← Retour · ← Accueil · ← Retour à la liste
[Briefing on Public Opinion No. 88] What was the impact of the August 8 cabinet reshuffle hearings on the current political situation?
Joint project of EAI and Korea Research August Public Opinion Survey
Briefing Topic
1. What was the impact of the August 8 cabinet reshuffle hearings on the current political situation?
2. Qualifications of high-ranking public officials: Is social consensus possible?
3. Crisis for the ruling party: An opportunity for the Democratic Party?
4. Next presidential candidates: Park Geun-hye leads, Kim Moon-soo and Sohn Hak-kyu emerge
Notice: This report is based on survey results from August 28 and was distributed before the press conference of Prime Minister nominee Kim Tae-ho's voluntary resignation (August 29, 10:00 AM).
1. What was the impact of the August 8 cabinet reshuffle on the current political situation?
1) Pouring cold water on President Lee Myung-bak's "August 15th Plan (Pro-people, Fair Society Theory)" favorable public opinion
Above all, the government and ruling party's August 15th plan, which aimed to win back public sentiment that had turned away after the June 2nd local election defeat and secure leadership in the latter half of their term, has been disrupted. In fact, given the unexpectedly significant defeat in the June 2nd local elections, there were even assessments that the government and ruling party's lame-duck phenomenon had already begun. However, from July onwards, the government and ruling party succeeded in re-igniting the pro-people, moderate pragmatism line by highlighting chronic societal issues, such as the predatory lending practices of major credit card companies, unfair buyer-seller relationships, and the social responsibility of large corporations, issues that had not even garnered attention from the progressive camp. Coupled with the complacency and misjudgment shown by the opposition after the June 2nd local elections, the July 28th by-elections served as a breakthrough for the government and ruling party to turn the political tide. This trend was most vividly expressed in what is known as the Lee Myung-bak administration's plan for the latter half of its term, announced on August 15th. In the August 15th commemorative address, by (1) re-emphasizing the existing pro-people, moderate pragmatism line and (2) highlighting the issue of 'fair society' as its core policy direction, it is true that they began to regain political leadership by absorbing a significant portion of the wavering middle ground.
Effectiveness of the August 15th Pro-people/Fair Society Plan
Indeed, in this survey, when asked "How do you evaluate the moderate pragmatism that President Lee Myung-bak has recently emphasized?", 50.8% responded positively (8.2% very positive, 42.5% somewhat positive), which exceeded the negative responses of 44.0% (12.9% very negative, 31.1% somewhat negative). When asked "How do you evaluate the fair society realization proposed as the policy direction for the latter half of your term in President Lee Myung-bak's August 15th commemorative address?", positive responses were 55.2% (10.0% very positive, 45.2% somewhat positive), and negative responses were 37.8% (10.6% very negative, 27.2% somewhat negative), with positive responses being significantly dominant. This indicates that alongside distrust in its sincerity, there was also considerable expectation for the August 15th policy plan.
[Figure 1] Favorable Public Opinion on the August 15th Political Plan: Pro-people Moderate Pragmatism and Fair Society Theory (%)
f2e34dd1a320d063
f2e34dd1a320d063
f2e34dd1a320d063
| Evaluation of Pro-people Moderate Pragmatism (%) | Evaluation of Fair Society Realization Policy (%) |
Led to an increase in support for the pro-people/fair society policy
As shown in [Figure 2], the President's approval rating, which had benefited significantly from the Cheonan-ham effect from the August 23rd national address until just before the elections, rising to 52.0%, decreased by 9.0 percentage points to 43.0% in the June 26th survey due to the Grand National Party's significant defeat in the June 2nd local elections. However, as the government successively introduced a series of pro-people, moderate pragmatism issues, the approval rating was prevented from further decline, reaching 44.3% in the July survey conducted two days before the July 28th by-elections. Following the August 15th commemorative address, which was characterized by the 'fair society' agenda, the approval rating continued to rise, reaching 48.7% in the Seoul Shinmun-Korea Research survey.
[Figure 2] Changes in Presidential Approval Rating (%)
*: The August 21st survey was conducted among 1,000 respondents by Seoul Shinmun and Korea Research; the rest were conducted among 800 respondents for the EAI-Korea Research regular public opinion barometer.
2) Hearings that caused a sharp turnaround in the political situation: MB's approval rating trend reversed before and after,
Turnaround in the political situation due to highly anticipated confirmation hearings: 84.8% watched the hearings or encountered related news
Changes in MB's approval rating: August 21st (early in the hearings) 48.7% → August 28th (immediately after the hearings concluded) 43.7%
However, the situation took a sharp turn with the confirmation hearings for the nine nominees for Prime Minister and ministers, which began on August 20th and continued until the 26th, as part of the August 8th cabinet reshuffle. The hearings for Minister of Knowledge Economy nominee Lee Jae-hoon and Minister of Employment and Labor nominee Park Jae-wan on August 20th were somewhat anticlimactic. However, as the hearings progressed towards the end, with allegations of various corrupt practices surfacing during the hearings for Police Commissioner nominee Cho Hyun-oh, Minister for Special Affairs nominee Lee Jae-oh, Minister of Health and Welfare nominee Jin Soo-hee, and Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism nominee Shin Jae-min on August 23rd, and for Prime Minister nominee Kim Tae-ho on August 24-25th, public attention became intensely focused. In this survey, 84.8% of respondents stated they had watched the confirmation hearings directly or encountered related news, while only 15.2% had not. During this process, President Lee Myung-bak's approval rating, which had approached 50% at 48.7% in the July survey, declined to 43.7% in this survey, posing a significant burden for the government and ruling party, which aimed to seize control of the political agenda in the latter half of their term.
Prime Minister nominee Kim Tae-ho, aged 40s, "Inappropriate appointment" 46.9% (21st) → sharply increased to 66.0% (28th)
President Lee Myung-bak's strategy for the latter half of his term was characterized by the emphasis on the pro-people/fair society policy direction, coupled with the August 8th cabinet reshuffle, which included the nomination of Kim Tae-ho, aged 40s, as Prime Minister and the appointment of pro-MB figures. While the policy domain received favorable public opinion, the August 8th cabinet reshuffle, represented by the Kim Tae-ho administration, aged 40s, ended in failure with the voluntary resignations of nominees Kim Tae-ho, Shin Jae-min, and Lee Jae-hoon. When asked "What do you think about appointing former governor Kim Tae-ho, aged 40s, as Prime Minister?", in a survey conducted on the 21st before the hearings, 30.3% considered it an appropriate appointment, while 46.9% considered it inappropriate. 22.8% responded 'don't know', indicating a fluid situation. However, in a survey conducted on the 28th, after the hearings for Prime Minister nominee Kim (August 24-25th), the response for "appropriate appointment" decreased by 10.4 percentage points to 19.9%, while the response for "inappropriate appointment" sharply increased to 66.0%, an increase of 19.1 percentage points compared to the previous week.
Effect of confirmation hearings: The more people encountered the hearings, the more negative their evaluation
Among those who watched/heard about the hearings, 71.0% said "inappropriate"; among those who did not encounter the hearings, only 53.1% expressed negative evaluations.
In this survey alone, the more people watched the hearings directly or encountered them through news, the stronger their negative perception of Prime Minister nominee Kim Tae-ho. Among the 113 respondents who did not watch the hearings or encounter related news, 18.6% considered the nomination of Prime Minister Kim Tae-ho appropriate, and 53.1% considered it inappropriate, with a majority negative response, but 28.3% responded 'don't know/no answer'. However, among the 687 respondents who watched the hearings directly or encountered them through news, the response for "appropriate" was 20.2%, showing little difference, but the response for "inappropriate" was a significant 71.0%, which is 17.9 percentage points higher than those who did not watch or hear the hearings. For those who watched the hearings or encountered related information, the 'don't know/no answer' rate was relatively low at 8.7%. Ultimately, this demonstrates that the confirmation hearings contributed significantly to voters' judgments about public office candidates, while also strengthening negative perceptions of Prime Minister nominee Kim Tae-ho and greatly contributing to the pressure for his resignation.
[Figure 3] Evaluation of Kim Tae-ho's Appointment as Prime Minister (%)
[Figure 4] Evaluation of Kim Tae-ho's Appointment as Prime Minister, aged 40s (%)
2. The public's view on the qualifications of Prime Ministers and Ministers: Is social consensus possible?
Since the enactment of the Confirmation Hearings Act, there have been significant difficulties surrounding confirmation hearings during the appointment process for key positions such as Prime Minister and ministers. The problems revealed in this process are threefold: First, nominees for Prime Minister and ministers often fail to meet the minimum moral standards, such as tax evasion and speculative investment, which are the primary areas of scrutiny during confirmation hearings. Second, regarding policy capabilities or expertise, which are required for heads of government ministries such as Prime Minister and ministers, these are not adequately verified through confirmation hearings, and in some cases, individuals lacking competence are appointed. Third, the content of these personnel verifications is applied inconsistently during the actual confirmation process. For example, speculative real estate investment or plagiarism of academic papers may lead to the downfall of a candidate for a specific administration or be considered a non-critical flaw for a particular individual.
Some in the political sphere have faced public backlash for suggesting the need for social consensus to relax the first criterion, given that many individuals do not meet it. However, it can be argued that political and social consensus is necessary to establish consistent standards for the appointment of high-ranking officials, such as Prime Ministers and ministers, as mentioned above.
[Figure 5] Disqualifying Reasons for Prime Ministers and Ministers as Perceived by the Public (%)
What are the qualifications for high-ranking public officials according to the public? We examined the level of social consensus regarding these perceptions. We presented criteria frequently raised during the current confirmation hearings and asked whether each constitutes a decisive flaw for a public official. From the public's perspective, the prevailing perception is that the various allegations revealed during the recent hearings generally constitute decisive flaws for public officials. However, there were significant differences in the intensity of consensus. From the public's viewpoint, tax evasion was considered a decisive flaw for a public official by 90.3%, speculative real estate investment by 79.1%, plagiarism of academic papers by 77.7%, and fraudulent residency for speculative purposes by 73.4%. In contrast, regarding fraudulent residency for educational purposes, 62.9% considered it a decisive flaw, indicating a more flexible view compared to speculative purposes. However, policy-related factors, which are as important as moral standards in the actual operation of the state, such as the ability to present policies and visions and a lack of expertise, were considered decisive flaws by only 61.9% of respondents, indicating that a considerable number of people hold a more lenient attitude compared to other moral standards. Notably, the issue of children acquiring foreign nationality, a moral standard, received the lowest response among the investigated items at a relatively low 57.4%.
One point worthy of attention is that public opinion regarding these criteria shows a high level of consensus. For most allegations, there is little difference in perception across social strata regarding whether such allegations, if proven true, would be considered appropriate or inappropriate. There were no significant differences in perception based on ideology, age, occupation, or party affiliation. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a strong social consensus among voters emphasizing strict ethics for public officials. Ultimately, the problem lies in the continued emergence of candidates who do not meet these standards. This is because it is difficult for the political sphere to find individuals who satisfy the strict criteria demanded by the public.
3. Confirmation Hearing Political Situation: A Crisis for the Grand National Party? An Opportunity for the Democratic Party?
The Grand National Party's support base is consolidated, with little decline in approval ratings during the confirmation hearing period.
In contrast, the Democratic Party saw a 6.8 percentage point decrease from the previous month, significantly impacted by the July 28th by-election defeat.
How do the current confirmation hearing political dynamics translate into gains and losses for each party? Logically, given the significant damage incurred during the current administration's personnel verification process, it should pose a crisis for the Grand National Party and an opportunity for the Democratic Party. However, examining the recent trends in party support ratings reveals a considerable gap between this logic and reality. Over the past four months, the Grand National Party has consistently maintained support ratings in the low 30% range, while the Democratic Party's support ratings have fluctuated. Despite facing crisis factors in the current confirmation hearing political situation, the Grand National Party has maintained its party support ratings without a significant decline in this survey. Conversely, the Democratic Party, after its strong performance in the June 2nd local elections, saw its support rise to 27.1% and further to 30.7% in the July survey before the July 28th by-elections, but it dropped to 23.9% in this August survey.
The fact that the Grand National Party, which suffered defeat in the June 2nd local elections and won the July 28th by-elections but faces considerable political pressure in the current confirmation hearing political situation, maintains stable support ratings appears to reflect the high level of support consolidation and loyalty from the Yeongnam region and conservative base. Furthermore, while the current confirmation hearing political situation is a burden for the government and ruling party, the existence of favorable public opinion towards the August 15th political plan, which emphasizes the pro-people, moderate pragmatism line and the realization of a fair society, also acts as a factor preventing a sharp decline in support ratings.
Conversely, the Democratic Party's regional support base in Honam, while showing strong consolidation, is smaller than that of Yeongnam, making its regional base weaker than the Grand National Party's. Since the current administration took office, fluctuations in the Democratic Party's support ratings have been largely driven by external factors, such as the controversy surrounding former President Roh Moo-hyun or the perceived unilateral political operations of the Grand National Party, leading to significant variations in its support based on changing circumstances. Finally, the division within the opposition also plays a role. While conditions were ripe for alliances and unified candidacies with parties opposing the Grand National Party during the June 2nd local elections and July 28th by-elections, the Democratic Party's centripetal force within the opposition in the current everyday political phase is relatively weak, contributing to frequent fluctuations in its support ratings. The key challenge is expected to be how the party will address the dual tasks of establishing its identity and consolidating its core support base while expanding its support base in the upcoming party convention to elect its next leadership in October.
[Figure 6] Changes in Support Ratings for the Big Two Parties and Unaffiliated Voters: May-August (%)
However, similar to the June survey, the Democratic Party maintained an advantage in the 20s, 30s, and even 40s age groups in this August survey. In the 20s, the Grand National Party's support rating was 25.9%, and the Democratic Party's was 29.5%, with the gap widening. In the 30s, the Grand National Party had 17.1% and the Democratic Party had 23.8%. In the 40s, the Grand National Party recorded 25.2% and the Democratic Party 32.3%. The Grand National Party received high support from those aged 50 and above at 49.8%, while the Democratic Party received only 15.9%. It can be seen that the 40s, who had shifted towards the Democratic Party following the June local elections, narrowed the support gap with the Grand National Party. However, the decline in the Democratic Party's support among younger demographics in this survey is also a point to watch closely in the future.
[Table 1] Changes in Approval Ratings for the Two Major Parties by Age Group (%)
[Table 2] Changes in Party Support Ratings (January-July 2010) (%)
* First asked in the December 2009 survey.
** Combined value of "No party affiliation" and "Don't know/No answer".
*** The January 14th survey was a joint political issue survey by EAI and Maeil Business Newspaper (1,002 respondents), not a regular survey.
**** The Pro-Park Geun-hye Alliance was renamed the Future Hope Alliance in February 2010. On April 2nd, the Future Hope Alliance resolved to merge with the Grand National Party. Defectors formed the Future United Party on April 18th (Lee Gyu-taek).
***** From March to May 2010, the Han Hwa-gap party (Peace Democratic Party) and the Shim Dae-pyung party (People's Central Union) were included as options and categorized under 'Other'.
4. Next presidential election: Park Geun-hye leads, Kim Moon-soo at 8.6% for first time in 2nd place, Sohn Hak-kyu at 6.5% for 5th place
Park Geun-hye 23.8% > Kim Moon-soo 8.6% > Yoo Si-min 7.6% > Han Myeong-sook 7.1% > Sohn Hak-kyu 6.5%
In the August survey of support for potential presidential candidates, former representative Park Geun-hye maintained her lead with 23.8% support. Overall, within the ruling camp, Governor Kim Moon-soo, who has been openly critical of the Blue House and President Lee Myung-bak recently, is emerging, while Mayor Oh Se-hoon, who is struggling with Seoul's financial issues and conflicts with the city council, appears to be faltering. Governor Kim Moon-soo has risen to second place, following Representative Park Geun-hye, for the first time since this regular survey began. Among the opposition, former minister Yoo Si-min and former prime minister Han Myeong-sook, who received around 10% support before and after the June 2nd local elections, have stagnated as they have moved away from the center of political discourse. In contrast, the upward trend of former representative Sohn Hak-kyu, who declared his return to politics after a two-year hiatus, is noteworthy. It is speculated that his recent leading position in various opinion polls for the next Democratic Party leader also contributes to this.
[Table 3] Support Ratings for Next Presidential Candidates (%)
* L'enquête de mai n'a pas été menée en raison des élections locales et de l'enquête sur la perception de la sécurité.
** Ajouté à la question sur le Premier ministre désigné Kim Tae-ho dans l'enquête d'août.
Après la présidente Park Geun-hye, le gouverneur Kim Moon-soo (8,6%), l'ancien ministre Yoo Si-min (7,6%) et l'ancien Premier ministre Han Myeong-sook (7,1%) ont suivi. Le maire Oh Se-hoon, qui s'était classé quatrième avec 8,5% de soutien dans l'enquête de juillet, a été relégué à la sixième place avec 5,5% de soutien dans cette enquête, derrière l'ancien représentant Sohn Hak-kyu qui a obtenu 6,5%. Les autres candidats sont restés largement inchangés par rapport à l'enquête précédente, et l'ancien gouverneur Kim Tae-ho, inclus pour la première fois dans cette enquête, n'a obtenu que 1,0%. Cela semble être dû aux blessures subies lors des audiences d'investiture et à une faible notoriété publique.
Selon le soutien au parti, l'ancienne présidente Park Geun-hye a montré une avance écrasante parmi les partisans du Grand National Party et les non-alignés, avec respectivement 40,1% et 16,9%. Lors de l'enquête du mois dernier, elle avait obtenu 32,3% des partisans du Grand National Party et 21,5% des non-alignés. Ce mois-ci, son soutien a augmenté parmi les partisans du Grand National Party et a diminué parmi les non-alignés. Parmi les partisans du Grand National Party, le gouverneur Kim Moon-soo s'est classé deuxième avec 17,5% de soutien (troisième avec 10,3% en juillet), et le maire Oh Se-hoon s'est classé troisième avec 12,2% (deuxième avec 18,4% en juillet), inversant les rangs par rapport au mois dernier. En revanche, il convient de prêter attention aux préférences des partisans du principal parti d'opposition, le Parti Démocrate. Dans l'enquête de juillet, 21,0% des partisans du Parti Démocrate soutenaient l'ancien Premier ministre Han Myeong-sook, se classant premier, tandis que l'ancienne présidente Park Geun-hye, avec 17,2% de soutien, se classait deuxième, et l'ancien ministre Yoo Si-min, avec 13,6%, se classait troisième. Cependant, dans cette enquête, l'ancienne présidente Park Geun-hye s'est classée première parmi les partisans du Parti Démocrate avec 16,9% de soutien, l'ancien Premier ministre Han Myeong-sook s'est classée deuxième avec 14,7%, l'ancien représentant Sohn Hak-kyu s'est classé troisième avec 13,1% et l'ancien ministre Yoo Si-min s'est classé quatrième avec 12,5%.
*Ce texte est une traduction par IA d'un original rédigé en coréen. Certaines traductions ou nuances peuvent être inexactes.