[Public Opinion Brief No. 137] EAI and Japan's Genron NPO Jointly Discuss Regional Conflicts in East Asia and the Role of Public Diplomacy

[Public Opinion Brief No. 137] EAI and Japan's Genron NPO Jointly Discuss Regional Conflicts in East Asia and the Role of Public Diplomacy

1. Possibility of Military Conflict in the East Asian Region

2. Evaluation of Intergovernmental Diplomacy and Causes of Conflict

3. Potential and Limitations of Public Diplomacy

4. Necessity of Multilateral Government Dialogue

5. Prospects for Public Diplomacy in East Asia

1. Possibility of Military Conflict in the East Asian Region

- Military conflict may occur in East Asia: South Korea 28.9%, Japan 58.9%

- The primary region anticipated for military conflict is the East China Sea

- Possibility of conflict on the Korean Peninsula: South Korea 28.9%, Japan 18.0%

Among the experts surveyed by EAI, the proportion who responded that the possibility of military conflict in East Asia is low was higher than the proportion who responded that it is likely. More specifically, 46.4% (12.6% unlikely + 33.8% probably unlikely) responded that there is no possibility of military conflict in East Asia, showing a significant gap compared to the 29.0% (5.5% likely + 23.5% probably likely) who responded that it is likely, and even compared to the 23.7% who responded that it is equally likely or unlikely.

However, it would be premature to interpret these results as purely optimistic. The 28.9% who responded that there is a possibility of military conflict in East Asia is not a low figure, and when combined with the 23.7% who responded that it is equally likely or unlikely, it suggests that even among the surveyed experts, a majority (52.6%) harbor some level of anxiety.

The concerns of Japanese respondents were even greater compared to the South Korean results. The proportion who responded that there is no possibility of military conflict in East Asia was only 21.9% (5.7% unlikely + 16.2% probably unlikely). In contrast, the proportion who responded that military conflict is likely reached 58.9% (7.4% likely + 51.5% probably likely).

[Figure 1] Likelihood of Military Conflict in East Asia (%)

The 138 EAI survey participants who responded that there is a possibility of military conflict in East Asia were asked to identify the regions where such conflict is most likely to occur. The results showed the East China Sea (China-Japan) as the most frequently cited region, with 62.3% (86 respondents). The Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea (China-Vietnam, China-Philippines, etc.) were cited by 19.6% (27 respondents) and 17.4% (24 respondents), respectively. Only one respondent mentioned Taiwan.

Japanese respondents cited the East China Sea and the South China Sea with high frequency. Specifically, 45.5% responded the East China Sea, and 30.2% responded the South China Sea. The proportion citing the Korean Peninsula was 18.0%. These results indicate that more than eight out of ten respondents anticipate that military conflict in East Asia will be directly related to China.

[Figure 2] Regions with High Likelihood of Military Conflict in East Asia (%)

2. Evaluation of Intergovernmental Diplomacy and Causes of Conflict

- Intergovernmental diplomacy can prevent military conflict in the East China Sea: South Korea 49.3%, Japan 42.1%

- Intergovernmental diplomacy cannot prevent it: South Korea 16.6%, Japan 19.2%

While the possibility of military conflict in East Asia cannot be entirely dismissed, many experts perceive intergovernmental diplomacy as continuing to play a crucial role. Regarding the East China Sea dispute, 49.3% of respondents indicated that intergovernmental diplomacy can prevent military conflict. The proportion who responded that it is equally likely or unlikely was also not low at 32.9%, but this is approximately three times higher than the 16.6% who responded that it cannot prevent conflict.

The survey results from Japanese respondents, similar to the EAI survey, emphasized the importance of intergovernmental diplomacy. Specifically, 42.1% responded that intergovernmental diplomacy can prevent military conflict, while 19.2% responded that it cannot. The proportion who responded that it is equally likely or unlikely was 35.0%.

[Figure 3] Possibility of Preventing East China Sea Disputes through Intergovernmental Diplomacy (%)

* Don't know/No response excluded from analysis

- Intergovernmental diplomacy among South Korea, China, and Japan is not functioning properly: South Korea 67.7%, Japan 85.2%

- Key factor: South Korea cites confrontation over territory or historical perception (32.8%)

- Japan cites domestic political situations in each country (38.9%)

- Due to Prime Minister Abe's actions and statements: South Korea 13.9%, Japan 15.6%

While many experts acknowledged the importance of intergovernmental diplomacy in preventing disputes in the East China Sea, this does not necessarily imply that intergovernmental diplomacy is functioning effectively. Only 15.5% (2.1% strongly agree + 13.4% somewhat agree) responded that intergovernmental diplomacy is functioning effectively in relations between South Korea and Japan, and between China and Japan. Excluding the 15.7% who responded 'neutral', the remaining 67.7% (12.6% strongly disagree + 55.1% somewhat disagree) responded that intergovernmental diplomacy is not functioning effectively.

The survey results from Japanese respondents were not significantly different from those of South Korea. The proportion who responded that intergovernmental diplomacy is functioning effectively in relations between South Korea and Japan, and between China and Japan, was 0.0% for 'strongly agree' and only 7.7% for 'somewhat agree'. In contrast, the proportion who responded 'disagree' was 85.2% (45.1% strongly disagree + 40.1% somewhat disagree).

[Figure 4] Is Intergovernmental Diplomacy Among South Korea, China, and Japan Functioning Effectively? (%)

* Don't know/No response excluded from analysis

Among the 323 respondents who provided a negative evaluation, the most frequently cited reason, with an response rate of 32.8%, was "confrontation over territory or historical perceptions." "Nationalistic and overheated public opinion in each country" also showed a relatively high response rate of 27.6%. The proportion citing "domestic political situations in each country" was 22.3%, and "Prime Minister Abe's statements and actions" was 13.9%.

The survey results from Japanese respondents showed a difference compared to the South Korean results. The most significant difference was in the item "domestic political situations in each country," which accounted for 38.9% of responses. The proportion citing "confrontation over territory or historical perceptions," which was the highest response rate in the South Korean survey, was 19.1%, lower than the 22.2% response rate for "overheated public opinion in each country." An interesting point is the results regarding Prime Minister Abe. In the Japanese survey, 15.6% responded that intergovernmental diplomacy among South Korea, China, and Japan is not functioning effectively due to "Prime Minister Abe's statements and actions." This suggests that there is considerable public opinion in Japan concerned that Abe is having a negative impact on the East Asian region, at least in terms of diplomacy.

[Figure 5] Factors Hindering Effective Intergovernmental Diplomacy Among South Korea, China, and Japan (%)

3. Potential and Limitations of Public Diplomacy

- Public diplomacy effectiveness is positive: South Korea 51.8%, Japan 56.9%

- Positive outlook for public diplomacy: South Korea 40.0%, Japan 80.5%

The experts surveyed were not uniformly positive about public diplomacy or people-to-people diplomacy. Regarding public diplomacy, only 4.4% anticipated significant success. While 47.4% anticipated some success, leading to an overall positive outlook of 51.8%, it is difficult to conclude that this represents an optimistic assessment, considering it is based on 'prospects.' The proportion responding 'neutral' was 19.9%, and the combined proportion responding 'little success' and 'no success at all' was 27.4% (24.3% and 3.1%, respectively).

The Japanese survey results did not show a significant difference. The proportion anticipating success for public diplomacy was 56.9%, and the proportion anticipating no success was 26.2%. The proportion responding 'neutral' was 15.8%.

[Figure 6] Prospects for the Role of Public Diplomacy (%)

* Don't know/No response excluded from analysis

The outlook for people-to-people diplomacy, which is expected to fill some of the gaps in intergovernmental diplomacy, was also not optimistic. The proportion responding that they have high expectations for the role of people-to-people diplomacy was 11.7%, and 'somewhat high' was 28.3%. Consequently, the total proportion responding with expectations did not reach a majority, at 40.0%. The proportion responding 'very low expectations' was 13.0%, and 'somewhat low' was 17.2%, resulting in a combined proportion of negative outlooks at 30.2%. Adding the 28.7% who responded 'neutral' brings the proportion of surveyed experts who hold a cautious or passive stance on the role of people-to-people diplomacy to 58.9%.

The Japanese survey results showed a distinct difference from the South Korean results regarding the role of people-to-people diplomacy. This is because 43.6% responded that they have very high expectations for the role of people-to-people diplomacy, and 36.7% responded 'somewhat high.' In contrast, the proportion responding 'very low expectations' and 'somewhat low expectations' was the same at 7.7%. These results highlight the high expectations Japanese respondents have for people-to-people diplomacy.

The over 40 percentage point gap in the outlook for the role of people-to-people diplomacy between the South Korean and Japanese surveys can be inferred from the survey results on the factors hindering effective intergovernmental diplomacy among South Korea, China, and Japan. While South Korean experts most frequently cited territorial and historical perception issues as the cause, Japanese respondents most frequently cited domestic political situations. South Korean experts diagnose the conflict among South Korea, China, and Japan as stemming from fundamental issues of territory and historical perception, thus anticipating a limited role for people-to-people diplomacy. In contrast, Japan cited domestic politics, factors that could be influenced by people-to-people diplomacy, leading to an overwhelmingly positive outlook on its role.

[Figure 7] Prospects for the Role of People-to-People Diplomacy (%)

* Don't know/No response excluded from analysis

- Who should play a role in people-to-people diplomacy? South Korea: Civil society organizations and intellectuals. Japan: Civil society organizations and conscientious citizens.

The background to the not-entirely-optimistic outlook on the role of people-to-people diplomacy may also stem from the approach that the relationships among the three East Asian countries are influenced not only by current diplomatic issues but also by long historical contexts. This suggests that mutual distrust and dissatisfaction exist not only at the governmental level but also among the general public in these three countries.

When asked who should carry out the role of people-to-people diplomacy, with multiple responses allowed, the proportion citing "citizens with a sense of ownership as stakeholders in problem-solving" (33.5%) or "youth, including students" (26.6%) and "the media" (49.1%) was lower than that citing "non-profit organizations such as NPOs and NGOs" (63.9%) or "intellectuals" (62.3%). Additionally, the proportions citing "corporations" and "don't know" were 50.1% and 1.5%, respectively.

In the Japanese survey results, the proportion citing "non-profit organizations such as NPOs and NGOs" was the highest at 70.4%, similar to the South Korean survey. However, the proportion citing "conscientious citizens" was 47.5%, showing a difference from the South Korean results. Excluding intellectuals at 41.1%, the proportions citing corporations, the media, and youth including students were all in the 30% range, showing a relatively even distribution.

[Figure 8] Suitable Actors for People-to-People Diplomacy (%)

4. Necessity of Multilateral Government Dialogue

- Government dialogue is necessary for East Asian stability: South Korea 93.0%, Japan 96.3%

- Resolution of East China Sea disputes should be through multilateral consultations rather than bilateral China-Japan talks

Regarding the necessity of multilateral government dialogue for peace and security in East Asia, which is as tangled as a ball of yarn, 68.1% responded 'strongly agree,' and 24.9% responded 'somewhat agree.' Consequently, the proportion responding that multilateral government dialogue is necessary reached an overwhelming 93.0%. The proportion responding 'neutral' was 3.8%, and the proportions responding 'strongly disagree' and 'somewhat disagree' were 0.4% and 1.7%, respectively.

The Japanese survey results also showed an overwhelming consensus (96.3%) on the necessity of multilateral government dialogue for regional stability in East Asia. In contrast, the proportion responding that it is not necessary was only 0.3%, and the proportion responding 'neutral' was 2.4%.

[Figure 9] Necessity of Multilateral Government Dialogue for East Asian Stability (%)

* Don't know/No response excluded from analysis

Regarding the East China Sea issue, the most effective consultative body was considered to be a trilateral consultation involving China, Japan, and the US, with 31.0% of respondents choosing this option, which is higher than the 12.2% who selected bilateral consultations between China and Japan. Furthermore, the proportions citing the "East Asia Summit" or "ASEAN+3" were 25.4% and 13.2%, respectively, both higher than the proportion citing bilateral consultations between China and Japan. APEC member economies include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. ASEAN member states are Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Laos. ASEAN+3 includes the 10 ASEAN countries plus South Korea, China, and Japan. The East Asia Summit includes the 10 ASEAN countries plus South Korea, China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India, the United States, and Russia. The ASEAN Regional Forum includes the United States, India, Indonesia, Australia, Canada, South Korea, Cambodia, North Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, China, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Bangladesh, Timor-Leste, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, Laos, Russia, and the EU. G20 countries are the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, EU, Russia, China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Argentina.

In the Japanese survey as well, when asked about consultative bodies for resolving disputes in the East China Sea, respondents preferred trilateral consultations involving the US, China, and Japan (32.0%) over bilateral consultations between China and Japan (15.8%). While the East Asia Summit and ASEAN+3 were also cited, their response rates were only in the 10% range.

[Figure 10] Consultative Bodies for Resolving East China Sea Disputes (%)

APEC member economies include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. ASEAN member states are Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Laos. ASEAN+3 includes the 10 ASEAN countries plus South Korea, China, and Japan. The East Asia Summit includes the 10 ASEAN countries plus South Korea, China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India, the United States, and Russia. The ASEAN Regional Forum includes the United States, India, Indonesia, Australia, Canada, South Korea, Cambodia, North Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, China, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Bangladesh, Timor-Leste, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, Laos, Russia, and the EU. G20 countries are the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, EU, Russia, China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Argentina.

5. Prospects for Public Diplomacy in East Asia

- People-to-people diplomacy is important in East Asia: South Korea 69.4%, Japan 78.5%

- Participating countries: South Korea, China, Japan + US, highest

The experts surveyed by EAI showed no significant disagreement on the point that cross-border public dialogue and people-to-people diplomacy will play an important role in East Asia. When asked if public dialogue and people-to-people diplomacy would play an important role, 23.5% responded 'strongly agree' and 45.9% responded 'somewhat agree,' resulting in a combined positive assessment of 69.4%. The proportion responding 'neutral' was 19.7%, and the proportions responding 'strongly disagree' and 'somewhat disagree' were only 0.8% and 9.2%, respectively.

The Japanese survey results were even more proactive compared to the South Korean results. When asked if public dialogue and people-to-people diplomacy would play an important role, 32.7% responded 'strongly agree,' and 45.8% responded 'somewhat agree.' In contrast, the proportions responding 'strongly disagree' and 'somewhat disagree' were only 3.0% and 2.4%, respectively.

[Figure 11] Importance of People-to-People Diplomacy in East Asia (%)

* Don't know/No response excluded from analysis

Regarding the participating countries and regions in East Asian people-to-people diplomacy, the results were virtually identical for the three core stakeholders: South Korea, China, and Japan. When asked with multiple response options allowed, 96.4% responded China, 95.7% South Korea, and 95.4% Japan. The United States was also highly cited at 73.6%, while North Korea and Russia were cited by 57.8% and 53.2% respectively, both exceeding the majority threshold. ASEAN member states were also relatively highly cited at 48.9%. The response rates for India (23.7%), Australia (20.1%), New Zealand (14.0%), and others (0.9%) were comparatively lower than for other countries or regions.

However, one result that warrants attention is the overall response rate. With multiple responses allowed, the sum of the overall response rates reached 579.9%. This implies that each survey participant selected an average of approximately six countries and regions. This finding indicates that many survey participants, who are experts, believe it is necessary to include a wide range of countries and regions in East Asian people-to-people diplomacy.

The survey in Japan also showed high citation rates for Japan, China, and South Korea. Specifically, 91.6% responded Japan, 91.2% China, and 81.9% South Korea. The United States was also highly cited at 70.2%. Additionally, Russia and North Korea were cited by 32.8% and 25.6% respectively. The Japanese survey results also indicate a preference for people-to-people diplomacy that includes as many countries as possible.

[Figure 12] Who Should Be Included in East Asian People-to-People Diplomacy (%)