[Public Opinion Brief No. 74] Major Agendas and Public Opinion in the 2010 Local Elections

EAI · 한국리서치 Planning <Local Elections D-60>

Analysis Framework for the 2010 Local Elections Agendas: Priming Effect and Framing Effect

This chapter analyzes the major agendas of the 2010 local elections by utilizing the concepts of framing effect and priming effect (also known as ignition effect), which are used in political communication research to analyze the influence of media on public opinion.

Recently, analyses using the framing effect concept are spreading in election analysis articles and academic research papers. During this local election, the concept of frame or framing effect is easily found in political discourse, as evidenced by Jeong Doo-un, the Grand National Party's election planning director, stating, "We will define this local election as a battle between the Grand National Party as the 'force of economic success' versus the Democratic Party as the 'force hindering economic progress'." (Yonhap News, 2010/02/21).

The framing effect refers to the phenomenon where public perception is influenced by the aspects of a particular agenda that the media (or political circles) highlight, or the way the agenda is presented (the way to be presented) (Min Young, 2008). For example, regarding aid to North Korea, there are positive aspects such as strengthening cooperation and inducing openness, and negative aspects such as prolonging the North Korean regime's flawed system. If progressive media primarily approaches the issue with the frame of the Sunshine Policy, emphasizing the former, conservative media may address the issue with the frame of "handouts," emphasizing the latter. The framing effect can be said to occur when the public perceives the issue of aid to North Korea based on the frame they frequently encounter.

Looking at the election process so far, it can be assessed that the frame competition between the ruling and opposition parties, centered on the "mid-term evaluation" agenda, is currently dominating the election landscape. The Democratic Party's frame of mid-term evaluation aims to judge the current government's failures over the past two years and check its unilateral actions, while the Grand National Party's frame of mid-term evaluation seeks to empower the current government to achieve sustained economic growth and national stability.

Meanwhile, the priming effect refers to the phenomenon where a particular agenda, among various competing agendas, emerges as a factor influencing voters' judgments and choices. During the Gulf War in 1991, President Bush enjoyed high approval ratings while media outlets were flooded with reports on the war. However, as media attention shifted to the economic recession, the public's criteria for evaluating the president changed to economic issues, leading to a sharp decline in his approval ratings. This is cited as a representative example of the priming effect (Erikson and Tedin, 2005). In other words, when a specific agenda is highlighted by the media or political circles among various agendas and serves as a criterion for voters' judgments and choices, that agenda can be called a 'primed agenda'.

Currently, various agendas such as mid-term evaluation, judgment of the administration, candidate unification, Sejong City, the trial of former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook, and the Four Major Rivers Project are emerging in the local elections. While the current confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties can be understood as a frame competition over the characterization of the mid-term evaluation, it is predicted that the focus will shift to a priming competition where both parties will highlight agendas favorable to them to become voters' criteria for voting.

This report posits that the 'local economy' agenda has the potential to emerge as a primed agenda that will shape the election landscape, competing with already primed agendas such as mid-term evaluation, candidate unification, and Sejong City. As the election schedule intensifies, if the agenda of regional development gains prominence, it will engage in a priming competition with existing agendas. The core message of this report is that voters' choices may significantly differ depending on which agenda emerges as the primary voting criterion.

Local Election Agendas by Media Coverage Frequency

Analysis of 2,257 Portal News Articles on

Sejong City 821 articles (36.4%) > Candidate Unification 444 articles (19.7%) > Pro-Lee, Pro-Park 391 articles (17.3%)

To compare the frequency of news articles for each agenda item as presented by the media, the number of articles captured through keyword searches using Naver's news search function was tallied. This count represents the number of articles aggregated when the keywords for the respective agendas were added to the base keyword "Local Election Variables." Although this is not a methodology based on sophisticated analysis, it sufficiently confirms the trends in media attention for each local election agenda. The analysis results can be found in [Table 3].

■ Primed Agendas: Mid-term Evaluation, Sejong City/Han Myeong-sook/Four Major Rivers/Pro-Lee-Pro-Park Conflict

Democratic Party's "Midterm Evaluation - Judgment of Administration - Candidate Unification Theory" Ranks High in Media Exposure

In terms of frequency, the 'Sejong City' issue was the most frequent with 821 articles, accounting for 36.4% of the total 2,257 search articles. Next, articles searched with the keyword 'candidate unification' numbered 444, also representing 19.7% of the total 2,257. The third highest were articles searched with the keyword 'Pro-Lee, Pro-Park,' totaling 391 articles (17.3%). Following these were articles concerning the trial of Han Myeong-sook with 336 articles (14.9%), the 'judgment of administration' theory with 252 articles (11.2%), and 'Four Major Rivers' with 243 articles (10.8%), and the 'midterm evaluation' theory with 205 articles (9.1%).

Conversely, the frames proposed by the Grand National Party, such as 'Stable Governance' (84 articles, 3.7%), 'Economic Growth Theory' (42 articles, 1.9%), and 'Economic Revitalization' (51 articles, 2.3%), fall significantly short of the article counts for the Democratic Party's election frames of 'Judgment of Administration' and 'Candidate Unification.' In terms of issues, those raised by the Democratic Party and opposition parties, such as Sejong City, the Four Major Rivers, and free school meals, were more frequently exposed in the media compared to issues championed by the Grand National Party, such as economic revitalization, inter-Korean summit, and educational reform, which have not yet garnered significant media attention.

One could argue that the high frequency of media exposure for agendas raised by the Democratic Party and other opposition parties is partly due to the overrepresentation of progressive online media among the news outlets provided by online portals. However, an analysis and comparison of the content of 39 special feature articles diagnosing local election variables in progressive and conservative daily newspapers, economic newspapers, and weekly magazines this year revealed that most media outlets, regardless of their political leaning, commonly cited midterm evaluations, judgment of administration theory, candidate unification, Sejong City and the Four Major Rivers issues, factional conflicts between pro-Lee and pro-Park factions, and the trial of former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook as variables for the local elections.

[Table 1] Keyword Search Counts for "Local Election Variables" in Naver News

■ Low Interest in Regional Development Agendas

The media exhibit extraordinary interest in the 'mid-term evaluation-candidate unification-regime critique' frame of the local elections, which has been led by the Democratic Party and opposition parties, the intra-party conflict between the pro-Lee Myung-bak and pro-Park Geun-hye factions, and major political issues at the central government level such as Sejong City and the Four Major Rivers Project. However, neither the media nor the political parties preparing for the election are paying much attention to the inherent role and function of local politics in local elections: formulating visions for regional development and recruiting elites to lead local politics. When searching for keywords such as 'local economy,' 'regional development,' and 'regional development,' the number of articles found was only 71, 115, and 39, respectively, accounting for less than 5% of the total 2,257 articles included in the analysis. Some central economic newspapers and local newspapers in Daegu and Gangwon, by introducing local opinion polls, suggest that public interest is focused on revitalizing the local economy and local issues, and that local variables will become the main agenda for voting choices.

Agenda Analysis Based on Public Opinion

1. Primed Agenda and Public Opinion

Candidate Unification - Regime Critique - Mid-term Evaluation / Sejong City - Free School Meals

The tendency to view the regime critique as the biggest agenda for this local election is consistently observed in both progressive and conservative media. While some analyses suggest that the president's relatively high approval rating or the Grand National Party's dominant party support may diminish the impact of the regime critique (SBS, 2010/02/20), the experiences of the ruling party's defeat in the local elections of 1995, 2002, and 2006, held during the mid-to-late terms of the presidency, appear to have led all political parties and almost all media outlets to focus on mid-term evaluations, regime critiques, and candidate unification. However, an analysis of the current survey results indicates that while the broad consensus on candidate unification suggests a significant impact, offsetting factors that limit this impact must also be considered in a balanced manner.

■ Consensus on Administration Restraint and Pan-Opposition Candidate Unification

Broad Opposition Candidate Unification: 53.3% Agreement vs. 39.5% Disagreement, 7.2% Don't Know/No Answer

When asked about the claim that the broad opposition should achieve candidate unification in the local elections, 53.3% of all respondents (21.0% strongly agree, 32.3% generally agree) agreed, while 39.5% (28.8% somewhat disagree, 10.7% strongly disagree), indicating a majority consensus.

Based on this public consensus, opposition parties have been discussing candidate unification through the '5+4 Joint Conference (5 parties + 4 civic groups)' since the beginning of the year, with the perception that they could win if they nominate a unified candidate. However, the Progressive Justice Party withdrew from the discussions early on due to disagreements over the principles of electoral alliance, and the nationwide candidate unification talks have currently concluded without success. Nevertheless, discussions on candidate unification are ongoing among the remaining opposition parties, particularly focusing on the Gyeongnam and Gyeonggi gubernatorial elections, and expectations for a unified candidate will likely persist until the final stages of the election in disadvantageous regions.

[Figure 1] Agreement on Broad Opposition Candidate Unification (%)

■ Offsetting Factors for Pan-Opposition Unification Effect

Varying Degrees of Support for Unification Among Opposition Supporters

Higher Agreement Among MB Critics, Progressives, and Democratic Party Supporters; 45.4% Among RDP Supporters; Indifferent Among Unaffiliated 39.9%

Support for candidate unification is high among progressive and opposition party supporters. While 47.5% of those with a positive view of President Lee Myung-bak's administration agreed with the opposition's candidate unification, this figure rose to 60.2% among those with a negative view. Ideologically, 49.4% of conservatives and 50.8% of moderates agreed, while 63.6% of progressives agreed with the opposition's candidate unification.

By party support, 46.7% of the ruling Grand National Party supporters expressed agreement. However, among supporters of the five opposition parties discussing candidate unification, agreement varied by party. A significant 71.8% of Democratic Party supporters, 83.8% of New Progressive Party supporters, and 92.3% of the Party for People's Participation supporters backed the necessity of candidate unification. In contrast, only 45.4% of the Democratic Labor Party supporters and 29.9% of the Creative Korea Party supporters agreed.

Another factor that may undermine the impact of opposition candidate unification is the cynicism among undecided voters toward the idea of a unified opposition candidate. Only 39.9% of undecided voters agreed with the unified opposition candidate proposal, falling significantly short of the overall average of 53.3%, with 45.7% disagreeing.

[Figure 2] Agreement on Broad Opposition Candidate Unification by Political Orientation

Note: Don't Know/No Answer regarding candidate unification is not shown.

■ Restraint Argument or Stability Argument? MB's Unilateralism Restraint Argument Holds a Fragile Lead, with a Significant Portion Remaining Undecided

Stable governance support 27.8% vs. MB checks and balances theory 39.2% vs. Undecided 33.0%

Currently, the ruling party is promoting stable governance for economic revitalization, while the opposition party is advocating for judgment and checks on the government and ruling party, engaging in a fierce contest. When the balance of power is disrupted, a herd mentality phenomenon occurs. However, an asymmetrical balance has been maintained thus far. While 27.8% agreed with the statement 'Support the ruling party for stable governance,' 39.2% agreed with the statement 'Support the opposition party to prevent President MB and the Grand National Party from acting unilaterally.' The public opinion supporting checks and balances against the President and the Grand National Party's unilateral actions is emerging as a variable that could shake the election landscape, which is currently favorable to the Grand National Party. However, it should not be overlooked that support for the checks and balances theory is only around 40%, and the proportion of undecided respondents is as high as 33.0%. Fluid factors remain.

Capital region + Chungcheong + Honam show increased MB checks and balances theory; support for stable governance among Gyeongsang voters only 36%

Attitude Change of Undecided Voters is a Variable

Generally, in the Gyeongsang region, the base of the current ruling party, the theory of stability is dominant, while in regions with strong anti-Grand National Party sentiment such as Honam and Chungcheong, and in the capital region, public opinion favoring checks and balances is relatively high. The argument for supporting the ruling party for stable governance received support of only 36.4% in Daegu/Gyeongbuk, the ruling party's regional base, and even 36.2% in Busan/Gyeongnam. Support for the stability theory was not high in the capital region either, with 30.9% in Seoul and 27.5% in the Gyeonggi region. In Daejeon/Chungcheong, where criticism of the current government is highest, it was only 16.5%, and in Honam, it was as low as 7.8%.

The theory of checks and balances, advocating support for the opposition party to prevent the unilateral actions of the President and ruling party, was highest among Honam voters at 67.4%, followed by Daejeon/Chungcheong region at 43.0%, Seoul region at 43.0%, and Gyeonggi/Incheon region at 38.9%. In the Busan/Gyeongnam region, support for the checks and balances theory was 28.6%, and among Daegu/Gyeongbuk respondents, the proportion agreeing with checks and balances was only 20.1%. The strength of the checks and balances theory in Seoul (40.4%) and the Gyeonggi/Incheon region (36.0%), which exceed the Grand National Party's national average support (34.5%), is expected to act as a favorable condition for the spread of opposition party alliances.

[Figure 3] Regional Preference for Restraint vs. Stability Argument (%)

Political centripetal force: 'Stable governance theory is stronger': 82.7% of stable governance supporters back GNP, while only 45.2% of checks and balances supporters back DP

Among undecided individuals, there is strong opposition to a unified candidate from the broader opposition bloc, with 36.5% agreeing vs. 49.6% disagreeing.

While public opinion slightly favors the theory of checks and balances, which is expected to be the core frame of this election competition, the extent to which this sentiment will translate into actual vote-getting power for each party remains a variable. In this regard, the Grand National Party is in a somewhat advantageous situation.

As many as 82.7% of stable governance supporters indicated they are currently supporting the Grand National Party, indicating a strong political centripetal force for the stable governance theory. In contrast, the distribution of party support is fragmented among respondents who hold the position of checking the MB administration. Among those favoring checks and balances, 45.2% stated they support the Democratic Party, while the remaining majority are divided in their party support. Therefore, it is questionable how chemically the supporters of checks and balances will be unified if discussions advance towards unification with a party they do not support.

Meanwhile, among the undecided individuals who have not chosen either side, support for the Grand National Party was the highest at 24.7%, with support for the Democratic Party being only 14.2%. This is also expected to act as a factor that diminishes the effectiveness of a unified opposition candidate, even if one is successfully formed. The cynicism towards a unified opposition candidate among undecided individuals, who have not decided between the stable governance and checks and balances theories, is also expected to offset the pressure and effect of the unified opposition candidate theory. The proportion of undecided individuals who agree with a unified candidate from the broader opposition bloc is 36.5%, significantly lower than the 49.6% who disagree.

[Table 2] Party Support Distribution by Stance on Stability vs. Restraint Argument (%)

[Figure 4] Agreement on Candidate Unification by Stance on Stability vs. Restraint Argument (%) Note: Don't Know/No Answer regarding candidate unification is not shown.

2. Potential Regional Economic Agenda: Possibility of Priming Effect

■ Why Was the Regional Development Agenda Suppressed?: "Regional Economic Issues" Buried by the "Midterm Evaluation Theory of the MB Administration"

Looking at public opinion, not just media exposure, reveals that election issues at the regional political level are dormant. An analysis of the current survey results indicates that while the media and political parties are not paying attention to these issues, causing them to not be primed as criteria for voter judgment, regional economic agendas have a high potential to emerge as core issues depending on the responses of candidates and parties.

A majority of voters view this local election as an opportunity to select local representatives for regional development, a perspective that stands in stark contrast to the view of the midterm election through the lens of a midterm evaluation. Within the regions that form the support base for each political party, perceptions different from the election frames promoted by those parties are spreading. In reality, most respondents feel a relative deprivation, believing that while the Seoul metropolitan area has benefited economically under the current administration, 'our region is being economically marginalized.' This sentiment is prevalent in all regions except the Seoul metropolitan area. Therefore, depending on whether political parties and candidates actively highlight this sense of regional marginalization and the public's desire for regional economic development, these issues have the potential to emerge as key election variables alongside the government judgment theory.

■ Ruling and Opposition Party Confrontation: Transition from Priming Competition to Framing Competition

Initial Competition: "Midterm Evaluation = Government Judgment Theory (Opposition)" vs. "Regional Development (Ruling)" Agenda Priming Competition

Current Situation: "Midterm Evaluation = Government Judgment Theory (Opposition)" vs. "Midterm Evaluation = Support for Economic Growth Forces (Ruling)" Frame Competition

If the opposition party had consistently framed the election's nature from the perspective of 'midterm evaluation = government judgment theory,' the Grand National Party, embroiled in internal conflict due to issues like the revision of the Sejong City plan, failed to present a distinct election frame for the local elections until early this year. At best, they countered the opposition's midterm evaluation agenda by proposing a regional development agenda focused on electing local representatives for regional development. Consequently, the competition between the ruling and opposition parties during this period centered on a priming competition, with each side attempting to highlight their respective agendas – the opposition's midterm evaluation and the ruling party's regional agenda – as the core issues of the local elections.

However, with the formation of the Grand National Party's election planning committee 100 days before the election on February 21st, the party has shifted towards a direct confrontation with the opposition's frame of 'midterm evaluation = government judgment theory' by presenting its own ruling party's midterm evaluation frame, rather than merely responding with a different agenda (regional development) to the opposition's government judgment theory. Specifically, the Grand National Party, using the launch of the local election planning group as an opportunity, has begun to emphasize its stance that the local elections are a prelude to the 2012 presidential and general elections, framing them as a contest between 'forces promoting economic growth' and 'forces hindering economic progress,' and as a midterm evaluation of these forces. They argue that this necessitates laying the groundwork for stable state administration by supporting the incumbent ruling party to ensure continuous economic revitalization (JoongAng Ilbo, 2010/02/22). The dynamic has now transformed into a confrontation between the Grand National Party's midterm evaluation theory and the Democratic Party's midterm evaluation theory. In essence, a frame competition has officially begun over how to define the meaning of 'midterm evaluation.'

This shift in the Grand National Party's election strategy appears to reflect both defensive and offensive considerations. Defensively, as observed earlier, the ruling party's regional economic theory and local representative agenda were lagging behind the opposition's midterm evaluation and government judgment theory in the priming competition. Therefore, a change in strategy was necessary to regain the initiative in the election landscape. Offensively, considering the incumbent president's high approval ratings and the ruling party's advantage in party support compared to previous local elections, they assessed that a frame competition centered on 'midterm evaluation = supporting the ruling party that is revitalizing the economy' was feasible, rather than accepting the opposition's logic of 'midterm evaluation = government judgment.'

In reality, the original meaning of a 'midterm election' is not solely about judging the incumbent ruling party; it can also serve as a vote of confidence to empower the current government to work more effectively. If voters' evaluations of the government and ruling party's performance are negative, it can lead to a judgment (retrospective punishment). Conversely, if the government and ruling party receive favorable evaluations by the midterm election and voters form expectations of future success (prospective expectation), the midterm election can become an occasion for renewed confidence. While the opposition's midterm evaluation frame is based on a retrospective, negative assessment aimed at judging the government and ruling party's perceived high-handedness and failures through the election, the Grand National Party's midterm evaluation theory frame is based on rewarding the government and ruling party's economic successes and on prospective expectations that they will lead the economy even better.

The problem is that in this process, the meaning of local elections, which involves the expectations of local voters for regional development and the competition to achieve it, is being diluted. As media attention focuses primarily on the midterm evaluation and judgment theory, and the Grand National Party, which initially proposed the regional development issue, shifts the core election agenda to its own midterm evaluation theory, the regional development agenda is further disappearing from the realm of public interest and failing to be primed. The results of the current survey indicate that the latent regional development agenda has the potential to compete with the midterm evaluation theory and other agendas as the election campaign progresses. In other words, as the election campaign intensifies, a priming competition among various agendas may be reignited within the frame competition of midterm evaluations.

■ Factors Priming the "Regional Economy" Agenda

Can the results of this survey be explained solely by the midterm evaluation agenda from beginning to end? Our research team argues that this is not the case. Examining public opinion raises questions about how well the election agendas and frames that the media and political parties have focused on actually reflect public sentiment, and whether voters will make their voting decisions in this local election solely from the perspective of midterm evaluation, which is the focus of the ruling and opposition parties and the media. Rather, as the election intensifies and regional policy issues, along with central political factors, come to the fore, there is significant potential for the public's current expectations and dissatisfaction regarding regional economy and development to be activated.

- Meaning of the June 2 Local Elections: "Selecting Local Representatives" 49.9% vs. "Midterm Evaluation of the MB Administration" 44.2%

"Local Representative Theory" Highest in Honam at 56.3% > PK 55.5% > Chungcheong 51.9% > Incheon 50.7%

"MB Administration Midterm Evaluation Theory" Seoul 51.4% > Gangwon/Jeju 48.5% > TK 46.8% > Honam 42.5%

The survey results indicate that while the political circles and major media are primarily focused on the midterm evaluation-government judgment agenda, this is distant from public opinion. Regarding the meaning of the upcoming June 2 local elections, the public is evenly divided between the midterm evaluation theory and the idea of electing local representatives to lead regional development. The proportion viewing the June 2 local elections as an opportunity to 'elect local representatives' was 49.9%, while the claim that it is a 'midterm evaluation of the Lee Myung-bak administration' was 44.2%. Undecided/No response accounted for 6.0%.

Survey results from January 13, 2010, show similar outcomes, with 'electing local representatives' at 46.9% and 'government midterm evaluation theory' at 46.5%. Unlike four years ago, when the theory of judging an incompetent central government gained traction, it is noteworthy that public opinion now leans towards the inherent meaning of local elections – selecting representatives to lead regional development – with a majority holding this view.

[Figure 5] Meaning of the June 2 Local Elections as Perceived by Voters (%)

Examining the results by region reveals significant findings. Firstly, in the Honam and Chungcheong regions, where anti-government sentiment is strong, the emphasis on regional development through electing local representatives is greater than the midterm evaluation theory. In the Honam region, the response for the MB administration's midterm evaluation was only 42.5%, whereas the response for electing local representatives was a significantly higher 56.3% compared to other regions. In the Daejeon/Chungcheong region, which has strong opposition to the Sejong City revision plan, only 41.0% agreed with the midterm evaluation theory of the MB administration.

Conversely, there is a temperature difference within the Yeongnam region, the current government's support base, between the TK and PK regions. In the PK region, only 38.2% supported the MB administration's midterm evaluation, while the response for electing local representatives was the second highest at 55.5%. In contrast, the TK region showed a higher agreement with the MB administration's midterm evaluation theory at 46.8%, ranking third after Seoul and Gangwon/Jeju. Only 42.9% agreed with the idea of electing local representatives. The relatively high proportion supporting the MB administration's midterm evaluation theory in the TK region appears to be partly due to the spread of sentiment regarding reverse discrimination during the Sejong City revision controversy, which increased distrust in the government and ruling party.

Meanwhile, clear differences in opinion are also evident among voters in the Seoul and Gyeonggi regions of the metropolitan area. In Seoul, the MB administration's midterm evaluation theory received support from over half of the respondents (51.4%), while 43.9% responded that it was an election to select local representatives. In contrast, in the Gyeonggi region, only 42.2% agreed with the MB administration's midterm evaluation theory, and 50.7% supported the local representative theory. Even within the same metropolitan area, the Gyeonggi region, which has a higher proportion of underdeveloped areas, shows stronger voter demand for regional development. In the Gangwon/Jeju region, the MB administration's midterm evaluation theory and the election of representatives for regional development were evenly matched, receiving 48.5% and 49.1% support, respectively.

Overall, a balanced state is maintained between the perspective of regional development and the perception of a midterm evaluation of the current government in defining the nature of the local elections. Considering the necessity of inter-party debate on regional policies due to the nature of local elections, and the fact that public opinion prioritizing regional agendas is close to a majority, the likelihood of the regional development agenda being primed is expected to increase as the election campaign intensifies.

- Uneven Regional Economic Development: Seoul Metropolitan Area Development vs. Underdevelopment in Honam, Yeongnam, Gangwon/Jeju, and Chungcheong

Region Receiving Maximum Benefit: Seoul 38.4% > Chungcheong 11.0% > Yeongnam 9.7% > Gyeongin 8.3%

Region Most Marginalized: Honam 22.1% > Yeongnam 14.4% > Gangwon/Jeju 11.6% > Chungcheong 11.3%

Overall, when asked which region has benefited most economically under the current administration, 38.4% of respondents cited Seoul, and 8.3% cited Incheon/Gyeonggi, totaling 46.7% who believe the Seoul metropolitan area has benefited. The Chungcheong region, which received various support measures during the Sejong City revision plan, was cited as a beneficiary by 11.0%, making it the second highest after Seoul. Responses citing TK were 5.1%, and those citing PK were 4.6%; combined, 9.7% of respondents identified the Yeongnam region as an economic beneficiary. The Gyeongin region was cited by 8.3%. The proportion citing Honam was very low at 1.0%, and for Gangwon/Jeju, it was 0.2%.

Conversely, when asked to identify the region most economically marginalized under the current administration, the overall response rates were: Honam 22.1%, Gangwon/Jeju 11.6%, Chungcheong 11.3%, and TK and PK at 7.2% each, followed by other regions. When the two Yeongnam regions are combined, the proportion identifying Yeongnam as economically marginalized was 14.4%, making it the second highest after Honam. Public opinion citing the Gyeongin region as economically marginalized was only 3.3%, and for Seoul, it was 2.0%.

Based on the average of all respondents, the regions perceived to have benefited most economically under the current administration were, in order: Seoul, Gyeongin/Chungcheong, and Yeongnam. The regions perceived as most marginalized were, in order: Honam, Yeongnam, Gangwon/Jeju, and Chungcheong. For the Chungcheong and Yeongnam regions, there is a coexistence of perceptions of benefit and marginalization. This suggests a difference in perspective between residents of the Chungcheong and Yeongnam regions and residents of other areas.

[Figure 6] Regions Receiving Maximum Economic Benefit and Maximum Marginalization Under the Current Administration

- Relative Deprivation and Sense of Marginalization Due to the Regional Economy

Maximum Beneficiary Region by Region: Seoul Ranked First

Analyzing how respondents identify the most economically benefited and marginalized regions by their respective areas provides significant insights. Firstly, regarding regions that have benefited greatly, Seoul was overwhelmingly cited across all regions. As confirmed in the figures and tables, while some regions cited Gyeongin, Chungcheong, and Yeongnam (TK+PK) as beneficiary regions, the responses were relatively lower compared to Seoul, and responses citing Gangwon/Jeju were almost nonexistent. The proportion of respondents who identified Seoul as the most benefited region was highest among Chungcheong respondents at 49.3%, while it received 35.3% to 38.8% support from respondents in other regions.

Among Seoul residents, 37.2% responded that Seoul was the most benefited region during the current administration, a higher proportion than in other regions. The second most frequently cited beneficiary region after Seoul was the Chungcheong region. Notably, respondents from the TK and Seoul regions cited the Chungcheong region as having benefited relatively more, at 17.7% and 14.7% respectively, exceeding the average. The TK region is known as one of the areas with the strongest sentiment of dissatisfaction regarding reverse discrimination during the Sejong City revision controversy.

Instead of the Chungcheong region, a considerable number of respondents cited the Yeongnam region as the second most benefited region after Seoul. In the PK region, considered the regional base of the President and the Grand National Party, the proportion citing the Yeongnam region as a beneficiary was high at 13.6% (TK 8.1%, PK 5.5%). Conversely, respondents from Honam and Chungcheong cited the Yeongnam region as a beneficiary more often than the Chungcheong region. As many as 20.4% of Honam respondents (TK 9.1%, PK 11.3%) answered that the Yeongnam region was benefiting, while in the Chungcheong region, this figure was 9.1% (TK 6.7%, PK 2.4%).

"Our Region is the Most Marginalized" - Strong Sense of Victimhood in Honam/Chungcheong/TK

Meanwhile, when asked to identify the most economically marginalized region, it was found that most regions outside the Seoul metropolitan area have a strong sense of victimhood, believing their own region is the most marginalized. The proportion of respondents who identified their own region as the most economically marginalized under the current administration was highest in Honam at 66.9%, followed by TK at 53.1%, and Chungcheong at 45.6%. Although the PK region also had the highest proportion of respondents citing PK as economically marginalized, the percentage was relatively lower at 39.7%. Only 6.3% of Seoul respondents cited Seoul as the most economically marginalized region, and only 9.4% of Gyeonggi respondents cited the Gyeonggi region, indicating a low sense of economic marginalization in the Seoul metropolitan area. Seoul respondents cited Honam (24.4%), Gangwon/Jeju (9.9%), and Chungcheong (8.6%) as the most economically marginalized regions, in that order. In the Gyeonggi region, the order was Honam (18.8%), Chungcheong (13.5%), Gyeongin (9.4%), and Gangwon/Jeju (8.3%).

As observed earlier, public opinion that differs from traditional political attitudes is confirmed, particularly in the Honam and TK regions. Given that these regions exhibit a strong sense of economic marginalization, it is important to consider the possibility that this sense of victimhood has influenced existing party support or political attitudes. If dissatisfaction with one's regional economy and a sense of marginalization lead to a withdrawal of support for the party representing that region or a shift to supporting another party, significant changes in the existing regional party system can be anticipated. Examining the scale of defection in the Honam and TK regions is expected to be a crucial point of observation for this election.

[Figure 7] Most Benefited Region

[Figure 8] Most Marginalized Region

[Table 3] Most Economically Benefited Region: Comparative Responses by Region (%)

[Table 4] Most Economically Marginalized Region: Comparative Responses by Region (%)

■ The Frame Competition Must Be Accompanied by the Presentation of Regional Development Visions

Priming Competition May Become More Important Than Frame Competition

Indeed, the so-called 'New Town' craze that swept through the Seoul metropolitan area during the 2008 general elections can be seen as symbolic of the 'regional economy' issue emerging as a variable in voter choices. It is anticipated that in local elections, voters' interest in the regional economy agenda will be no less, if not greater, than in presidential or general elections. The current survey indicates that voters are more interested in regional economy and development agendas than the political circles and media are in the midterm evaluation theory. Furthermore, the strong sense of economic marginalization among voters in the core support bases of both parties (TK/Honam/Chungcheong) suggests that this agenda could be primed as a voting variable once the local election schedule intensifies and policy competition regarding the regional economy among candidates becomes more active.

If the current election contest is determined solely by the pros and cons of the government judgment theory surrounding the midterm evaluation theory, voting behavior will be decided by evaluations of the president and support for political parties, and the election may conclude without significant variables. However, if the regional development issue emerges as a new election agenda and competes with the government-checking theory, voters may arise who support different parties for different issues, in addition to consistent supporters of the Grand National Party and consistent supporters of the Democratic Party. For these voters, the key variable will be which issue emerges as the core issue determining their vote, rather than the election frame for a specific issue. In other words, a situation where a priming war becomes more important than a frame war may arise.

In the case of the Grand National Party, as the ruling party in the central government and most local governments, it is relatively advantageous compared to the Democratic Party or other opposition parties if the regional economy and regional development issues gain prominence. Voters in its core support base, particularly in the TK region, harbor a strong sense of relative deprivation and marginalization due to the regional economic downturn. Moreover, opposition to the midterm evaluation and the ruling party's high-handedness is detected among the Grand National Party's supporters in the Seoul metropolitan area. The current emphasis on state stability alone is likely to weaken its vote share in the TK region, and without countermeasures against the government-checking theory, it may experience a loss of support from the Seoul metropolitan area.

The Democratic Party also sees strong expectations for regional development confirmed in the Honam and Chungcheong regions, where its support rate is high. While support for government judgment is growing among its supporters in the Seoul metropolitan area, they harbor antipathy towards the relocation of Sejong City. If the party insists solely on the government judgment theory, it risks weakening the mobilization of Honam and Chungcheong voters who desire regional development visions. While it may be possible to expand its base among supporters in the Seoul metropolitan area who desire government checks, it could also lead to the alienation of supporters in the Seoul metropolitan area who are concerned about the division of the capital region.

Ultimately, if various agendas compete rather than a single issue dominating the election, it appears crucial for each party to prepare its own policy alternatives for each respective agenda. While a strategy of going all-in on the government judgment theory might have been effective in 2006 when it dominated, the 2010 local elections, characterized by competing agendas, require parties to prepare a diverse policy portfolio across various fronts rather than focusing on a single issue.

Analysis of Issue Influence: Sejong City / Free School Meals

1. Weakening Support for the Sejong City Revision Plan

Support for Sejong City revision: 50.4% (November) → 47.6% (February) → 45.3% (March)

The Sejong City issue, which sparked intense conflict between the pro-Lee Myung-bak and pro-Park Geun-hye factions after the details of the revision plan were finalized in February, has temporarily subsided as discussions within the Grand National Party are being handled by the senior members' consultative body, which is active until the end of March. The government submitted its revised plan to the National Assembly on March 23rd, shifting the ball to the political arena, and is monitoring the parliamentary discussions. However, due to incidents like the sinking of the Cheonan, it has not emerged as a central issue.

Public opinion has shown a continuous decline in support for the Sejong City revision plan since November of last year when the plan was first proposed. In the November survey, 50.4% supported the revision plan, 31.4% supported the original plan, and 18.2% reserved their response. However, in the current survey, support for the revision plan was 45.3%, support for the original plan was 33.7%, and undecided responses were 21.0%. Although not a drastic change, there is a trend of public opinion shifting away from supporting the revision plan towards supporting the original plan or remaining undecided. This is a concern for the government, which expects the revision plan to be passed early after the completion of the senior members' consultative body's activities.

[Figure 9] Changes in Preference for Sejong City Policy (%)

■ Daegu-Gyeongbuk Public Opinion: Supports Grand National Party but Vetoes Policies

Although there are limitations in interpretation due to small sample sizes by region, the trend of public support for Sejong City by region shows that Seoul (54.7%), Busan/Gyeongnam/Ulsan (49.7%), and Gyeonggi/Incheon (45.8%) showed above-average support rates. In contrast, Daegu/Gyeongbuk (39.2%), Honam (35.0%), and Chungcheong region (27.0%) fell below the average support rate. Notably, the TK region saw a decrease of -8.9%p compared to the previous month's survey, and the Chungcheong region saw a decrease of -7.0%p.

In this survey, the TK region still shows high approval ratings for the president (66.5%) and high support for the Grand National Party (42.8%). However, public opinion favors a mid-term evaluation of the local elections, and support for the ruling party's argument for stable state administration to ensure stable governance is relatively low. Overall, there is public backlash against the government and ruling party's major policies and direction. The same trend is observed in the Sejong City issue, suggesting that consolidating and appeasing public opinion in the TK region will emerge as a significant task.

■ Democratic Party Faces Burden of Worsening Public Opinion in Seoul Metropolitan Area as Sejong City Issue Gains Traction

Conversely, while the Democratic Party is succeeding in gaining support in the Chungcheong region through the Sejong City issue, it faces a dilemma as public opinion in the Seoul metropolitan area deteriorates in the process. As mentioned earlier, public opinion in Seoul, which views the original Sejong City plan as a division of the capital, is causing the Democratic Party to lag significantly behind the Grand National Party in terms of support. While there is a growing consensus in Seoul for a mid-term assessment and a check on the ruling party, forming a dual front, efforts to develop policies that can re-absorb public opinion in Seoul, which has worsened due to Sejong City, in addition to the mid-term assessment, appear necessary.

[Table 5] Changes in Public Support for the Revised Sejong City Plan by Region (%)

2. Free School Meals: Debate on Scope and Timing of Support

Universal Support/Prompt Implementation (DP Plan): 31.9% vs. Selective Support/Prompt Implementation (GNP Plan): 31.3%

Universal Support/Phased Implementation (Yoo Si-min Plan): 25.2% vs. For Low-Income Households/Phased Implementation: 8.3%

The opposition parties are highlighting Gyeonggi Education Superintendent Kim Sang-gon's free school meal initiative as a key campaign issue for the local elections. The core issue has two main aspects: first, whether the scope of support should be for all students or limited to low-income households; and second, whether the implementation should be prompt or phased according to financial resources.

The survey results indicate that while there is majority public opinion favoring the expansion of free school meals, a considerable portion of the public also holds a gradualist view regarding the scope and implementation phases. Support for the current party platforms of the Democratic Party, the Democratic Labor Party, and the Progressive New Party, which advocate for prompt implementation with universal support, stands at 31.9%. Support for the Grand National Party's position, which advocates for prompt implementation limited to low-income households, is also closely contested at 31.3%. The position represented by former Minister Yoo Si-min's proposal, which aims for universal support but phased implementation considering financial resources, also garners 25.2% support.

In terms of the scope of support, the universal support theory, which advocates for free school meals for all students, received 57.1% (prompt implementation + phased implementation), while the selective support argument received 39.6% (prompt implementation + phased implementation), indicating a majority for the universal approach. However, when considering the timing of support, it is evident that a significant portion of the public does not agree with the immediate implementation of free school meals for all students. It is necessary to closely monitor how public opinion evolves during the election process.

[Figure 10] Preference for Free School Meal Plans

Four Major Rivers Project / Former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook's Trial / Cheonan Incident Also Variables

Notably, according to media reports, public opinion on the Four Major Rivers Project, actively promoted by the President, remains lukewarm. If this issue gains traction as a campaign topic in the local elections, the policy drive to push through the revised Sejong City plan will likely face difficulties. The Grand National Party leadership's consideration of strategically nominating Lee Wan-koo, former governor of South Chungcheong Province, who resigned to take responsibility for the promise of the original Sejong City plan for the election in the province, lends credence to this outlook. The recent declaration of opposition to the Four Major Rivers Project by religious groups, including the Catholic Bishops' Conference, has further energized opposition, posing a burden for the ruling party. Meanwhile, the trial of former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook, scheduled for April 9, is a significant issue that could greatly influence the overall election landscape.

The sinking of the naval vessel Cheonan on March 26 has emerged as a major variable for the upcoming local elections. Although there is considerable time remaining until the elections, the sinking of a naval patrol ship in a zone adjacent to North Korea, resulting in numerous casualties, has been met with a response during the rescue and investigation process that has raised questions even within the ruling party. Public distrust in the government and military's response is amplified.

While the initial shock of the incident is subsiding as the search operation concludes and moves into the recovery phase, the fact that major issues such as the trial of former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook, Sejong City, and the Four Major Rivers Project are largely related to the credibility of the government and judicial institutions means that if trust in the government is not restored during the handling of the Cheonan incident, a domino effect of distrust cannot be ruled out.

For the opposition parties, although President Lee Myung-bak himself has stated that he has no intention of using the Cheonan incident for the elections, if North Korean involvement is proven during the investigation, an extraordinary situation will inevitably arise. In such a scenario, the resurgence of conservative public opinion and a widespread desire for stable governance could create unfavorable conditions for the opposition parties.