[North Korea's Future Leader] ② Is the Succession of Kim Ju-ae Already a Done Deal? | Ahn Jeong-sik, Daewoo Professor at Dongguk University, Former SBS North Korea Correspondent

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kwCxv5IpMsg&si=GvB7g8CCW0rBktwb

Video Script

Hello. I have organized the content primarily focusing on observations in North Korean society following the emergence of Kim Ju-ae. As Professor Kim Young-hyuk mentioned earlier, Kim Jong-un's succession occurred very rapidly, and he likely wanted to take his time in proceeding to the next succession plan. Nevertheless, Kim Ju-ae gradually appeared in 2022. Our government estimates Kim Ju-ae's birth year to be 2013. Why was such a young child, not even ten years old, introduced so early? Even acknowledging that the succession process is being conducted over time, we must consider the reasons for her early introduction. This can be broadly divided into two main aspects. The first is Kim Jong-un's health issues.

Signs of Kim Jong-un's Health Concerns and Succession Planning

Please refer to page 15 of the briefing materials. In April 2020, there were serious rumors about Kim Jong-un's health. Speculation was rampant, to the point of near-death rumors. The health concerns were temporarily put to rest when he appeared at the Suncheon Fertilizer Complex completion ceremony on May 1st, but there is some debate as to whether anything was truly wrong with Kim Jong-un at the time, or if he was staying at his Wonsan villa and traveling to and from Pyongyang. In any case, the severe health issues at the time seem to have at least prompted Kim Jong-un to consider the question, 'What would happen if I suddenly became unable to rule?' This is because, following this period, signs of Kim Jong-un contemplating his health and succession power have been observed.

The first sign emerged in August 2020, when then-NIS Director Park Jie-won reported that Kim Jong-un was practicing delegated rule by distributing authority to his close associates, which caused controversy. Even among North Korean scholars, there was debate about whether the term 'delegated rule' was appropriate, but the essence of the NIS report at the time was that he was transferring his authority to subordinates to alleviate ruling stress and distribute responsibility in case of policy failures. Alleviating ruling stress essentially means reducing workload, which implies a form of health management. Furthermore, in January 2021, at the 8th Party Congress, North Korea amended its Party Charter to establish the position of First Secretary. This position, as a deputy to the General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, was newly created, and it was the first time in North Korean history that a provision for the supreme leader's incapacitation was included in the Party Charter.

At the time, Kim Jong-un was only 37 years old, and the inclusion of a provision for his incapacitation in the Party Charter is highly significant. Additionally, the Party Charter amendment allowed members of the Politburo Standing Committee to convene Politburo meetings upon delegation from the General Secretary. This can also be understood as a measure to reduce the workload, easing the burden on his close associates. Although Jo Yong-won has presided over Politburo meetings once or twice since then, Kim Jong-un currently presides over all meetings. Nevertheless, such a provision did exist.

In June 2021, Kim Jong-un reappeared after nearly a month, looking significantly thinner. According to NIS reports at the time, he had lost approximately 20 kg. Currently, Kim Jong-un is reported to be 170 cm tall and weigh 140 kg. Losing 20 kg at that time was a substantial change; his People's attire was loose. Of course, even at 120 kg, he was severely obese, so he couldn't be described as completely slim, but he has since regained weight to 140 kg due to yo-yo effect. Regardless, the attempt at dieting is a fact. Dieting requires a combination of diet and exercise, which is painful for the individual. Enduring such pain to go on a diet is a signal that he is actively managing his health. Another point to consider is the attendance at major North Korean anniversaries, such as the birthdays of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, and the death anniversaries of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. The supreme leader's visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun for these occasions was an indispensable schedule. However,

starting in 2022, this situation changed, and Kim Jong-un's attendance at these major anniversaries became optional. Consequently, it is no longer unusual for Kim Jong-un not to visit the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun on these key dates. In other words, a schedule that was once mandatory for the supreme leader has become an optional event. While many explain this as Kim Jong-un's effort to establish his independent leadership, moving away from the shadows of his father and grandfather after more than ten years in power, I do not dispute that explanation. However,

the health concerns in 2020 were triggered by Kim Jong-un's absence from the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun on April 15th, the Day of the Sun. Therefore, the existence of several occasions each year where the supreme leader must appear creates the possibility that if he is unwell on a particular day, the outside world might speculate about an issue with the North Korean supreme leader. Thus, it is conceivable that the fixed attendance at major anniversaries was changed to an optional schedule to alleviate such pressure.

Changes in Kim Yo Jong's Status and the Emergence of Kim Ju-ae

The second aspect concerns Kim Yo-jong. This is on page 17. Kim Yo-jong was widely considered the de facto second-in-command in North Korea in the late 2010s. At the time, some experts even referred to it as the 'Kim Jong-un and sister regime,' and many predicted that Kim Yo-jong would act as regent if Kim Jong-un became incapacitated. By August 2020, the NIS had also reported Kim Yo-jong as the de facto second-in-command. However, with the emergence of Kim Ju-ae, Kim Yo-jong appears to have been somewhat sidelined. In February 2023, at a military parade, Kim Ju-ae displayed her status by standing with People's Army generals forming a backdrop. When Kim Jong-un and his daughter entered the parade grounds, walking on the red carpet (the photo is on page 18), Kim Yo-jong was observed standing at the periphery of the event, watching. Furthermore, at this parade, Kim Jong-un and his daughter ascended the rostrum, but Kim Yo-jong did not. The slogan chanted at this parade, which was mentioned earlier, was 'Defend the Paektu Bloodline to the Death.' While slogans like 'Defend Kim Jong-un to the Death' have been common, the slogan 'Defend the Paektu Bloodline to the Death,' implying loyalty not only to Kim Jong-un but also to his family, was unprecedented in North Korean history. It is significant that Kim Ju-ae was on the rostrum when this slogan was chanted, but it is also symbolic that Kim Yo-jong was not on the rostrum. Additionally, on page 17, at the bottom, in February 2023, a sports competition was held between the North Korean Cabinet and the Ministry of National Defense to celebrate Kim Jong-un's birthday. The photo on page 18 shows Kim Jong-un and his daughter, Kim Yo-jong, and North Korean officials in attendance. Here, Kim Yo-jong is seated in the second row, at the far end. This seating arrangement was also shown in photos from the Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central News Agency. The Korean Central Television broadcast a video of approximately 5 minutes and 40 seconds on that day. In this broadcast, most individuals on the rostrum were shown in frontal shots, even if only in groups of two or three. However, Kim Yo-jong was never shown in a frontal shot. Her appearances were limited to three brief shots, often obscured by the person in front, with her face partially or fully hidden. The filming and editing of broadcasts always reflect power dynamics.

If Director Jeon Jae-seong were to film today's event and create a promotional video, he would inevitably include shots of himself. Even if he said, 'I'm busy today, don't mind me, I'll just drop by and leave,' the cameraman would still film him and include him in the edit. That's how filming and editing work. The fact that Kim Yo-jong was not shown in a single frontal shot in a video lasting nearly five to six minutes is highly symbolic. One might argue that her seating in the second row at the end was simply a matter of free seating based on her position as a Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party. However, this is contradicted by subsequent events. On page 19, two months later, for Kim Il-sung's birthday, a similar sports competition was held between officials from the Cabinet and the Ministry of National Defense in the same venue.

If Director Jeon Jae-seong were to film this event today and create a promotional video, it would be impossible not to include Director Jeon Jae-seong's face in the editing process. Even if he gave the opening remarks today and said, 'I'm busy today, so don't mind me. I'll just stop by briefly and leave,' the person filming could not omit shooting Director Jeon and leaving him out of the edit. That is the nature of filming and editing. However, the fact that Kim Yo-jong was not shown in a single frontal shot in a video of nearly five to six minutes carries symbolic meaning. One might think that Kim Yo-jong's seating in a back-row corner was a matter of free seating arrangement according to her position as a deputy department director of the Workers' Party at the time, but this is revealed to be otherwise later. On page 19, you can see that two months later, on the occasion of Kim Il-sung's birthday, in the same venue, with the same Cabinet and

At this event, Kim Yo-jong moved to the middle of the second row. Were the individuals seated further out than Kim Yo-jong of lower rank? No. They were all of higher rank than Kim Yo-jong. At that time, Kim Yo-jong was not even a candidate member of the Politburo, yet individuals of higher rank, such as candidate members of the Politburo and department directors of the Central Committee, were seated outside of her position. Therefore, the change in Kim Yo-jong's seating position from the end to the middle in two nearly identical events in February and April suggests that some change occurred within North Korea between February and April, such as the definitive finalization of the status of Kim Yo-jong and Kim Ju-ae, or the completion of Kim Jong-un's process of 'taming' Kim Yo-jong. In other words, another factor contributing to Kim Ju-ae's early emergence is that Kim Jong-un is reinforcing, both domestically and internationally, the message that the next power will pass to his children, not his sister. This is my assessment.

Kim Ju-ae's Current Status and Kim Yo-jong's Conduct

This served to somewhat diminish the status of Kim Yo-jong, who held the position of de facto second-in-command, and to solidify Kim Ju-ae's superior status within North Korea. Now, let's turn to page 20. What is Kim Ju-ae's current status? The status arrangement is now complete. I estimate that this process was largely concluded between February and April 2023. Currently, Kim Yo-jong is observed to be treating her niece with utmost respect. Occasionally, during Kim Jong-un's on-site guidance, Kim Yo-jong appears to avoid drawing attention to herself. She maintains a considerable distance from Kim Jong-un, positioning herself on the periphery, and if the camera focuses on her, she moves out of frame. These instances are occasionally observed. In other words, Kim Yo-jong is making efforts not to be highlighted. Her conduct

seems to be cautious. Furthermore, Kim Yo-jong's children have been publicly revealed twice recently. Her son and daughter, believed to be Kim Yo-jong's children, were seen at the 2014 New Year's celebration performance and the launch ceremony of the Choe Hyon-ho last April. This aspect also suggests that Kim Yo-jong's children are not related to power. If her children were involved in the succession, they would not have been publicly revealed. Lastly, Kim Jong-un's health currently appears to be largely stable. Of course, given Kim Jong-un's severe obesity and symptoms of high blood pressure and diabetes, the possibility of health issues is always present. However, considering that he has smoothly delivered lengthy speeches at the 9th Party Congress and the Supreme People's Assembly's policy address this year, and has been conducting on-site guidance, it seems unlikely that he is facing any immediate major health problems. Now, let's look at the bottom of page 21. In the conclusion, I will address whether Kim Ju-ae will indeed become the successor. I believe the biggest variable for Kim Ju-ae becoming the successor

is time. Time. In April of this year, NIS Director Lee Jong-sup stated that based on credible intelligence, Kim Ju-ae could be considered a successor. However, if she was born in 2013, she is currently 13 years old. Even if designated as a successor as early as possible, wouldn't at least 10 years be required? Ten years is an enormous amount of time. It's enough time for the landscape to change, isn't it? Therefore, what might happen during that period is beyond human imagination. Will Kim Jong-un maintain his health during that time? Will Kim Ju-ae smoothly undergo succession training as she grows up? Kim Ju-ae has not even reached puberty yet. These are variables. Will Kim Ju-ae demonstrate the qualities necessary to lead a nation? In other words, her capabilities have not yet been proven.

time. This is the time. In April of this year, NIS Director Lee Jong-sup stated that credible intelligence suggested Kim Ju-ae could be considered a successor, but if she was born in 2013, she is currently 13 years old. Even if she were designated as a successor as early as possible, wouldn't at least 10 years be required? Then, a period of 10 years is an enormously long time. Isn't it a time when even the landscape changes? Therefore, what might happen in the meantime could be beyond human imagination. Will Kim Jong-un maintain his health during that period? Will Kim Ju-ae smoothly undergo succession training as she grows? Kim Ju-ae has not even passed puberty yet. There are such variables. Will Kim Ju-ae demonstrate the qualities necessary to lead the nation? In other words, her capabilities have not yet been verified.

These are some of the factors. Secondly, regarding the possibility of a power struggle with Kim Yo-jong, which occasionally garners attention, I believe this possibility is almost nonexistent while Kim Jong-un is alive, as the status arrangements have already been finalized. The issue arises only if Kim Jong-un were to die prematurely or become incapacitated. In the case of previous successions, the possibility of a power struggle between Kim Ju-ae and Kim Yo-jong is unlikely. The finalization of their respective statuses and Kim Yo-jong's cautious conduct imply that she is not building her own power base, as her elder brother is likely watching her closely. Therefore, it would be difficult for Kim Yo-jong, who currently lacks her own power base, to emerge as a variable in a power struggle even if Kim Jong-un were to die suddenly. However, as time passes, if Kim Jong-un were to face sudden incapacitation, the possibility of securing the next power structure by those currently supporting Kim Ju-ae is high. If the power structure does not stabilize and time passes, Kim Yo-jong might find more room to maneuver. Thus, a potential possibility might exist, but it would only materialize a considerable time after Kim Jong-un's incapacitation.

Kim Jong-un's Strategy for Utilizing Kim Yo-jong and Recent Actions

Finally, one of the aspects that most intrigues me recently is this: How does Kim Jong-un view and intend to utilize Kim Yo-jong? The reports in South Korea about the potential power struggle between Kim Ju-ae and Kim Yo-jong are accessible to both individuals. This might be why Kim Yo-jong is cautious in her conduct. As for Kim Jong-un, does he truly trust his sister and believe she can be used without issue, or does he harbor concerns about potential power struggles and therefore intends to employ her but keep her on the periphery? I am curious about Kim Jong-un's thoughts on this matter. I will conclude by briefly discussing the recent situation.

At the recent Party Congress, Kim Yo-jong was reinstated as a candidate member of the Politburo and promoted to Director of the General Affairs Department. For reference, the General Affairs Department is not a core department; it is akin to a secretariat. Despite being appointed Director of the General Affairs Department, she has continued to issue statements regarding ROK-US joint military exercises and drones. Her promotion to Department Director of the Central Committee, while continuing her existing external affairs responsibilities, indicates an expansion of her scope of work, meaning her influence has

expanded. However, she was removed from the State Affairs Commission at the Supreme People's Assembly in March. While the actual role of the North Korean State Affairs Commission is unclear, her removal could be interpreted as being inconsistent with the position of Director of the General Affairs Department. However, this can also be viewed differently. When she was Vice Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, she was a member of the State Affairs Commission even with that title. Her removal from the State Affairs Commission after being promoted to Director suggests that she has been pushed to the periphery, leading to her removal from the commission.

At the recent Party Congress, Kim Yo-jong was re-admitted as an alternate member of the Political Bureau and promoted to Director of the General Affairs Department. While the General Affairs Department is not a core department, she has continued to issue statements regarding ROK-US training and unmanned aerial vehicles even after her appointment. Her promotion to Director of a Central Committee Department while retaining her existing duties suggests an expansion of her scope of work.

However, she was dropped from the State Affairs Commission at the Supreme People's Assembly. While the practical role of North Korea's State Affairs Commission is unclear, this could be interpreted as a mismatch with the position of Director of the General Affairs Department. However, considering that she was a member of the State Affairs Commission even when she was a deputy director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department in the past, her loss of the State Affairs Commission membership despite her promotion to director could also be seen as her being relegated to an outer-circle department.

As I mentioned, I believe there are aspects that require further observation regarding how Kim Jong-un intends to utilize Kim Yo-jong.