[EAI Commentary No. 9] China's Dilemma After the Cheonan Incident and the Future of Korea-China Relations

On May 20, 2010, the results of the international joint investigation into the Cheonan incident were announced. The South Korean government formalized the finding that the Cheonan was sunk by a North Korean torpedo attack, and 22 countries, including the United States, issued statements of agreement. Contrary to the South Korean government's expectations, China adopted a reserved stance. As the investigation began, China emphasized

Following the Cheonan incident, China's official commentary has focused on the points that "China is a responsible major power" and "China's goal is to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula." First, China has defined "responsible major power" in its own way and emphasized the compatibility between being a responsible major power and the North Korea-China alliance. Furthermore, China prioritizes the need to prevent further conflict and instability between North and South Korea to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The "responsible major power theory" and the "theory of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula" best summarize China's thinking during the Cheonan incident period.

The reason China is withholding its assessment of the South Korean government's investigation results is that evaluating the results as "objective" and "scientific" inherently means acknowledging the Cheonan incident as an act by North Korea. If China acknowledges North Korea as the primary perpetrator of the sinking, it will face a difficult situation of having to decide on a statement, condemnation, or, in the worst-case scenario, sanctions against North Korea in the UN Security Council. Conversely, if it does not acknowledge North Korea as the primary perpetrator, China will have to debate the scientific validity and objectivity of the investigation results with the majority of countries that do acknowledge North Korea as the primary perpetrator, hence its current withholding of an assessment of the Cheonan incident.

Regardless of the actual facts of the incident, China is not showing enthusiasm for acknowledging the Cheonan incident as an act by North Korea. The reason China is adopting such a cautious strategy is that it views the current internal situation in North Korea as unusual. North Korea is facing severe internal and external difficulties due to its increasing isolation from the international community, ongoing economic hardship following currency reforms, and issues related to Kim Jong-il's deteriorating health and unstable power succession. It appears that China has concluded that excessive external pressure could pose a serious threat to the stability of the North Korean regime. The difficulty in achieving a joint response from South Korea and China to the Cheonan incident stems from the divergence in their strategic visions for the long-term future of North Korea. China can be seen as lacking confidence that the future of North Korea will unfold favorably for China if it agrees to sanctions against North Korea. Unless South Korea can present a rationale that its sanctions against North Korea are not merely a hardline strategy but are aimed at a new vision for the future of North Korea as well as for inter-Korean and Korea-China relations, China will inevitably pursue its own national interest strategy.

China is not unconditionally pursuing a "hug North Korea" strategy. China is applying pressure on North Korea to prevent the recurrence of security instability caused by it. As suggested by Hu Jintao's five principles raised during the North Korea-China summit in early May, China is demanding strengthened strategic communication between North Korea and China. The core of these principles is the significant implication of closely communicating and consulting with China on important matters, including North Korea's domestic and foreign affairs, which shows a different aspect from China's traditional principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Through strengthened strategic communication, China aims to preemptively prevent North Korea from indiscriminately threatening peace and security in Northeast Asia, thereby negatively impacting China's top priority of economic development.

Amidst the challenges posed by China's passive stance, South Korea's diplomacy regarding the Cheonan incident is proceeding as planned. Regarding measures by the UN Security Council, South Korea, like China, is not considering the conclusion of a resolution imposing sanctions on North Korea. Imposing another sanctions resolution on North Korea, which is already under UNSC Resolution 1718 encompassing all possible sanctions, would have a negligible practical effect. Instead, the South Korean government is pursuing a presidential statement from the UN Security Council, as it can lead international opinion regarding North Korea's actions without imposing substantial sanctions. However, the possibility of China agreeing to a presidential statement from the UN Security Council is slim. Given that North Korea strongly denies responsibility for the Cheonan incident, China likely believes it is undesirable to participate in a collective condemnation of North Korea's actions. From China's perspective, opposing a presidential statement also presents significant diplomatic challenges. China has consistently emphasized the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, separating them from the Cheonan incident, and has shown a difference in opinion with South Korea, which advocates for "resolving the Cheonan incident first, then holding the Six-Party Talks." To overcome this difference in opinion, it is necessary for both South Korea and China to pass a presidential statement from the UN Security Council, use this as an opportunity to conclude the Cheonan phase, and simultaneously transition to the Six-Party Talks phase. However, the core of the issue appears to lie in the decision of whether to explicitly name North Korea as the primary perpetrator of the Cheonan incident in the presidential statement. While South Korea considers naming North Korea in the statement as a matter of course, China expresses difficulty with this.

If a presidential statement from the UN Security Council is passed, the South Korean government will strive to resume the Six-Party Talks. North Korea has demanded the easing or lifting of UN Security Council sanctions as a condition for resuming the Six-Party Talks, but the South Korean government, in close cooperation with the United States and China, needs to push for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks while demanding that North Korea participate with a more sincere and proactive attitude. However, if a presidential statement from the UN Security Council is not passed, China is likely to face considerable difficulty in exercising leadership to resume the Six-Party Talks. Therefore, the current Cheonan incident is likely to serve as a significant evaluation opportunity for China's future leadership development in the international community.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China, South Korea has believed that to lead North Korea in the direction we desire, given China's political, economic, military, and diplomatic influence over North Korea, it is necessary to foster friendly Korea-China relations. We have tended to prioritize maintaining smooth relations with China over actively pursuing our national interests. China has sought to exercise its influence over North Korea and maintain North Korea-China relations according to its own national interests, regardless of South Korea's stance towards China. If South Korea attempts to influence North Korea by leveraging China's power, it must ensure that China accurately recognizes the changes in its current international environment so that China's national interests align with South Korea's national interests within the context of Korea-China relations or Northeast Asian international relations.

The ROK-US joint military exercises, currently under review for recurrence prevention following the recent Cheonan incident, offer significant implications for China. As the participation of the US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington was cautiously considered during the ROK-US joint exercises, China felt a considerable security threat from the entry of US nuclear-powered aircraft carriers into the West Sea and reacted sensitively. China lacks realistic means of sanction against the ROK-US joint exercises and can only rely on diplomatic means to convey its opposition. China will gradually realize that the cooperation between South Korea and the US during the Cheonan incident, or future similar incidents or contingencies, could negatively impact China's strategy in Northeast Asia. It is important that all three countries—South Korea, China, and the US—recognize this opportunity to reach a long-term agreement and cooperate on the evolving situation in North Korea, which has many possibilities for change. China, observing the discussions on ROK-US joint military exercises, will likely recognize that events related to North Korea can significantly alter the military balance of power in Northeast Asia.

China's control over North Korea is also considerably limited, thus strategic cooperation with South Korea and the United States is necessary to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula in the future. To resolve the "North Korean issue," it is necessary to activate the Six-Party Talks along with a "minilateralism" format where relevant countries gather to discuss issues efficiently as needed. South Korea, China, and relevant countries will face various regional security issues in the future, including the long-term future of North Korea, regime instability, the nuclear issue, and the issue of North Korean defectors, and it is necessary to develop diverse and flexible discussions to address them. To resolve the issues of North Korea's future and regime instability, South Korea, China, and the US should convene; for the issue of North Korean defectors, South Korea, China, and Mongolia (and possibly Japan) should convene; and for the North Korean nuclear issue, South Korea, China, and the US should convene to present appropriate solutions for each issue. With China's continuous rise, Korea-China relations are becoming increasingly important over time. Korea-China relations are no longer a bilateral relationship but have emerged as a critical issue concerning the survival of the Korean Peninsula in the 21st century. However, considering the geopolitical positions and national power disparity between China and South Korea, the realistic influence that South Korea can exert on China is limited. It is paramount to accurately understand the objectives and specific policies of China's foreign strategy, and it is necessary to strengthen efforts to align strategic interests between South Korea and China in a phased manner. As demonstrated by the Cheonan incident, if strategic dialogue on the future of North Korea and the Korean Peninsula is neglected, smooth cooperation between South Korea and China on specific issues will be difficult to expect. In the process of concluding the Cheonan incident, it is necessary to explore avenues for strategic cooperation between South Korea and China regarding future North Korean nuclear issues, the Six-Party Talks, North Korean regime instability, and the succession process.

While strengthening traditional domestic capabilities and efforts for power balance are important, it is also necessary to simultaneously seek the enhancement of Network Power. The Cheonan incident clearly demonstrated the complex, high-order equation involving neighboring countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula issue. When one fails to envision the entire network for problem-solving, one ultimately faces frustration due to unconnected nodes. In the future, the existing ROK-US alliance must be deepened into a complex alliance suited to the changes of the 21st century, and efforts to strengthen cooperation in a new era should be sought for Korea-Japan relations. Simultaneously, to develop strategic friendly cooperative relations between South Korea and China, the deepening of network diplomacy with China must proceed in a multifaceted manner in terms of protagonists and stages. South Korea's diplomacy towards the US and Japan, and its diplomacy towards China, are no longer a matter of choice but a matter of embracing both asymmetrically according to the power dynamics of the time.■

Chairman

Ha Young-sun (Seoul National University)

Member

Chun Jae-sung (Seoul National University)

Han Suk-hee (Yonsei University)

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Attachment: EAI_Commentary_no9.pdf