[EAI Commentary] The Abolition of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Northeast Asian Security Situation

Editor's Note

On August 2, the United States officially announced its withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, citing Russia's violations. Lee Soo-hyung, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy, explains, "The US withdrawal from the INF Treaty is likely intended as a strategic pressure tactic to facilitate the conclusion of a new INF treaty that includes China, or, if that proves unfeasible, to deploy intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles targeting China by leveraging its Asian allies." He further argues that the ensuing debate over new INF deployments in Northeast Asia will not only escalate the arms race between the US and China but also among their respective allies, and it is highly likely to negatively impact the denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea-US relations. The author emphasizes that the expansion of US-China strategic competition resulting from the INF debate in Northeast Asia must not extend to the North Korea-US denuclearization process.

Despite the Murphy's Law that should not apply to the grand endeavor of ushering in a new era of peace on the Korean Peninsula, an incident has indeed occurred. On August 2, the United States, citing Russia's violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, officially declared its withdrawal from the treaty signed in 1987. This marks exactly six months since US Secretary of State Pompeo officially announced in a statement on February 2, 2019, that the US would withdraw from the INF Treaty within six months. In response to the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, the Russian government also officially declared its withdrawal, stating, "The INF Treaty, signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in Washington on December 8, 1987, has been terminated today at the initiative of the US side."

US Intentions Behind Abolishing the INF Treaty

The abolition of the INF Treaty after 32 years will undoubtedly be recorded as a historic turning point with significant implications for the future of international security and global affairs. In particular, the issue of intermediate-range nuclear forces, unlike in the past when it caused immense repercussions for European security, is poised to deliver a negative shock to peace in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. The most concerning aspect is that the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty will not only accelerate the ongoing strategic competition between the US and China in East Asia but also exacerbate regional security dilemmas. While the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty uses Russia as a pretext, its actual strategic intent is to curb China's expanding influence in East Asia, aligning with the broader context of US-China strategic competition. The US does not attempt to conceal this stance or intent. In this regard, John Bolton, then Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and now National Security Advisor, argued in an August 2011 Wall Street Journal op-ed that the INF Treaty should be abrogated or China should be admitted as a new signatory to counter China's growing intermediate-range missile capabilities. Furthermore, in an April 2017 congressional testimony, Admiral Harry Harris, then Commander of the US Pacific Command, noted that over 90% of the ballistic and cruise missiles deployed by China violated the INF Treaty.

As the US has expressed concerns, China has been strengthening its intermediate-range missile capabilities since 2010 as part of its Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) strategy to block US military access in the South China Sea region. For instance, China possesses a variety of ground-launched missiles, including the DF-11 (600km), DF-15 (800km), DF-16 (1,500km), DF-21 (1,700km), and DF-25 (4,000km) intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as the CJ-10 (2,500km) cruise missile. Notably, the DF-21D, deployed in 2013 to counter US Navy aircraft carriers, is the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile. Dubbed the 'carrier killer,' this missile has a range of 1,800-3,000 km and is extremely difficult to intercept, posing a significant threat to the United States.

US Desires INF Deployment in Asian Allies

The INF Treaty has prevented the US from testing and deploying ground-launched intermediate-range missiles capable of effectively countering China's growing INF capabilities. Therefore, the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty is likely intended as a strategic pressure tactic to facilitate the conclusion of a new INF treaty that includes China, or, if that proves unfeasible, to deploy intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles targeting China by leveraging its Asian allies. A recent media report quoted Gary Seymour, former White House Coordinator for WMD Policy, as pointing out that "one of the reasons the US withdrew from the INF Treaty is that China was not part of it." Additionally, US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stated, "We want to deploy new precision-guided intermediate-range missiles to our allies in Asia," and clarified, "The deployment location must be discussed with allies, but the missiles to be deployed will be within the INF range." Secretary Esper's remarks can be interpreted as an attempt to publicly acknowledge that the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty is related to China and to indirectly gauge the reactions of allied nations. However, the strategic implications of the US deploying intermediate-range missiles targeting China in Guam or its Asian allied countries are fundamentally different from the European situation in the 1980s, which is where the gravity of the issue lies.

Northeast Asian INF Debate Dynamics Differ from Europe

As is well known, the INF debate during the Cold War, which amplified the risk of nuclear war in European security while simultaneously facilitating the end of the Cold War, fundamentally occurred in a context where a balance of strategic nuclear weapons capable of striking each other's homelands existed between the US and the Soviet Union. Consequently, the US and the Soviet Union were able to control and manage the risks associated with intermediate-range nuclear forces, ultimately leading to the INF Treaty in December 1987, which promoted the end of the Cold War. However, the INF debate that will unfold in Northeast Asia following the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty occurs in a context of strategic nuclear imbalance, where the US and China cannot strike each other's homelands with strategic nuclear weapons. Moreover, ground-launched intermediate-range missiles that could be deployed in US Asian allied countries would target mainland China. Therefore, the perceptions and responses of the US and China to the INF debate in Northeast Asia will inevitably differ. These differences mean that the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the subsequent testing and deployment of new US intermediate-range missiles will have multidimensional and multi-layered strategic implications for the Northeast Asian security landscape, incomparable to the European case.

Possibility of China's Strategic Nuclear Buildup or Formalization of Sino-Russian Alliance

First and foremost, China, which is at a significant disadvantage compared to the US in terms of strategic nuclear weapons, will likely adopt one of two strategic stances in response to the deployment of US intermediate-range missiles: either a buildup of strategic nuclear capabilities to strike the US homeland, thereby seeking to achieve a balance of strategic nuclear weapons capable of striking each other's homelands, or the formation of a de facto security alliance with Russia, which possesses strategic nuclear capabilities comparable to the US. Through this alliance, China could leverage Russia's strategic assets to offset US pressure. Regardless of which policy option China chooses, the new INF debate in Northeast Asia will likely accelerate the arms race between the US and China and serve as a catalyst for a new type of arms race among major regional powers.

Periodic Outbursts of Alliance Dilemmas Due to Strategic Misalignment

The second strategic implication of the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty is the potential to create alliance dilemmas. Specifically, the US and its Asian allies (South Korea, Japan, and Australia) will experience periodic security conflicts stemming from a 'strategic misalignment' that prevents finding common ground regarding the deployment of new US INF. This is because the ground-launched intermediate-range missiles that the US intends to deploy in allied countries are aimed directly at mainland China. In particular, regarding Secretary of Defense Esper's statement that "the deployment location must be discussed with allies," some have expressed concern about the possibility of deploying missiles in Darwin, northern Australia, which is a US ally located 5,000 km from Shanghai, China. In response, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne offered a very general and cautious statement: "We see China as a very important partner for Australia... We will pursue stability, security, and prosperity in cooperation with our strongest ally, the United States, and our key partner, China." The US strategic plan to deploy new intermediate-range missiles on allied territory will face difficulties in policy coordination with allied nations because these missiles are aimed at mainland China. From the perspective of allied nations, the deployment of US intermediate-range missiles targeting mainland China could lead to a significant loss of national security interests, rather than simply being a matter of alliance cooperation or strengthening.

Negative Repercussions on the North Korea-US Denuclearization Process

The US withdrawal from the INF Treaty also carries a high probability of negatively impacting the denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula. Following the second North Korea-US summit in Hanoi in 2019, the North Korea-US denuclearization process is in a state of pause, awaiting future negotiations. It is anticipated that working-level talks between North Korea and the US will commence after the suspension of joint South Korea-US military exercises. However, even if the denuclearization process progresses with the third North Korea-US summit, based on mutual trust between Chairman Kim Jong Un and President Trump, and the outline of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula becomes clearer, the new INF debate unfolding in Northeast Asia could negatively affect the dismantling of North Korea's intermediate- and long-range missiles as part of the denuclearization process. Primarily, in consideration of the new INF debate in Northeast Asia, North Korea is highly likely to exclude intermediate-range missiles such as Scud, Nodong, and BM-25 from the denuclearization agenda or adopt a very passive stance towards their dismantling. That is, while North Korea might agree with the US on dismantling intercontinental ballistic missiles like the Hwasong-15, which can threaten the US mainland, as part of the denuclearization process involving the dismantling of missile delivery systems, it is likely to oppose the dismantling of intermediate-range missiles that can threaten the homelands of US allies like South Korea and Japan. This, in turn, could highlight the alliance dilemma between the US and its allies during the denuclearization process. This is because North Korean intermediate-range missiles do not fundamentally threaten the US, but are perceived as an existential threat by US allies such as South Korea and Japan.

Alternatively, the new INF debate in Northeast Asia could, if mishandled, be exploited by the US as a tool for military pressure against North Korea to achieve denuclearization. If the North Korea-US denuclearization process proceeds positively for both sides, there would be no issue. However, if the process encounters another stalemate or if the pace of denuclearization differs significantly between North Korea and the US, the INF issue could be utilized as a card for military sanctions against North Korea, alongside economic sanctions, as part of a coercive strategy to break the deadlock, regardless of North Korea's stance. Particularly, if the North Korea-US denuclearization process becomes somewhat linked to the US presidential election cycle, the Trump administration might leverage the INF issue to extract tangible denuclearization achievements from North Korea. Furthermore, if North Korea, in an attempt to exert pressure on the US, were to conduct tests of intermediate- or long-range missiles to achieve its objectives in the denuclearization process, the US might respond by deploying INF in allied countries to exert strong pressure on North Korea. Of course, such a scenario would deviate from the current dialogue-centered denuclearization framework on the Korean Peninsula and could signal a return to a traditional US-North Korea confrontation.

The security policies of the US and Russia, which have been engaged in a game of chicken for several years, have ultimately led to the abolition of the INF Treaty. Moreover, the recent abolition of the INF Treaty by the US and Russia raises concerns that it may jeopardize the fate of the upcoming New START treaty between the two countries. At a time when strategic competition between the US and China is intensifying across East Asia, the newly discussed INF debate in Northeast Asia will undoubtedly exacerbate US-China competitive relations. Nevertheless, the expansion of US-China conflict resulting from the INF debate must not extend to the North Korea-US denuclearization process. ■

■ Author: Lee Soo-hyung_ Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies and is an adjunct professor at the Graduate School of North Korean Studies. His research areas include international relations history, NATO and European security, and ROK-US alliance and Northeast Asian international politics. His major publications include "A Plan for a Korean Peninsula Peace Regime and North Korea Policy" (co-authored, 2017), "The Strategy of the Millstone's Turning Point: A Strategic Plan for Peaceful Unification of the Korean Peninsula" (2014), and "North Atlantic Treaty Organization" (2012).

■ Responsible Editor: Baek Jin-kyung, EAI Research Fellow

               Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I j.baek@eai.or.kr

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