[EAI Commentary] "The Future of US-China Competition - The Technology Chapter" US-China Tech Hegemony War: Focusing on Semiconductors, 5G, and Artificial Intelligence

Note from the editor

EAI, in order to present a blueprint for a desirable Asia-Pacific order and Korea's role in it, aiming for China's future growth to lead to human coexistence and sustainable development, has been planning and operating a mid- to long-term research project titled "China's Future Growth and the Construction of a New Asia-Pacific Civilization" since 2018. As the first phase of this project has been completed, EAI has published its research findings as an English-language working paper series over April and May. As a follow-up series, EAI has planned a special issue briefing series titled "The Future of US-China Competition: Dynamics of a Four-Stage Competition," consisting of four reports examining the future of US-China relations.

As the second report in this series, we are publishing an issue brief on the US-China tech hegemony war, authored by Professor Bae Young-ja of Konkuk University. The author points out that the hegemonic competition between the US and China is expanding beyond trade into advanced technology, with semiconductors, 5G, and artificial intelligence emerging as key areas of competition. The author emphasizes that if this technological competition between the two countries continues in conjunction with trade pressures, restrictions on corporate transactions, and regulations on foreign investment, it could lead to the bifurcation of global supply chains and even reshape the world economic order. In particular, if global supply chains are bifurcated, countries like Korea, which are economically closely linked with both the US and China, could face a difficult choice of taking sides, thus the author suggests that a compromise should be sought to manage the US-China technological conflict within universally accepted norms.

Problem Statement

The hegemonic competition between the United States and China is the most important topic in 21st-century global politics. Amidst the protracted trade dispute between the two countries, advanced technologies such as semiconductors and 5G communications equipment are receiving attention as the core of the trade conflict. China, challenging the long-standing US dominance in advanced technologies, and the US, attempting to restrain China in various ways, are clashing sharply through tariffs, foreign investment regulations, transaction restrictions, and intellectual property disputes. 5G, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence technologies, the main battlegrounds of the two countries' technological competition, are key areas driving the new economic paradigm known as the Fourth Industrial Revolution. While the sense of crisis that heightened after President Trump and President Xi Jinping agreed at the Osaka G20 summit to continue trade negotiations without additional tariffs has temporarily subsided, the potential for conflict in advanced technology sectors remains, and the conflict between the two countries surrounding these issues is expected to continue.

Competition among great powers over technology is not a new phenomenon. In the 1980s, when Japanese automakers and semiconductor companies made significant advances in global and US markets, the US accused Japanese semiconductor companies of stealing American technology and selling militarily sensitive products to the Soviet Union (Johnson 1991). In 1982, IBM sued Hitachi for stealing technology, and the US government pressured Toshiba for selling technology to the Soviet Union. The US attacked Japanese semiconductor companies using Section 301, anti-dumping duties, and ex officio investigations, and through the 1986 US-Japan Semiconductor Agreement, secured a 100% tariff and increased the market share of American companies in Japan. Meanwhile, the attempted acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor, an American semiconductor company, by Japan's Fujitsu led to US restraint and tense negotiations between the two countries, ultimately resulting in Japan abandoning the merger. On the other hand, after the Soviet Union successfully launched Sputnik, the first artificial satellite, in 1957, the US and the Soviet Union engaged in fierce competition in space technology to be the first to land a probe on the moon, resulting in the US establishing NASA in 1958 and launching the Apollo 11 lunar module in 1969.

In the modern international political order, technological innovation has been recognized as the foundation for economic growth as well as military power, making dominance in advanced technology a crucial condition for global political and economic hegemony. Britain, which succeeded in the Industrial Revolution driven by a series of technological innovations such as the spinning jenny, steam engine, and railways, was able to build a global empire on this foundation. The United States, at the forefront of innovation in electricity, chemistry, and automobiles, firmly established itself as the world hegemon through World Wars I and II. While the significant role of technology as a foundation for hegemony is widely recognized, technological competition and conflict between hegemonic powers have not previously come to the forefront of attention compared to military or economic conflicts.

Then why has technology become a particularly prominent core area in the recent hegemonic competition between the US and China? How is the current technological competition and conflict between the two countries actually unfolding? What are the implications of US-China technological competition for the world political and economic order and the shift in hegemony? This study will begin by considering the meaning of US-China technological competition and hegemony in relation to these questions. It will then examine the dynamics of US-China technological competition in the fields of semiconductors, 5G, and artificial intelligence. Finally, it will analyze how this US-China technological competition is transforming the world political and economic order.

Hegemonic Competition and Technology

Technology played a crucial role in the expansion and operation of the British Empire in the 19th century. At the time, Britain considered itself a "Titan of Technology," possessing a technological advantage over other countries and taking great pride in it (Kubicek 1999). However, with the acceleration of technological innovation and industrialization in Germany and the United States in the late 19th century, these countries surpassed Britain in areas such as steel, chemicals, and electricity, marking a significant turning point in the challenge to British hegemony.

Despite the widespread recognition of technology's importance as a foundation for hegemony, there are few studies that specifically analyze the rise and fall of hegemonic powers focusing on technology. Studies on the rise and fall of great powers often cite general factors such as "Imperial Overstretch" and "Intolerance and Exclusivity" as reasons for hegemonic decline (Kennedy 1987; Chua 2007). Organski's power transition theory posits that the international political order changes according to relative shifts in national power, focusing on changes in national power as the most important variable (Organski 1958; Kim Young-jun 2015). They argue that national power is determined by domestic factors, with population, economic productivity, and political system efficiency being the three main components of national power. They use GDP or the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) to measure economic productivity. CINC includes factors such as the proportion of urban population, steel production, energy consumption, and military spending, but does not include comprehensive technological innovation factors (Singer 1980). Power transition theory argues that a crisis within the system begins when one of the great powers emerges as a challenger to the hegemon due to an increase in its national power through industrialization, and the possibility of interstate war increases when the challenger's national power catches up to that of the hegemon. While power transition theory has drawn attention to the existence of a hegemon in the world political and economic order, focusing on the replacement of hegemons and war, it merely briefly mentions industrialization and economic growth as conditions for a country's rise to hegemony without thoroughly explaining this process.

The Leadership Long Cycle theory explains the replacement of hegemons in the world political and economic order by focusing on technological innovation (Modelski and Thompson 1996). They use the concept of "leadership" rather than hegemony, arguing that leadership in the world order since 1500 has been replaced approximately every 100 years and has coevolved with Kondratiev waves (hereinafter K-waves) of technological innovation occurring approximately every 50 years. Kondratiev argued that cycles of recession and boom in the world economy, based on indicators such as prices, wages, and savings rates, have repeatedly occurred in 40–50 year cycles, and Schumpeter demonstrated that these cycles are related to technological innovation (Schumpeter 1939), a view that Modelski adopted. That is, they saw K-waves as consisting not of general economic indicators like GDP, prices, or recessions, but of the rise and growth of leading sectors. Innovation in these sectors occurs clustered, driving the circulation of the world economy. Technological innovation in leading sectors occurs predominantly in specific regions and countries, and the country leading the leading sector rises to become the hegemon, driving the reorganization of the world political and economic order and normative system. The United States emerged as the world hegemon by leading sectors such as electricity, steel, electronics, and automobiles since the late 19th century, constructing a US-led world political structure and normative system, and has maintained its hegemonic position by leading the information and communication technology innovations that have occurred since the 1970s. The current world economy is seen as being in the declining phase of the 19th cycle, with the 20th cycle emerging.

The Leadership Long Cycle theory has argued that technological innovation occurs clustered in specific times and spaces, and the country leading this innovation rises to become the world political hegemon. However, unfortunately, the specific mechanisms by which technological innovation leads to leadership or hegemony, and the subsequent process of reorganizing the world political economy and normative order, have not been sufficiently studied in existing international relations and innovation research. The current link between these concepts is explained by a series of developments such as economic crises, increased investment in new technologies and innovation, friction with existing technological systems, crises, wars and changes in the world political order, leadership changes, and the diffusion and stabilization of new technology industries, simply described as "coevolution" of technology and the world political order (Modelski and Thompson 1996). Despite this series of concepts, ambiguities remain in the relationship between the two. For example, it is not sufficiently explained why crises caused by the clash between existing and new technological systems inevitably lead to war, or how and through what process a country leading technological innovation rises to become a hegemon (Bae Young-ja 2016).

Explaining the differences in technological innovation capabilities and economic growth rates among countries, and defining and measuring the sectors leading K-waves, go beyond the scope of international relations scholars. Here, we will raise and organize several perspectives that are important for exploring the relationship between hegemony and technological innovation and that contribute to understanding the characteristics of the current US-China technological competition.

First, there is the understanding of the relationship between dominance in advanced technology and hegemony. Many current articles and reports assume that dominance in advanced technology directly leads to hegemony and focus on comparing US and Chinese technological capabilities (Abrami 2014; Atkins 2019). They argue that while Chinese science and technology are rapidly advancing, US hegemony will continue to be maintained because the US holds a solid advantage in basic science and advanced technological innovation. Conversely, others argue that China will soon become the hegemon because it surpasses the US in technological innovation capabilities, including the number of scientific papers and patents in certain fields. However, these simple assumptions about the relationship between science and technology capabilities and hegemony are questionable in light of several historical examples and require a broader perspective on the relationship between science and technology and hegemony. For instance, the fundamental technology of the steam engine invented by Newcomen in Britain in 1712 originated from Papin in France in 1691 (Kim Tae-you et al. 2017). British iron production was world-leading until the mid-19th century. However, as the iron industry shifted to steel, Britain's steel industry was surpassed by the US and Germany. The Bessemer process, one of the most important innovations in steel production, was developed in Britain. However, it was US companies like Carnegie Steel that recognized the importance of this process and maximized its potential through large-scale investment. In the case of telegraph machines in the mid-19th century, they were first developed in Britain, but it was German companies like Siemens that improved their technological sophistication and reaped significant profits from laying telegraph networks across Europe and continents.

Studies on the historical process of US technological innovation emphasize that it was not the superiority in individual technologies per se, but rather the emergence and diffusion of new production methods based on new technologies, known as the "American System of Manufacturing," and the large markets and abundant resources that enabled this, that played a crucial role in solidifying America's industrial dominance around the turn of the 20th century (Chandler 1990; Nelson et al. 1992). It is argued that based on this industrial superiority, the US conducted more organized research and development, surpassing Europe even in science. Indeed, between 1901 and 1930, the number of Nobel laureates in physics and chemistry was 33 in Germany, 18 in Britain, and 6 in the US; it was only after World War II that the US caught up to the number of laureates in France, Britain, and Germany (Brunnermeier et al. 2018).

In contrast to most studies discussing America's technological superiority in the recent contest between the US and China in artificial intelligence, Kai-Fu Lee argues that in the world of AI, implementation is more important than discovery, and data is more important than expertise. He asserts that China surpasses the US in implementation and data, thus tilting the playing field of the global AI order in China's favor (Lee 2018). While the US leads in discovery and expertise, he argues that four factors – abundant data, hungry entrepreneurs, AI scientists, and an AI-friendly government environment – work in China's favor, highlighting the significance of China's role in the development of the global AI order. His argument suggests that to understand the dynamics of technological competition, one must look beyond technology itself and consider a broader context, including how new technologies are developed into new industries or production methods, as well as various factors such as markets and government policies.

Second, there is the question of how to interpret why technology has become so prominent in the recent US-China hegemonic competition. Recent studies on the dynamic relationship between technology and hegemony criticize existing research that has treated technological innovation and industrial development as black boxes or external variables, emphasizing the need to explain technological innovation as an internal variable in the formation of the world political and economic order (Kennedy et al. 2018; Mayer 2017). Studies by Kennedy et al. argue that a hegemonic challenger faces an "innovation imperative" to continuously enhance its technological innovation capabilities and strives to strengthen these capabilities through various means such as "making" (in-house development), "transacting" (technology transfer), and "taking" (technology acquisition). They argue that the process by which the existing hegemon restrains this in various ways needs to be analyzed in greater detail from an international relations perspective.

The argument that the technological advancement of the challenger country and the weakening of the existing hegemon are predetermined outcomes and external variables outside the international political order, rather than an inherently endogenous analysis within the context of international relations, is persuasive. However, finding ways to develop an endogenous analysis of the relationship between technology and world politics within the current framework of international relations is not easy. They connect technology and world politics through the concept of "externality" of technology. That is, while the continuous and diverse efforts of the hegemonic challenger to strengthen technological innovation have the effect of enhancing cooperation with the hegemon to some extent, they inevitably lead to conflict between the two countries, which is related to the externality of technological innovation. Since most advanced technologies are of a "dual use" nature, the advanced technological innovation of the hegemonic challenger generates a "security externality" that threatens national security, causing the hegemon to pay attention and restrain technology transfer and acquisition through trade and investment regulations. Furthermore, when the hegemonic challenger pursues advanced technology transfer or acquisition, if it violates norms and rules institutionalized by the existing hegemon, an "order externality" of challenging the existing order occurs, leading to conflict between the two countries as the hegemon employs coercive measures to maintain the existing order.

Unlike the hegemonic competitions that took place within Western countries in the past, the hegemonic competition between the US and China, with their distinct cultural backgrounds, has more clearly revealed the military implications of advanced technologies and the externalities of challenging the existing world order. This can be interpreted as the reason why technology has emerged as a core area of conflict. Semiconductors, 5G, and artificial intelligence, which are currently at the center of US-China friction, are all core components of cutting-edge military equipment, related to key military information infrastructure, or directly linked to the emergence of new weapons such as killer robots. Furthermore, disputes over China's challenges to and violations of international norms established by the US, such as the TRIPs agreement on intellectual property rights and internet freedom, lie at the heart of the US-China technological hegemony competition.

However, the fact that the current US-China technological competition is particularly prominent in the areas of semiconductors, 5G, and artificial intelligence is because these technologies are general-purpose technologies that serve as the cornerstone of the new economic paradigm called the Fourth Industrial Revolution. It is predicted that new industries and economic paradigms will emerge based on these technologies, which have not yet fully materialized, and these will play a significant role in the rise and fall of individual national powers as well as the future reshaping of the world political and economic order. Viewed in this light, along with military and world order externalities, economic externalities should receive even greater attention. Moreover, the question of whether it is appropriate to conceptualize the emergence of new industries and economic paradigms, as well as military applications and their relationship to the world order, as technological externalities needs further consideration.

It is also important to recognize that the fact that the US and China are currently in a state of close economic and technological interdependence is significantly different from historical cases of hegemonic competition. Even considering the high degree of interdependence in trade within the Western economy in the early 20th century when Britain, Germany, and the US were competing, it cannot be compared to the degree of global economic integration that has accelerated since the 1990s. The US has built a global production network amidst the accelerating globalization since the 1990s, and China was fully integrated into this network through trade and foreign investment after joining the WTO in 2001. Within the global production network, the US and China have built a close competitive and cooperative relationship, each taking responsibility for their areas of strength. The theory of "Commercial Peace" has predicted that in situations of economic interdependence between countries, the possibility of conflict escalating to war is low, and this has been the basis for optimism regarding US-China relations. Recent cases of US-China trade and technology disputes suggest that the interdependence within the global economy, which has accelerated since the 1980s, may not be a constant but a variable. Observing the recent conflicts between the US and China over advanced technologies, predictions are emerging that the US and China will reduce their technological and economic interdependence at immense cost and side effects, forming separate economic and technological spheres, and the outcome of this is being closely watched (Bremmer et al. 2018; Luce 2018; Orange et al. 2019; Panda et al. 2019).

This study will first briefly examine the process of technological competition between the two countries, focusing on semiconductors, 5G, and artificial intelligence, by looking at how China, as the hegemonic challenger, has increased its technological innovation capabilities in response to the "innovation imperative" and how the US has responded to this. It will then examine how this technological competition between the two countries is impacting the changes in the world political and economic order.

US-China Technological Conflict Status: Semiconductors, 5G, Artificial Intelligence

Since Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up in 1978, China has been forming its current technological innovation system by restructuring its economy around two pillars: decentralization and privatization (Fu 2014; Gu and Lundvall 2006; Lewin et al. 2016; Someren et al. 2013; Zhou et al. 2016, etc.). Following the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Reform of the Science and Technology System" in 1985, a large-scale reorganization of R&D organizations, which were centrally controlled and separated from production departments, was carried out. Over 5,000 R&D organizations were merged, transformed into production organizations or enterprises, and guided to engage in innovation activities that directly contribute to economic development. In addition, with the surge in foreign direct investment and government R&D investment, innovation activities have become vigorous, and innovation capabilities have been rapidly enhanced in a short period. Since 2005, China has emphasized the importance of scientific and technological innovation in its continuous economic growth and has announced various policies to support it. In particular, emphasizing the need to move from a resource-based national development strategy to an innovation-driven national development strategy, China has set forth a series of plans, including the "Mid-to-Long-Term Plan for Scientific and Technological Development (2006–2020)," "Science and Technology Leader Strategy for 2050," and "13th Five-Year Plan for Innovation Development (2016–2020)," with the goal of building an innovation-oriented country by 2020 based on "independent innovation." Through these initiatives, China has focused on strengthening its technological innovation capabilities to become a global science and technology power.

China defines an "innovation-oriented country" as one that invests more than 2% of its GDP in R&D, where the contribution of science and technology to economic growth exceeds 60%, the output of knowledge-intensive service industries accounts for 20% of GDP, and the external technological dependence is less than 30% (Outline of China's Innovation-Driven Development Strategy, 2016). It describes building a strong science and technology nation not as reaching a few "Taishan Mountains" (visually imposing but only 1,545m above sea level), but as constructing a "Tibetan Plateau" of science and technology (3,000–4,000m) (Yoon Dae-sang 2018). China has set goals to enter the ranks of innovative nations by 2020, lead innovative nations by 2030, and become a leading innovation power by 2050.

Among China's various science and technology plans, "Made in China 2025," announced in 2015, has received the most attention. It aims to transform China's economic model from "quantitative growth" to "qualitative growth" by fostering its manufacturing base, promoting technological innovation, and achieving green growth. It classifies major manufacturing countries into three tiers: Tier 1 (US), Tier 2 (Germany, Japan), and Tier 3 (China, UK, France, South Korea), and presents a plan to upgrade China's manufacturing industry to become the world's leading manufacturing power. Specifically, in Phase 1 (2016–2025), China aims to enter the ranks of strong manufacturing nations; in Phase 2 (2026–2035), it aims to surpass Germany and Japan to reach an intermediate level among strong nations; and in Phase 3 (2036–2049), it aims to lead among strong nations. This plan particularly emphasizes the localization of core technologies, a point reiterated by Xi Jinping in his speech at the joint annual meeting of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Engineering in 2018. "Core technologies cannot be obtained, bought, or begged for freely. [...] Only by mastering core technologies can the national economy, defense security, and national security be fundamentally guaranteed. Strive to achieve self-reliance in core technologies and grasp the initiative in innovation and development (Yang Jung-dae 2018)."

Thanks to the Chinese government's will and active support, China's science and technology level has developed rapidly over the past 20 years. China's PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty) patent applications numbered approximately 49,000 in 2017, closely trailing the US, which held the top spot with 56,000 applications. In terms of SCI papers, China ranked second with 360,000, following the US with 520,000 (Korea-China Science and Technology Cooperation Center 2018). In 2017, China became the country with the most supercomputers, possessing 202 out of the world's top 500, surpassing the US (143). China currently operates the Tiangong space station and has launched a navigation system capable of tracking locations, observing weather, and exploring resources by connecting 35 satellites, providing 24-hour global coverage. It has also announced a space plan to become the world's leading space power by 2045, surpassing the US. Following the successful maiden flight of its indigenously developed large passenger aircraft C919 in 2017, China aims to reshape the global aviation industry landscape into an "ABC" structure—Airbus, Boeing, and the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC). Despite the Chinese government's full support and remarkable achievements in scientific and technological innovation, China's overall innovation level and environment are still rated relatively low, indicating that it still has a long way to go. In 2018, China's overall innovation index ranked 17th globally, receiving particularly low scores in government regulation, innovation environment, and qualitative achievement (Global Innovation Index 2018). Considering China's rising wages and slowing economic growth, it is evident that China faces an "innovation imperative" to overcome the "middle income trap" and emerge as a hegemonic power.

In addition to increasing R&D investment, China has strived to acquire advanced technologies through various methods such as technology transfer and mergers and acquisitions, with the technology transfer and mergers and acquisitions of US companies playing a particularly important role in this process (O’Connor 2019). China's outward foreign direct investment (FDI) in US companies rapidly increased after 2010, reaching a peak of $46.9 billion in 2016, and is currently declining. 97% of China's FDI in the US consists of corporate mergers and acquisitions, particularly concentrated in the information and communication technology and energy sectors. A report by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) states that China has illegally acquired advanced US technologies by forcing technology transfer from US companies, implementing discriminatory licensing restrictions, acquiring US companies, and infringing intellectual property rights via the internet (USTR 2018). The report provides a detailed enumeration and analysis of China's acquisition of advanced technologies in sectors such as information and communication, aerospace, and biotechnology through mergers and acquisitions of US companies. For instance, the Chinese government has established and operated a semiconductor fund of $107 billion, investing $37 billion in the merger of 27 semiconductor companies between 2010 and 2016, thereby acquiring the necessary technologies to develop its current semiconductor industry, the report claims. This study will examine China's efforts to increase technological innovation, the US response, and the dynamics of conflict between the two countries, focusing on semiconductors, 5G, and artificial intelligence, the fields where intense technological competition is currently taking place.

Semiconductors

In 2017, China's semiconductor imports amounted to $259.6 billion, making it the largest import item for China in that year (Kim Soo-jin 2019; Bae Young-ja 2011; Lee Eun-young 2018; Ernst 2016; Lewis 2019; McKinsey 2018, etc.). This is over 60% more than the second largest import item, crude oil (approximately $160.6 billion). As of mid-2018, China's consumption accounted for about 44.2% of the global semiconductor market, while its self-sufficiency rate was a low 13.5%. The semiconductor industry is one of the 10 key industries in "Made in China 2025."

The global semiconductor industry is broadly divided into two sectors: non-memory and memory, with market sizes in a ratio of approximately 7:3. The industry is structured by specialized functions: fabless companies specializing in the design and marketing of chips for specific applications without direct production; foundries specializing in the production of chips commissioned by other companies, based on advantages in production technology and cost; and assembly and testing specialists (packaging & testing). Memory chips are mostly designed and manufactured by the same entity.

The United States accounts for approximately 50% of global semiconductor production and has built a production network centered on non-memory semiconductors. In the non-memory semiconductor sector, high-level design technology capable of meeting diverse demands is the core of competitiveness, and integrated device manufacturers or fabless companies with this technology are the key players leading the non-memory semiconductor production network. The US semiconductor industry holds an overwhelming advantage in the design segment, which is the largest in market size and highest in added value. Currently, US companies lead in the non-memory sector, while South Korean companies lead in the memory sector.

China's semiconductor industry began with the labor-intensive assembly and testing segment, outsourced by US semiconductor companies, and has gradually expanded into the more technologically advanced process and design segments (Bae Young-ja 2011). China entered and developed within the global semiconductor industry's production network by actively adopting existing standards in the semiconductor sector—specifications and processes for semiconductor chips, methods for assembly and testing, and operational methods for production lines embedded in semiconductor equipment, as well as related technologies. China's technological innovation in the semiconductor sector has progressed by investing enormous funds to upgrade manufacturing processes and acquiring core technologies through mergers and acquisitions of foreign companies or by recruiting high-level personnel (Thomas 2015).

The Chinese government established the "China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund" in 2015 to increase the self-sufficiency rate in semiconductors to over 70% by 2025 (Lee Eun-young 2018). China has focused its investment particularly on fabless, foundry, and memory sectors, with notable achievements in recent years. In the non-memory fabless market, China's share, which was around 5% in 2010, rose to about 11% in 2017. Chinese companies such as Hisilicon and Unigroup have shown significant progress. Hisilicon, in particular, was strategically developed by Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications equipment company, in 2004 to reduce dependence on US companies like Qualcomm and Intel. With the rapid growth of the fabless market, domestic demand for foundry services in China has increased, leading to a steady growth in China's foundry sector's market share from 11% in 2015 to 12% in 2016 and 13% in 2017 (Lee Eun-young 2018). China's semiconductor "rise" has been particularly focused on the memory sector. In the memory sector, Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix hold about 80%, with the remaining 20% held by Micron of the US. While China's memory industry has not yet shown significant visible achievements, companies like Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp. (YMTC), Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit Co., Ltd. (JHICC), and Hefei Changxin (Innotron) have garnered attention. Although China has made strides in the fabless, foundry, and memory sectors of the semiconductor industry through aggressive investment and mergers and acquisitions of US companies, it has recently encountered difficulties due to various export bans and restrictions on foreign investment imposed by the Trump administration.

The Trump administration has judged that China's technological innovation in semiconductors is achieved through aggressive mergers and acquisitions of its companies or illegal technology theft, posing a threat to its own semiconductor industry and constituting "economic aggression" (White House 2018). Furthermore, recognizing the development of Chinese semiconductor technology as a "military threat" closely linked to the development of advanced weapons, it has attempted to curb this through various means such as tariffs, export restrictions, regulation of Chinese mergers and acquisitions of US companies, and intellectual property lawsuits.

In December 2017, Micron, the largest US memory semiconductor company, filed a lawsuit in a US court against Fujian Jinhua, a Chinese state-owned semiconductor company, and Taiwan's UMC, which was constructing a joint factory with Fujian Jinhua, for patent and trade secret infringement. In response, UMC filed a counterclaim in a Chinese court, requesting a sales ban on Micron products (Lee Soo-hwan 2018). The Fuzhou court in China ordered a sales ban in China for 26 products manufactured by Micron, including DRAM and NAND flash memory.

In August 2018, the Trump administration finalized its decision to impose a 25% high tariff on Chinese imports, with many items benefiting from "Made in China 2025" included, such as semiconductors and related equipment, as well as electronics, plastics, railway vehicles, and chemicals. In October 2018, the US Department of Commerce restricted exports to Fujian Jinhua, a Chinese DRAM manufacturer. Judging that Fujian Jinhua's memory chip manufacturing capabilities posed a "significant threat" to the survival of US military system chip suppliers, the Department of Commerce placed Fujian Jinhua on the Entity List, which restricts exports of software and technology. Consequently, US companies must obtain special approval from US authorities to export to Fujian Jinhua. In 2019, the US Department of Commerce designated Huawei's subsidiary, semiconductor design company HiSilicon, as a company subject to transaction restrictions. HiSilicon is experiencing difficulties as it cannot use automated design tools for semiconductors from US companies.

In 2015, Tsinghua Unigroup, a Chinese semiconductor company, attempted to acquire Micron, the world's third-largest memory company, to expand its memory semiconductor business, but the attempt failed. In 2017, the acquisition attempt by Canyon Bridge, a Chinese private equity firm, of Lattice Semiconductor, a US semiconductor company, was rejected on the grounds that it could pose a risk to national security, considering the potential for intellectual property transfer and the semiconductor supply chain to the US. The acquisition attempt of US chipmaker Qualcomm by Broadcom, a Singaporean company with Chinese ties, in 2018 also failed (Yoon Dae-gyun 2018). The background to the failure of Chinese companies' mergers and acquisitions of US companies lies with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Based on the USTR's Section 301 investigation, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) was included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 and became effective in August 2018 with the President's signature. This law expanded the scope of CFIUS review, applied the concept of national security comprehensively in its review, and strengthened its authority by allowing the suspension of investment transactions during review and investigation.

China has also initiated antitrust investigations into US semiconductor companies and investigations into the monopolistic practices of Micron, Samsung, and SK Hynix within China. Furthermore, China has advanced intellectual property protection, arguing that it has not violated intellectual property laws, citing a doubling of royalty payments from $3.4 billion in 2011 to $7.2 billion. In April 2018, immediately after the US imposed sanctions on telecommunications equipment manufacturer ZTE, President Xi Jinping visited Wuhan Xinxin Semiconductor (XMC), an affiliate of China's Tsinghua Unigroup, emphasizing that semiconductors are the heart of realizing the "China Dream" and encouraging continuous technological innovation efforts. As the US-China trade and intellectual property war has concretely evolved into a semiconductor war, setbacks are also expected for China's semiconductor rise. Fujian Jinhua is a key component of the "Made in China 2025" program, and China had predicted 2019 to be the inaugural year for Chinese memory semiconductor production with the progress of Fujian Jinhua, Changxin Memory, and Hefei Changxin. However, with the current restrictions on importing equipment from the US, delays in Fujian Jinhua's mass production plans for memory semiconductors are inevitable. For the time being, China's semiconductor rise efforts are expected to enter a lull (Kim Soo-jin 2019). However, considering China's domestic market demand, which accounts for nearly half of global semiconductor demand, and the Chinese government and companies' commitment to localization and their investment capacity, China will continue to invest in and innovate in the semiconductor sector, including memory, foundry, other fabless, and downstream semiconductor equipment industries, despite the various difficulties caused by US actions.

5G

As new communication technologies have developed, the communication industry ecosystem has changed, and fierce competition has ensued to preempt technological standards and gain market leadership. 5G is predicted to bring about many domestic and international changes by reshaping the communication industry as a general-purpose technology that creates new industries and business models, in conjunction with artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things (IoT) (Lee Ji-yoon 2019; Samjong KPMG 2018; K-Sure Insurance 2018; CGS 2019; Eurasia Group 2018; Kania 2018; Lewis 2019). 5G is a common term used in the market; the official term approved at the ITU-R Radiocommunication Assembly in 2015 is "IMT-2020," characterized by ultra-high speed, ultra-low latency ensuring fast response times, and ultra-connectivity enabling massive device connections. The industry ecosystem surrounding 5G is expected to initially involve network equipment, infrastructure builders, terminals, components, and services, and then expand to content such as virtual reality, autonomous driving services, and further to smart homes, smart factories, remote healthcare, and smart cities.

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is scheduled to adopt the final 5G standard in the first half of 2020, with the US, China, and Europe vying for leadership. Due to the broad scope of the ecosystem covered by 5G, it is difficult for a single company to dominate. Currently, the competition surrounding 5G is particularly intense in areas such as equipment, terminals, components, and services. In the field of communication chip manufacturing, which develops the modem chips that practically implement 5G, US companies like Qualcomm and Intel hold overwhelming positions. In various communication equipment sectors requiring high-frequency bands, companies such as Ericsson, Nokia, Huawei, Samsung, and ZTE are active. In the communication terminal sector, Samsung Electronics and Apple are in a duopoly, but China's Huawei and Xiaomi are pursuing them by focusing on mid- to low-priced products. Currently, China holds an overwhelming number of 5G-related intellectual property rights, and it is expected that China's intellectual property revenue will significantly increase as the scale of the 5G industry expands (CGS 2019).

The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) of China announced the "Next Generation Information Technology Industry Plan (2016–2020)" in October 2016, presenting mid- to long-term guidelines for the development of the 5G mobile communication industry (Cho Eun-gyo 2019; Finley 2018; Kania 2018, etc.). It has promoted commercialization by dividing 5G mobile communication into two phases: Phase 1 (2016–2018) for core technology development and testing, and Phase 2 (2018–2020) for commercial product development and demonstration. In conjunction with the Ministry of Science and Technology, it has supported market, network, and frequency requirements for "IMT-2020" and research exchange activities in international standardization bodies. Driven by the government's active support policies, a structure has been created where the synergy effect between the three major telecommunications companies (China Telecom, China Unicom, China Mobile) and the two major telecommunications equipment manufacturers (Huawei, ZTE) is realized. That is, a virtuous cycle has been formed where telecommunications companies benefit from the active technical support of equipment manufacturers, and equipment manufacturers expand 5G infrastructure and grow the market, supported by large orders from telecommunications companies.

Currently, Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications equipment and mobile phone provider, is at the center of the US-China technological conflict. Founded in 1987, Huawei became the number one company in the Chinese telecommunications equipment market in 1999, surpassing global competitors. It began expanding into Southeast Asia, India, Africa, and other regions in 1996 and entered the US market in 2003 (Groll 2019; Lin et al 2018). Since 2010, it has actively built a global R&D network. Huawei, which has grown based on its success in the rapidly expanding domestic and international telecommunications markets, has strived for technological innovation by investing an average of 15% of its annual revenue in R&D. It has now grown to form a triad with Ericsson and Nokia in the 5G telecommunications equipment market.

<그림 1> Top 5G Standard Essential Patent Countries

출처: CGS 2019 (data from IPlyrics)

As a result of continuous innovation, Huawei's patent count far surpasses that of other Chinese companies like Lenovo, Haier, and Xiaomi. Moreover, in terms of PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty) patents, a globally recognized measure, it has surpassed Samsung and Apple (Choi Eui-hyun et al. 2018). Huawei's PCT patents started with one patent in 2000 and reached 20,722 by the end of 2015, making it the company with the most PCT patent applications worldwide in 2015. Samsung Electronics had approximately 10,402 PCT patents by the end of 2015, while Apple had only 3,335. However, in terms of US registered and applied patents, which are directly related to patent quality, Huawei lags behind both Samsung and Apple.

Since entering the US market in 2001, Huawei has been involved in numerous lawsuits over patent infringement and technology theft. Currently, it faces severe criticism for alleged intellectual property rights violations and opaque ties with the Communist Party of China. In 2003, Cisco, a major US telecommunications equipment manufacturer, sued Huawei for allegedly stealing its source code. Huawei has also been accused of illegally supplying equipment containing US components to Iran.

The first official expression of suspicion towards Huawei in the US came in a 2005 report published by RAND (RAND 2005). The report claimed that Chinese companies like Huawei were forming a "Digital Triangle" with the Chinese military and state research institutions. "Huawei maintains close ties with the Chinese military, which serves as an important customer, political sponsor, and R&D partner for Huawei. The government and military present Huawei as a national champion, and this company is currently China's largest, fastest-growing, and most impressive telecommunications equipment manufacturer." In 2008, Huawei's attempt to acquire 3-Com, a US software company, was blocked by CFIUS.

In 2012, the US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released a report discussing the impact of Huawei and ZTE on national security (SCI 2012). The report concluded that Chinese telecommunications equipment could be used for cyberattacks by the Chinese government, posing a threat to US national security. Due to a lack of transparent information regarding the relationship between Huawei and the Communist Party of China and security threats posed by Huawei, the US government should not adopt Huawei or ZTE telecommunications equipment, and US companies should also avoid using equipment from these companies. The announcement of "Made in China 2025" in 2015 served as a significant turning point in fostering a climate of restraint towards Chinese technological innovation in the US (Lee Min-ja 2019). Under the Trump administration, a series of documents were published, including the USTR's "Section 301 Investigation Report (USTR 2018)," the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission's (USCC) "Hearing Report on China's Market Distortions (USCC 2018)," and the White House's "Report on China's Economic Aggression (White House 2018)." All of these criticized "Made in China 2025" for implementing large-scale overseas investment strategies aimed at acquiring advanced technologies from developed countries including the US and EU to achieve China's independent innovation and enhance the international competitiveness of Chinese companies. They argued that this state-led investment in technological development abroad is a form of "Economic Aggression," which involves acquiring core technologies and intellectual property rights from major countries and stealing advanced technologies. As US-China trade tensions intensified, in May 2019, the US Department of Commerce announced that it had placed Huawei, a leading company in next-generation mobile communications 5G, and its 68 affiliates on the "Entity List" for export control. This list includes individuals, companies, research institutions, and civil organizations that the Bureau of Industry and Security under the US Department of Commerce deems a threat to US national security or a high risk. Subsequently, US companies must obtain a separate license to conduct business with Huawei, including the leasing of software like Google Apps and intellectual property rights such as patent licenses. Following this, Google, Microsoft, Intel, and Qualcomm announced the termination of technology use agreements with Huawei or the suspension of transactions. The US has also pressured its allies, such as Canada, Australia, the UK, and New Zealand, to ban Huawei's telecommunications equipment, and Canada and Australia have now joined this effort.

Due to strong US containment, Huawei is currently facing difficulties as it cannot import key components and software. However, it is strongly protesting and resisting regarding intellectual property rights and its relationship with the Communist Party of China. Huawei recently published a white paper titled "Respecting and Protecting Intellectual Property: The Cornerstone of Innovation," introducing its contributions to innovation and intellectual property rights (IPR) protection (Huawei 2019). The white paper states that innovation and IPR protection have been the core of Huawei's success over the past 30 years, and as of the end of 2018, Huawei had received 87,805 patents, of which 11,152 were US patents. The white paper also explains that Huawei generated $1.4 billion in licensing revenue from 2015 onwards. In addition to securing its own patents, Huawei pays over $6 billion in royalties for the legal use of other companies' intellectual property, stating that 80% of this amount was paid to US companies. The US has not lifted its import restrictions on Huawei, and Huawei is fiercely retaliating with patent lawsuits, suggesting that the conflict will continue.

인공지능(Artificial Intelligence: AI)

Эндрю Ын, ведущий мировой специалист по глубокому обучению, назвал искусственный интеллект «электричеством новой эры» (AI is the New Electricity). Ожидается, что искусственный интеллект, применяемый во всех отраслях промышленности, приведет к различным политико-экономическим изменениям как внутри страны, так и за рубежом (О Чон Хёк 2018; Ли Ван Хви 2019; Hass et al. 2018; Horowitz et al. 2018; Lee 2018). Сектор искусственного интеллекта пока сложно анализировать с точки зрения общей промышленной структуры или глобальной цепочки создания стоимости (Global Value Chain). В целом, считается, что превосходство в секторе искусственного интеллекта будет определяться наличием подходящих данных, кадров, вычислительных мощностей, алгоритмов, а также различных потребностей и политической воли, стимулирующих его применение (Horowitz et al. 2018). В настоящее время США имеют преимущество в области кадров, вычислительных мощностей и алгоритмов, а Китай — в области данных, потребностей и политики. Особенно отмечается, что Китай значительно опережает в области распознавания речи и лиц (CISTP 2018; Ding 2018). В настоящее время Китай опережает США по количеству публикаций и патентов, связанных с искусственным интеллектом (Ким Дэ Чон и др. 2019; Пак Сын Хёк 2019). Однако, если присмотреться, то в случае патентов большинство из них (13 088, 95,8%) приходится на заявки, поданные внутри страны, причем университеты (6 496) подали больше патентов, чем компании (5 824). В Китае патенты на искусственный интеллект подаются на основе университетского подхода, в то время как в США патенты в основном подаются компаниями (5 478, 87,2%), лидирующими на мировом рынке, что указывает на превосходство США в конкурентоспособности коммерциализации технологий.

Китай уже сформировал двустороннюю структуру с США в области технологий ИИ, и такие организации, как Goldman Sachs и McKinsey, прогнозируют, что Китай опередит США и станет мировым лидером в области технологий ИИ в течение следующих 10 лет благодаря человеческим ресурсам, инфраструктуре и промышленной политике (Goldman Sachs 2017; McKinsey 2017). В 2015 году «искусственный интеллект» (人工智能) впервые появился в отчете правительства Китая (He 2017). После «Интернет Плюс» в 2015 году правительство Китая в 2017 году опубликовало «План развития искусственного интеллекта нового поколения» (新一代人工智能发展规划), представив дорожную карту для достижения мирового лидерства в области технологий ИИ к 2030 году. «Мы должны использовать историческую возможность развития искусственного интеллекта. Это возможность для экономического и социального развития, а также для национальной безопасности и, в конечном счете, для укрепления и повышения общей конкурентоспособности Китая (牢牢把握人工智能发展的重大历史机遇，[…] 引领世界人工智能发展新潮流，服务经济社会发展和支撑国家安全，带动国家竞争力整体跃升和跨越式发展).

Крупные китайские ИТ-компании BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent) активно расширяют инвестиции в ИИ (О Чон Хёк 2018; Ли Ван Хви 2019 и др.). Эти компании в настоящее время разделяют обязанности и возглавляют развитие сектора искусственного интеллекта в Китае. Baidu запустила проект Apollo, план разработки платформы для автономных транспортных средств. Alibaba отвечает за проект City Brain по созданию платформы для строительства умных городов и планирует построить футуристический умный город, интегрирующий передовые технологии, такие как ИИ, в районе Сюнъань, провинция Хэбэй, после пилотного строительства умного города в Ханчжоу, провинция Чжэцзян. Tencent фокусируется на платформах в области медицины и здравоохранения.

Данные, генерируемые огромным населением Китая, составляют 13% мировых данных и служат источником для создания больших данных, необходимых для построения ИИ. Goldman Sachs прогнозирует, что к 2020 году эта доля увеличится примерно до 20-25%. Относительно слабый по сравнению с развитыми странами уровень защиты личных данных также упоминается как важный фактор, позволяющий получить доступ к огромным объемам данных. В Китае инвестиции стремительно растут, особенно в таких областях, как распознавание лиц и голоса, необходимых для таких передовых отраслей, как финансы и онлайн-платежи, а также в области гуманоидных роботов и компаний, занимающихся ИИ в сфере здравоохранения. Ожидается, что технологии ИИ, такие как распознавание лиц и голоса, будут применяться в китайских передовых отраслях, таких как финансы и автономное вождение, выводя китайскую промышленность на новый уровень. Хотя Китай лидирует в некоторых прикладных областях, таких как распознавание лиц и голоса, а также в здравоохранении, благодаря огромным венчурным инвестициям и данным, считается, что США сохраняют свое превосходство в области искусственного интеллекта в целом, включая аппаратное обеспечение, высококачественные кадры и фундаментальные исследования (Ding 2018).

В отличие от полупроводников, в области искусственного интеллекта явные негативные стратегии сдерживания не проявляются, однако США ограничивают китайские инвестиции в собственные технологии и компании ИИ и усиливают полномочия CFIUS в этой области (O’Connor 2019). Кроме того, США критикуют китайское правительство за использование ИИ для контроля и военного применения, внимательно следя за развитием китайских технологий ИИ (Horowitz et al. 2018).

США сохраняют свое превосходство в области искусственного интеллекта в целом и в то же время подчеркивают важность инвестиций и подготовки кадров для развития собственных технологий ИИ. Администрация Обамы в своем отчете по ИИ перед окончанием срока полномочий представила три стратегии: разработка технологий ИИ, гражданское образование и поддержка работников (Obama Administration 2016). Администрация Трампа вступила в конфликт с научным и технологическим сообществом из-за обсуждения мер, пагубных для научно-технических инноваций в США, таких как сокращение бюджета на исследования и разработки и антииммиграционные законы, однако издала исполнительный указ, который ставит приоритетом исследования и разработки в области ИИ (White House 2019a). Этот исполнительный указ, названный «Инициатива ИИ», предписывает федеральному правительству стремиться к разработке технологий для обеспечения превосходства в области ИИ нового поколения, предусматривая поддержку исследований в среднесрочной и долгосрочной перспективе, расширение доступа к федеральной информации для стимулирования исследований в области ИИ, а также усиление образования в области науки, технологий, инженерии и математики. Президент Трамп, который в начале года в своем обращении к нации заявил о расширении инвестиций в ИИ и 5G, на церемонии подписания подчеркнул: «Постоянное лидерство в области ИИ имеет первостепенное значение для поддержания американской экономики и национальной безопасности».

Ожидается, что в будущем китайский сектор искусственного интеллекта будет продолжать бросать вызов США в новых областях применения благодаря огромным объемам данных и технологическому развитию. Обе стороны будут конкурировать, разделяя сферы превосходства. Фактически, у США не так много рычагов для сдерживания Китая, который растет в определенных секторах благодаря огромным объемам данных, капиталу и всесторонней поддержке со стороны правительства. С другой стороны, Китаю будет трудно быстро догнать США в таких областях, как фундаментальные исследования и высококвалифицированные специалисты, где США имеют преимущество. Это требует реформ в китайской системе образования, региональных различиях и всей национальной инновационной системе.

В последнее время в США растет обеспокоенность по поводу возможности использования китайским правительством технологий ИИ для наблюдения и контроля (Horowitz et al. 2018; Mozur 2019). Возникают вопросы относительно того, будет ли сбор и использование больших объемов данных, являющихся основой технологий ИИ, продолжаться легко, поскольку в Китае растет осведомленность о правах человека и усиливается контроль над информацией. В настоящее время китайские технологии распознавания лиц уже используются для выявления нарушителей общественного порядка, таких как переход дороги в неположенном месте, и преступников, и обсуждаются вопросы нарушения прав человека в связи с этим. Также высказываются предположения, что глобальная экспансия китайских технологий ИИ может замедлиться из-за ограничений, налагаемых китайским правительством на интернет, что ограничивает накопление данных из-за пределов Китая.

Подводя итог вышеизложенному, можно сказать, что благодаря различным санкциям США против китайских компаний в полупроводниковой отрасли, где технологическое превосходство США является подавляющим, ожидается значительная задержка в «полупроводниковом рывке» Китая. В полупроводниковой отрасли у Китая в настоящее время ограниченные возможности для противостояния США. Однако, учитывая внутренний спрос на китайском рынке, который составляет почти половину мирового спроса на полупроводники, а также стремление правительства и компаний Китая к локализации и их инвестиционные возможности, можно прогнозировать, что Китай продолжит инновации в полупроводниковой отрасли, и, хотя и с задержкой, «полупроводниковый рывок» Китая будет реализован.

В области искусственного интеллекта, который находится на ранней стадии развития, США и Китай, основываясь на своих преимуществах, фокусируются на различных секторах, поэтому, кроме общего сдерживания со стороны США и постановки вопросов об использовании в военных целях и государственном контроле, конфликта в этой области не возникает. Со временем, по мере совпадения ключевых технологий и основных секторов, а также по мере распространения военного применения ИИ и его тесной связи с государственным контролем и наблюдением, конкуренция и конфликты в области искусственного интеллекта между двумя странами, как ожидается, обострятся.

В области 5G США сохраняют свое превосходство в ключевых чипах в сегменте телекоммуникационного оборудования и стремятся к доминированию в стандартах технологий 5G, чтобы компенсировать свою слабую физическую инфраструктуру в целом, развивая соответствующие сервисные сегменты. Можно видеть, что США очень чувствительно реагируют на потерю конкурентоспособности в сегменте телекоммуникационного оборудования из-за чрезмерной конкуренции и убытков в оборудовании 4G LTE, и вместо этого ярко появились китайские компании Huawei и ZTE. В настоящее время Huawei находится под шквалом технологического конфликта между США и Китаем, и ожидается, что этот конфликт не утихнет в краткосрочной перспективе. В утекшем в 2018 году отчете Белого дома выражалась обеспокоенность отставанием США в инфраструктуре 5G и предлагалось установить федеральные правила, касающиеся процедур покупки, установки и эксплуатации телекоммуникационного оборудования, а также унифицировать разрозненные правила на уровне штатов и муниципалитетов для усиления безопасности в ответ на китайскую киберразведку. В качестве наилучшего решения предлагался вариант, при котором государство напрямую строит/владеет сетью 5G и сдает ее в аренду сервисным операторам, что вызвало споры (Swan et al. 2018). Этот инцидент можно рассматривать как отражение нервозности и чувства кризиса в США в области 5G. Ожидается, что конкуренция между США и Китаем за доминирование в 5G также усилится.

Более 100 лет назад Великобритания и Германия сохраняли превосходство над США в новых научно-технических областях, таких как химия, телеграф и сталь. Тем не менее, новые отрасли и методы производства, основанные на новых технологиях, успешно утвердились через Атлантику в США, заложив основу для подъема США как гегемонистской державы. В то время США были динамично развивающейся страной, сочетающей в себе обширную территорию, богатые ресурсы, вызовы и инновации изобретателей и предпринимателей, а также активную государственную политику поддержки развития промышленности. Причина, по которой нельзя недооценивать вызов Китая в областях полупроводников, 5G и искусственного интеллекта, несмотря на технологическое превосходство США, заключается в том, что Китай также обладает огромным населением и ресурсами, вызовами со стороны инновационных предпринимателей, сформировавшихся в процессе экономического роста, и активной государственной политикой. Важно то, сможет ли этот потенциал быть реализован, и для этого существует множество внутренних и внешних вызовов, которые Китаю предстоит преодолеть. Текущий торговый и технологический конфликт с США представляет собой серьезный вызов для Китая и является большой горой, которую Китаю предстоит преодолеть. Ключевым моментом будет то, сможет ли Китай успешно справиться с этими вызовами, продолжая технологические инновации и экономический рост, и сможет ли он, подобно тому, как США восстановили свою жизнеспособность и сохранили гегемонию благодаря подъему так называемой информационной экономики в начале 1980-х годов, возглавить поток четвертой промышленной революции, восстановить экономическую жизнеспособность и снова добиться прорыва.

Краткий обзор технологической конкуренции между США и Китаем в текущих областях полупроводников, 5G и искусственного интеллекта ясно показывает, что технологическое развитие происходит не в вакууме, а в конкретном политико-экономическом контексте, и особенно взаимосвязано с глобальными политико-экономическими факторами. Скорость и траектория технологического развития, а также его движущие силы формируются под влиянием глобальных политико-экономических факторов, и это технологическое развитие, в свою очередь, является основным фактором, формирующим изменения в мировом политико-экономическом порядке. Необходимо продолжать исследования, которые более тщательно анализируют взаимосвязь между технологиями и мировым политико-экономическим порядком в рамках концепции их совместной эволюции.

США-Китай технологическая гегемония конкуренция и мир политико-экономический блок?

Поскольку США продолжают вводить пошлины на китайскую технологическую продукцию, ограничивать деловые операции компаний и регулировать зарубежные инвестиции, прогнозируются изменения в либеральном мировом политико-экономическом порядке, построенном после Второй мировой войны. В частности, существует вероятность разделения цепочек поставок (Supply Chain), которые были тесно связаны в рамках глобальных цепочек создания стоимости (Global Value Chain, GVC) для производства товаров и услуг за рубежом с 1990-х годов, на американскую и китайскую стороны. Фактически, это воспринимается как стратегия, намеченная администрацией Трампа, и этот процесс называется по-разному: «Decoupling», «Bifurcation», «Economic Iron Curtain», «Balkanization», «Cold Tech War» (Bremmer et al. 2018; Luce 2018; Orange et al. 2019; Panda et al. 2019).

В 2018 году Huawei опубликовала список из 92 ключевых поставщиков комплектующих, среди которых 33 компании были американскими, такими как Intel, Xilinx и TI (Rollet 2019). Сразу после того, как администрация Трампа издала исполнительный указ о запрете сделок с Huawei, американские компании, такие как Intel, Google и Qualcomm, прекратили сделки с Huawei. Кроме того, сообщения о том, что иностранные компании в Китае рассматривают возможность сокращения масштабов деятельности или ухода из-за давления в виде пошлин, повышают вероятность реструктуризации GVC. В настоящее время цепочки поставок, связывающие азиатские страны, особенно Китай, в производстве электроники, одежды, автомобилей и т. д., являются заметными. Высказываются опасения, что давление на Huawei может распространиться на другие сектора и на весь азиатский регион.

Если торговые пошлины, ограничения на деловые операции и регулирование зарубежных инвестиций со стороны администрации Трампа в США будут продолжаться в долгосрочной перспективе, и GVC, созданные за последние десятилетия, действительно разделятся, и произойдет процесс разделения цепочек поставок технологической продукции, это поднимет два важных вопроса. Во-первых, действительно ли GVC разделятся в соответствии с намерениями правительства Трампа, и до какой степени будут разделены цепочки поставок обеих сторон. Искусственное разделение GVC, сформированных в рыночной и государственной политической среде за последние десятилетия, повлечет за собой значительные экономические издержки и политические трудности, и управление последующим мировым экономическим спадом также будет непростым. Например, Apple за последнее десятилетие значительно увеличила количество китайских партнеров-поставщиков и управляет примерно 380 производственными объектами в Китае. Хотя сообщалось, что в настоящее время планируется перенести около 30% из них за пределы Китая, вопрос о том, будет ли это реализовано, остается неопределенным, и это, безусловно, станет серьезным бременем для Apple (Kynge 2019).

Во-вторых, многие страны, помимо США и Китая, окажутся под давлением выбора, к какой GVC присоединиться. Для таких стран, как Южная Корея или ЕС, которые находятся в GVC, связанной одновременно с Китаем и США, этот выбор неизбежно повлечет за собой болезненные процессы и результаты, и найти альтернативу будет непросто (CGS 2019; Lucas 2019). Трудно предсказать, к какой стороне они присоединятся. Для 24 азиатских стран средняя доля экспорта в Китай составляет 24%, в то время как доля экспорта в США составляет лишь половину — 12%. С точки зрения чистой экономики, выбор в пользу Китая был бы правильным, но, учитывая сотрудничество в области безопасности, построенное США в азиатском регионе, и мировой политико-экономический порядок, основанный на универсальных идеологиях либеральной демократии, выбор может быть сложным. Учитывая, что конкуренция за гегемонию между США и Китаем будет продолжаться в первой половине 21 века, лучший путь для Южной Кореи и мировой экономики — найти способы управления технологическим конфликтом между США и Китаем на уровне, который не нарушает универсальные принципы или нормы, а не разделение мирового политико-экономического порядка на основе двух полюсов — США и Китая. Фактически, США и Китай были двумя основными бенефициарами в рамках GVC, созданных за последние десятилетия, и, осознавая, что они способствовали процветанию обеих стран через движение рабочей силы и капитала в рамках либерального мирового экономического порядка, они должны искать точки соприкосновения для избежания полномасштабного конфликта и достижения компромисса (Thomson and Bremmer 2018).

Окончательный вопрос о том, как будет перестроен мировой политико-экономический порядок в результате технологической конкуренции за гегемонию между США и Китаем, будет заключаться в том, сможет ли Китай преодолеть различные внутренние и внешние вызовы, с которыми он сталкивается, и взять на себя ведущую роль в построении устойчивых технологических инноваций и новых промышленных и экономических парадигм, основанных на них. Однако, в то же время, более фундаментальный вопрос для Китая заключается в том, какой страной и каким миром Китай стремится создать на основе технологических инноваций и экономического роста, и сможет ли Китай предложить нормы, которые будут рационально и убедительно восприняты другими странами. По этому поводу одно исследование утверждает, что важно, сможет ли Китай дать ответ на проблему 19 века «Восток и Запад» (東道西器), которую он не смог реализовать (Hui 2016). Отмечается, что большая проблема заключается в том, что неясно, что именно Китай стремится реализовать с помощью технологий и материального превосходства, помимо материального догоняния США. Приводится пример из Чжуан-цзы «Повар, разделывающий быка» (庖丁解牛). «По» (庖) означает человека, разделывающего быка, а «хай» (解) означает разделывание быка.

«Однажды По, разделывающий быка, готовил быка для господина Вэнь Хуэя. Его движения рук, плеч, наклонов, движений ног и коленей, а также движения ножа соответствовали ритму. Господин Вэнь Хуэй был впечатлен и спросил: «Как можно достичь такого уровня мастерства?» По отложил нож и ответил: «То, что я ценю, — это «Дао». Оно превосходит ловкость рук. Когда я впервые начал разделывать быков, я видел только быка и не мог найти, куда приложить нож. Через три года я увидел нечто большее, чем быка. В последнее время я воспринимаю быка духом, а не глазами. Когда действие глаз прекращается, остается только естественное действие духа. Тогда я следую естественному принципу, нахожу большие промежутки и пустоты между кожей и мясом, костями и плотью, и мой нож движется там. Тонкость моего мастерства заключается в том, что я никогда не ошибался ножом, не повреждая плоть или кости. Опытные мясники меняют нож через год, потому что они разрезают плоть. Обычные мясники меняют нож каждый месяц, потому что они вынуждены разрезать кости. Но мой нож используется уже 19 лет, и я разделал тысячи быков, но лезвие выглядит так, как будто его только что заточили...»

Этот анекдот предполагает, что превосходство в мастерстве может быть достигнуто только тогда, когда оно неразрывно связано с духовным Дао, и что мастерство и Дао неразделимы. Другими словами, технологическая конкуренция между США и Китаем — это не только борьба за материальную и фактическую силу, но и, в конечном счете, вопрос идеологии и духовного Дао. Важно то, как США и Китай будут управлять мировым политико-экономическим порядком, формирующимся на основе новых технологий, с точки зрения норм и идеологии. ■

■ Автор: Бэ Ён Чжа_ Профессор кафедры политологии и международных отношений Университета Кунгук. Окончила факультет международных отношений Сеульского национального университета и получила докторскую степень по политологии в Университете Северной Каролины в США. Основные области исследований включают международльную политическую экономию, политическую экономию прямых иностранных инвестиций, науку и технологии и международные отношения, Интернет и международные отношения, научно-техническую дипломатию. Основные опубликованные работы и соавторские работы включают «Сеть и государственная стратегия» (2015, в соавторстве), «Мир и Северная Корея через сеть» (2015, в соавторстве), «Публичная дипломатия стран среднего уровня» (2013, редактор).

■ Ответственный редактор: Чхве Су И, старший научный сотрудник EAI

Контакт: 02 2277 1683 (доб. 206) I schoi@eai.or.kr

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