[EAI Commentary No. 2] North Korea at a Crossroads

The Kim Jong-il regime in North Korea faces a strategic decision: will it adhere to the 'nuclear-first military' policy until the end despite growing international sanctions, or will it abandon nuclear weapons, considered the last bastion of regime preservation, and pursue a new 'non-nuclear, economy-first policy'? In North Korea, where power succession is imminent, the leadership emerging after Kim Jong-il will walk a path of opportunity or crisis depending on Kim Jong-il's strategic decision. In the upcoming phase where international sanctions and comprehensive negotiations will be pursued simultaneously, Chairman Kim Jong-il must solve the difficult task of laying the foundation for both the survival and prosperity of the successor regime. Meanwhile, the surrounding parties must also realistically provide for the regime and state security of North Korea, create an international environment that can induce nuclear abandonment and reform and opening, and flesh out measures to build a permanent security and peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

Since 1994, Chairman Kim Jong-il has pursued a national strategy inherited from President Kim Il-sung's dying wish: "North Korea's denuclearization should only be achieved if the U.S. withdraws its hostile policy towards North Korea and resolves the nuclear threat." In the post-Cold War international environment, North Korea, rapidly isolating itself, chose to develop nuclear weapons as the last bastion to ensure the survival of its regime and state. However, the United States, which considers North Korea's denuclearization as a fundamental principle of its North Korea policy, did not accept North Korea's 'nuclear-first military' policy, nor could it, as a central country supporting the global order. Ultimately, in the process of pursuing the 'nuclear-first military' policy chosen as the last bastion for regime survival, North Korea is walking the path of a weakened small state, continuing its 'arduous march' instead of building a powerful nation based on nuclear deterrence.

The third crossroads facing the Kim Jong-il regime in North Korea is far more complex than the two crossroads of 1994 and 2003, as it is intertwined with the challenge of establishing the Kim Jong-il successor regime amid an economy on the brink of collapse. If the vested interests of the 'nuclear-first military' policy form the leading force of the new leadership, without Chairman Kim Jong-il making a strategic decision to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, it will be difficult for North Korea to easily choose a new path from 'nuclear-first military policy' to 'non-nuclear, economy-first policy'. This is because, internationally, pressure from the U.S. and the international community for North Korea's denuclearization continues to increase, and domestically, regime stability is weakening. It is realistically difficult to abandon the last visible card for survival, and at the same time, abandoning the 'nuclear-first military policy' means political death for the new leadership. The only leader who can survive while abandoning nuclear weapons is Kim Jong-il, the son of President Kim Il-sung, the embodiment of the Juche ideology. However, the bigger problem is that there is no apparent way to escape the deepening crisis that will arise without denuclearization. While nuclear weapons may act as a painkiller, temporarily allowing one to forget hardships, they cannot fundamentally cure a fatal disease.

The new path that North Korea has not yet taken is to abandon nuclear weapons, pursue an economy-first policy, and seek a strong nation in the 21st century. This means that Chairman Kim Jong-il would directly lay the domestic groundwork for a 'non-nuclear, economy-first policy,' make international efforts, and leave the dying wish for a 'non-nuclear, economy-first policy' to the new successor regime. Only by taking on and resolving the risks associated with nuclear abandonment, which signifies an actual regime transition, can the successor have a chance of survival. Of course, making the strategic decision to abandon nuclear armament is not easy. We must quickly find a path to pursue economic prosperity in the 21st century by securing regime guarantees through bilateral and multilateral efforts with the surrounding parties. It is more realistic to lay the political groundwork during Chairman Kim Jong-il's lifetime, allowing the 'military-first' faction without Kim Jong-il to agree to the new dying wish, rather than having the successor regime pursue this transition after Kim Jong-il's death. Without Chairman Kim's resolve and the strategic cooperation of the surrounding parties, the likelihood of North Korea choosing the path of 'non-nuclear, economy-first policy' is not high. However, if Chairman Kim Jong-il makes a strategic decision, various discussions could become possible for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and establishing a 21st-century peace coexistence regime on the Korean Peninsula.

For the fundamental resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, North Korea must take the first step towards change. North Korea insists on the abandonment of the U.S. hostile policy towards North Korea and the U.S. nuclear threat as conditions for abandoning its nuclear weapons. Specifically, it calls for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, the abandonment of the ROK-U.S. military alliance, and the convening of a nuclear disarmament conference that includes the reduction and redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region. However, these demands by North Korea lack justification, are unrealistic, and do not provide an alternative that guarantees regime security. Even if the U.S. withdraws its forces from South Korea, dissolves the ROK-U.S. military alliance, and reduces nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region, North Korea cannot be free from the threat of U.S. military retaliation as long as intercontinental ballistic missiles exist. The core issue is to reach a broad political consensus to guarantee North Korea's regime and state security. In this process, North Korea must realize the reality that it must seek a new path of change to create a more desirable international order for survival and prosperity.

Efforts by the surrounding parties are also essential, matching North Korea's first step. The North Korean nuclear issue cannot be resolved by unilateral changes from any one side. The 'gears' of the six countries—North Korea, the U.S., South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia—must interlock and turn together to resolve the North Korean issue. To enable North Korea to make the strategic decision of 'complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of nuclear weapons (CVID),' the North Korean regime's anxiety about 'first denuclearization' must be alleviated. If this anxiety is not resolved, the 'military-first' faction in North Korea will think they are not facing a choice between life and death, but rather a choice of how to die. When North Korea turns its gear through a strategic decision, the surrounding parties must also turn their gears forward together, ensuring that North Korea's gear continues to interlock and turn forward. The surrounding parties must share a vision and plan for North Korea's long-term future to give North Korea the confidence that denuclearization is not the abandonment of its ultimate means of survival, but the answer to regime survival.

In response to North Korea's changes, South Korea's first effort to comprehensively resolve the North Korean issue must begin with developing new countermeasures between South Korea and the U.S. Past comprehensive approaches have yielded few tangible results due to disagreements between the two countries. On August 15th, the Lee Myung-bak administration presented a model of a 'Korean-style comprehensive package' primarily focused on economic aid and conventional arms reduction. However, as the experience of the Sunshine Policy shows, economic aid alone cannot unravel the complexities of fundamentally resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Alongside economic cooperation, more comprehensive content must be included in political and security aspects. The key is whether South Korea and the U.S. can agree on what they can offer North Korea in terms of normalization of relations and regime guarantees, and what the new North Korean successor regime desires, based on mutual trust-building. To this end, South Korea and the U.S. must share an understanding of the 'end point' of the North Korean nuclear issue and be fully prepared to seriously pursue a comprehensive package with North Korea once it makes a strategic decision. Simultaneously, cooperation between South Korea, the U.S., and China is as important as ROK-U.S. cooperation. Among the surrounding parties, China, which enjoys relatively high trust from the North Korean successor regime, must be actively involved in the negotiation and implementation of the comprehensive package. China will only support the ROK-U.S. cooperative system and persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons when it is convinced that South Korea and the U.S. are aiming for nuclear disarmament, not the collapse of the North Korean regime. Furthermore, to help North Korea become a successful nation, not a failed one, in the 21st century, active support from all parties to the Six-Party Talks, as well as the European Union and international organizations, is necessary. Through these multifaceted efforts, by showing North Korea a future of coexistence and shared prosperity with the surrounding parties after denuclearization, we must guide North Korea to find its own path to denuclearization and prosperity.■

Chairman

Ha Young-sun (Seoul National University)

Committee

Lee Sook-jong (EAI President, Sungkyunkwan University)

Chun Jae-sung (Seoul National University)

Hwang Ji-hwan (Myongji University)

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