[EAI Commentary] The Current State and Future Tasks of a Comprehensive Strategy Toward North Korea

[Editor's Note]

Amid North Korea's declaration of intent to 'break through' the difficulties it faces through the report of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, the United States continues to adhere to the fundamental principle of global order management, nuclear non-proliferation, and harbors distrust regarding North Korea's denuclearization. Consequently, no solution to the North Korean denuclearization issue is yet in sight. Furthermore, the North Korean nuclear issue is not limited to a simple bilateral North Korea-U.S. relationship but is a multilateral issue involving major stakeholders. To resolve such a multilateral issue, it is crucial for South Korea to establish its role and pursue its strategies. EAI experts analyze that South Korea must implement a balanced strategy of sanctions, deterrence, engagement, and internal transformation without leaning to one side.

This commentary is primarily authored by Baek Jin-kyung, EAI Research Fellow, and Jeon Jae-seong, Director of the EAI Center for International Relations and Professor at Seoul National University, based on discussions held at the [Global NK NuclearinSIDE Talk] 2020 East Asia Institute Forum on North Korea and Unification Strategy, held on January 21, 2020.

In early 2020, Chairman Kim Jong-un, through the report of the 5th Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, which replaced the New Year's address, declared his intention to 'break through' the dual difficulties of the domestic economy and the international security situation. Regarding denuclearization, he asserted that he would not make concessions, advocating for 'first, the withdrawal of hostile policies, then, the resumption of dialogue.' The United States has strengthened its resolve to uphold the fundamental principle of global order management, nuclear non-proliferation, and still harbors deep distrust of North Korea's willingness to denuclearize. The possibility of acknowledging North Korea's strategic stance of maintaining minimal nuclear deterrence, which North Korea inwardly desires, is slim.

Chairman Kim Jong-un aims to secure regime guarantees, sanctions relief, and a reduction of U.S. forces from President Trump after completing nuclear missiles capable of threatening the U.S. mainland. Following the achievement of these goals, he plans to pursue reform and opening through improved external relations via phased denuclearization. President Trump's primary objective is to achieve denuclearization through a 'Big Deal' and to showcase diplomatic achievements in the upcoming presidential election. With the strategies of President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un being key variables for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, North Korea demanded a change in the U.S.'s calculation by the end of 2019, but the deadline has passed, and it remains difficult to find common ground between the two countries to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.

The issue of North Korean denuclearization is a multilateral issue involving major stakeholders, not confined to a bilateral North Korea-U.S. relationship. The stalemate in North Korea-U.S. negotiations has also led to stagnation in inter-Korean relations, acting as an obstacle to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. President Moon Jae-in aims for the parallel and phased realization of Korean Peninsula denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime, while actively pursuing inter-Korean dialogue and avoiding war, and is acting as a mediator in North Korea-U.S. negotiations. The North Korean nuclear issue is a critical matter for China, requiring a response beyond the Korean Peninsula and within the framework of its policy toward the U.S. For President Xi Jinping, progress in denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime are favorable for reducing U.S. military presence. While President Xi Jinping complies with UN Security Council resolutions, he simultaneously plays the role of a patron to Chairman Kim Jong-un and shows vigilance against the expansion of U.S. influence in North Korea.

As it is difficult for both North Korea and the U.S. to expect unilateral concessions, it is virtually impossible to ease economic sanctions against North Korea, which has put forth a new 'frontal breakthrough line.' Economic sanctions imposed on North Korea have negatively impacted its economic growth rate for several years, inflicting a massive trade deficit and severe export weakening on North Korea, which has a high trade dependency. Although North Korea is showing upward trends in trade with China, infrastructure development, and tourism and service industries through self-reliance efforts, there will be limitations to its economic growth requiring high growth over a long period if economic sanctions are not eased. If economic sanctions against North Korea continue, foreign exchange reserves could plummet, leading to a foreign exchange crisis, despite internal efforts, and a sustained decrease in exports could significantly impact the North Korean market. Looking at the past experiences of socialist countries like Hungary and the Soviet Union, it is evident that North Korea cannot reap the benefits of reform and opening through policy changes alone while maintaining its legal system and framework. To resolve the immediate problems facing North Korea, it is impossible to rely solely on nuclear deterrence and self-reliance efforts; economic sanctions relief and reform and opening, which North Korea can achieve through complete denuclearization, are essential.

To resolve the denuclearization issue, efforts should be made to support North Korea's self-help initiatives while encouraging the international community to adopt a more proactive engagement policy toward North Korea. Attention should be paid to North Korea's persistent efforts to exclude South Korea, which is currently seeking to play the role of mediator or facilitator, from the negotiation table. 'Uriminzokkiri,' a North Korean propaganda outlet, emphasized on July 2019 that 'it is self-evident that South Korea has no need to interfere in the discussions between the two countries on pending issues, nor would it have anything to do if it did,' and North Korea mentioned a 'special communication channel' between the leaders of North Korea and the U.S. on January 11. In this reality, establishing South Korea's role and pursuing its strategies are important to become a successful player in the North Korean denuclearization game.

To this end, close cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. is necessary. The Trump administration is likely to respond more passively to the North Korean issue or focus on short-term interests due to the upcoming election and the unstable situation in the Middle East, including the Iran issue. The South Korean government still considers improving inter-Korean relations a top priority, and this difference in perception between South Korea and the U.S. could lead to ineffective responses to North Korea's future actions. The South Korean and U.S. governments must reaffirm the goals of their North Korea policies and thoroughly prepare for multidimensional, comprehensive cooperation on a broader diplomatic front. Given the clear structural vulnerabilities in North Korea-U.S. negotiations, methods for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue as a common goal should be devised through efforts such as multilateral negotiations among major stakeholders, and efforts should be made to break the stalemate in North Korea-U.S. negotiations and actively promote dialogue between the two countries.

The Trump administration's North Korea policy is likely to focus on short-term interests, and the South Korean government's North Korea policy also faces difficulties in responding flexibly according to North Korea's positions and strategies. The South Korean government's North Korea policy has undergone changes since its inception. These include the 'nuclear freeze as the entry point, denuclearization as the exit' proposed during the presidential campaign, the 'comprehensive agreement followed by phased implementation' presented from April to June 2018, and the 'proactive corresponding measures toward North Korea' newly proposed since October 2019. For the resolution of the unpredictable North Korean nuclear issue, a consistent and systematic North Korea strategy is essential; without such a strategy, successful outcomes in the North Korean denuclearization game cannot be achieved. At this juncture, South Korea and the United States must cooperate to develop realistic and concrete mid- to long-term strategies, including the definition, goals, end state, and corresponding measures for denuclearization.

A systematic North Korea strategy must not be one-sided and should be implemented in a complex and balanced manner, encompassing sanctions, deterrence, engagement, and internal transformation. First, it is inevitable to continue implementing economic sanctions toward North Korea that are both effective and conducive to dialogue. To this end, it is necessary to prepare a mid- to long-term sanctions roadmap and foster consensus domestically and internationally. Simultaneously, South Korea must establish a security posture to counter North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, actively utilize the deterrence system through the rotational deployment of U.S. strategic assets, and expedite the establishment of the Korean-style '3-axis system' (preemptive strike system, missile defense system, and mass punishment and retaliation system). Engagement is also a core strategy alongside sanctions and deterrence; realistic plans for establishing a complex peace regime and supporting North Korea's denuclearization, economic development, and the 'new military development line' should be devised. Efforts for North Korea's voluntary internal transformation and development should not be overlooked. Finally, South Korea, in solidarity with the international community, must help North Korea overcome its current difficulties through a new 'frontal breakthrough' instead of the 'frontal breakthrough' it claims, thereby enabling North Korea to stand on its own and forge its own path.

■ Author: Baek Jin-kyung_ EAI Research Fellow. She holds a Master's degree in International Relations from the University of Warwick, UK. She is currently responsible for the establishment and operation of 'Global North Korea,' an English comprehensive website on comprehensive strategies toward North Korea, as a research fellow in charge of North Korea and security research at EAI. Her main research areas include North Korean studies, international relations, and international security. Her recent publications include 'North Korea's Biological and Chemical Weapons and the Path to Complete Denuclearization' (2019, EAI Commentary/Global NK Commentary) and 'Policy Directions for Promoting Engagement with North Korea for the Realization of a Peaceful and Prosperous Korean Peninsula' (2019, EAI Issue Briefing/Global NK Commentary).

■ Author: Jeon Jae-seong_ Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies and Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University, USA, and serves as a policy advisor for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, history of international relations, ROK-U.S. alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major books and edited works include 'Threats of War and Peace Between South and North Korea' (co-authored), 'Is Politics Moral?', and 'East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory'.

■ Managed and Edited by: Baek Jin-kyung EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) j.baek@eai.or.kr

[EAI Commentary] is a commentary series planned to provide a forum for experts in various fields to present in-depth analyses and policy recommendations on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not affiliated with EAI and solely represent the views of the individual author.