[EAI Public Opinion Briefing No. 44-1] Stagnant Presidential Approval Rating, Doubtful to Surpass 40%

Presidential approval rating stuck in the 30% range for seven months, doubtful to surpass 40%

[Tracking 1] Stagnant Presidential Approval Rating, Doubtful to Surpass 40%?

[Tracking 2] Variables in Approval Rating Changes

[Tracking 3] Policy Consistency Issue is Serious, 68.9%



April Survey: MB Doing Well 34.0%, Not Doing Well 62.8%, Stagnant for Over 7 Months



In the April survey, President Lee Myung-bak's approval rating for state affairs was 34.0%, showing little change from 34.7% last month. It is difficult to see the Lee Myung-bak administration as having secured the momentum to raise its approval rating to the 40% range yet. The Lee Myung-bak administration, whose approval rating had plummeted to the 10% range at the beginning of his term in 2008, succeeded in a rebound in the latter half of last year, entering the 30% range. Since then, whether it would break into the 40% range has been a matter of interest for politicians and the public.



Recent media reports, based on internal surveys by the Grand National Party and some ARS surveys, indicated that the Lee Myung-bak administration's approval rating for state affairs had surpassed 40%, leading to speculation that the administration's drive might have yielded some results since the end of last year. However, it must be considered that these surveys were generally conducted by the Grand National Party itself and that there were variations due to the survey methodology.



Tracking the results from general telephone surveys shows that the approval rating, which recovered to the 30% range around the latter half of 2008, has remained largely unchanged to date. Despite a series of major political issues dominating the media, such as the Park Yeon-cha gate, the pro-Lee faction vs. pro-Park faction conflict surrounding the by-elections, the deepening internal conflict exacerbated by former Minister Chung Dong-young's defection, North Korea's missile launch, and the sex scandal involving a presidential office administrative officer, the approval rating has maintained a balance without rising or falling.



[Figure 1] Lee Myung-bak Administration's Approval Rating for State Affairs (%)

Solidification of Government Support Base - Return and Consolidation of Yeongnam-50s/60s-Conservative Support Pattern

Protestants 48.2%, Buddhists 35.8%, Catholics 25.0%, Atheists 24.7% Approval for State Affairs



Analysis by social group clearly identifies the support base for the Lee Myung-bak administration, with no significant changes from the previous month. The solidification of approval patterns for state affairs and political parties across different social groups appears to be leading to the current stagnation in approval ratings for state affairs and political parties.



[Figure 2] Approval Rating for State Affairs by Socioeconomic Variables

First, by region, the Daegu/Gyeongbuk region shows 51.8% support, relatively confirming it as Lee Myung-bak administration's regional base, while Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam shows only 36.0%. The approval rating for state affairs in the Gyeonggi/Incheon and Seoul regions is 34.2% and 33.9% respectively, recording the average level, and in the Daejeon/Chungcheong region, where the relocation of administrative agencies has recently faced setbacks, it is 30.4%, below the average level. The Gangwon/Jeju region is at 25.9%, and the Gwangju/Jeolla region is at 19.7%, confirming it as the region with the strongest opposition to the government.



By age group, support for President Lee Myung-bak among those in their 20s and 30s was only 21.5% and 22.0% respectively. Only 28.7% of those in their 40s, who shifted their support to Roh Moo-hyun in the 16th presidential election and then returned to support Lee Myung-bak in the 17th presidential election, expressed support for President Lee, showing a cold response to the current administration.



The pattern of supporting the Lee Myung-bak administration is maintained among those with lower educational attainment and among the elderly. Support for the Lee Myung-bak administration was highest among those with a middle school education or less at 44.8%, followed by 38.5% among high school graduates, and 24.7% among those with a college degree or higher, indicating below-average approval ratings. Only among those aged 50 and above did a majority, 52.7%, express support.



Ideologically, support was 44.2% among conservatives, compared to 33.0% among moderates and only 23.6% among progressives. However, as pointed out by some within the Grand National Party, Christian believers showed high support for the Lee Myung-bak administration in terms of religion.



[Figure 3] Approval Rating for State Affairs by Religion

Fragmented Party Support Patterns Also Solidified

Grand National Party 34.5%, Democratic Party 14.7%, Liberty Forward Party 3.1%, Democratic Labor Party 6.8%, Unaffiliated 31.2%



The stagnation observed in the presidential approval rating is also evident in the changes in party support ratings. Our monthly tracking of party support ratings reveals almost no change. For the Grand National Party, the support was 34.9% in the February survey, 35.8% in the March survey, and 34.5% in the April survey, with changes within the margin of error. The Democratic Party's support slightly decreased from 18.6% in the February survey to 14.7% in the current survey. Despite minor fluctuations, one in three citizens has no party to rely on. The current party competition structure appears to be solidifying, with little change observed in surveys conducted at the same time.



A characteristic of the current party competition structure is that the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party are gaining almost no reciprocal benefits from the mistakes of the opposing party, as they did in the past. Considering the continuous internal setbacks, such as the disclosure of the Park Yeon-cha list, the impending prosecution investigation of former President Roh Moo-hyun, and former Representative Chung Dong-young's defection and independent candidacy for the by-election, the changes are not significant. The Democratic Labor Party and the Creative Korea Party, which suffered moral damage due to internal corruption scandals and the cover-up of sexual assault incidents by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, have also not experienced significant shifts in their support ratings.



Furthermore, unlike in the past when minor parties focused on specific regions or strata emerged before and after elections, minor parties such as the Liberty Forward Party, the Democratic Labor Party, the Creative Korea Party, and the New Progressive Party have shown considerable persistence. This is because, in terms of political dynamics, it is impossible for the current ruling party to fully absorb parties like the Liberty Forward Party or the Pro-Park Unity, and on the opposition side, the current Democratic Party is acting as a centrifugal force promoting the fragmentation of the opposition rather than a unifying force representing the opposition.



The problem is that the current system is quite unstable. The Grand National Party maintains its political dominance with a 30% presidential approval rating and 30% party support, but it faces the irony of worrying about losing all by-elections despite having a majority in the National Assembly and facing an opposition that commands less than half of its own support. The opposition parties are fragmented without a unifying center, and their internal competition is highlighted, rather than meaningful competition with the ruling party, with the Democratic Party maintaining a 10% support rating and various minor opposition parties falling below 10% support. The shifts in support ratings based on evaluations of party activities are not leading to productive party competition; instead, each party is pursuing its own path based on the minimal support base of its core constituents. The worrying outcome is the solidification of subtractive politics, which divides based on core constituents, rather than additive politics where the political sphere unites in times of national crisis.



[Figure 4] Changes in Party Support Ratings