Special Commentary Series for the New Year - EAI 2020 Outlook and Strategy] ③ China-ROK Relations and South Korea's Foreign Policy Strategy toward China

Editor's Note

To mark the year 2020, EAI is publishing a series of six special commentaries titled "EAI 2020 Outlook and Strategy."

1. Ha Young-sun: North Korea in 2020: A Breakthrough Amidst Two Major Challenges (Published January 6, 2020)

2. Chun Jae-sung: South Korea's ROK-US Relations Strategy and US Strategy in 2020 (Published January 8, 2020)

3. Lee Dong-ryul: China-ROK Relations and South Korea's Foreign Policy Strategy toward China (Published January 13, 2020)

4. Sohn Yeol: ROK-Japan Relations and Policy toward Japan in 2020: Finding Solutions to Conflict by Broadening Perspectives (Scheduled for Publication January 15, 2020)

5. Lee Seung-joo: US-China Trade Dispute and Trade Policy: Middle Power Diplomacy for the Restoration of Multilateralism and the Restructuring of Regional Economic Order (Scheduled for Publication January 20, 2020)

6. Choi Tae-wook: Electoral System Reform in 2019 and the General Election in 2020: Outlook and Tasks (Scheduled for Publication January 22, 2020)

This is the third report in the special commentary series "EAI 2020 Outlook and Strategy." It presents Lee Dong-ryul, Director of EAI's Center for Chinese Studies and Professor at Dongduk Women's University, his commentary on the outlook for China-ROK relations in 2020 and South Korea's foreign policy strategy toward China. 2020 marks the year before the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and it is a crucial year for assessing the legitimacy of the Xi Jinping-centered CPC regime. China, which has proclaimed qualitative growth, is expected to pursue stable external relations for its domestic development. However, due to the fragility of the Chinese system, it is also possible that China will adopt a hardline foreign policy on issues related to national integration and regime stability, potentially intensifying conflicts and competition with the United States. The author argues that to minimize the impact of external variables such as the fluid and uncertain US-China relations, the China-ROK relationship must be substantively strengthened. It is important to establish mechanisms that can break through impasses during conflicts and crises through this strengthening. Furthermore, the author contends that for South Korea to secure its own strategic value, it must fundamentally alter its diplomatic landscape, which is currently biased towards major powers, and expand its international network.

I. China's Domestic and Foreign Challenges and Outlook for Foreign Policy Strategy in 2020

The Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping is one year away from 2021, the centenary of the founding of the CPC and the target year for realizing the "Chinese Dream" of "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." The year 2020 is crucial for assessing the feasibility of the "two centenary goals" vision and the legitimacy of the Xi Jinping-centered CPC regime. President Xi Jinping devoted most of his 2020 New Year's address to domestic issues. He presented the "comprehensive realization of a moderately prosperous society" and "poverty alleviation" as the two major policy objectives for 2020, emphasizing a focus on qualitative growth (高質量發展). The stability and continuity of the Xi Jinping regime require the realization of concrete development achievements in 2020. However, the domestic and international environments are far from favorable to the Xi Jinping regime's development strategy. For instance, the inauguration of Tsai Ing-wen's government in Taiwan, the protests in Hong Kong, and the intensifying "beat China" competition in the US presidential election are all factors that will make it difficult for China to focus on its development strategy. Moreover, the international economic environment has not improved, and pessimistic forecasts suggest that China may struggle to maintain 6% economic growth.

Therefore, China needs to maintain stable, low-cost external relations more than ever in 2020 to achieve results by focusing on domestic development under adverse conditions. The New Year's address minimally addressed foreign strategy, signaling a policy of maintaining the status quo. Specifically, it re-emphasized existing policy initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the construction of a community of shared future for mankind. However, if the Xi Jinping regime fails to achieve the expected level of development, it may seek other achievements, such as appealing to nationalism internally and expanding its international status and influence externally, to ensure integration and regime stability. Indeed, President Xi Jinping appealed to the patriotic sentiments of the people multiple times in his New Year's address. Thus, while maintaining low-cost international relations may be the realistic choice for the Xi Jinping regime, if core issues related to regime stability, national sovereignty, and integration arise, a hardline foreign policy may become unavoidable, potentially escalating international conflicts. For example, conflicts and disputes could arise concerning the South China Sea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Particularly, if pressure on China intensifies through cooperation among Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan (re-elected due to the Hong Kong protests), Trump (facing an election), and the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement, it will become difficult for China to make flexible choices that contradict the heightened patriotism of its people, leading to international tensions and potentially intensifying conflict and competition with the United States.

II. Outlook and Tasks for China-ROK Relations in 2020

For the past two years since the resolution of the THAAD dispute in October 2017, China-ROK relations have maintained an unusually quiet state, characterized by neither significant development nor notable conflict or issues. This is a peculiar phenomenon given the rapidly unpredictable situation in East Asia, including the Korean Peninsula, and the 27-year history of dynamic development and change in China-ROK relations. Both South Korea and China are at crucial historical junctures domestically and internationally, and the situation on the Korean Peninsula is volatile; yet, their bilateral relations have stagnated. China, facing domestic political and economic challenges of consolidating the Xi Jinping regime and securing new economic growth engines, as well as the major diplomatic challenge of the US-China trade dispute, has relegated relations with South Korea to a lower policy priority. The South Korean government, following the "Candlelight Revolution," is grappling with various domestic conflicts and competing interests, and is focused on the paramount historical task of improving inter-Korean relations and achieving denuclearization through mediating North Korea-US dialogue. In particular, as the US-China competition's repercussions extend to the Korean Peninsula and relations with Japan deteriorate to their worst state, South Korea's diplomacy toward China has been unusually neglected. Despite the reality that China's role on the Korean Peninsula will inevitably become more important, it is being consciously and unconsciously overlooked.

Since the latter half of 2019, as the US-China conflict has intensified and shown signs of prolonged duration, there has been a noticeable shift in neighboring countries' perceptions of China. China has increased its focus on peripheral diplomacy, sending a series of positive signals toward South Korea. These include Premier Li Keqiang's visit to the Samsung plant in China, the partial resumption of group tours from China to South Korea, the resumption of defense strategic dialogues that had been suspended for five years, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to Seoul, and a summit between the leaders of South Korea and China on the sidelines of the trilateral summit in December. The positive developments in China-ROK relations are expected to continue in the first half of 2020 with President Xi Jinping's visit to South Korea. This marks a progression toward normalizing relations following the resolution of the THAAD dispute, leading to the lifting of sanctions. It is important to note that China's series of friendly signals toward South Korea are not based on close discussions and agreements for bilateral relationship development but rather represent independent actions driven by China's needs and calculations. In essence, China intends to manage relations with South Korea and the situation on the Korean Peninsula stably as part of its strategy toward the United States.

While the recovery of China-ROK relations from the THAAD dispute is immediately necessary, it does not guarantee a stable future for the bilateral relationship. China-ROK relations have already experienced numerous cycles of conflict, resolution, recovery, and renewed conflict. Although relations were elevated to a "strategic cooperative partnership" in 2008, they deteriorated into distrust and conflict, rather than strategic consultation, following the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island shelling incidents in 2010. Relations then experienced an inexplicable and sudden recovery in the latter half of 2012 with the launch of new governments in both countries. Even in 2015, when relations were described as "the best ever," they plummeted to their worst state following North Korea's fourth nuclear test and the deployment of THAAD in 2016. This resulted from both countries hastily attempting only an outward recovery of relations, setting aside fundamental conflict factors. Therefore, it is premature to expect that the lifting of the "Hallyu ban" (限韩令) and the holding of summit talks will normalize bilateral relations to the pre-THAAD state. To prevent China-ROK relations from repeating such steep fluctuations without context, a cool-headed strategic reflection on how to design the future of China-ROK relations is necessary, rather than focusing solely on the recovery from the THAAD dispute itself.

China-ROK relations in 2020 stand at a critical historical crossroads, beyond mere recovery. Economic cooperation, which has driven the remarkable development of China-ROK relations over the past 27 years since normalization, is gradually losing momentum, and mutual perceptions between the citizens of both countries have significantly worsened. Strategic communication between the two countries on resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is also not as close as before. Expanding the view to a global level, a turbulent international landscape characterized by escalating great power competition, challenges to the free trade order, and rising nationalism is influencing the future strategic landscape of the Korean Peninsula, necessitating a new design for China's role on the peninsula and for China-ROK relations.

The THAAD dispute starkly demonstrated that China-ROK relations have transformed into a relationship vulnerable to external variables such as US-China relations, moving beyond the bilateral dimension. This vulnerability to external variables has already entered a structural phase. The complex interplay of competition, conflict, and cooperation between the US and China, a key structural variable, is likely to impact the Korean Peninsula with even greater force and unpredictability in the future. China's positive signals toward South Korea are ultimately a change in the context of its competition with the United States and are therefore likely to be fluid depending on the changes in US-China relations.

III. South Korea's Foreign Policy Strategy toward China

China-ROK relations are rapidly transitioning into a subordinate variable dependent on the international system and environment, without sufficient internal consolidation. Therefore, South Korea's foreign policy toward China must be conducted with complex strategic considerations that examine various issues and challenges at the bilateral, regional, and global levels. At the bilateral level, the immediate task is to overcome the disparity between outward appearance and substance and achieve substantive consolidation. At the regional and global levels, it is necessary to acknowledge the reality of strategic divergence between the two countries and prepare a variety of strategic options to manage the repercussions and impacts of external variables.

1. Substantive Consolidation of China-ROK Relations

Over the past 27 years, China-ROK relations have not adequately focused on strengthening their foundation, despite significant quantitative development. The bilateral relationship has rapidly transitioned into one vulnerable to the international system and environment without a solid foundation. The structural fragility of China-ROK relations underlies the disproportionate escalation and reproduction of the THAAD dispute. Although bilateral relations have already suffered from a lack of substantive consolidation, efforts to rebuild the foundation of the relationship are still necessary, given that the impact of external variables will undoubtedly increase. China-ROK relations have repeatedly fallen into impasses during periods of conflict, with dialogue channels for resolution being severed. Therefore, it is necessary to establish alternative consultation channels during peacetime that can bypass or break through impasses when government-level contact is stalled, and ensure their functionality during conflict.

Furthermore, since the THAAD dispute, negative perceptions of each other have rapidly expanded among the citizens of both China and South Korea. If these emotional conflicts become prolonged and structuralized in the future, the normalization of bilateral relations could become very difficult, potentially even weakening the impetus for substantive consolidation of China-ROK relations. As China-ROK relations involve the most diverse and frequent people-to-people exchanges globally, emotional conflicts have the potential to cause unpredictable and complex clashes and incidents. In particular, as the differences in systems and values between China and South Korea become more pronounced recently, the understanding of each other's political realities among their citizens has narrowed. To prevent these systemic differences from becoming obstacles to bilateral relations, it is necessary to foster an atmosphere of mutual understanding, acceptance (存异), and respect (尊异). Both governments must guard against the temptation to mobilize diplomacy for domestic politics and exercise caution in delivering diplomatic messages. Additionally, efforts are needed to manage the spread and reproduction of emotional conflicts between the citizens of both countries, particularly through media outlets and opinion leaders, to prevent further escalation.

2. Preparation of Strategic Communication Channels for Changes in the Future Landscape of the Korean Peninsula

China is fundamentally taking a cautious approach, observing the current denuclearization peace process on the Korean Peninsula rather than playing a concrete role compared to the past. However, as the North Korea-US and inter-Korean denuclearization negotiations reach an impasse, China's role is bound to become more prominent than before. For the denuclearization process to be structured, it must be closely linked with ensuring North Korea's regime security and facilitating a soft landing toward reform and opening up, in parallel with the implementation of denuclearization measures. China's role and close cooperation between South Korea and China will be crucial in this process. In particular, as the process moves toward long-term compensation and self-reliance for North Korea, close cooperation between South Korea and China will become indispensable. To smoothly establish a division of roles and a structural basis for cooperation between South Korea and China, it is essential to first consolidate and systematize the strategic dialogue and cooperation between the two countries, which are currently stagnant. While both South Korea and China share a basic consensus on peace on the Korean Peninsula, there may be gaps in specific policy directions, priorities, and timelines for establishing a peace regime. Therefore, it is imperative to establish a foundation of close strategic trust and communication between the two countries more than ever before to prepare for the subtle and complex strategic dialogues that will inevitably unfold.

3. Securing South Korea's Independent

In the current fluid and uncertain US-China relations, the external stability of China-ROK relations cannot be guaranteed. US-China conflicts could spill over to the Korean Peninsula, and as both the US and China compete to expand and establish their spheres of influence, issues that will force South Korea to make choices could expand beyond the Korean Peninsula. For instance, the THAAD dispute, which was merely contained, issues in the South China Sea, choices regarding technological standards such as the Huawei situation, and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula are all weighty issues that could overwhelm China-ROK relations at any moment.

In the short term, it is necessary to closely monitor the fluidity of US-China relations and respond cautiously to China's friendly signals within a scope that does not provoke the United States. For example, a strategy of "timing diplomacy" is needed, gradually responding in areas such as economic cooperation and civilian exchanges, while deferring or delaying policy choices that could provoke China's sensitivities. In the medium to long term, it is necessary to adopt a new approach that acknowledges the reality of China-ROK relations becoming structurally vulnerable due to their subordination to US-China relations and seeks to mitigate this vulnerability. South Korea has limited political and diplomatic cooperation agendas with China beyond the North Korean nuclear issue and unification. However, both issues carry the risk of strategic dependence on China and could draw US-China competition to the Korean Peninsula. New strategic value for South Korea needs to be developed so that China perceives South Korea's strategic value and motivation for cooperation in areas and issues other than its diplomacy toward the US.

To secure independent strategic value in its diplomacy toward China, it is crucial for South Korea to establish itself as a country with strong networks among China's neighboring countries. In this context, a fundamental change is needed in South Korea's diplomatic landscape, which is currently biased towards major powers like the US and China. As the "us-vs-them" power competition between the US and China is likely to continue, the number of countries experiencing dilemmas by being drawn into this proxy competition will increase, creating a new environment where solidarity among these countries becomes necessary. In preparation for this, it is necessary to proactively diversify South Korea's diplomatic landscape away from a focus on major powers and gradually expand its international network. ■

■ Author: Lee Dong-ryul, Director of EAI's Center for Chinese Studies and Professor at Dongduk Women's University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Peking University's School of International Studies, served as President of the Association for Modern Chinese Studies, and is currently a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and minority issues. His recent works include "China's Strategy and Role in the Denuclearization and Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula," "The Evolution of China's Foreign Policy Discourse Since the 1990s and its Contemporary Implications," "A Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemmas in Xi Jinping's 'Maritime Power' Initiative," "Deciphering China’s Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea," and "Territorial Disputes of China" (co-authored).

■ Managed and Edited by: Yoon Jun-il, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) I junilyoon@eai.or.kr

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