[EAI Commentary No. 19] The Jasmine Revolution in the Middle East and Democratization in China

Professor Kim Young-jin received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Freie Universität Berlin and is currently a professor in the Department of International Studies at Kookmin University.

Introduction

Will the ongoing democratization movements in various Middle Eastern and African countries since late 2010 lead to another epochal wave of democratization in world history? As argued by American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, democratization tends to emerge as a historical trend, much like waves. The current democratization movements, particularly in the Islamic world, which had previously deviated from Western notions of democratization due to religious or cultural factors, are reconfirming the universality of democracy. In this context, the question of whether a Jasmine Revolution will occur in China has captured the attention of domestic and international observers, as well as Chinese authorities, over the past few months. This article aims to examine China's response to the recent democratization protests in the Islamic world, the state of the democratization movement within China, and the long-term prospects for democratization.

China's Reaction to the Jasmine Revolution

Following the considerable success of democratization protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries, there were expectations that similar events might occur in China. Indeed, despite the Chinese government's stringent controls, such protests were attempted by some related organizations and activists. For instance, after a protest proposal was posted on Boxun博訊.com, an overseas portal critical of the Chinese government, similar attempts emerged on Twitter within China. These activities unfolded through tweets, blogs, and social network services (SNS) like QQ腾讯. The Chinese authorities blocked access to related websites through their firewall and controlled message transmissions. In addition, the government identified protest leaders through these SNS platforms and placed numerous activists under house arrest. Human Rights Watch reported that from February 16 to late March, approximately 25 lawyers, human rights activists, and bloggers were arrested or had 'disappeared' in China, and an estimated 100 to 200 individuals faced restricted activities due to house arrest and other measures.

In addition to physical control, the Chinese authorities have intensified propaganda efforts targeting their citizens. To this end, various media outlets, including the official People's Daily人民日報, as well as central and local media, were mobilized. They focused on emphasizing that China's situation differs from that of the Middle East, thus requiring a different pace and method of change, and that social stability is crucial for sustained economic development. They also highlighted that China has a higher degree of institutionalized democracy compared to the Middle East. For example, unlike in the Middle East, China has already established numerous democratic institutions, such as the abolition of lifelong tenure for top leadership, the replacement of top leaders, elections at the grassroots level in people's congresses and within the Central Committee, and the reflection of public demands in policy. The achievements of the Chinese Communist Party and the public's support for them were also emphasized.

However, despite the government's strict controls and propaganda, it was impossible to completely prevent the spread of information among China's over 400 million netizens. Protests were indeed scheduled in Beijing, Shanghai, and other cities in late January, attracting attention from overseas media. The Chinese government deployed large numbers of police to cordon off locations or swiftly detain the few protesters who appeared, thereby preempting the emergence of any significant demonstrations. The only incidents witnessed by overseas media were the arrests of a few protesters in Wangfujing王府井, a prominent shopping district in Beijing. While it is unclear to what extent the protest demands garnered implicit support from the general Chinese public, no noteworthy demonstrations materialized.

The Chinese Leadership's Response

Even if the government succeeded in preventing protests within China, it could not avoid making an official statement on democratization amidst the strong global wave of democratization. Particularly, with the convening of the 11th National People's Congress, 4th Session in early March, political reform became a major domestic and international concern. In this atmosphere, the stance of the Chinese Communist Party was most clearly and resolutely articulated by Standing Committee member Wu Bangguo, the second-highest-ranking official. In his report to the Standing Committee, he stated, "Starting from our national conditions, we solemnly declare that we will not adopt the system of power alternation between parties, we will not adopt the diversification of guiding ideology, we will not adopt the separation of powers and a bicameral system, we will not adopt a federal system, and we will not adopt privatization." His statement was subsequently promoted as the slogan of "Five Noes"五個不搞, systematically conveying the Party's position.

In fact, regarding political reform, Premier Wen Jiabao had recently garnered more attention than other leaders. This was because he had more actively raised the necessity of political system reform compared to others. In particular, when he argued in Shenzhen, a special economic zone, in late August of the previous year, "Without the guarantee of political system reform, the achievements of economic system reform may be lost, and the goal of modernization cannot be realized," his speech seemed to indicate a shift in the Chinese leadership's stance on the necessity of political reform. Predictions emerged that experiments, including local elections, might occur at least in Shenzhen. Of course, his views did not progress further due to the principled political reform stance of more conservative leaders. General Secretary Hu Jintao reiterated existing positions such as "governing the country according to law"依法治國 and "socialist democratic politics."

Around the opening of the National People's Congress on March 5, Premier Wen Jiabao once again raised the issue of political reform, showing a more cautious demeanor than the previous year. He still mentioned that without political system reform, the achievements of economic system reform could be lost, and the goal of modernization could not be realized. Therefore, political and economic system reforms must be pursued in parallel, and only through continuous reform can the Party and the state gain vitality. Nevertheless, his position did not advance further. Rather, he argued that political reform in a large country like China with a population of 1.3 billion is by no means an easy task and must be a gradual process based on order. In his words, political reform requires "a stable and harmonious social environment and must proceed in an orderly manner under the leadership of the Party."

However, focusing solely on the positions of the Party and its associates when discussing Chinese democracy may not be appropriate. This is because democracy is not something given but something fought for, and change cannot be forced by external actors. Therefore, it is necessary to examine factors that could bring about change, such as the underground human rights and democracy movements.

Emergence and Current Status of the Chinese Democratization Movement

Demands for democratization in China, most recently exemplified by the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, have roots in earlier criticisms of Party rule. Examples include the Tiananmen Square incident of April 1976, the "Wall of Democracy" and "Beijing Spring" of the late 1970s, and student movements in the early 1980s. The democratization movement has been organized more systematically through activist groups, especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. However, due to the difficulty of carrying out democratization movements domestically, key figures at the time largely had to seek exile abroad.

Most notably, Wei Jingsheng魏京生 and Wang Ruowang王若望, who led the "Wall of Democracy" movement and subsequently engaged in domestic democratization efforts before being expelled, continued their activities abroad. Additionally, Liu Binyan劉濱雁 and Yan Jiaqi嚴家其, who attempted institutional democratization in the 1980s but were exiled due to domestic political factors, formed a faction. Other young activists include Wang Dan王丹 and Han Dongfang韓東方, who were exiled after attempting domestic democratization movements following the June 4th Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. Through organized activities, the operation of magazines and websites, and solidarity with international human rights organizations, they have raised issues of democratization and human rights in China. While their influence has gradually waned and their activities have decreased due to the limitations of overseas movements, they have made significant contributions to the Chinese democratization movement.

Since the 1990s, democratization movements within China have become increasingly visible. For example, the "China Democratic Party Incident" in 1998 drew international attention when party branch members in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, Wuhan, Hubei Province, and Shanghai were arrested en masse. The China Democratic Party advocated for the establishment of constitutional democracy based on direct and democratic elections, promoting political and economic pluralism. To this end, they expressed opposition to the Communist Party's monopoly of power and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Key figures such as Xu Wenli徐文立, Wang Youcai王有才, and Qin Yongmin秦永敏, who played central roles, were arrested and sentenced to over 10 years in prison for "subverting state power." Some of them later went into exile in the United States. However, their activities continue abroad, with a party congress held in the United States in 2006 attended by 111 representatives nationwide. Recently, during the democratization revolutions in the Middle East, this organization attempted to spread the democratization movement in China via the internet.

Another example is the "Tiananmen Mothers Movement"天安門母親運動, founded in 2000 under the leadership of Ding Zilin丁子霖 and others. This organization, composed of mothers of victims of the Tiananmen Square incident, continuously demands a re-evaluation of the incident and punishment for those responsible. Furthermore, the organization has engaged in activities such as supporting Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo劉曉波 and promoting discussions on democratization.

There are also other active individuals, such as Liu Xiaobo劉曉波 mentioned earlier, who led the "Charter 08"零八憲章 in December 2008 and was sentenced to 11 years in prison for "subverting state power." "Charter 08" was signed by 303 intellectuals and explicitly called for human rights and political freedom. This document was widely disseminated online, eliciting significant responses and support from numerous individuals. It is well-known that the Chinese government reacted strongly when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize last year, viewing it as interference in China's internal affairs or a Western conspiracy for regime change, and boycotted the award ceremony. Recently, measures taken by the Chinese government against some activists have been reported in some media. For instance, Liu Xianbin劉賢斌, who contributed to overseas publications on human rights and democracy in China, was sentenced to 10 years in prison for "subverting state power" in late March of this year. He had already served over nine years in prison for his participation in the Tiananmen Square incident, the China Democratic Party incident, and "Charter 08." Around the same time, three civil activists, including Ran Yunfei冉雲飛, were arrested on charges of "inciting subversion of state power."

Beyond direct democratization efforts, human rights movements are also gradually emerging. An example is "Gongmeng"公盟, composed of human rights lawyers. Gongmeng gained domestic and international attention, particularly after the death of migrant worker Sun Zhigang孫志剛 due to police brutality in 2003. Following this incident, the issues of migrant worker reception and repatriation emerged as social problems, and Gongmeng played a leading role in prompting the Chinese government to abolish the relevant system. Furthermore, Gongmeng contributed to publicizing human rights issues by publishing reports on social issues such as human rights. Gongmeng also conducted its own investigations into events such as the Tibet crisis on March 14, 2008, and the melamine-tainted milk scandal in September of the same year, presenting more objective data. In addition, Gongmeng actively engaged in activities such as demanding government information disclosure, raising human rights awareness and legal knowledge, and educating the public about grassroots elections. Ultimately, the Chinese government obstructed Gongmeng's activities by imposing a hefty fine, leading to the closure of its office in July 2009 and the brief detention of its key figure, Xu Zhiyong許志永, on charges of tax evasion in August.

Discussion within the Chinese Communist Party on Democracy

As demands for democratization continue to be raised both domestically and internationally, the Party leadership has also expressed a relatively clear stance on the matter. The "White Paper on the Construction of Democratic Politics in China," considered the first systematic government document of this century concerning the construction of democratic politics, well reflects the leadership's awareness regarding the introduction of democratic institutions. According to this white paper, submitted by the State Council Information Office in 2005, China cannot easily adopt Western-style political systems because attempts to introduce Western systems such as multi-partyism and parliamentary systems after the Xinhai Revolution failed to achieve China's independence and democracy. This position has been repeatedly stated by Party leaders.

However, despite the principled opposition held by a majority of the leadership, more progressive views have emerged from some quarters. A prime example is Yu Keping俞可平's article "Democracy is a Good Thing"民主是個好東西, published in the autumn of 2006, where he is known as a leading theorist of the Party and deputy director of the Party Central Compilation and Translation Bureau. In this article, which represented progressive views within the Party, he first defined democracy not as limited democracy, as conceived by Chinese leaders and official scholars, but as Western-style democracy based on universal suffrage. On that premise, he countered the reservations or doubts raised regarding the introduction of democracy. According to his article, democracy may incur high costs due to complex procedures, and it may lead to political and social division and instability, or be exploited by some politicians to seize power or deceive the public. Nevertheless, he argued that democracy is the best political system invented by humankind and that democratization is a historical trend in various countries worldwide. Although it is premised that the introduction of democratic institutions is premature in the current Chinese context, such a problematization was sufficient to attract domestic and international attention as a shift in the Party's perception of democracy.

However, despite this initial problematization, the discussion has not progressed further. Instead, Yu Keping has retreated from his previous stance by mentioning the "China model" in political development following the recent events in the Middle East. He explains that the China model differs from traditional socialism before reform and opening up, i.e., the Soviet model, and also from the development models of Western developed countries. In particular, regarding the differences with the West, he clearly points out the implementation of a mixed ownership system centered on the shared economy rather than full privatization in terms of ownership, the absence of multi-party systems or parliamentary politics in the political system, the absence of separation of powers among legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and the continued adherence to Marxism's leading position while acknowledging other ideologies in terms of thought. Yu Keping's position here is not significantly different from that of Standing Committee member Wu Bangguo mentioned earlier.

Ultimately, discussions on Western-style democracy within the institutional framework are highly limited, regardless of whether they are conservative or progressive. Moreover, these discussions remain at a highly theoretical level, with little direct mention of concrete institutions. Therefore, the possibility of these discussions leading to political reform by the Party is very low. It merely reaffirms that democracy cannot be obtained for free.

Variables Affecting China's Democratization

How, then, can we assess the movement for democracy, i.e., the Chinese democratization movement? Considering several important variables for the Chinese democratization movement, we can first think of overseas exile groups. As mentioned earlier, China's democratization forces have limited capacity as a political force and rely on the roles of a few courageous activists. However, as is well known, organized activities are nearly impossible within China due to the Chinese government's strict repression, which has led most key figures who led the democratization movement since the late 1970s to seek exile abroad. While they continue their individual and organized activities abroad, their momentum is weakening over time. Furthermore, overseas democratization forces are highly fragmented. Not only is there almost no organizational solidarity among these groups, but they sometimes engage in ideological confrontation over domestic and international issues concerning China. As a result, the activities of overseas democratic forces have a low probability of securing domestic support in China or influencing the political situation, making it difficult for them to make a core contribution to China's future democratization.

The second important variable is the expansion of the middle class, which is, as is well known, considered a crucial foundation for democratization. China's economic growth has not only formed a middle class but also led to a numerical increase. Surveys indicate that the proportion of people who consider themselves middle class reaches 40-50 percent. Nevertheless, analyses of their political inclinations confirm that they are not a supportive force for democratization but rather a basis for the Communist Party's rule. This is because the middle class in China is quite conservative, rejecting rapid change as beneficiaries of economic success. They are far more likely to be Party members than ordinary workers or peasants and focus on consumption rather than political issues. Of course, as members of the middle class, they fundamentally possess a strong sense of participation and democratic consciousness, and they also exhibit critical views on government policies. This suggests that the Chinese middle class could become a driving force for social change depending on the circumstances. However, at least in the short term, it is difficult to expect them to take the lead in democratization.

In conclusion, the factors determining China's democratization are highly complex. Factors positively influencing democratization include the growth of the middle class, institutional efforts by the government such as the expansion of elections, and the enhancement of citizens' rights awareness and the roles of democratic forces and the media. Conversely, factors such as the absorption of the middle class into the system or their conservative tendencies, public political apathy, and government repression can negatively impact democratization. Additionally, non-political factors such as the sustainability of economic growth and international pressure are also important.

Prospects for China's Democratization

Considering these factors, how can we forecast China's future democratization? Simplified, two perspectives are possible: one is that China's democratization is inevitable, and the other is that China will successfully maintain a resilient authoritarian political system for the foreseeable future. However, depending on the viewpoint, political turmoil and division may also arise.

The first perspective posits that China's continued growth will inevitably lead to democratization. The basis for this argument is that, from a functionalist standpoint, China's democratization is possible within a certain period due to the expansion of economic growth, higher education, legal systems, media, and elections. Some scholars within China also agree with this perspective on the possibility of China's democratization. However, they lack a consensus on the specific type of democratization and avoid answering the original question by not considering temporal aspects such as the timing of democratization. Therefore, the view that democratization is inevitable if China continues to grow has the limitation of directly applying the experiences of Western countries and some East Asian nations to China.

Secondly, a more pessimistic view regarding social change might raise the possibility of democratization. That is, as various problems causing social costs accumulate, the system may no longer be sustainable in its current repressive form, leading to natural democratization. These problems include corruption, inequality, restrictions on union activities, discrimination against farmers, environmental issues, illegal activities such as smuggling, counterfeiting, tax evasion, organized crime, and cronyism, various disasters like traffic accidents, financial crises, social pathologies stemming from public immorality, and unemployment. The accumulation of these problems will question the governing capacity, a crucial element of the Party's legitimacy. Of course, given that economic growth and consumption expansion, as well as China's enhanced international status, are expected to continue for some time, the possibility appears low. At least, this is the case unless a sudden domestic or international economic crisis occurs. Even if such a crisis occurs and the Chinese government takes political reform measures in response, a smooth landing for democratization is not guaranteed. Rather, there is a high possibility of chaos due to loss of control.

Thirdly, a perspective suggests that a form of resilient authoritarianism may be maintained in China for a considerable period. Resilient authoritarianism, similar to the Park Chung-hee regime in South Korea, does not permit Western democratic elements such as the expression of diverse opinions, fair elections, and multi-party systems, but emphasizes patriarchal authority and social consensus. Nevertheless, this system can secure a certain level of legitimacy as a relatively efficient political system by achieving economic growth and community welfare. In practice, China has secured legitimacy through economic growth, social welfare, administrative efficiency, and foreign policy achievements, while maintaining system stability through strict control, organization, and mobilization. Currently, this approach appears to be the most viable option for both Chinese leaders and researchers. From this perspective, the possibility of democratization in China in the near future is low.

Finally, there is the possibility of political turmoil and division, rather than gradual democratization or resilient authoritarianism. This implies that political change occurs not through a natural and gradual process with a soft landing, but through a hard landing. The reason for this possibility is, above all, that authoritarian governments are unable to actively engage in institutional reform and thus cannot adequately respond to the growing social demands and problems caused by marketization. Authoritarian reform methods are inherently limited in realizing institutionalization necessary for political development, such as independent legislative or judicial bodies and electoral systems. Consequently, they fail to find appropriate solutions to problems such as a lack of government accountability, weak administrative structures, widespread corruption, and repression. Furthermore, government corruption and incompetence can lead to social discontent from below, which could result in the collapse of the system, as seen in Eastern Europe. Such radical approaches are more likely to cause extreme turmoil or division rather than guarantee democracy.

Ultimately, from a realistic standpoint, the direction of democratization in China is inevitable, but since conditions such as the capacity of civil society are not yet met, limited democratic reforms from above by the Party are likely to continue. However, since political reform entails the weakening of the Communist Party and the associated instability, reforms by the Party are bound to have certain limitations. In a situation where there is no alternative force to the Communist Party, and the leadership's will for change is also limited, the direction of China's political development is difficult to predict, and unexpected outcomes may occur. In such cases, it will be unavoidable to go through a difficult transitional period due to complex conflicts among domestic political forces.■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has been selected as a core research institution for the MacArthur Foundation's "Asia Security Initiative" program and receives financial support. [EAI Commentary] aims to provide in-depth analysis and practical alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting [EAI Commentary]. This manuscript represents the personal opinions of the author and does not reflect the official position of the East Asia Institute. The East Asia Institute receives financial support from the MacArthur Foundation as a core research institution for its "Asia Security Initiative" program.