Ha Young-sun Column: For a Successful Third North Korea-U.S. Summit: Convergence of North Korean and U.S. Calculation Methods

[Editor's Note]

Amidst global attention, the second North Korea-U.S. summit was held in Hanoi, Vietnam, but concluded without the two sides reaching a final agreement. This is because the gap in positions between North Korea and the U.S. regarding North Korea's denuclearization still exists. Ha Young-sun, Director of EAI, analyzes that progress in North Korea's denuclearization is unlikely unless North Korea completely abandons its nuclear weapons and the U.S. fails to present North Korea with a credible diplomatic and military security guarantee that is more reliable than nuclear weapons. In particular, the first and second North Korea-U.S. summits were largely 'probing' in nature, and the author emphasizes that South Korea's active role as a mediator is required to achieve substantial results in the third summit. That is, South Korea must persuade North Korea to move towards complete denuclearization while simultaneously working with the U.S. to develop concrete and attractive measures for North Korea's regime security and prosperity.

Following the conclusion of the second North Korea-U.S. summit, where a final agreement was not reached, North Korea clearly articulated its calculation method for denuclearization in a late-night press conference. First, if the U.S. lifts some UN sanctions, specifically those affecting the civilian economy and people's livelihoods, North Korea will permanently and completely dismantle all nuclear material production facilities, including those for plutonium and uranium at Yongbyon, under the supervision of U.S. experts and through joint work by technicians from both countries. Second, North Korea will provide a written commitment to permanently halt nuclear tests and long-range rocket test launches. Third, while security guarantees are a more critical issue than denuclearization, North Korea proposes partial sanctions relief as a corresponding measure, as the U.S. appears to be more hesitant about this. Fourth, this initial process is unavoidable for complete denuclearization, and the optimal plan we have presented must be followed. Fifth, however, the U.S. insisted to the end on one additional measure beyond the dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, indicating that the U.S. is not prepared to accept our proposal.

Meanwhile, the U.S. explained its calculation method for North Korea's denuclearization at a press conference immediately after the summit. First, for complete denuclearization, the permanent dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities proposed by North Korea is insufficient; additional nuclear facilities as demanded by the U.S. must be included. Second, the dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities alone does not warrant the lifting of key sanctions that North Korea desires. Third, North Korea currently holds a different vision for denuclearization than the U.S. However, the gap in visions has relatively narrowed over the past year, and it is expected that they will ultimately share the same vision. Fourth, if North Korea chooses denuclearization, the U.S. will promote international support for it to become an economic powerhouse.

The most significant outcome of the second North Korea-U.S. summit was the clear demonstration that the current North Korean and U.S. calculation methods for North Korea's denuclearization are irreconcilable. Since the Singapore summit, there have been sharp divisions among domestic and international policymakers and experts between optimistic views that the differences between the two calculation methods are sufficiently adjustable and pessimistic views that they are entirely impossible. The East Asia Institute (EAI) has criticized the dichotomy of simplistic optimism and pessimism on this issue and has pointed out that North Korea is pursuing a three-stage negotiation plan for a North Korean-style complete denuclearization, which differs from the North Korea-U.S. style complete denuclearization. The first stage involves inducing the suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises through the voluntary dismantling of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and the Dongchang-ri engine test site and missile launch pad as a trust-building measure. The second stage involves permanently dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear facilities in exchange for the termination of hostile policy toward North Korea and the easing of economic sanctions based on the principle of 'action for action.' The third stage proposes a nuclear disarmament conference that includes the Korean Peninsula and surrounding regions from the perspective of 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' for complete denuclearization ("EAI Commentary(June 21, 2018)/Ha Young-sun Column(January 3, 2019)).

The second North Korea-U.S. summit proved that cautious optimism, rather than the optimistic view that North Korea agreed to complete denuclearization or the pessimistic view that it did not agree at all, was the correct analysis. It demonstrated that denuclearization, both currently and in the future, can be agreed upon based on trust-building and corresponding measures, but North Korea cannot abandon its past nuclear weapons while maintaining a minimum deterrence system that reliably guarantees its security. Therefore, the Yongbyon nuclear facilities can be dismantled in exchange for corresponding measures, but North Korea could not report additional nuclear facilities as demanded by the U.S.

North Korea is currently facing a difficult predicament. North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho concluded his press conference by stating, "There will be no change whatsoever in our position, and our proposal will remain unchanged even if the U.S. side reopens negotiations in the future." However, as long as North Korea continues to pursue its current calculation method, it is difficult to expect the corresponding measures of sanctions relief and security guarantees that North Korea desires. Furthermore, if, as Chairman Kim Jong-un stated in his New Year's address, North Korea seeks "a new path to defend sovereignty and the supreme interests of the state and achieve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula," it faces the risk of experiencing a "second arduous march" with its regime still unsecured and sanctions intensifying. Therefore, North Korea has reached a critical juncture where it must quickly devise a new North Korean calculation method to "achieve regime security and prosperity without nuclear weapons."

The U.S. also needs to supplement its current calculation method to achieve substantial results in the third North Korea-U.S. summit for North Korea's complete denuclearization. First, to help North Korea quickly develop a new calculation method for genuine complete denuclearization, the U.S. must earnestly pursue discussions on diplomatic and military regime guarantees that are more reliable than nuclear weapons, with close cooperation from South Korea and China. Discussions on establishing multi-layered security guarantees at bilateral levels (North Korea-U.S., North Korea-China, South Korea-North Korea), multilateral levels (six-party talks), and international levels (UN) are urgently needed. Second, measures for sanctions relief and economic assistance corresponding to North Korea's declaration, inspection, and dismantling of all nuclear facilities, nuclear materials, and nuclear weapons, including Yongbyon, as concrete proof of its sincerity towards complete denuclearization, should be discussed internationally.

South Korea must also devise a new South Korean calculation method that can reconcile the North Korean and U.S. calculation methods for the success of the third North Korea-U.S. summit, moving beyond both optimism and pessimism towards a cautious perspective. Above all, it is crucial to correctly recognize that the nature of the first and third North Korea-U.S. summits is entirely different. The first summit proceeded at the level of trust-building according to North Korea's three-stage negotiation plan. The second summit clearly demonstrated the impossibility of reconciling the existing North Korean and U.S. calculation methods. The third summit requires North Korea and the U.S. to devise new calculation methods and reach an agreement. Therefore, South Korea's role, which is entirely different from the first or second summits, is crucial. South Korea must maximally encourage North Korea to create a new calculation method for complete denuclearization, and simultaneously, in cooperation with the U.S., supplement the North Korean denuclearization plan to more actively include North Korea's regime security and prosperity, so that the two calculation methods can be reconciled at the third summit.

North Korea's complete denuclearization is rapidly approaching a moment of truth. If the first and second summits were exploratory, the third summit must be a historic meeting where all protagonists in the ring achieve victory. ■

■ Written by: Ha Young-sun_ Director of EAI, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington. He has served as a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for International Affairs at Seoul National University, Director of the Center for American Studies, and President of the Korean Peace Studies Association. His major works and edited volumes include "Complex World Politics: Strategy, Principles, and a New Order," "The New Era of Korea-Japan Relations and Symbiotic Complex Networks," "World Politics in Transition," and "The U.S.-China Competition in Building the Asia-Pacific Order."

■ Managed and Edited by: Choi Soo-yi, Senior Researcher at EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 105) I schoi@eai.or.kr

[EAI Commentary] is a commentary series planned to provide a forum for discourse where experts from various fields can offer in-depth analysis and policy recommendations on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not affiliated with EAI and are solely the views of the respective authors.