[China Briefing] Democracy and China

It is a opportune time to reflect on democracy. Trump was elected president in the United States, and the UK decided on Brexit in Europe. South Korea is also marking the 30th anniversary of democratization with its first-ever presidential impeachment and dismissal.

Although the patterns vary globally, the crisis facing democracy can be summarized in two dimensions. One is the 'input crisis.' Democracy was originally designed to represent more of the populace than previous political systems. However, contemporary democracies are not very representative in their 'input.' Voter turnout is quite low in many countries, and it is on a downward trend. It is not uncommon for elected candidates to receive far less than a majority of the votes. The pool of individuals running for office is also narrow. The criticism that democracy has degenerated into a plutocracy, where a few wealthy individuals acquire political power, is now trite. Adding to this the inter-generational injustice summarized by the over-representation of the elderly and the under-representation of the youth, and the global inequality caused by the over-representation of powerful nations and the under-representation of weaker ones, the challenges facing democracy are by no means easy.

The crisis of democracy is also, on the other hand, an 'output crisis.' Citizens feel that the 'outputs' of political systems, such as laws and policies created by elected officials, are ineffective in improving the quality of their lives and solving the problems facing the political community. Many democratic countries are experiencing significant deficiencies and shortcomings in the leadership and decisiveness of national leaders, the integrity and expertise of bureaucrats, the negotiation skills and policy knowledge of politicians, coordination and cooperation among government ministries, and the maturity of other institutional environments, all of which are essential for solving various public problems. As a result, many important policy issues are left unresolved and adrift, or are 'resolved' incorrectly.

However, what poses the greatest challenge to democracy is neither the input-level crisis nor the output-level crisis. It is the 'existing alternative,' namely the 'China model.' No matter how flawed existing representative democracy may be and how numerous the criticisms leveled against it, it would not face a significant crisis if there were no realistic alternatives. The 'China model' poses a strong challenge by exploiting the vulnerabilities of democratic political systems, particularly the problem of insufficient policy performance.

The challenge posed by China to democracy can be broadly summarized into four points. First, it argues that output is more important than input for political systems. It claims that how effectively government policies solve practical problems of people's livelihood and achieve the fundamental objectives of the state, such as national security, economic growth, and political development, is more important than ensuring adequate and equitable participation of the populace in the input process. Second, the criterion for evaluating the quality of 'input' is not representativeness, as emphasized in Western representative democracy – i.e., 'how adequately and fully each segment of the population is represented' – but rather 'how effectively competent and outstanding individuals are discovered and trained through competition or other methods to rise to the position of high-level policymakers.' Third, in terms of discovering competent and outstanding individuals, 'voting,' which most democracies emphasize as an infallible method, is not very appropriate. It argues that internal party competition outcomes and experience serving in local government are more effective indicators. Finally, it posits that when such competent and outstanding individuals are discovered and entrusted with administration and policy, it leads to the output of high-quality policies desired by the populace.

According to Wang Xiaoguang's (2010) critique of representative systems, current Western democracies are merely 'choosing lords' (選主), where citizens merely participate in voting without becoming true masters. This is because Western democracies have erred by focusing excessively on the methods and procedures of 'democracy' rather than its essential meaning. True 'democracy' is not about 'lords' being 'represented' (代議) through voting, but a system where policies desired by the people, the true masters of state affairs, are effectively implemented by competent state managers, bringing widespread benefits to the populace. Based on these arguments, the Chinese model of 'meritocracy' or 'meritocratic democracy' has gained prominence as superior to the existing Western-style representative democracy (Bell 2015; Bell and Li 2012; Li 2012; Li 2013).

For China's 'meritocratic democracy' to consistently and stably produce excellent policy outcomes, it is crucial for state officials to secure relative autonomy or insulation from the direct influence of the populace, i.e., social pressure. To this end, the appropriate control and effective management of the internet are key to preventing the emergence and spread of subversive public opinion. The Chinese government is effectively preventing the destabilizing factors brought about by the ICT revolution through 'smart' censorship and the construction and development of ChinaNet (European Council on Foreign Relations 2013: 150-157).

However, no matter how smart the censorship and control, it is difficult to completely block or prevent the overall impact of information and communication technology on citizens and politics. It is impossible to completely prevent 300 million Chinese bloggers from debating specific issues on ChinaNet or to prevent the exposure of corruption by public officials in unpredictable ways. The internet and online spaces are explosively growing in China, and information exchange and communication are becoming more active with the emergence of various platforms and changes in traditional media. The subjects of online public opinion are the younger generation, and their content mainly consists of exposing social problems. The overwhelming majority of SNS users are urban residents, who have a developed sense of self and are accustomed to more liberal expression (Hu Yong 2006), possessing a critical awareness of injustice and a desire for democratic participation (Zhang Xijin 2011). Online public opinion even tends to connect with offline collective protests.

Collective protests in China were tallied at 10,000 cases in 1993 and over 74,000 cases in 2004. In 2010, approximately 180,000 collective protests occurred across China, a twofold increase compared to 2006 (New York Times, August 16, 2011). Most protests are related to unauthorized or unfair land appropriation by the government or developers, abuse of power by local officials, or wage arrears by companies, and they tend to be movements for people's livelihood and rights protection rather than political movements. Recently, not only have protests become more frequent, but they are also showing signs of becoming organized (Lee Dong-ryul & Seo Bong-gyo, 2012).

In China's meritocratic democracy, a lack of representativeness in the input dimension is unlikely to become a serious problem. This is because the concept has been inverted, where true 'democracy' is not about electing national policymakers by the people and enhancing the representativeness of the political system, but rather 'acting for the people' (爲民) where the government competently designs and implements policies on behalf of the populace. The perception that delegative democracy is superior to representative democracy has long been firmly established.

The foundation supporting the equation 'acting for the people = democracy' is the continuous output of excellent policies that satisfy the majority of the populace. However, no government in history has ever continuously produced only successful policies. Policy failures, whether large or small, in the near or distant future, are bound to occur. Perhaps China's alternative democracy may be able to conceal the negative repercussions of such events through 'smart' public opinion control, effectively manage them, or at least prevent online public opinion from connecting to offline collective protests. Furthermore, continuous anti-corruption campaigns will be necessary to demonstrate the fairness and impartiality of administration, policy processes, and law enforcement.

However, guaranteeing the continuous success of policies is not an easy task. This is because 'good policies' that can effectively cope with the constantly changing policy environment are unlikely to emerge without creativity (創新), a concept that the Chinese government has only recently begun to focus on. For the continuous output of high-quality policies, state officials must be unimaginably creative, or they must be able to borrow the creativity they lack from the private sector, such as the market or civil society.

This is precisely where the challenge for Chinese democracy lies. Chinese democracy has emerged as an attractive alternative to Western-style representative democracy through a redefinition of 'democracy.' It claims to better realize 'democracy' even without Western representation. However, if China aspires to a society that fosters creativity, which provides the foundation for continuous policy success (and also enables economic development), it must also redefine 'freedom' in Chinese terms. In other words, if it can generate 'creativity' without Western freedom, Chinese democracy could become a formidable alternative to Western representative democracy facing a crisis. Ultimately, the main battleground for the success of China's 'democracy' experiment is not 'democracy' itself, but 'freedom.' ■

Author

Kim Sun-hyuk_Professor of Public Administration at Korea University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University. His main research areas include Korean politics, comparative politics, and government reform. His recent works include "The Changing Modes of Administrative Reform in South Korea" (2017, co-authored), "The ICT Revolution and the Future of Democracy" (2016), and "NGOs and Social Protection in East Asia: Korea, Thailand and Indonesia" (2015).

<China Briefing> is a briefing series designed to provide insights through in-depth analysis of major Chinese issues by various experts. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institute independent of any partisan interests. The arguments and opinions presented in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not related to EAI and are solely the views of the individual author.