[Briefing on Public Opinion No. 129] Trends and Causes of Changes in Presidential Candidates' Support

[Briefing on Public Opinion No. 129] Joint Presidential Panel Survey No. 4 by EAI, SBS, JoongAng Ilbo, and Hankook Research

1. Increasing Election Interest and Voting Intention

2. Changes in Voters' Support Choices

3. Fluctuations in Candidates' Support Bases

4. Candidates' Favorability and Unfavorable Perceptions

5. Priority National Tasks for the Next Government and Candidates to Address Them

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

1. Increasing Election Interest and Voting Intention

- Election interest soared to 96.9%

■ With the presidential candidates' TV debates continuing and each campaign intensifying in the final week before the election, the interest of voter panelists in the election is also increasing.

■ Looking only at the proportion of respondents who answered they were interested (very interested + generally interested), it increased from 86.8% in the first survey in August to 92.7% in the third survey in November, and to 96.9% in this fourth survey. This result confirms the high level of interest voter panelists have in this presidential election.

[Figure 1] Interest in the 18th Presidential Election (%)

■ Interest levels by candidate support also increased compared to the third survey in November. Among Park Geun-hye's supporters, the proportion who answered they were interested (very interested + generally interested) increased from 94.6% to 97.5%. Among Moon Jae-in's supporters, the response rate increased from 95.8% to 99.1%. Interest among the undecided also shows an upward trend. The proportion of undecided respondents who answered they were interested in this presidential election also increased by 6.1 percentage points (p), from 73.2% to 79.3%.

[Figure 2] Changes in Interest by Presidential Candidate Support in the 18th Presidential Election

- Very interested: Increased from 45.0% in August to 59.6% in December

- Park Geun-hye supporters: Very interested 60.6%

- Moon Jae-in supporters: Very interested 64.3%

- Undecided: Very interested 27.1%

■ Examining the proportion of respondents who answered they were very interested in this presidential election also confirms the increase in interest among voter panelists. The overall response rate increased from 45.0% in the first survey in August to 54.0% in the third survey in November, and further to 59.6% in this fourth survey.

■ The proportion of respondents who were very interested, by candidate support, also increased. Among Park Geun-hye's supporters, the proportion who answered they were very interested in this presidential election increased by 8.4 percentage points (p) from 52.2% in the first survey to 60.6% in this fourth survey.

■ The response rate among Moon Jae-in's supporters increased relatively more, rising by 12.4 percentage points (p) from 48.2% in the first survey to 60.6% in the fourth survey.

[Figure 3] Proportion of "Very Interested" Responses (%)

- Will definitely vote: 83.4% in October, 87.7% in December

- Park Geun-hye supporters: Will definitely vote 88.7%

- Moon Jae-in supporters: Will definitely vote 91.3%

- Undecided: Will definitely vote 52.4%

■ Voting intention is also intensifying. The proportion of respondents who answered they would definitely vote in this presidential election was 83.4% in the second survey in October, decreased slightly to 81.2% in the third survey in November, but rebounded to 87.7% in this fourth survey.

■ By candidate support, among Park Geun-hye's supporters, the proportion who answered they would definitely vote increased from 87.3% in the third survey in November to 88.7% in this fourth survey.

■ The response rate among Moon Jae-in's supporters increased more significantly than that of Park Geun-hye's supporters. In the third survey, the proportion who answered they would definitely vote was 85.1%, while in this fourth survey, it was 91.3%. This result shows that the mobilization of Moon Jae-in's supporters is stronger compared to that of Park Geun-hye's supporters.

[Figure 4] Changes in the Proportion of Strong Voting Intention (%)

[Figure 5] Changes in the Proportion of Strong Voting Intention by Candidate Support (%)

2. Changes in Voters' Support Choices

- Moon Jae-in's support rate: 13.9% in August, 46.0% in December

- Park Geun-hye's support rate: 40.8% in August, 45.8% in December

■ In this survey, the support for Park Geun-hye and Moon Jae-in was in a close race within the margin of error. Moon Jae-in's support rate was 46.0%, and Park Geun-hye's support rate was 45.8%.

■ Examining the changes in support rates between the two candidates, we can see that Moon Jae-in's support rate is rising more steeply compared to Park Geun-hye's. In a multi-candidate race, Moon's support rate was only 13.9% in the first survey in August. It rose to 23.9% in the second survey in October, but still trailed Park Geun-hye by a large margin. In the third survey in November, it narrowed the gap to 1.9 percentage points (p) with 43.2%, marking the start of a close contest, and rose to 46.0% in this fourth survey.

■ Park Geun-hye's support rate maintained a stable structure without significant fluctuations. Her support rate was 40.8% in the first survey and 38.2% in the second survey. After Ahn Cheol-soo's withdrawal, her support rate rose to 45.0% in the third survey in November, but stagnated at 45.8% in this fourth survey. Consequently, Park Geun-hye's support base is very stable and even solid, but at the same time, it shows limitations in its expansion potential.

[Figure 6] Changes in Voters' Support Choices

3. Fluctuations in Candidates' Support Bases

1) Changes by Generation

- Park Geun-hye: Increased by 2.3% p among those in their 50s

- Moon Jae-in: Increased by 5.8% p among those in their 30s and 4.1% p among those in their 40s

■ By generation, comparing the results of the fourth survey with the third, support for Park Geun-hye increased by 2.3 percentage points (p) among those in their 50s. In contrast, her support rate decreased by 0.5 percentage points (p) among those in their 40s.

■ Support for Moon Jae-in increased among those in their 30s and 40s. Support increased by 5.8 percentage points (p) among those in their 30s and by 4.1 percentage points (p) among those in their 40s compared to the third survey. An increase in support for Moon Jae-in was also observed among those aged 60 and over. Support increased from 20.4% in the third survey to 23.0% in this fourth survey, a rise of 2.6 percentage points (p).

[Table 1] Changes in Support Rates by Generation (%)

2) Changes by Region of Residence

- Park Geun-hye: Increasing trend in Incheon/Gyeonggi and Daegu/Gyeongbuk

- Moon Jae-in: Support rates in the 40% range in Daejeon/Chungcheong and Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam

■ By region of residence, Park Geun-hye maintained her strength in Daegu/Gyeongbuk, considered her political stronghold, and showed an increasing trend in Incheon and Gyeonggi. However, her support weakened in Daejeon/Chungcheong and Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam.

■ Moon Jae-in's support showed a relatively even increase in other regions, exceeding 40% in Daejeon/Chungcheong and Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam.

[Table 2] Changes in Support Rates by Region of Residence (%)

3) Changes by Party Affiliation

- Solidifying support by party affiliation

■ By party affiliation, Park Geun-hye's support weakened among non-Saenuri Party supporters, particularly failing to expand her support among unaffiliated voters. In contrast, Moon Jae-in saw increased support from Democratic Party supporters and a 5.8% increase among unaffiliated voters, but experienced a 5.9% decrease in support from Unified Progressive Party supporters.

[Table 3] Changes in Support Rates by Party Affiliation (%)

■ While support for the candidate favored by each party has strengthened, both parties have seen an increase in their support rates. However, it is important to consider that the Saenuri Party's support rate is approximately 10 percentage points (p) higher than that of the Democratic Party. This suggests that the Saenuri Party's support may have a greater impact on the presidential election than the Democratic Party's support. Meanwhile, the proportion of unaffiliated voters has been gradually decreasing since the second survey in October. Although the mobilization between candidates is increasing, the possibility of shifts in the election landscape is also diminishing.

[Figure 7] Changes in Support Rates by Party Affiliation (%)

4) Changes by Ideological Orientation

- Park Geun-hye: Solid support from conservative and moderate voters

- Moon Jae-in: Expanded support from progressive and moderate voters

■ En examinant les variations du taux de soutien par orientation idéologique, le candidat Park Geun-hye a maintenu son niveau dans les couches modérées et conservatrices, tandis que son soutien dans la couche progressiste s'est affaibli. Le candidat Moon Jae-in, tout en renforçant son soutien dans la couche progressiste, a non seulement montré une augmentation de plus de 50% de son taux de soutien dans la couche modérée, mais son taux de soutien dans la couche conservatrice a également augmenté de 2,8 points de pourcentage (p) pour atteindre 24,3% par rapport à la troisième enquête de novembre.

[Tableau 4] Variations du taux de soutien par orientation idéologique (%)

4. Attrait et perception négative des candidats à l'élection présidentielle

- Score d'attrait, candidat Moon Jae-in 6,1 points, candidat Park Geun-hye 5,5 points

■ En ce qui concerne l'attrait des candidats à l'élection présidentielle, le candidat Moon Jae-in a reçu la note la plus élevée de 6,1 points lors de cette enquête, tandis que le candidat Park Geun-hye a obtenu 5,5 points, ce qui suggère qu'il n'a pas réussi à changer significativement son image.

[Figure 8] Évolution de l'attrait des candidats

- Candidats qui ne devraient pas être élus, Park Geun-hye 28,8%, Moon Jae-in 5,8%

- Indécis. Park Geun-hye 15,4%, Moon Jae-in 3,8%

- Pourcentage de partisans de Park Geun-hye soutenant Moon Jae-in 12,2%

- Pourcentage de partisans de Moon Jae-in soutenant Park Geun-hye 59,3%

■ Les résultats de l'enquête sur les candidats qui ne devraient pas être élus montrent que le pourcentage de réponses désignant le candidat Park Geun-hye a augmenté de 3,0 points de pourcentage (p) par rapport à l'enquête de novembre pour atteindre 28,8%. Inversement, le pourcentage de réponses désignant le candidat Moon Jae-in a diminué de 3,7 points de pourcentage (p) par rapport à l'enquête précédente pour s'établir à 5,8%.

■ Parmi les partisans du candidat Park Geun-hye, le pourcentage de ceux qui estiment que le candidat Moon Jae-in ne devrait pas être élu est de 12,2%, tandis que parmi les partisans du candidat Moon Jae-in, le pourcentage de ceux qui estiment que le candidat Park Geun-hye ne devrait pas être élu est élevé à 59,3%. De plus, parmi les indécis, le pourcentage de ceux qui rejettent le candidat Park Geun-hye, c'est-à-dire qui répondent qu'il ne devrait pas être élu, est de 15,4%, soit environ quatre fois plus que le pourcentage de ceux qui ont répondu le candidat Moon Jae-in (3,8%).

[Figure 9] Variations du pourcentage de réponses désignant les candidats qui ne devraient pas être élus (%)

[Figure 10] Variations du pourcentage de réponses désignant les candidats qui ne devraient pas être élus par soutien de candidat (%)

5. Priorités politiques du prochain gouvernement et candidats pour leur résolution

- Problème de la polarisation économique, de 27,9% à 30,2%

■ Concernant les tâches politiques prioritaires que le prochain gouvernement devrait résoudre, les résultats sont similaires à ceux de l'enquête d'octobre, mais la proportion du problème de la polarisation économique a augmenté, tandis que la proportion de la croissance économique a relativement diminué.

■ Ce changement de perception est compris comme l'une des raisons pour lesquelles le candidat Moon Jae-in, qui montre des atouts dans la polarisation économique, se retrouve dans une confrontation très serrée avec le candidat Park Geun-hye, évalué comme ayant des atouts dans la croissance économique.

[Figure 11] Perception des tâches politiques prioritaires du prochain gouvernement (%)

[Figure 12] Candidats pour la résolution des tâches politiques prioritaires du prochain gouvernement (%)