[Public Opinion Brief No. 131] Key Findings from the 2013 Survey on Mutual Perceptions between Korea and Japan

[Public Opinion Brief No. 131] Jointly by EAI and Genron NPO

1. Negative Mutual Perceptions between Korean and Japanese Citizens

2. Negative Perceptions Also Evident in Personal Impressions

3. Perceptions of Bilateral Relations in Security and Economy

4. Differences in Perceptions Between Korean and Japanese Citizens Regarding Bilateral Relations

5. Characteristics of Perceptions of National Character

6. Obstacles to the Development of Korea-Japan Relations

7. Necessity of Summit Meetings and Key Agendas

8. Vitalizing People-to-People Exchange and Perceptions of Media Reporting Fairness

[Appendix]

1. Negative Mutual Perceptions between Korean and Japanese Citizens

- Korea-Japan Relations: 'Bad' - 67.4% of Koreans, 55.1% of Japanese

- Bilateral Relations Over the Past Year: 'Improved' - 2.4% of Koreans, 4.5% of Japanese

- Future Outlook for Korea-Japan Relations: 'Will Improve' - 14.0% of Koreans, 23.1% of Japanese

To summarize the perceptions of Japan and Korea held by citizens of both countries in 2013 in one word: 'bad.' Among Korean citizens, only 3.4% (very good 0.1% + somewhat good 3.3%) responded that relations with Japan were 'good.' Conversely, 67.4% (very bad 15.2% + somewhat bad 52.2%) responded that they were 'bad.' Japanese citizens also perceived relations with Korea negatively.

Among Japanese citizens, the proportion who responded that relations with Korea were 'good' was 11.3% (very good 0.5% + somewhat good 10.8%), a significantly lower level compared to the 55.1% (very bad 8.3% + somewhat bad 46.8%) who responded that they were 'bad.' The proportion who responded 'so-so' was 29.2% among Korean citizens and 33.6% among Japanese citizens.

These survey results are based on a public opinion poll conducted in March and April by EAI and Genron NPO, a leading Japanese civic organization, in Korea and Japan, respectively. The Korean survey, managed by EAI, was conducted from March 25 to April 15, commissioned to Korea Research Co., Ltd., through face-to-face interviews by surveyors with 1,004 adults aged 19 and above nationwide, including Jeju Special Self-Governing Province. The maximum permissible sampling error is ±3.1% at a 95% confidence level. The Japanese survey, managed by Genron NPO, was conducted from March 30 to April 15, commissioned to the Institute for Social Research (Seron Sogo Kenkyusho), using the leaving method with 1,000 adults aged 18 and above nationwide.

[Figure 1] Perceptions of Bilateral Relations by Korean and Japanese Citizens in 2013 (%)

The negative perception of bilateral relations among Korean and Japanese citizens was not confined to specific age groups; it was observed across all age demographics. In fact, excluding the 40s in Korea where 4.5% responded positively, the proportion answering 'good' (very good + somewhat good) was less than 4% in all other age groups.

The age-specific results from Japan, while showing a relatively higher proportion of 'good' responses compared to Korea, still indicated that the percentage of respondents viewing bilateral relations as good remained around the 10% range. In Japan, the highest proportion of 'good' responses was observed among those in their 50s, but it only reached 15.9%.

Considering that in 2012, both Korea and Japan experienced the most negative perceptions of each other in the past decade, the current situation in 2013 can be inferred. Furthermore, given that it is difficult to identify any events in the past year that positively influenced bilateral relations, the current state of Korea-Japan relations in terms of public opinion can be considered the most negative in the past decade (refer to Appendix for survey results from 2002-2012). For more detailed information, please refer to Lee, Sook-jong. 2013. "2013 Outlook for Korea-Japan Relations and Korea's Response." 《EAI Issue Briefing No. MASI 2013-01》. East Asia Institute.

[Figure 2] Proportion of Korean and Japanese Citizens Responding 'Good' Regarding Bilateral Relations by Age Group

Given that a significant number of Korean and Japanese citizens hold a highly negative view of current bilateral relations, they also responded negatively regarding relations over the past year and the future outlook. Specifically, the proportion of Korean citizens who responded that bilateral relations 'improved' (very improved + somewhat improved) over the past year was 2.4%, and for Japanese citizens, it was 4.5%. The proportion who responded 'about the same' was 43.5% for Koreans and 29.2% for Japanese. Those who responded 'worsened' were 53.9% of Koreans and 66.3% of Japanese. The proportion answering 'worsened' overwhelmingly dominated the other responses for both Korean and Japanese citizens.

It is unreasonable to interpret the future outlook for bilateral relations as positive. Among Korean citizens, the proportion who responded that relations 'will improve' (very much will improve + somewhat will improve) was 14.0%, falling short of the 26.6% who responded that they 'will worsen' (very much will worsen + somewhat will worsen).

While 59.9% responded that relations 'will remain about the same,' which constitutes a majority, considering the current negative mutual perceptions between Korea and Japan, it is difficult to interpret this positively.

The situation was similar for Japanese citizens. Among Japanese citizens, the proportion who responded that relations 'will improve' was 23.1%, which is higher than the 18.2% who responded that they 'will worsen.' The proportion who responded that relations 'will remain the same' reached 34.6%, but again, considering the current negative state of bilateral relations, it is difficult to interpret this positively.

[Figure 3] Bilateral Relations Over the Past Year (%) [Figure 4] Future Outlook for Bilateral Relations (%)

2. Negative Perceptions Also Evident in Personal Impressions

- 'Have a good impression of the other country': Koreans 12.2%, Japanese 31.1%

- Impression of Japan over the past year: 'Improved' 3.6%

- Impression of Korea over the past year: 'Improved' 7.4%


The negative perception of bilateral relations among Korean and Japanese citizens was not unrelated to their personal impressions of each other. Among Korean citizens, only 12.2% (have a good impression 1.0% + generally have a good impression 11.2%) responded that they had a good impression of Japan. The proportion who responded that they had a bad impression was 76.6% (have a bad impression 37.9% + generally have a bad impression 38.7%).


While the survey results for Japanese citizens could be considered relatively more favorable compared to Korean citizens, they do not necessarily indicate a positive impression of Korea. In fact, among Japanese citizens, only 31.1% (good impression 6.3% + generally good impression 24.8%) reported having a good impression of Korea, while those who reported a bad impression totaled 37.7% (bad impression 9.9% + generally bad impression 27.4%).


[Figure 5] Impressions of the Other Country by Korean and Japanese Citizens (%)

The change in impressions of the other country over the past year was similar. The proportion of Korean citizens who responded that their impression of Japan had improved was only 3.6% (very much improved 0.5% + generally improved 3.1%), while the proportions who responded 'about the same' or 'worsened' were 49.7% and 48.7% (very much worsened 8.6% + generally worsened 38.1%), respectively.

When considering those who responded 'about the same' in conjunction with the previously discussed perceptions of current bilateral relations, the proportion answering 'bad' reached 57.5%. This suggests a low likelihood of a positive interpretation of 'about the same.'

Similarly, among Japanese citizens, the proportion who responded that their impression of Korea had improved over the past year was only 7.4% (very much improved 2.0% + generally improved 5.4%). In contrast, those who responded that it had worsened totaled 39.6% (very much worsened 8.1% + generally worsened 31.5%), significantly exceeding the proportion who reported improvement. The proportion who responded 'about the same' was 52.9%, but considering that many Japanese citizens view current relations between Japan and Korea negatively, this result is also difficult to interpret positively.


[Figure 6] Change in Impressions of the Other Country Over the Past Year by Korean and Japanese Citizens (%)

3. Perceptions of Bilateral Relations in Security and Economy

- Countries Posing a Military Threat: Koreans - North Korea > China > Japan; Japanese - North Korea > China > Russia

- Japan's Economic Development: Positive for Korea - 31.6%, Negative for Korea - 47.6%

- Korea's Economic Development: Positive for Japan - 45.0%, Negative for Japan - 32.3%

The negative perceptions of bilateral relations and the other country among Korean and Japanese citizens can also be observed in the areas of security and economy. Relatively more negative perceptions were evident among Korean citizens.

Regarding countries posing a military threat, to which multiple responses were allowed, 86.7% of Korean citizens cited North Korea. China was cited by 47.8%, and Japan by 43.9%. The proportions citing the United States and Russia were each in the 4% range.

Similar to Korean citizens, Japanese citizens most frequently cited North Korea as a military threat, with 78.9% of respondents. China was cited by 60.1%. Following these were Russia, Korea, and the United States in that order. The proportion citing Korea was 12.2%, indicating that more than one in ten Japanese citizens consider Korea a military threat.

[Table 1] Countries Posing a Military Threat

Perceptions of bilateral economic relations were also not entirely favorable. Here too, Korean citizens' perceptions were more negative compared to Japanese citizens. Among Korean citizens, the proportion who responded that Japan's economic development positively impacts Korea and is necessary was 31.6% (very much so + generally so).

Conversely, the proportion who responded that Japan's economic development poses a threat to Korea was 47.6% (very much so + generally so), indicating that a higher percentage of citizens perceive Japan's economic development negatively.

Japanese citizens were not entirely positive in their perceptions of Korea's economic development either. The proportion who responded that Korea's economic development positively impacts Japan and is necessary was 45.0%, while the proportion who responded that Korea's economic development poses a threat to Japan was 32.3%.


[Table 2] Perceptions of Bilateral Economic Relations (%)

* Non-responses were excluded from the analysis.



4. Differences in Perceptions Between Korean and Japanese Citizens Regarding Bilateral Relations

- Mutual Future Outlook: Positive

- Importance of Relations: Korea-Japan Relations - 73.6%, Korea-China Relations - 74.0%

- Greater Importance: Korea-Japan Relations over Korea-China Relations - 9.3%; Korea-China Relations over Korea-Japan Relations - 13.9%

- Affinity towards China/Japan: Feel more affinity towards Japan - 13.5%, Feel more affinity towards Korea - 45.5%

Despite the unfavorable perceptions of bilateral relations in security and economic fields, the future outlook for each other was not negative. Regarding the international influence of the other country in 2030, Korean citizens most frequently predicted that Japan would maintain its position as the world's third-largest economic power (34.1%). The next most common response was that Japan would be a middle power with strong influence (29.6%).

Japanese citizens also offered positive future projections for Korea. Excluding 'don't know' (32.8%), the most common prediction for Korea in 2030 was that it would be a middle power with strong influence (21.3%). The proportion predicting Korea as a small country with strong influence was 14.9%. These results indicate that both Korean and Japanese citizens have a hopeful outlook for the future of the other country.

Furthermore, both Korean and Japanese citizens attach importance to relations with the other country. Among Korean citizens, 73.6% responded that relations with Japan are important, with only 6.0% stating they are not important. Similarly, 74.0% of Japanese citizens responded that relations with Korea are important, while only 7.1% stated they are not important. These results demonstrate that citizens of both countries positively view the future of the other and highly value their bilateral relationship.


[Figure 7] Perceptions of the Importance of Bilateral Relations Between Korean and Japanese Citizens (%)

A significant variable surrounding Korea-Japan relations is China. East Asia, being the region most directly affected by China's rise, places both Korea and Japan within China's sphere of influence. However, there are differences in how Korean and Japanese citizens view China. Korean citizens, who hold relatively negative perceptions of Japan, are more proactive regarding China.

When asked, with multiple responses allowed, which country or region would lead global politics in the future, 74.8% of Korean citizens cited the United States, followed closely by China at 71.7%. Other responses included the G8 (10.5%), the G20 (9.9%), and Korea and Japan at 5.5% and 4.7%, respectively.

Among Japanese citizens, the United States was cited most frequently at 51.3%, followed by the G8 (24.7%) and the G20 (19.3%). China ranked fourth with 18.7%, showing a difference from the Korean survey results. Japan and Korea were cited at 9.9% and 1.2%, respectively.

The aforementioned differences in future outlook between the two countries' citizens reveal a disparity in the perceived importance of Korea-Japan relations versus Korea-China relations. Among Korean citizens, 55.0% responded that both Korea-Japan and Korea-China relations are important. However, the proportion who considered Korea-China relations more important (35.8%) was approximately four times higher than those who considered Korea-Japan relations more important (9.3%).

For Japanese citizens, the highest proportion (49.6%) also responded that both relations are important. However, a difference was observed in that the proportion considering Korea-Japan relations more important (20.0%) was higher than that for Korea-China relations (13.9%).

[Figure 8] Perceptions of the Importance of Korea-Japan Relations vs. Korea-China Relations (%)

These survey results appear to be related to the differences in feelings of affinity towards China and the respective other countries. Among Korean citizens, the proportion who felt more affinity towards China (36.2%) was nearly three times higher than that towards Japan (13.5%).

The proportion who felt equally friendly towards both countries was 12.3%. Among Japanese citizens, the proportion who felt more affinity towards Korea (45.5%) overwhelmingly surpassed that towards China (5.9%). The proportion who felt equally friendly towards both countries was 8.5%.

However, the survey result that warrants attention is the proportion who responded that they do not feel friendly towards either country. For Korean citizens, this proportion was 38.0%. For Japanese citizens, it was 24.6%.

This result represents the highest response rate among Korean citizens and the second-highest among Japanese citizens. It indicates that neither Korean nor Japanese citizens have sufficiently accumulated positive perceptions of the other country, nor has a positive perception of China spread widely.


[Figure 9] Comparison of Affinity Towards the Other Country and China (%)





5. Characteristics of Perceptions of National Character

- Perceptions of Each Other's National Character: 'Conflict-inducing'

- Diligence and Friendliness: Mutually Acknowledged

In summary, Korean and Japanese citizens strongly perceive the national character of the other country as 'conflict-inducing.' Regarding 'trustworthy' versus 'untrustworthy,' both Korean and Japanese citizens showed a higher proportion responding 'untrustworthy.' For 'cooperative' versus 'uncooperative,' a larger number of citizens responded 'uncooperative.' When asked about 'flexible' versus 'stubborn,' respondents considered the other country's citizens to be more stubborn, and for 'peaceful' versus 'belligerent,' the proportion responding 'belligerent' was higher.

[Figure 10] Trustworthy vs. Untrustworthy [Figure 11] Cooperative vs. Uncooperative

[Figure 12] Flexible vs. Stubborn [Figure 13] Peaceful vs. Belligerent

However, it is not the case that Korean and Japanese citizens evaluate the national character of the other country entirely negatively. Among Korean citizens, the proportion who responded that Japanese people are 'friendly' (69.2%) was higher than that for 'arrogant' (9.7%).

Japanese citizens also frequently responded that Korean people are friendly. Regarding 'diligent' versus 'lazy,' the proportion of Korean citizens who responded that Japanese people are diligent (78.5%) was overwhelming, and Japanese citizens also had a higher proportion (57.7%) responding that Korean people are diligent.

[Figure 14] Friendly vs. Arrogant [Figure 15] Diligent vs. Lazy

There were also differences in how Korean and Japanese citizens viewed each other. Regarding 'creative' versus 'imitative,' Korean citizens responded that Japanese people are creative more often (43.9%) than imitative (25.0%). Conversely, Japanese citizens responded that Korean people are imitative more often (27.9%) than creative (16.5%).

Regarding 'honest' versus 'dishonest,' Korean citizens' response rate for Japanese people being honest (35.2%) was higher than for dishonest (25.5%). However, Japanese citizens' response rate for Koreans being dishonest (25.1%) was higher than for honest (18.4%).

[Figure 16] Creative vs. Imitative [Figure 17] Honest vs. Dishonest

6. Obstacles to the Development of Korea-Japan Relations

- What comes to mind for Korean citizens when thinking of Japan: Dokdo issue and comfort women survivors, in order.

- What comes to mind for Japanese citizens when thinking of Korea: Korean cuisine and the Takeshima issue, in order.

For Korean citizens, the relationship between Korea and Japan has been fundamentally shaped by the memory of colonial rule and the conflicts surrounding historical and territorial disputes that reproduce it. In a survey where respondents were asked to choose up to three items, clear differences emerged in what Korean and Japanese citizens thought of when considering the other country.

When asked what comes to mind when thinking of Japan, Korean citizens most frequently cited 'Dokdo issue' and 'comfort women survivors.' The proportion of respondents who chose the Dokdo issue was 84.4%, and for comfort women survivors, it was 61.5%. The Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster were cited by 24.9%, and offensive remarks by politicians by 16.6%, ranking third and fourth respectively. However, these figures were significantly lower compared to the responses for the Dokdo issue and comfort women survivors.

Among Japanese citizens, 'Korean cuisine' received the highest response rate at 59.1%. The Takeshima issue was cited by 56.7%, Hallyu dramas and K-POP by 47.2%, and anti-Japanese sentiment and protests by 32.0%.


[Table 3] What comes to mind when thinking of the other country (%)

* The translations of the options are reproduced as used in the actual survey.

- Different Historical Memories

- Korean citizens' knowledge of Japanese history: Imjin War, atomic bombings, Pacific War, in order.

- Japanese citizens' knowledge of Korean history: Birth of a female president, Seoul Olympics, Korea-Japan World Cup, in order.

The differences in perceptions concerning the other country between Korea and Japan were also clearly revealed in knowledge of the other country's history. When asked to select all applicable items, among the various options, Korean respondents showed high response rates for the Imjin War (80.6%), the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (74.8%), the Pacific War (55.4%), and the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty (49.9%), in that order. Among Korea's historical events, Japanese respondents showed high response rates for the birth of a female president (72.4%), the Seoul Olympics (7.1%), the Korea-Japan World Cup (70.0%), and the Korean War (66.6%), in that order.

Consequently, Korean citizens primarily recalled historical events where Korea was significantly impacted by Japan, while Japanese citizens tended to recall relatively recent events. These results demonstrate that both Korean and Japanese citizens have formed different historical memories of each other.


[Table 4] Knowledge of the other country's history (%)

* The translations of the options are reproduced as used in the actual survey.

- Japan's political and social operating principles: Militarism > Capitalism > Nationalism, in order.

- Korea's political and social operating principles: Nationalism > Militarism > Capitalism, in order.

The memories Korean citizens hold about Japan do not seem unrelated to the results regarding the question about Japan's political and social operating principles. Among Korean citizens, 50.3% answered 'militarism,' 46.9% 'capitalism,' 34.6% 'nationalism,' and 26.6% 'statism.' Japanese citizens also responded most frequently to 'nationalism' when asked about Korea's political and social operating principles, with 43.3%, followed by militarism at 31.3%, capitalism at 31.2%, and statism at 29.4%.

While both Korean and Japanese citizens generally viewed the other country through pre-modern lenses, excluding capitalism, the 'Dokdo issue' and 'historical perception' were identified as key obstacles to the development of Korea-Japan relations. When allowed to select multiple options, the Dokdo issue was cited most frequently, with historical perception and historical education also receiving high response rates. Commonalities were also found in other categories.

- For both Korean and Japanese citizens, the top obstacle to the development of Korea-Japan relations is the Dokdo issue.

- For Korean citizens, Japan's historical perception and historical education, and the inflammatory remarks of Japanese politicians, in order.

- For Japanese citizens, Korean citizens' anti-Japanese sentiment, and Korea's historical perception and historical education, in order.

Korean citizens frequently cited inflammatory remarks by Japanese politicians aimed at provoking anti-Japanese sentiment (31.1%) and anti-Japanese sentiment among Japanese citizens (24.7%) as obstacles to the development of Korea-Japan relations. However, Japanese citizens cited anti-Japanese sentiment among Korean citizens (55.1%) and anti-Japanese reporting by Korean media (25.3%) at high rates. These results indicate that both Korean and Japanese citizens believe that emotional provocations from the other side are hindering bilateral relations.

[Table 5] Obstacles to the Development of Korea-Japan Relations (%)

* The translations of the options are reproduced as used in the actual survey.

7. Necessity and Key Agenda Items for Summit Meetings


- Necessity of summit meetings: 84.9% of Korean citizens, 70.2% of Japanese citizens.

- Key agenda items cited by Korean citizens: Dokdo issue, historical issues, and comfort women issue.

- Key agenda items cited by Japanese citizens: Takeshima issue and North Korean nuclear issue.

Both Korean and Japanese citizens overwhelmingly agreed on the necessity of summit meetings between the two countries. Among Korean citizens, the proportion who responded that Korea-Japan summit meetings are necessary was 84.9% (Necessary 27.8% + Generally necessary 57.1%). Among Japanese citizens, the proportion who responded that Korea-Japan summit meetings are necessary was 70.2% (Necessary 40.2% + Generally necessary 30.0%). This indicates that Korean citizens showed a higher overall response rate, while Japanese citizens showed a higher intensity of perceived necessity.

There were subtle differences between Korean and Japanese citizens regarding the priority agenda items for summit meetings. Korean citizens most frequently cited the Dokdo issue. While Japanese citizens also cited this issue, they ranked the historical issues and the comfort women issue second, whereas Japanese citizens ranked the North Korean nuclear issue and the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea second and third, respectively.

However, a commonality is that both Korean and Japanese citizens assign high priority to the Dokdo issue, historical issues, the comfort women issue, the North Korean nuclear issue, and exchanges and cooperation in the military and security sector, as well as strengthening cooperation in trade and investment and the FTA.


[Table 6] Key Agenda Items for Summit Meetings (%)

* The translations of the options are reproduced as used in the actual survey.

The two core issues identified by both Korean and Japanese citizens were the 'Dokdo issue' and 'historical issues.' Firstly, when asked if a territorial dispute exists between Korea and Japan, an overwhelming majority responded affirmatively. Among Korean citizens, 82.7% answered that a dispute exists, and among Japanese citizens, 69.2% answered that a dispute exists.


[Figure 18] Existence of Territorial Dispute Between the Two Countries (%)

Respondents who answered that a territorial dispute exists were asked about solutions. Among Korean citizens, the highest response rate was for strengthening effective control (37.7%), followed by pursuing peaceful resolution (26.7%). Among Japanese citizens, the overwhelming majority (60.7%) responded that the issue should be brought before the International Court of Justice, and 22.0% responded that diplomatic negotiations should be pursued to gain Korea's recognition of the existence of the territorial issue.


[Table 7] Solutions for Territorial Disputes (%)

Historical issues are also a key agenda item requiring resolution between the two countries. Both Korean and Japanese citizens shared common ground on this matter. When asked about optimistic prospects that historical issues would be gradually resolved as bilateral relations develop, the proportion of respondents who agreed was 29.2% for Korean citizens and 23.6% for Japanese citizens.

Conversely, 41.5% of Korean citizens and 25.9% of Japanese citizens responded that the development of bilateral relations would be difficult without resolving historical issues. The proportion who answered that historical issues would be difficult to resolve even with the development of bilateral relations was 29.3% for Korean citizens and 32.1% for Japanese citizens. These results highlight the significance and complexity of historical issues in bilateral relations.


[Figure 19] Resolution of Historical Issues and Development of Bilateral Relations (%)

Regarding solutions for historical issues, the perceptions of Korean and Japanese citizens were largely parallel. When allowed to select multiple options, both Korean and Japanese citizens frequently perceived the responsibility to lie with the other party. Korean citizens most often cited the issue of Japanese history textbooks, followed by Japan's perception of aggressive wars, Japanese perceptions of military comfort women, the lack of reflection or apology from Japanese people regarding the past, and politicians' statements.

Japanese citizens most frequently cited excessive anti-Japanese actions by Koreans, and anti-Japanese education and textbook content in Korea. High response rates were also given to anti-Japanese reporting by Korean media and statements by politicians. However, the response rate of 26.8% for Japan's perception of aggressive wars indicates that the perceptions of Korean and Japanese citizens are not entirely parallel.


[Table 8] Issues to be Resolved in Historical Matters (%)

8. Activation of People-to-People Exchanges and Perception of Fairness in Media Reporting


- Importance of activating people-to-people exchanges with a consensus.

- Korean media reporting on Japan: Objective and fair 33.0%, Not objective and fair 41.6%.

- Japanese media reporting on Korea: Objective and fair 31.3%, Not objective and fair 26.2%.

Both Korean and Japanese citizens showed a high consensus on the importance of activating people-to-people exchanges. Among Korean citizens, the proportion who responded that activating people-to-people exchanges is important was 75.2% (Important 26.0% + Generally important 49.2%). Only 4.9% responded that it is not important (Not important 1.0% + Generally not important 3.9%).

Among Japanese citizens, the proportion who responded that activating people-to-people exchanges is important was 74.7% (Important 39.1% + Generally important 35.6%), and the proportion who responded that it is not important was 7.6% (Not important 2.8% + Generally not important 4.8%).


[Figure 20] Perception of the Importance of Activating People-to-People Exchanges (%)

The importance of cultural exchange activation was generally recognized even among citizens who held negative impressions of the other country (answered 'have a bad impression' + 'generally have a bad impression').

Among those who held negative impressions of the other country, the proportion who responded that cultural exchange is important (Important + Generally important) was 73.4% in the Korean survey and 67.6% in the Japanese survey.

[Figure 21] Perception of the Importance of Activating Cultural Exchanges Among Respondents with Negative Impressions of the Other Country (%)

Regarding the fields for activating people-to-people exchanges, both Korean and Japanese citizens most frequently cited cultural exchanges, followed by exchanges between media organizations and talent exchanges between private companies. A difference was observed in that Korean citizens showed high response rates for exchanges between scholars (27.8%) and teachers (17.8%), whereas Japanese citizens showed relatively higher rates for student exchanges, specifically attracting international students (22.7%) and middle and high school field trips (14.1%).


[Table 9] Fields for Activating Cultural Exchanges (%)

While it is difficult to establish a clear causal relationship, these exchanges cannot be entirely dismissed as having the potential to help foster positive mutual perceptions between Korean and Japanese citizens. First, we examined the proportion of respondents who reported having a good impression of the other country, comparing those who had visited the country with those who had not.

Among Korean citizens who had visited Japan, 24.7% reported having a good impression of Japan. Among those who had not visited Japan, the response rate was 8.3%. Japanese citizens showed a similar trend. The proportion of Japanese citizens who had visited Korea and reported having a good impression of Korea was 42.1%, which was higher than the 28.1% reported by those who had not visited Korea.

Similar results were observed regarding the presence of acquaintances (close acquaintances + acquaintances with whom one frequently communicates) compared to the absence of visits. Among Korean citizens who had acquaintances in Japan, the proportion reporting a good impression of Japan was 22.7%, higher than the 11.0% reported by those without acquaintances. Among Japanese citizens, the proportion reporting a good impression of Korea when they had acquaintances in Korea was 45.9%, higher than the 26.9% reported by those without acquaintances.

[Figure 22] Visiting Experience and Good Impression of the Other Country [Figure 23] Presence of Acquaintances and Good Impression

Differences by age group also warrant careful consideration. In both Korea and Japan, younger demographics, specifically those in their 20s and 30s, showed a relatively higher proportion of respondents reporting a good impression of the other country.


[Figure 24] Proportion of Respondents with a Good Impression of the Other Country by Age Group

In both Korea and Japan, it appears that citizens do not necessarily believe their domestic media reports on the other country are objective and fair. Among Korean citizens, the proportion who believed that Korean media reporting was objective and fair was 33.0%. Those who disagreed numbered 41.6%.

The situation was similar for Japanese citizens. The proportion who responded that domestic media reporting was objective and fair was 31.3%, while those who disagreed numbered 26.2%. These results indicate that the perception that the media is a factor negatively impacting bilateral relations is significantly held by citizens of both countries.


[Figure 25] Evaluation of the Objectivity and Fairness of Domestic Media Reporting on the Other Country (%)