Ha Young-sun Column: Kim Jong-un's 2019 New Year's Address and the Task of Complete Denuclearization

[Editor's Note]

As is customary, North Korea's New Year's address was delivered on the first day of the year. However, the format differed significantly from previous years. Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, appeared in a Western suit rather than his usual People's attire, and delivered the address from his office sofa instead of a podium. Despite these unconventional gestures, the content appears to continue pursuing socialist revolution based on the victory of the existing Byungjin line. Notably, this New Year's address places unprecedented emphasis on North Korea-U.S. relations, which Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute, analyzes as a key prerequisite for strengthening domestic and inter-Korean capabilities. However, he adds that resolving the issue of 'denuclearization' is essential for improving North Korea-U.S. relations, and the process will not be easy as long as the divergence in understanding regarding complete denuclearization persists.

Unlike in the past, Kim Jong-un, Chairman of North Korea's State Affairs Commission, delivered his 2019 New Year's address while comfortably seated on a sofa in the reception room of the Workers' Party of Korea headquarters, under the large portraits of his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, and his father, Kim Jong-il. The New Year's address characterizes 2018 as a "historic year in which great changes occurred in domestic and foreign affairs and socialist construction entered a new stage due to our Party's Juche line and strategic decisions." On April 20, 2018, North Korea declared the victory of the Byungjin line, which pursued economic construction and nuclear armament simultaneously, and presented a new strategic line focused on concentrating all efforts on socialist economic construction. However, the New Year's address clearly states that the new strategic line is not about pursuing denuclearization and economic construction, but rather serves as a crucial opportunity to continue elevating the socialist revolution and accelerating socialist progress based on the victory of the Byungjin line.

For strengthening domestic capabilities in 2019, North Korea advocates achieving the "struggle task of expanding and strengthening the nation's self-reliant development to open a firm prospect for further progress in socialist construction," under the new slogan, "Let us open a new path of advance in socialist construction through self-reliance." Accordingly, it emphasizes prioritizing the strengthening of the socialist self-reliant economy, bolstering socialist political capabilities in all aspects, accelerating socialist cultural construction, fortifying national defense capabilities, and finally, urging revolutionary cadres to strive with vigor. However, to strengthen these capabilities, the enhancement of international capabilities through improved North Korea-U.S. relations and inter-Korean capabilities through improved inter-Korean relations are essential.

Regarding the strengthening of inter-Korean capabilities, North Korea positively assesses the past year as a "turbulent year in which dramatic changes unprecedented in the 70 years of national division occurred." The three inter-Korean summit talks clearly demonstrated that inter-Korean relations have entered a new phase, and the Panmunjom Declaration, the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September, and the Inter-Korean Military Agreement hold significant meaning as de facto non-aggression declarations. Furthermore, satisfaction is expressed with the initial steps taken in active exchanges between athletes and artists, and cooperation projects in various fields, including railways and roads.

However, it is noteworthy that North Korea presents two important demands related to regime security and sanctions relief. First, it states, "Since the North and South have pledged to move towards peace and prosperity, joint military exercises with foreign forces, which are the source of tension on the Korean Peninsula, must no longer be permitted, and all war equipment, including strategic assets from external sources, must be completely halted." Second, it asserts, "In close connection with the parties to the Armistice Agreement, multilateral negotiations must be actively pursued to transform the current armistice regime on the Korean Peninsula into a peace regime, thereby substantially laying the foundation for guaranteeing lasting peace."

Furthermore, it expresses willingness to resume operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Geumgangsan tourism project, asserting that as long as the united strength of the Korean people can be demonstrated, external sanctions and pressures cannot block their path toward national prosperity.

However, for these North Korean assertions to realistically become the agenda for substantive negotiations, North Korea must first demonstrate sincerity in accepting and implementing complete denuclearization as demanded by the international community. Second, the easing of military tensions in inter-Korean relations must move beyond the current initial stage of trust-building to a more substantive phase of operation and structural arms control. Simultaneously, the Northeast Asian order must evolve collectively.

This year's New Year's address places greater emphasis on North Korea-U.S. relations for strengthening international capabilities than ever before, as improved North Korea-U.S. relations are a key prerequisite for strengthening domestic and inter-Korean capabilities. It evaluates the North Korea-U.S. summit as having "greatly contributed to dramatically transforming the most hostile North Korea-U.S. relations and ensuring peace and security in the region of the Korean Peninsula," and states, "As declared in the June 12 North Korea-U.S. Joint Statement, establishing the interests of the two countries in line with the demands of the new century and building a permanent and robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and moving towards complete denuclearization is the immutable position of our Party and the government of the Republic, and my firm will."

However, in explaining North Korea's efforts toward complete denuclearization, it states, "We have proclaimed to the world and taken various practical measures, including not manufacturing, testing, using, or transferring nuclear weapons anymore." This explanation only refers to future denuclearization and does not encompass past denuclearization.

A clear explanation of North Korea's concept of complete denuclearization can be found in the commentary published by the Korean Central News Agency on December 20 last year, titled "It is better to find a new path than to hit a wall on the old road." This article kindly and meticulously explains the difference in concepts to correct the U.S.'s "erroneous understanding" of 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' versus 'North Korean denuclearization.' It emphasizes, "It must be clearly understood that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula means removing not only all nuclear threat factors within the territories of the North and South but also those from surrounding areas targeting the Korean Peninsula." It further argues that for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 'the complete elimination of nuclear threats to Korea' must precede the dismantling of North Korea's nuclear deterrent. Simultaneously, North Korea claims that at the Singapore summit, the agreement was on 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,' not 'North Korean denuclearization.' Unless a new strategic line has been adopted in the past ten days, this commentary elaborates on North Korea's version of complete denuclearization as articulated in the New Year's address.

For North Korea's version of complete denuclearization, North Korea is pursuing a three-stage negotiation plan with the United States, initiated at the summit. The first stage involves voluntary dismantlement of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and missile engine test site to build trust, thereby inducing the suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises. In the second stage, North Korea proposes to report and allow inspections of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, a part of its past nuclear program, in exchange for the termination of the U.S. policy of hostility towards North Korea and sanctions relief, based on the principle of 'action for action.' The third stage proposes nuclear disarmament talks, encompassing the Korean Peninsula and surrounding regions, from the perspective of 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' for complete denuclearization.

However, the dream of North Korea's three-stage negotiation strategy for complete denuclearization is unrealistic. The United States and North Korea are currently in a final tug-of-war for a second summit. As a starting point to demonstrate sincerity for complete North Korean denuclearization, North Korea is partially reporting past nuclear facilities like Yongbyon and seeking IAEA inspections, in response to the U.S. demand to report all past, present, and future nuclear facilities and undergo international verification.

Meanwhile, unless North Korea accepts complete denuclearization, including past programs, the United States will only grant regime security and sanctions relief, as demanded by North Korea, in a very limited manner. Therefore, even if a second summit takes place, the sincerity of both sides will likely remain insufficient to fully satisfy the other, making it difficult to lay the groundwork for a third meeting aimed at genuine complete denuclearization.

Kim Jong-un stated, "I am prepared to sit down with the U.S. President again in the future and will strive to achieve results that will be welcomed by the international community." However, he also asserted that if the U.S. misjudges North Korea and continues with sanctions and pressure, North Korea will have no choice but to seek a new path. Nevertheless, as long as the gap in understanding between North Korea's 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' and the U.S.'s 'denuclearization of North Korea' for complete denuclearization is not resolved, the U.S. will not accept North Korea's assertions.

Therefore, contrary to our expectations, current efforts toward complete denuclearization by North Korea will face difficulties. To overcome these obstacles, first and foremost, the seriousness of the issue must be accurately recognized from a perspective of objective caution rather than subjective optimism. Second, it must be clearly communicated, in coordination with the international community including the U.S., that current sanctions and deterrence cannot be eased as long as North Korea pursues 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.' Conversely, if North Korea pursues a new strategic line of 'denuclearization of North Korea,' the simultaneous realization of active engagement, guaranteeing regime security and sanctions relief as North Korea hopes for, must be foreshadowed. Finally, and most importantly, North Korea itself must recognize and implement 'denuclearization of North Korea,' not 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,' as a new self-reliant measure for North Korea in the 21st century. ■

■ Written by: Ha Young-sun_ Chairman of EAI, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington and has served as Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for International Affairs, Director of the Center for American Studies, and President of the Korean Peace Studies Association. His major works include "Complex World Politics: Strategy, Principles, and a New Order," "Korea-Japan New Era and Symbiotic Complex Networks," "World Politics in Transition," and "The U.S.-China Competition in Building the Asia-Pacific Order."

■ Managed and Edited by: Choi Soo-yi, Senior Researcher at EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 105) I schoi@eai.or.kr

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