[EAI Commentary No. 12] The Formalization of Kim Jong-il's Succession System and the Future of the Korean Peninsula

Following the deterioration of Chairman Kim Jong-il's health in 2008, the succession system, which has garnered global attention, has finally come to light. At the 3rd North Korean Workers' Party Delegates' Conference on September 28, Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il's third son, and his close aides and patrons who support him, rapidly emerged. The world's attention was focused on the direction of North Korea's succession system because it would not end as merely an internal power transfer issue but is directly linked to the future of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. The political and diplomatic choices made by the Kim Jong-il succession system in the future will critically influence not only North Korea's own future but also the North Korean nuclear issue, inter-Korean relations, and the Northeast Asian international order.

Kim Jong-un has been effectively elevated to the position of the second-in-command by being granted the title of General and appointed Vice Chairman of the Party's Central Military Commission. Kim Jong-un has been formalized as Chairman Kim Jong-il's successor as he is named after the four members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau in North Korea's state-run media and his photograph has been released to the press. This is proceeding faster than expected. This can be compared to Chairman Kim Jong-il, who only began public activities six years after being elected as a member of the Political Bureau in 1974. The highly meticulous promotion of Kim Jong-un, including the conferral of the title of General on the 27th, his appointment as Vice Chairman of the Party's Central Military Commission on the 28th, and the release of his photograph on the 29th, even reveals North Korea's haste. The official proclamation of Kim Jong-un's designation as successor to the outside world was made through the live broadcast by foreign correspondents of the joint appearance of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un at the military parade celebrating the 65th anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea founding on October 10.

While it is premature to define the nature of the Kim Jong-un succession system at this juncture, it is inevitable to conclude that it leans towards 'continuation' rather than 'disconnection' or 'transformation' from the existing military-first line. Above all, the fact that Kim Jong-un holds a position in the Party's Central Military Commission, which directs the military, rather than in the Party's Political Bureau or Secretariat, is noteworthy. This is a strategic move to position Kim Jong-un as a faithful successor to the military-first line. As Vice Chairman of the Party's Central Military Commission, Kim Jong-un will exercise the right to interpret the ruling ideology and is expected to focus on revolutionizing Kim Jong-il's military-first line into Kim Jong-ilism. It is also noteworthy that Kim Jong-un's support group consists of his father's associates. Figures such as Kim Kyong-hui (Member of the Political Bureau), Jang Song-thaek (Alternate Member of the Political Bureau, Member of the Party's Central Military Commission, Director of the Party's Central Committee), and Ri Yong-ho (Presidium Member of the Political Bureau, Vice Chairman of the Party's Central Military Commission), who have been placed in key positions in the Party and military, are among them. While it may seem natural, individuals who can be called Kim Jong-un's people are not yet visible. The inheritance of a father's legacy, through 'hereditary succession' rather than 'usurpation,' is an unavoidable phenomenon in the process of transferring power.

However, the dilemma of the Kim Jong-un succession system is that it cannot rely solely on the military-first principle. Kim Jong-un, who has virtually no accomplishments to his name, must advance to the Presidium of the Political Bureau based on achievements befitting a successor to be definitively confirmed as the successor. This process is expected to be completed around the 7th Party Congress in 2012, which North Korea designates as the first year of a strong and prosperous nation, meaning Kim Jong-un has limited time. Kim Jong-un needs to achieve notable results in building a 'strong economic power,' in addition to the 'strong political and ideological power' and 'strong military power' that are claimed to have already been achieved among the three pillars of a strong and prosperous nation. However, as long as the existing military-first line is maintained, it is nearly impossible to find a path to economic recovery on its own.

The increasing influence of China during the establishment of the Kim Jong-un succession system is also a structural factor constraining Kim Jong-un's choices. Through two visits to China in May and August of the same year, within a period of less than three months, Kim Jong-il emphasized the "long-standing Sino-North Korean friendly relations" and requested China's support for the Kim Jong-il succession system. This is a typical behavior of a dynastic state in the traditional East Asian international order, attempting to supplement domestic political legitimacy by utilizing a tributary relationship. However, North Korea's increased dependence on China is acting as pressure for a change in the military-first line and for reform and opening. Indeed, in May, Premier Wen Jiabao mentioned to Chairman Kim Jong-il that he "would like to introduce China's reform and opening experience," and at the Sino-North Korean summit in August, Chairman Kim Jong-il unusually praised China's reform and opening. President Hu Jintao also mentioned in his congratulatory message to the Party Delegates' Conference that North Korea had "achieved a series of gratifying results in areas such as economic development and improvement of people's livelihoods." While China's external support is absolutely necessary for the consolidation of the Kim Jong-il succession system, this paradoxically acts as pressure for a change in the military-first line domestically. North Korea's recent proactive engagement in inter-Korean approaches and improvement of North Korea-U.S. relations, such as family reunions and working-level military talks, may be aimed at securing support to overcome economic difficulties, but it also appears intended to disperse the pressure for opening that could result from excessive dependence on China.

The Kim Jong-un succession system faces a paradoxical dilemma, where the inherent limitations of a third-generation succession, which must emphasize the 'succession' of the military-first principle, coexist with the structural pressure for 'change' necessary for economic recovery. The options available to the Kim Jong-un succession system are limited. Of course, North Korea would prefer to maintain its nuclear-military-first line while receiving external support from China, South Korea, and others to sustain its regime. However, considering the positions of neighboring countries, this dual strategy by North Korea is unlikely to work any longer. Ultimately, North Korea has two paths to choose from. One is to ignore the pressure for change and endure another "arduous march" by adhering to the military-first principle through a second 'legacy rule.' If this path is chosen, the regime may be maintained for a certain period, but it will ultimately face an existential crisis. This is because if North Korea's economy continues to deteriorate without external support, Kim Jong-un, whose political legitimacy is weak, will find it difficult to maintain power.

The other path is to move towards reform and opening with a focus on the economy ('선경先經') based on a denuclearized peace regime. As long as the military-first principle is adhered to, it is impossible to create an international environment for stable regime maintenance, and it is difficult to expect the inflow of external capital for substantial economic recovery. Internally, the continuation of the military-first principle, prioritizing the defense industry, will not only lead to a shortage of financial resources but also to inefficient use of those resources. Ultimately, without reform and opening towards prioritizing the economy ('선경'), survival itself, let alone development, will be difficult. Therefore, given the characteristics of a power transition period, it may be difficult to pursue drastic changes immediately, but for the future of the regime, this path must be cautiously pursued.

The key to this issue must be found in the North Korean nuclear problem. With the formalization of the Kim Jong-il succession system now settled, the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, led by China, will likely be actively pursued soon. At this point, North Korea's choice will be a crucial litmus test for the future of its succession system. Simply participating in the talks will no longer be sufficient for North Korea to obtain the external support necessary for the consolidation of the Kim Jong-il succession system. Judging from the case of North Korea's nuclear negotiations during the late Kim Il-sung era, it is highly probable that successor Kim Jong-un will be granted authority over nuclear negotiations. Nuclear weapons are undoubtedly the greatest legacy Kim Jong-il can bequeath to Kim Jong-un. The question is how to utilize them effectively. The Kim Jong-un regime must demonstrate wisdom in simultaneously resolving the system's security and economic recovery, which North Korea desperately needs, through nuclear negotiations. To this end, North Korea must engage in nuclear negotiations with sincerity. A concrete plan must be prepared to move the denuclearization process, which has stalled at the stages of disablement, declaration, and verification, to the final stage of dismantlement. Kim Jong-un must make a strategic decision to pursue security through the establishment of a denuclearized, complex peace regime, based on the realistic recognition that nuclear weapons cannot guarantee his future path. He must change his perception to use the peace regime as a stepping stone to ensure the security of his regime both internally and externally, rather than as a tactical tool for North Korea's short-term interests. Building a web of interconnected relationships with South Korea, China, and the United States is the safest path to guarantee North Korea's survival.

Along with North Korea's strategic decision, efforts for 'co-evolution' and mutual change are needed from South Korea and the relevant parties. Although North Korea's existence as a problematic state already hinders the stability and prosperity of the world and Northeast Asia, if North Korea degenerates into an uncontrollable failed state, the burden will have to be shared by all neighboring countries. The collapse of North Korea will not result in strategic gains for any single country, such as South Korea or China, but will only create a significant 'structural hole' in Northeast Asia and the world. Therefore, we must collectively seek the evolution of North Korea policy so that the North Korean succession system can choose a path of life, not death. The role of a lighthouse keeper is needed to guide the Kim Jong-il succession system to transform the existing military-first line and move towards denuclearization and reform and opening. The most crucial aspect is to present a peace regime that Kim Jong-un can choose in lieu of nuclear weapons. Discussions are needed on a peace regime with a complex guarantee, where South-North Korean peace agreements and North Korea-U.S. peace agreements are guaranteed by China. Kim Jong-un will not abandon nuclear weapons, which he considers the last bastion of survival, unless he feels secure about the survival of his regime and state. Neighboring countries must confirm that if North Korea pursues a peace without nuclear weapons, a peace that does not pose a military threat to its neighbors, not only will the North Korean regime survive, but in the long term, North Korea will be supported to embark on the path of reform and opening and develop. When neighboring countries jointly design a place for North Korea within the blueprint for the future of Northeast Asia and show that they are contemplating alternatives that North Korea can pursue as a normalized state, North Korea will perceive this as a signal necessary for ensuring its survival. Ultimately, efforts must be made to confirm that North Korea cannot simultaneously possess nuclear weapons, the Suryong system, and economic development, while also strengthening both incentives and pressure.

Strategic cooperation between South Korea and China regarding the establishment of the Kim Jong-il succession system is also important. The subtle competition and conflict between South Korea and China that emerged during the Cheonan incident diplomacy must not be repeated in the response to the Kim Jong-il succession system. If there is no strategic consensus between South Korea and China regarding the future state of North Korea, all contingencies will cause conflict and make joint responses between South Korea and China difficult. If the competition for influence over North Korea between South Korea and China continues, it will become easier for the Kim Jong-il succession system to maintain the existing military-first line by exploiting this situation, which is an undesirable outcome for both South Korea and China. South Korea and China must urgently develop a joint strategy that actively utilizes North Korea's demand for external support, based on a strategic agreement on North Korea's desirable future, to promote internal change in North Korea.■

Chairman

Ha Young-sun (Seoul National University)

Member

Kim Sung-bae (Institute for National Security Strategy)

Chun Jae-sung (Seoul National University)

Cho Dong-ho (Ewha Womans University)

The East Asia Institute (EAI) is a core research institution for the MacArthur Foundation's 'Asia Security Initiative' program and receives financial support. [EAI Commentary] aims to provide in-depth analysis and practical alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting [EAI Commentary].