kim Jong-un's power base is more solid than anticipated.

The Kim Jong-un regime will focus on consolidating its power base by leveraging the "rule by Kim Jong-il's legacy" as its primary political asset. After Kim Il-sung's death in 1994, North Korea also spent three years promoting "rule by Kim Il-sung's legacy" to strengthen Kim Jong-il's power base. Given the inherent limitations of a third-generation succession, the Kim Jong-un regime, under the banner of "rule by Kim Jong-il's legacy" officially proclaimed in the New Year's joint editorial, has no choice but to start with the continuation rather than a shift away from Kim Jong-il's military-first policy. This is because the Kim Jong-un regime has not yet secured the political forces and leadership necessary to manage the socio-economic turmoil that would result from a rapid policy change.

Due to its relatively weak power base, the Kim Jong-un regime must accommodate both the military, which holds hardline stances towards the South, and the existing elite groups. Even if there is a will for reform and opening, it is impossible without domestic confidence. While recognized as the successor within the ruling elite, stability cannot be secured without the support of the general populace. This is why the joint editorial this year presented the slogan "Let us do more good things for the people!" and emphasized that "all work must be done in accordance with the will and interests of the people" and that "the convenience of the people must be prioritized and considered absolute." Therefore, it maintains a rigid stance in inter-Korean and foreign relations to secure military control and domestic stability. The prolonged stalemate in inter-Korean relations after Kim Il-sung's death in 1994 was significantly influenced by the vicious cycle of the Kim Young-sam administration's North Korea policy, which did not recognize the Kim Jong-il regime, and the Kim Jong-il regime's rigid inter-Korean policy. The Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, North Korea's inter-Korean affairs body, declared on December 25 last year that it would use the South Korean government's attitude regarding condolences as a benchmark for future inter-Korean policy and strongly criticized South Korea's limited expression of sympathy in the New Year's joint editorial. However, it is unlikely that the Kim Jong-un regime will attempt physical conflict or military tension escalation between the two Koreas. China, North Korea's absolute supporter for regime stability, has been strongly restraining North Korea's provocative policies since late 2010. Domestically, North Korea must focus on celebratory events such as the 70th anniversary of Kim Jong-il's birth on February 16, 2012, and the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung's birth on April 15, following a national mourning period, thus requiring a stable environment.

The issue is the next step North Korea will take after achieving short-term stability. During the Kim Jong-il era, Kim Il-sung's legacy and directives served as limited assets for 17 years, but in the Kim Jong-un era, Kim Jong-il's directives are unlikely to be an invincible weapon to protect him. The period until 2015 (the 70th anniversary of the Party's founding), when the official period of ruling by legacy (three years of mourning) expires, will be crucial for determining whether the Kim Jong-un regime will face North Korea's reality and embark on a path of Kim Jong-un-style policy to ensure its long-term survival. Will North Korea truly evolve?

The Impending Hardships and Strategic Crossroads for North Korea

As long as the Kim Jong-un regime continues the Kim Jong-il regime based on ruling by legacy, the triple dilemma cannot be resolved. The tasks of securing domestic political legitimacy, resolving diplomatic issues through the denuclearization of North Korea, and addressing economic hardship are intertwined in a contradictory manner. The 17 years of the Kim Jong-il regime demonstrated that it is impossible to maintain the leader-centered system while resolving economic difficulties with nuclear weapons. The Kim Jong-il regime believed that nuclear possession was necessary to maintain the leader-centered system, but nuclear possession accelerated economic hardship. If nuclear weapons were abandoned to resolve economic difficulties, the maintenance of the leader-centered system would become difficult. The pursuit of excessive security beyond an appropriate level through nuclear weapons resulted in a failure of ideal asset allocation. Currently, if nuclear weapons are abandoned and reform and opening are pursued to resolve economic difficulties, the dictatorial leader-centered system itself will face a crisis.

In 2012, the Kim Jong-un regime will pursue political legitimacy by inheriting the military-first policy, but this will only yield short-term results. Firstly, international pressure, including the North Korean nuclear issue, will intensify. North Korea has precariously endured the contradictory situation of continuing to possess nuclear weapons while simultaneously pursuing nuclear negotiations. This is because it could not give up the allure of both security provided by nuclear weapons and economic assistance offered in exchange for denuclearization. However, this will no longer be possible. The regime will become more vulnerable, and the consequences of economic failure will be more devastating. Due to various reasons, including North Korea's need to continue nuclear negotiations and China's desire for stability on the peninsula, North Korea will have no choice but to return to the negotiating table. While the United States and the international community are currently prioritizing stable power transition, they will gradually intensify their demands for North Korea's adherence to its denuclearization commitments.

Secondly, a full-blown economic crisis will emerge, posing a threat to the regime and the system. It is evident that North Korea's economy, without substantial external support, will not be able to provide the economic resources to maintain Kim Jong-un's legitimacy, let alone achieve a "strong and prosperous nation." The current market economy in North Korea, where the rationing system has failed, is likely to emerge as a threat to regime security, akin to nuclear weapons. In such circumstances, the legacy of nuclear possession and military-first policy will not revive the economy but rather increase popular discontent and the potential emergence of opposing forces capitalizing on it.

Furthermore, external economic assistance must lead to reform and opening to ensure long-term stability. China, a strong pillar of support for the Kim Jong-un regime, is already exerting increasing pressure for reform and opening. Politically, Kim Jong-un needs to discover achievements distinct from his grandfather's "self-reliance" and his father's "nuclear-military-first" policy to usher in his own era, and this can only be "development and growth." The adjustment of the military-first policy, which prioritizes excessive security, is inevitable for the development of light industry and the improvement of people's livelihoods, which North Korea has emphasized for several years. However, reform and opening will bring about reform and opening in North Korean society, and the ultimate question will be whether the dictatorship can withstand this and how it will transform from a dictatorial leader to an enlightened leader accordingly. Ultimately, the Kim Jong-un regime will face a crossroads of strategic choice: either choose the path of a second military-first policy and face the tragedy of a "vegetative state," or cautiously begin to walk the path of North Korean-style reform and opening.

The Necessity of Initiating South Korea's Coevolution Strategy

Starting in 2012, South Korea needs to carefully observe the leadership change in North Korea and establish thorough short-, medium-, and long-term plans. The current administration must refine its policy package for the year within the framework of a long-term strategy, laying the groundwork for the next administration. Candidates for the presidential election must engage in fierce policy competition to establish a bipartisan North Korea policy paradigm that transcends domestic politics. For the 2010s, where the dichotomy of the Sunshine Policy versus strict engagement policy, and progressivism versus conservatism, is no longer viable, a third policy alternative must be developed, and every effort must be made to prevent public opinion from being divided by internal conflict.

The core of the strategic message to be immediately presented to North Korea is that North Korea's strategic decisions are crucial for its survival and development, as well as for a new governance form on the Korean Peninsula and inter-Korean integration. South Korea will coevolve to support North Korea's vision of advancement and persuade the international community. The primary recipients of this message will be the key figures of the Kim Jong-un regime, but in the medium to long term, it will be all reformist and open forces within North Korea seeking coevolution with South Korea and the international community. We must present a concrete blueprint of a future Korean Peninsula where coexistence and cooperation are possible to the North Korean leadership and populace, who are trapped by the experience of a leader-centered system and closed-door socialism and cannot see the path to the future.

In the medium term, South Korea needs to anticipate the triple dilemma North Korea will face and develop policy alternatives to resolve it. First and foremost is the North Korean nuclear issue. Recognizing that the North Korean nuclear issue is a political problem related to North Korea's overall survival, we must strive to provide security assurances for the North Korean regime while creating conditions for denuclearization. Taking advantage of Kim Jong-il's death, the Six-Party Talks should function as an international framework not only for the North Korean nuclear issue but also for discussing and managing the increasingly uncertain North Korean situation as a whole. A more forward-looking and proactive approach to the Six-Party Talks could be considered, on a separate track from inter-Korean relations improvements, such as North Korea's apology for the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents. Beyond the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue, a strategy for a peace regime is also necessary. To date, the peace regime has not reached an agreement because the South and the North have tactically responded to peace regime talks under different strategies. In particular, North Korea has conventionally demanded the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella commitment, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, and the demarcation of the western sea boundary in peace regime talks. However, the strategic objective North Korea seeks to achieve through these peace regime tactics must now fundamentally change. In a situation where survival is impossible without fundamental evolution in North Korea, the peace regime must be recognized as a breakthrough of a new dimension.

South Korea also needs to adopt a strategic approach, moving away from viewing peace regime negotiations as merely a pretext for North Korea to avoid denuclearization, and instead utilizing them as an opportunity for the Kim Jong-un regime to choose a development model of "moving away from military-first and towards economy-first." We must persuade North Korea with patience and sincerity that nuclear weapons are not the way to ensure the safety of its regime and system. We must also convince them that North Korea can achieve security for its regime and system within a complex security network involving South and North Korea, the U.S. and China, Japan and Russia, and even the UN, and that by abandoning nuclear weapons, it can realize the dream of becoming an "economic powerhouse" that Chairman Kim Jong-il could not fulfill, through large-scale international support. Ultimately, true peace and coexistence on the Korean Peninsula will only come about when a peace regime at the Korean Peninsula level, an agreement between the U.S. and China guaranteeing North Korea's survival, and a peace regime at the Northeast Asian level operate in conjunction.

Once the medium-term objectives are achieved, we can aim for a North Korea that is not only normalized but also advanced in the long term. This is a path that North Korea cannot discern or tread on its own. It must transform from a leader-centered system to a democratic system and become a nation that leads the international community. Only then can the North and South advance together in building a peaceful and coexisting Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. North Korea must transform into a 21st-century nation grounded in knowledge, culture, environment, and economy, rather than a "strong and prosperous nation."

For the Evolution of International Strategies Towards North Korea

North Korea's future is intertwined with the international politics of Northeast Asia. The emerging architecture of East Asia cannot be separated from the blueprint for the future of the Korean Peninsula. While South Korea may not yet be the primary architect of the East Asian structure in which we will live, it must emerge as a middle power that influences the overall regional design by taking the lead in designing one part: the Korean Peninsula. A new North Korea presents an opportunity and a test case for solidifying South Korea's diplomatic standing within the regional framework, as well as determining the fate of the Korean Peninsula.

The most crucial variable determining the future of the Korean Peninsula for at least the next decade will be the U.S.-China relationship. The Korean Peninsula, and particularly the new North Korea, is a stage for the competition and conflict between the rising China and the U.S., which is entering a relative decline; between China's desire to make East Asia a core area for peaceful development and the U.S.'s determination to stake everything on East Asia as a stage for regaining hegemony. The intense conflict between the U.S. and China in 2010 was temporarily resolved with the U.S.-China summit in January 2011. The U.S. respected China's core interests, and China acknowledged the U.S.'s engagement policy in East Asia. However, since immediately after the summit, the U.S.'s East Asia strategy has been gradually taking shape. It is strengthening relations with Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia, and Myanmar, and raising its voice in East Asian multilateralism through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the East Asia Summit (EAS). It is emphasizing bilateral alliance strengthening with South Korea and Japan, as well as trilateral cooperation among the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. This is a redesign of East Asia's security and economic architecture.

China is also keenly watching these U.S. moves and seeking to counter them. The newly changing North Korea will become a site where the U.S. and China cautiously clash. Both the U.S. and China initially desire the status quo but will react sensitively to changes in North Korea that lean drastically in one direction. In particular, China will remain vigilant about the future of North Korea transforming into a frontline base for containing China, falling under the influence of South Korea and the U.S.

Since Kim Jong-il's death, both the U.S. and China have adopted a wait-and-see attitude, hoping for the status quo, while cautiously sketching out their desired visions for North Korea. From the outset, China sent messages of "clear and decisive" support for Kim Jong-un (Global Times, December 20, 2011), and all nine members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party visited North Korea to confirm their strong support for the Kim Jong-un regime. The U.S., while reaffirming its support for stability on the Korean Peninsula and its ally South Korea, is focusing on a stable power transition in North Korea. Subsequent U.S. statements have set its North Korea policy priorities in the following order: stable power transition in North Korea, adherence to denuclearization commitments, improvement of relations with neighboring countries, and improvement of human rights and livelihoods for North Korean residents.

South Korea's opportunistic moves along the direct line of U.S.-China competition are bound to fail. South Korea must be able to persuade both countries, and all members of East Asia, that when the U.S. and China stubbornly adhere to their own architectural blueprints and clash, it harms everyone. South Korea must discover opportunities within the gaps of new visions as a middle power amidst the grand architecture of great powers and establish a policy system that draws together the discourse and logic surrounding North Korea's future, as well as the evolution of North Korea and international strategies towards it.

South Korea will immediately be asked about the content of its long-term strategy for North Korea under the Kim Jong-un regime in consultations with the U.S. and Japan, fierce negotiations within the Six-Party Talks, and the upcoming South Korea-China summit this month. The future of North Korea that South Korea desires shares many commonalities with what the U.S. and China want: a normalized, advanced North Korea that abandons nuclear weapons, pursues reform and opening, and contributes to regional development in the long term. The issue lies in concrete and realistic detailed policies to achieve this, the ability to coordinate the interests of surrounding countries, and strong international cooperation to prevent North Korea policy from being dictated by the domestic politics of each country. North Korea's 2012 New Year's joint editorial's emphasis on the importance of North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia relations is not coincidental. It suggests that the Kim Jong-un regime intends to leverage the U.S.-China competition in building the East Asian architecture. Even if the Six-Party Talks resume soon, North Korea's denuclearization will not progress easily unless the strategic interests of the involved parties are properly coordinated. Honest dialogue between South Korea and China on North Korea policy is urgently needed if we are not to leave the future of North Korea and the Korean Peninsula to the politics of great powers.

The steps South Korea takes forward will have an immense impact on the future Korean Peninsula and the region. Recognizing the importance of this rare opportunity, we must harmonize South Korea's strategy towards North Korea, its strategy to lead international policy towards North Korea, and its efforts regarding the new East Asian architecture, and systematically realize the blueprint for a coevolutionary policy towards North Korea. ■

Chairperson

Ha Young-sun (Seoul National University)

Member

Kim Sung-bae (Institute for National Security Strategy)

Lee Sook-jong (Director, EAI, Sungkyunkwan University)

Jeon Jae-sung (Seoul National University)

Cho Dong-ho (Ewha Womans University)

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has been selected as a core research institution for the MacArthur Foundation's 'Asia Security Initiative' program and is receiving financial support. [EAI Commentary] seeks to provide in-depth analysis and relevant alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. When citing [EAI Commentary], please be sure to acknowledge the source.