[US-China Relations Briefing] The Clash of Core Interests and the Future of US-China Relations

Why Analyze Official Statements?

When studying changes in US-China relations, the most crucial question is, 'What data should be used for analysis?' While accessing classified documents from the top leadership of both governments would be the ideal way to secure the most reliable data, this is practically impossible. Although it might be possible to conduct interviews with key officials from both countries on a limited basis, it is difficult to completely dispel the suspicion of 'Are they truly telling the truth?' Therefore, in reality, official statements from both governments are the most authoritative sources. Of course, official statements inevitably contain a certain degree, or a significant portion, of propaganda. However, in today's highly globalized information environment, pursuing policies that completely deviate from publicly declared official government positions incurs a high cost. Thus, official statements are undoubtedly highly reliable sources that provide a blueprint for future actions of each country.

Then, to what extent should official statements be recognized? In the United States, a transparent political culture that widely disseminates its positions is well-established, and regarding foreign policy, official statements from various departments generally exhibit a relatively high level of consistency. Therefore, government positions disclosed through official government websites can be recognized as official statements. Data can be collected from the websites of representative ministries, including the White House, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.

On the other hand, China maintains a somewhat closed socialist state system, resulting in a limited number of sources that can be recognized as official statements beyond the regular press briefings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, even in these regular briefings, the government often selectively expresses its positions, which inherently limits data collection. For this reason, considering that the Chinese government operates under a party-state system effectively run by the Communist Party, this report will include editorials published by the official media of the Communist Party within the scope of official statements for analysis.

Data collection began in November 2010, a significant period marked by the US-China summit, the G20 Seoul Summit, and the emergence of Xi Jinping as the next Chinese leader. Due to the limitations of the analyst's language proficiency, only English-language materials were collected. However, for Chinese official statements, English texts independently published by China were gathered. The collected data is released monthly through the U.S.-China Relations (UCR) Statement Factsheet series. The UCR Briefing will be published every four months, analyzing the UCR Statement Factsheet data. This first UCR Briefing report covers official statements from November 2010 to February 2011. The next report, UCR Briefing No. 2, will analyze official statement data from March to June 2011.

Core Interests and Power Transition

The UCR series (UCR Statement Factsheet, UCR Briefing) collects and categorizes daily official statements from the US and China by issue. The rationale is as follows. Initiated under the assumption that the power gap between the US and China might narrow after the economic crisis, this series fundamentally shares the problematic awareness of power transition theory. Traditional power transition theory posits that 'when a rising power becomes dissatisfied with the international political order maintained by the dominant power, the probability of war increases at the point where the power of the two competing nations becomes equal' (Kugler and Lemke, et al. 1996, 7-10; Chan 2007, 2), and has conducted research on 'power transition' and the 'outbreak of major wars.' However, recent studies focus on the fact that power transition has not necessarily led to war and strive to identify the conditions that enable peaceful transitions. The conditions they commonly point to are 'how much each party infringes upon the other's core interests' during a power transition situation (Kupchan 2001, 18-33; Zhu 2006, 23). Therefore, the most critical issue is to identify the areas of 'core interests,' which are sensitive to the other party, and for this, it is important to collect and categorize official statements from both countries by issue.

Core Interests of the United States and China

Before examining the specific differences in the positions of the US and China on current issues as reflected in their official statements, it is necessary to look at the core interests of each country as publicly declared in a broader framework. In assessing this, the U.S. National Security Strategy document released by the Obama administration in 2010 is important, and for China, the 'core interest' remarks made by State Councilor Dai Bingguo during the US-China 'Strategic and Economic Dialogue' in 2009 are significant (China News Service 2009/07/29; U.S. Department of State 2009).

First, examining the Obama administration's 2010 National Security Strategy, the U.S. outlines its national security strategy priorities around four areas: 'security,' 'prosperity,' 'values,' and 'international order.' In the realm of 'security,' it emphasizes non-proliferation and nuclear security, the fight against networks of hate and violence, and stability in Iraq and the Middle East. In the realm of 'prosperity,' it posits the recovery of economic strength, which is the foundation of U.S. leadership in the international community, and balanced, sustainable growth for global prosperity as important U.S. interests. In the realm of 'values,' it clarifies that the protection of universal values such as human rights and democracy contributes to fundamental U.S. interests, and states that 'just peace' and the strengthening of international norms for it are U.S. interests. Finally, in the realm of 'international order,' it asserts that addressing global challenges facing this era, such as climate change and the spread of infectious diseases, is also within the scope of U.S. strategic interests.

Next, examining the remarks of Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo, it is understood that he emphasized the importance of respecting each other's core interests for the long-term development of US-China bilateral relations and articulated China's core interests in three areas: first, the preservation of China's 'basic systems' and 'national security'; second, 'sovereignty and territorial integrity'; and third, China's 'economic and social sustained development.' According to recent research (Swaine 2011), it is evident that the Chinese government has particularly emphasized the second core interest, sovereignty and territorial integrity, among the three. More specifically, it has clearly stated that 'Taiwan,' 'Tibet,' and the 'Xinjiang region' are core Chinese interests that must be defended, even at the cost of using force, under any circumstances.

Interestingly, there are significant differences in how the United States and China define their respective interests. First, while the U.S. does not present a clear hierarchy in defining its core interests, China clearly presents a distinct order of priority, particularly specifying areas of 'non-negotiable interests.' Second, instead of presenting a clear hierarchy, the U.S. operates under the perception that each interest is 'inextricably linked,' making it impossible to pursue one interest in isolation, and that success in one area forms the foundation for success in all others. In contrast, China presents its core interests in a fragmented manner, one by one, and does not hold a particular stance on the interconnectedness between these interests. Third, crucially, while the U.S. uses language such as 'networks,' 'shared values,' 'international norms,' and 'global order' to articulate its interests, China uses language such as 'territorial integrity' and 'sustained economic and social development' to declare its core interests.

In summary, the U.S. discourse on core interests is largely based on a recognition of complex networks, whereas China's discourse is underpinned by a model of 'nation building' or 'enriching the country and strengthening the military.' In other words, although both countries are living in the 2010s, they are in different historical periods in terms of their development paths. Consequently, even when using the same words to define core interests, the meanings they convey are bound to differ. It is difficult to avoid a situation of 'sleeping in the same bed but dreaming different dreams' (동상이몽), and there appears to be a structural problem that makes it likely for the principle of 'seeking common ground while reserving differences' (구동존이) to reach its limits.

Key Issues Between the US and China from November 2010 to February 2011

[Table 1] summarizes the major issues that arose from November 2010 to February 2011 and the positions of both countries regarding them.

Examining the positions of both countries on the major issues, it is evident that despite both recognizing the need to develop a 'positive, cooperative, and comprehensive' US-China relationship for global peace, stability, and development, the U.S., which emphasizes 'seeking common ground' (구동), and China, which emphasizes 'reserving differences' (존이), exhibit distinct differences in their stances on most issues. A more serious problem is that the fundamental confrontations between the two countries are occurring around issues that both define as core interests, such as 'human rights' or 'Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang issues.' From the U.S. perspective, while it continuously emphasizes that upholding international norms like 'democracy' and 'freedom' is not only a matter of U.S. core interests but also for 'universal human rights,' China's refusal suggests that China's rise is not a 'peaceful rise' but harbors 'aggressive intentions.' From China's perspective, despite repeatedly and officially emphasizing that 'sovereignty' and 'territorial integrity' are 'non-negotiable core interests,' the U.S.'s lack of respect for these indicates a hidden strategic intention by the U.S. to contain China's rise... (continued)