[EAI Commentary No. 2] North Korea at a Crossroads

North Korea's Kim Jong-il regime stands at a crossroads, facing a strategic decision: will it stubbornly adhere to its 'military-first (nuclear) policy' despite increasing international sanctions, or will it abandon nuclear weapons, considered the last bastion of regime preservation, and pursue a new 'non-nuclear, economy-first policy'? In North Korea, where power succession is visibly approaching, the leadership that emerges after Chairman Kim Jong-il will walk a path of opportunity or crisis depending on Chairman Kim Jong-il's strategic decision. In the upcoming phase where international sanctions and comprehensive negotiations will be pursued simultaneously, Chairman Kim Jong-il must solve the difficult puzzle of simultaneously laying the foundation for the survival and prosperity of the successor regime. Meanwhile, the surrounding parties must also concretize plans to establish a permanent security and peace regime on the Korean Peninsula by realistically providing for North Korea's regime and national security while inducing denuclearization and reform and opening.

Since 1994, Chairman Kim Jong-il has pursued a national strategy inherited from the last will of President Kim Il-sung: 'North Korea's denuclearization should only be achieved if the US's hostile policy toward North Korea is withdrawn and the nuclear threat is resolved.' In the post-Cold War international environment, North Korea, rapidly becoming isolated, chose to develop nuclear weapons as the last bastion to secure the survival of its regime and nation. However, the United States, which regards North Korea's denuclearization as a fundamental principle of its North Korea policy, did not accept North Korea's military-first (nuclear) policy, nor could it, as a central power upholding the global order. Ultimately, in the process of pursuing a military-first (nuclear) policy chosen as the last bastion for regime survival, North Korea has not built a strong nation based on its military-first (nuclear) policy, but has continued its arduous march, walking the path of a weakened and small nation.

The third crossroads facing Kim Jong-il's regime in North Korea is far more complex than the previous crossroads of 1994 and 2003, as it is intertwined with the challenge of establishing a Kim Jong-il successor regime in a situation where the economy is on the verge of collapse. If the vested interests of the military-first (nuclear) policy form the leading force of the new leadership without Chairman Kim Jong-il making a strategic decision to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, it will be difficult for North Korea to easily choose a new path from a 'military-first (nuclear) policy' to a 'non-nuclear, economy-first policy.' Internationally, pressure from the United States and the international community for North Korea's denuclearization is continuously increasing, and domestically, regime stability is weakening at an accelerating pace. It is realistically difficult to abandon the last visible card for survival, and at the same time, abandoning the 'military-first (nuclear) policy' means political death for the new leadership. The only leader who can survive while abandoning nuclear weapons is Kim Jong-il, the son of President Kim Il-sung, the embodiment of the Juche ideology. However, the bigger problem is that there is no visible way to escape the deepening crisis that will arise without denuclearization. Nuclear weapons may act as an anesthetic in the short term, allowing one to forget hardships, but they cannot fundamentally cure a fatal illness.

The new path that North Korea has not yet taken is the path of abandoning nuclear weapons, pursuing an economy-first policy, and seeking a strong nation in the 21st century. This means Chairman Kim Jong-il directly laying the domestic foundation for a 'non-nuclear, economy-first policy' and making international efforts to leave the last will of a 'non-nuclear, economy-first policy' to the new successor regime. Only by Chairman Kim Jong-il personally bearing and resolving the risks associated with abandoning nuclear weapons, which signifies an de facto regime transformation, can the successor have a chance of survival. Of course, making the strategic decision to abandon nuclear armament is not easy. It is necessary to quickly find a path to pursue economic prosperity in the 21st century by solidifying regime guarantees through bilateral and multilateral efforts with neighboring countries. It is more realistic for the Kim Jong-il faction of the military-first policy to prepare a political foundation upon which they can agree to the new last will during Chairman Kim Jong-il's lifetime, rather than for the successor regime to pursue this transition after Kim Jong-il. Without Chairman Kim's determination and the strategic cooperation of the surrounding parties, the possibility of North Korea choosing the path of a 'non-nuclear, economy-first policy' is not high. However, if Chairman Kim Jong-il makes a strategic decision, discussions on resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and establishing a 21st-century coexistence system on the Korean Peninsula will become possible.

For a fundamental resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, North Korea must take the first step toward change. North Korea argues that the condition for abandoning nuclear weapons is the cessation of the US hostile policy toward North Korea and the abandonment of the nuclear threat. As concrete expressions of this, it demands the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea, the abandonment of the ROK-US military alliance, and the convening of a nuclear disarmament conference that includes the reduction and redeployment of US nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region. However, these demands by North Korea are weak in justification, unrealistic, and do not provide an alternative that guarantees regime security. Even if the United States withdraws its forces from South Korea, dismantles the ROK-US military alliance, and reduces nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region, North Korea will still not be free from the threat of US military retaliation as long as intercontinental ballistic missiles exist. The core issue is to reach a broad political consensus to guarantee North Korea's regime and national security. In this process, North Korea must realize the reality that it must seek a new path of change to create a more desirable international order for survival and prosperity.

The efforts of the surrounding parties are also essential, matching North Korea's first step. The North Korean nuclear issue cannot be resolved by unilateral changes from one side alone. The North Korean issue can only be resolved when the 'gears' of the six countries—North Korea, the United States, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia—mesh and turn together. To enable North Korea to make the strategic decision of 'complete and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons,' the North Korean regime's anxiety about 'prior denuclearization' must be alleviated. If this anxiety is not alleviated, the leadership driving North Korea's military-first (nuclear) policy will believe they are not facing a choice between life and death, but a choice of how to die. If North Korea turns its gear through a strategic decision, the surrounding parties must also turn their gears forward together so that North Korea's gear continues to mesh and turn forward. The surrounding parties must share a vision and plan for North Korea's long-term future to give North Korea the belief that denuclearization is not the abandonment of the last means for regime survival, but the answer to regime survival.

In response to North Korea's changes, South Korea's first effort to comprehensively resolve the North Korean issue must begin with the formulation of new countermeasures between South Korea and the United States. Past comprehensive alternatives have been difficult to achieve substantial results due to disagreements between the two countries. On August 15, the Lee Myung-bak administration presented a model for a 'Korean-style comprehensive package' primarily consisting of economic assistance and conventional arms reduction. However, as the experience of the Sunshine Policy shows, economic assistance alone cannot unravel the complexities of fundamentally resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. In addition to economic cooperation, more comprehensive content must be included in political and security aspects. The key is whether South Korea and the United States can agree on what they can offer North Korea in terms of normalization of relations and regime guarantees, and what the new successor regime in North Korea desires, based on mutual trust-building. To this end, South Korea and the United States must share an understanding of the end point of the North Korean nuclear issue and be fully prepared to pursue a comprehensive package in earnest with North Korea, which has made a strategic decision. At the same time, cooperation between South Korea, the United States, and China is as important as ROK-US cooperation. Among the surrounding parties, China, which enjoys relative trust from the North Korean successor regime, must be actively involved in the negotiation and implementation of the comprehensive package. China will only strengthen the ROK-US cooperation system and persuade North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons when it is convinced that South Korea and the United States aim for nuclear abandonment, not the collapse of the North Korean regime. Furthermore, to help North Korea become a successful nation, not a failed state in the 21st century, active support from all parties to the Six-Party Talks, as well as the European Union and international organizations, is necessary. Through these complex efforts, by showing North Korea a future of coexistence and common prosperity with the surrounding parties after denuclearization, North Korea should be guided to find its own path to denuclearization and prosperity. ■

Chairman

Ha Young-sun (Seoul National University)

Committee

Lee Sook-jong (President, EAI, Sungkyunkwan University)

Chun Jae-sung (Seoul National University)

Hwang Ji-hwan (Myongji University)

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