[EAI Commentary No. 7] The Meaning and Impact of National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il's Visit to China

Professor Lee Dong-ryul holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Peking University's School of International Studies. He is currently a professor in the Department of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women's University and serves as the Chairman of the EAI China Research Panel.

Background and Significance of Chairman Kim's Visit to China

National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il made an unofficial visit to China from May 3rd to 5th. This was his fifth visit, occurring 4 years and 4 months after his visit in 2006. Externally, this visit adheres to the established pattern of North Korea-China summit diplomacy. Although the nuclear test caused a prolonged hiatus, the visit was fundamentally an extension of the summit diplomacy that resumed in 2000. Furthermore, the issue of economic assistance from North Korea to China and North Korea's return to the Six-Party Talks, which has been ongoing since the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2003, was again a major agenda item at this summit. Even the itinerary, which included unofficial and unannounced visits to observe successful examples of China's reform and opening-up, was similar to his previous four visits.

Despite these similarities, the current visit has generated more speculation and controversy than any previous one. This is because, while maintaining its general format, the summit took place amidst a highly complex and delicate inter-Korean political and security environment. Therefore, to properly understand the significance of Chairman Kim's visit, it is essential to first comprehend the political and security landscape of the Korean Peninsula at the time of the visit.

Firstly, from a broader perspective, this North Korea-China summit was held after the longest interval since the restoration of North Korea-China relations in 2000. It also occurred at a time when the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue had been suspended for 18 months. Critically, the summit was abruptly arranged immediately after South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's visit to China, at a time when tensions on the Korean Peninsula were escalating due to the Cheonan incident. Moreover, North Korea was facing unprecedented difficulties, including reports of Chairman Kim's deteriorating health, efforts to establish a three-generation succession, post-currency reform chaos, and deepening economic hardship due to UN sanctions.

Given the complex circumstances surrounding this summit, various pressing issues were highlighted, and the subsequent repercussions are expected to be significant. Therefore, the period we should truly be watching closely is from now on, after the North Korea-China summit has concluded. The North Korea-China summit did not issue a joint statement, nor did it openly disclose the specific details of the talks. Consequently, to understand the agreements reached during the summit, it is necessary to keenly observe and analyze the subtle movements that will emerge as North Korea and China implement the outcomes of the talks.

There are three main points to consider when evaluating this North Korea-China summit. First, what is the significance of this summit for North Korea-China relations and China's policy toward North Korea? Second, was there a quid pro quo between China's aid to North Korea and North Korea's return to the Six-Party Talks, and what is the likelihood of the Six-Party Talks resuming as a result? Third, what impact will the North Korea-China summit, held during the investigation into the Cheonan incident, have on South Korea-China relations?

China's Strategy Toward North Korea and North Korea-China Relations

Chairman Kim's visit to China, occurring immediately after the Cheonan incident, has amplified debates about the current state of North Korea-China relations. Recently, North Korea-China relations have appeared increasingly erratic and difficult to decipher. China took a strong stance by agreeing to UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea following its nuclear test. North Korea, in turn, criticized China along with the United States and its followers, calling the UN sanctions 'maneuvers by the U.S. and forces that flatter and drive it'.

However, on the other hand, China has not imposed direct and strong sanctions on North Korea; instead, it has expanded economic exchanges with the country. In 2008, North Korea's trade dependence on China reached a staggering 73%. Through Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to North Korea in 2009 and Chairman Kim Jong-il's visit to China this time, both countries emphasized economic cooperation and showcased their traditional friendly relations.

The contradictory situation in North Korea-China relations stems from the divergence between China's short-term tactics regarding the North Korean nuclear issue and its long-term strategy for North Korea. Considering China's foreign policy strategy, its optimal policy objective for North Korea can be summarized as 'maintaining the stability of the North Korean regime under a pro-China government that does not possess nuclear weapons.' The fundamental premise of this policy objective is that China's rise should not be affected by issues related to North Korea. China is concerned that a crisis in North Korea's regime, as much as its nuclear development, could significantly hinder its rise. Therefore, in the short to medium term, China attempts to manage the situation through the Six-Party Talks to prevent its surrounding security environment from deteriorating further due to the North Korean nuclear issue. China still believes that its role in the fundamental resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue is limited, as it is primarily a bilateral issue between North Korea and the United States.

Conversely, China pursues a more fundamental and long-term strategic goal of transplanting its own model of reform and opening-up to North Korea through continued economic exchange and cooperation. Through this, China anticipates strategic benefits such as stabilizing the North Korean regime, establishing a pro-China system, and preparing for a potential weakening of China's relative influence following an improvement in North Korea-U.S. relations. Chairman Kim's visit to China, like his previous four visits, focused on regions that exemplify China's successful economic reforms, such as Dalian, Tianjin, and Zhongguancun. Notably, Premier Wen Jiabao explicitly stated, 'China will actively support North Korea's economic development and improvement of livelihoods, and we wish to share China's experiences in reform, opening-up, and economic construction with North Korea.' China deems it necessary to continue economic exchange and cooperation with North Korea, despite conflicts arising from the nuclear issue, to achieve this long-term strategy.

The fact that the visit took place immediately after the Cheonan incident suggests that China was concerned about the potential instability of the North Korean regime acting as a security burden. In essence, North Korea is currently a 'strategic burden' for China, but simultaneously holds value as a future 'strategic asset,' making it difficult for China to abandon. Therefore, China is attempting to manage the short-to-medium term burdens while simultaneously working to maximize its value as an asset by stabilizing North Korea into a pro-China regime in the long term. Through this, China is also preparing for potential shifts in the power dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula after the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved.

Prospects for the Six-Party Talks Following the North Korea-China Summit

Chairman Kim Jong-il likely had several expectations for his visit to China, including economic assistance and cooperation, support for his regime during the succession process, and potentially an opportunity to explain the Cheonan incident. Conversely, China's expectations from North Korea were relatively few. Similar to Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to North Korea in October 2009, China's primary expectation was North Korea's return to the Six-Party Talks. Therefore, the key question is whether this unequal exchange between the two countries proceeded smoothly during the visit. If the exchange was smooth, behind-the-scenes diplomacy among the relevant parties to resume the Six-Party Talks will likely commence soon. North Korea-China relations are also likely to recover to a stable state.

Based solely on official statements regarding the Six-Party Talks thus far, there appears to be no significant progress compared to the discussions during Premier Wen's visit to North Korea in 2009. Chairman Kim and President Hu Jintao reaffirmed their principled stance, stating, 'The two countries will make joint efforts to realize the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula based on the September 19 Joint Statement.' Furthermore, the economic assistance China offered in return for North Korea's return to the Six-Party Talks is less clear than in the past. President Hu reportedly proposed and essentially agreed upon five cooperation measures, including deepening economic cooperation. However, the details remain largely principled. There have been no reports of specific economic aid details or amounts, as were leaked to the media after previous summits. Considering that this was the first summit in over four years, the outcomes are not as clearly highlighted as expected. In fact, looking back at the pattern of exchanges between the two countries concerning the Six-Party Talks since 2003, North Korea's return to the talks has been slower than anticipated, despite China's efforts. This indicates that negotiations between the two countries to resume the Six-Party Talks are not easy.

However, it is premature to be entirely pessimistic about the prospects for the Six-Party Talks. There are several reasons to wait and see. Despite the dilemma posed by the Cheonan incident, not only China but also the U.S. Obama administration, which advocates for a 'world without nuclear weapons,' has expressed considerable expectations for resuming the Six-Party Talks for denuclearization. There is also an atmosphere suggesting that the U.S. has delegated a certain role to China regarding the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. China has historically played a mediating role between the U.S. and North Korea through shuttle diplomacy to facilitate the Six-Party Talks. Indeed, prior to the North Korea-China summit, on April 29th, Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo discussed the resumption of the Six-Party Talks with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton via phone. It is now time for renewed discussions between China and the U.S. based on the outcomes of the North Korea-China summit. With the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue scheduled for May 24th, the success of future behind-the-scenes contacts between North Korea, the U.S., and China will be a key variable in assessing the Six-Party Talks. It is possible that the North Korea-China summit discussed conditions for persuading the U.S. to participate in the Six-Party Talks. Chairman Kim's remark, 'We hope to create favorable conditions for resuming the Six-Party Talks together with the relevant parties,' can be interpreted as a message hinting at the possibility of resuming talks through China's mediation after the Cheonan incident is resolved.

The Cheonan incident is undoubtedly another significant variable in the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. China fundamentally believes that the Cheonan incident should not escalate into a factor of security instability for China. Therefore, if irrefutable evidence is presented that the international community can agree upon, linking the Cheonan incident to North Korea, China will likely participate in UN sanctions against North Korea, just as it did after North Korea's second nuclear test. Conversely, if the evidence is not conclusive, China will likely attempt to promote the resumption of the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible to shift the crisis towards dialogue.

Implications for South Korea-China Relations

Chairman Kim Jong-il's visit to China unexpectedly created a peculiar ripple effect on South Korea-China relations. South Korean diplomacy has unexpectedly been put to a significant test. The series of events, including the Cheonan incident, President Lee Myung-bak's visit to China, and Chairman Kim Jong-il's visit to China, has created a situation where North and South Korea appear to be engaging in a diplomatic competition over China. This is an unexpected development, given that North Korea-China relations and South Korea-China relations were long considered to have moved beyond a zero-sum game. South Korea and China have experience in policy coordination based on a shared sense of crisis regarding the North Korean nuclear issue since 2003. In other words, the North Korean nuclear issue has served as both a crisis and a driving force for the development of relations between the two countries.

Since the launch of the Lee Myung-bak administration in 2008, South Korea and China have 'upgraded' their relationship to a strategic cooperative partnership. However, a peculiar phenomenon has emerged where issues arise in understanding and communication between the two countries on critical strategic issues such as the North Korean nuclear issue and the Cheonan incident. The Cheonan incident and the North Korea-China summit should serve as an opportunity to re-recognize the unique nature of the 'China variable' on the Korean Peninsula. It is a time for serious reflection on how South Korea should manage the China variable in the process of navigating the complex, high-level international functional relationships that will rapidly unfold around the Korean Peninsula.

First, a re-examination of the 18-year history of South Korea-China relations is necessary. South Korea-China relations have achieved remarkable growth over the past 18 years. However, overshadowed by this external growth, efforts to strengthen the foundational capacity for mutual understanding and trust between the two countries have been neglected. It is no exaggeration to say that this imbalanced development over the past 18 years is manifesting as the current problems in South Korea-China relations. Therefore, a stance of starting anew from the basics of promoting mutual understanding between South Korea and China is necessary. Efforts to 'understand China correctly' are essential, and parallel efforts must be made to ensure that China, whose influence is steadily growing, properly understands us. In this context, we must also observe China's policy toward North Korea and North Korea-China relations with an objective and sober perspective, rather than with hopeful assumptions and emotions.

Second, efforts are needed to regain South Korea's initiative on the North Korean issue. Despite the recent series of incidents between South Korea and China, the necessity for closer discussion and cooperation between the two countries on the North Korean issue is growing daily. However, we must abandon the illusion that China's information and means regarding North Korea can be utilized to our benefit. South Korea must secure more information, channels, and leverage regarding North Korea than China possesses. Based on this, South Korea must take the lead in persuading the other five parties, whether it be through sanctions or the Six-Party Talks. The North Korean nuclear crisis is leading to an expansion of China's influence on the Korean Peninsula, which is rapidly emerging. Conversely, as inter-Korean relations have become strained, South Korea's position on the Korean Peninsula issue has weakened. In the long term, even with a view toward the unification of the Korean Peninsula, it is undesirable for South Korea to appear to be in a diplomatic competition with China over North Korea. To prepare for potential future power competition between the U.S. and China, South Korea must focus on diplomacy to secure its own strategic value and standing.■

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