[Global NK Comment] Leader Variables and the Resumption of Summit Diplomacy Toward North Korea from the Perspective of Individual-Level Analysis

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Introduction

The use of multiple levels of analysis in the study of international relations dates back at least to Kenneth Waltz’s classic formulation of the “three images” in Man, the State, and War (1959). Waltz demonstrated how explanations for conflict differ depending on whether scholars emphasize human nature, domestic political factors, or the structure of the international system. These insights helped reshape the field of international politics. Subsequent work (Waltz, 1979) further systematized the study of state interactions and encouraged subsequent generations of scholars to examine a wider range of causal processes rather than assuming or advocating for their preferred drivers of international outcomes. Building on this tradition, the author teaches introductory international politics using a framework that students jokingly refer to as “Easley’s 3x3 Matrix” (though the author is likely not the only instructor to employ such a tool). The rows of the matrix represent individual, domestic, and international levels of analysis, while the columns apply realist (power-centric), liberal-institutionalist (interdependence-centric), and constructivist (identity/idea-centric) theoretical approaches to international relations. The matrix aims to generate nine competing explanations for virtually any international trend or outcome. The tool’s pedagogical utility lies in encouraging students to consider competing theories more analytically rigorously than broadcast pundits or talking heads, to state alternative hypotheses explicitly, and to evaluate empirical evidence. Yet, there is a long-standing debate in the academy about the ontological and methodological limits of analyzing beyond a simple contrast of individual, domestic, and international factors (Singer, 1961). Given the growing importance of leaders like Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin in foreign policy decision-making, this paper explores in greater detail the variables scholars seek to assess at the individual level of analysis. Drawing on insights from the scholarly literature, it outlines twelve categories and presents specific examples related to the potential resumption of high-level talks between the United States, South Korea, and North Korea. While this framework is not intended to be representative of or exhaustive of the literature’s consensus, it can serve as an introduction to how political scientists study the role of leaders in foreign policy and global governance, especially as policymakers consider the possibility of summits between Trump and Lee Jae-myung with Kim Jong Un as early as April 2026 (Cronin, 2025; HJ Lee, 2025).

1. Personal Characteristics and Leadership Style

Scholars have long studied how personal dispositions such as composure under pressure, principled decision-making, and personal integrity shape foreign policy behavior (Hermann, 1980). Research on leader characteristics has shown empirical correlations between belief in one’s ability to control events, conceptual complexity, and needs for power, and behavior during crises and negotiation strategies (Hermann, 2003). These traits also influence how leaders interpret information, manage uncertainty, and respond to threats. Political biographers often make the analysis of leaders’ personal characteristics a central research task. In Trump’s case, a dominant and conceptually simple style may account for both rhetorical volatility and the use of blunt policy instruments like threats of tariffs and military force. These traits may also explain why Trump identifies with “great historical figures” who engage in high-stakes negotiations on the chessboard of geopolitics, expanding or contracting spheres of influence. His confidence in making personal deals and preference for improvisational and theatrical diplomacy suggest he may pursue another summit with Kim Jong Un, building on his past unconventional moves that resembled a television show.

2. Human Nature, Ethics, and Worldview

A leader’s assumptions about human nature—whether people are inherently good or selfish, and whether they are socialized to be generally cooperative or conflictual—pre-dispose expectations about trust, deterrence, and the use of force. These beliefs provide the basis for judgments about reputation and credibility (Mercer, 1996). Studies in international politics tracing back to the classical realist tradition suggest that a leader’s ethics and worldview motivate foreign policy in ways not explained by domestic political constraints or international structural incentives (Lebow, 2009, 16). Kim Jong Un’s willingness to meet with the U.S. and South Korean presidents in 2018 reflected a calculation that sanctions relief and regime security could be obtained through diplomacy. In contrast, his refusal to resume similar meetings after the COVID-19 pandemic reflects deep distrust of the United States and South Korea, frustration over the failed Hanoi summit, and perhaps heightened concerns for personal safety. Kim likely believes that cooperation with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, who provide diplomatic support and technical assistance, offers benefits with fewer risks to his personal security. Summit meetings with Xi and Putin also suggest a preference for aligning with authoritarian counterparts rather than resuming negotiations with democratically elected leaders who do not share his worldview and whose terms may be limited (Kotkin, 2025).

3. Political Ideology

Ideological orientation connects to a leader’s political priorities, perceptions of in-group versus out-group identity, and normative beliefs about what is right for the state and society. Foreign policy research shows how ideology structures policymakers’ assumptions about military operations, multilateralism, and engagement (Holsti, 2006, 175). While ideology does not solely determine outcomes, it contributes to constructing a cognitive map for understanding and interpreting events. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung demonstrates ideological flexibility and pragmatism, despite leading a progressive party during his time in opposition. His foreign policy stance emphasizes cooperative relations with the United States and Japan, and coordinated interactions with China (Easley, 2025). While skeptical of the conservative South Korean approach relying on military deterrence and economic sanctions, he shows calculated patience in pursuing engagement with North Korea. He may pursue an inter-Korean summit to re-institutionalize communication and exchange, depending on the progress of Trump-Kim summits.

4. Religious and Ethnic Identity and Forms of Nationalism

Identity drives a leader’s priorities and narratives of justification. Religious and ethnic identities tied to territorial claims or historical grievances can deter or encourage displays of force (Toft, 2003). Nationalism can be used both to motivate and justify a leader’s foreign policy choices aimed at consolidating popular authority and domestic control (Brubaker, 1996). Kim Jong Un has turned away from an identity based on shared bloodlines, culture, and history, suggesting Pyongyang’s distance from Seoul. Kim’s nationalism relies more heavily on the myths of self-reliance (Juche) and anti-imperialism to justify regime survival priorities and military modernization. His narrative frames external threats from the United States and South Korea as existential, thereby justifying the development of nuclear weapons as a guarantor of sovereignty. Given this nationalist framing, it is unlikely that Kim would be willing to give up his nuclear capabilities. He is likely delaying engagement with the United States and South Korea until he maximizes the benefits he can obtain from Russia and China, who provide support to enhance the status and capabilities of his missile and nuclear programs, before ultimately seeking additional economic benefits through resumed summit diplomacy.

5. Socioeconomic Background and Class Identity

A leader’s socioeconomic background can shape empathy for minority and marginalized groups, distributive priorities, and attachment to particular economic models. The arts, music, and traditions that a leader enjoys can influence whom they identify with and their resonance with the public. Leaders from working-class backgrounds tend to favor different policies than financial elites, and research suggests correlations between career paths and policy choices (Carnes, 2013, 95–107). Differences in background, in particular, can shape preferences for trade, diplomatic styles, and sensitivity to global inequality. Trump, a billionaire businessman and celebrity from a wealthy family, uses a combination of traditional media, social media, and popular culture and populism to reach his political supporters. At the same time, he embraces the notion that elite leaders must personally “make the deal,” a framework he explicitly invoked in his summits with Kim Jong Un. He appears more concerned with financial outcomes than legal principles or policy processes. Trump’s tendency to emphasize personal rapport, status, and transactional negotiations led him to view engagement with Kim Jong Un as an interaction with someone with whom he “gets along very well” and shares an understanding of winning in terms of business and economic growth.

6. Education and Professional Socialization

Educational backgrounds and professional networks foster operational codes—which encompass both philosophical and instrumental beliefs that may unconsciously influence political calculations (George, 1969). Whether a leader trained as a lawyer, has business experience, was a professional athlete, or served in the military is often considered not only in terms of qualifications but also as a source of potential biases. Knowledge of economics can serve to vet policy proposals for realism by examining them on an empirical basis (Christensen, 2018). Exposure to diverse organizational environments and sports can influence risk-taking propensities and focus on strategic innovation (Horowitz, 2010). In Lee Jae-myung’s case, his formative experiences include working as a child laborer and suffering a severe physical injury in a factory accident. Lee later pursued a career as a lawyer focused on human and labor rights after qualifying as an attorney (M Kim, 2025). His education and professional socialization provide the foundation for his political orientation of suppressing the powerful and protecting the weak (Cho, 2021). Applied to inter-Korean relations, this orientation manifests in Lee’s emphasis on patient, process-oriented diplomacy. In his congratulatory speech on the 80th anniversary of Liberation Day, Lee clarified his approach to North Korea engagement: pursuing dialogue and trust-building, coexistence, respecting North Korea’s sovereignty, and pursuing denuclearization as a long-term goal rather than a precondition (JM Lee, 2025).

7. Historical Lessons and Interpersonal Interactions

Decision-makers learn from past negotiations, crises, and interpersonal encounters. Leaders may learn to cooperate through international interactions, or they may draw lessons that cooperation is unnecessary, leading to non-cooperative outcomes (Larson, 2000, 155–162). References to historical examples can involve analogical reasoning (Khong, 1992). Cognitive heuristics—mental shortcuts for understanding present challenges based on past experiences—can have psychological effects, such as distorting threat perceptions (Stein, 1988). The Trump-Kim summit diplomacy of 2018–2019 demonstrated how interpersonal engagement could temporarily reframe adversarial relationships. However, the collapse of the Hanoi summit likely reinforced Kim Jong Un’s suspicion that U.S. leaders offered only diplomatic gestures without meaningful sanctions relief, leading him to focus more on perceived threats from the United States than on the opportunity costs of Pyongyang’s policies. Kim appears to have felt personally betrayed by Moon Jae-in over the Hanoi failure and may harbor deep resentment toward South Korean leaders. Lee Jae-myung has therefore sought to differentiate himself from his predecessors, especially the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, which explicitly discussed regime change and flew drones over Pyongyang. While it is easy to blame Yoon Suk Yeol for the stalemate in inter-Korean relations following his failed attempt at a state of emergency and subsequent impeachment and imprisonment, Kim Jong Un’s designation of South Korea as a separate hostile state since December 2023 reflects a strategic rather than tactical decision (SK Kim, 2025). Trump’s pledge to aggressively defend U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere (White House, 2025b) reflects a self-perception as a historical figure akin to Presidents Monroe or McKinley during eras of expansion. His obsession with acquiring Greenland, which was not widely shared by other government departments or the U.S. public, appears driven by a personal desire to expand U.S. territory and receive credit for one of the greatest real estate deals in history (Svendsen, 2025). When European governments firmly rejected Trump’s maximalist demands, he declared victory by announcing a “framework agreement” with NATO to expand U.S. access to Greenland for Arctic security, missile defense, and critical minerals, backing down from threats of additional tariffs and hints of military action. Kim Jong Un, considering this pattern, is likely to interpret Trump’s pressure as requiring initial resistance followed by a vague compromise that can be renegotiated later.

8. Rational Calculation versus Emotional Behavior

Leaders differ in whether they rely on analytical reasoning or intuition and emotion. Decision-making can take on a non-rational rather than irrational character by prioritizing values such as honor, sacrifice, and faith, as opposed to rationality based on cost-benefit calculations. So-called bounded rationality uses psychology to explain how the human brain works differently from computers or AI, thinking sometimes quickly and automatically, and sometimes slowly and deliberately (Kahneman, 2011). Even when leaders consider numerous variables and try to maximize utility, some are more risk-averse while others are more risk-seeking. Game-theoretic modeling shows how strategic calculations can become complex under uncertainty and differing utility concepts, especially when leaders selfishly equate their own interests with those of the state (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2012). Trump’s impulsive and norm-violating style stands out in U.S. foreign policy history. He is the only U.S. president to date willing to take the risk of meeting with the North Korean leader without extensive preparation or bureaucratic consensus. Such spontaneity can again lead to unconventional and unpredictable outcomes (Easley, 2019). Trump’s tendency to display the photo taken with Kim Jong Un at Panmunjom prominently in the White House (News1, 2019) and repeatedly showcase personal rapport with authoritarian leaders suggests an approach reliant on gut feeling rather than careful calculation for high-stakes summits.

9. Psychological Biases and Cognitive Limitations

Cognitive psychology has profoundly influenced individual-level analysis. Selective perception, attribution errors, and confirmation bias can affect threat assessments (Jervis, 1976). Age, health, and media-related information processing are inevitably important. Studies using experiments and simulations suggest that stress and physiological responses affect decision-making, especially in unfamiliar situations (McDermott, 2004). Understanding how actors assess the intentions of potential adversaries is also critical for understanding biases that can lead leaders to very different conclusions than their staffs or intelligence agencies (Yarhi-Milo, 2014). Trump’s tendency to quickly redefine enemies, react to signals from television and social media, and interpret the flattery of foreign leaders as evidence of good faith raises strong doubts about his judgment, especially in high-stakes environments like the summit with Putin in Alaska in August 2025. However, Trump is not simply an isolationist, as some observers have claimed (O’Hanlon, 2026); his America First foreign policy can take the form of aggressive military operations, as seen in the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025 and the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January 2026. Trump’s impulsive remarks may also be seen as evidence of cognitive aging and severe forms of bias, but his overt approach to politics and publicity involves a daily effort to dominate the news cycle, rendering the public desensitized to scandals and often forcing competitors to react rather than act proactively.

10. Personal Narratives, Legacy, and Motivation

Leaders often act with a sense of mission, aware of their potential place in history. Personal self-perception can shape both coalition politics and foreign policy agendas (Kaarbo, 2012). Decision-makers may be driven by personal narratives, misled by overconfidence, or motivated by consciousness of their legacy. Interactions with other actors can rely as much on emotional intelligence as on rational calculation (Greenstein, 2009). Trump has openly pursued a Nobel Peace Prize and repeatedly framed diplomacy with North Korea as a legacy project for posterity. Lee Jae-myung played on Trump’s desired image as a unique dealmaker capable of resolving intractable issues by telling him during their first meeting at the White House in August 2025, “If you become a peacemaker, I will help you as a pacemaker” (American Presidency Project, 2025). Trump enjoys projecting a peacemaker image, but he tends to favor grand gestures and personal displays over substantive policy, as seen in the October 2025 Thai-Cambodian ceasefire press conference (White House, 2025a), the renaming of the U.S. Institute of Peace to the Trump Institute of Peace in December (Livesay, 2025), and the so-called “Board of Peace” launched in January 2026 to support ceasefire and reconstruction efforts in Gaza (Williams, Talmazan, and Duffy, 2026). Kim Jong Un may therefore be uninterested in a deal with Trump, doubting the sustainability of a grand bargain. South Korea’s developing military technology, partnerships with the United States and Japan, and soft power could threaten the legitimacy of his regime, which is tied to human rights abuses and an economically inefficient system. Kim appears more concerned about the future of his own family, perhaps carefully introducing his daughter into politics as a potential successor. As Kim seeks to leverage Trump’s domestic political schedule and ego considerations for North Korea’s goals, analysts will be watching his statements at the Ninth Party Congress for signs of policy direction (HR Lee, 2025).

11. Decision-Making Processes and Constraints

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) connects individual preferences to institutional contexts, often using matrices of various factors to explain decision-making. Political actors link domestic and international political issues in processes of elite competition (Rosenau, 1969). Staff and advisory bodies around leaders play a role at the intersection of material and ideational factors within the decision-making unit (Hudson, 2007). Leaders are susceptible to framing effects, especially in how they assess and seek to avoid potential losses (Levy, 1997). Bureaucratic processes and institutional constraints are also important for understanding the path dependency of policy outcomes (Allison, 1971). Trump frequently bypassed established institutional and legal procedures, excluded interagency processes, and relied on informal advisors. Policy advocates around the president can appeal to the leader’s biases (disastrous immigration policies of past administrations), ego (only you can achieve the greatest things), grievances (your competitors must be punished for specific reasons or U.S. companies are being mistreated), and preferred agenda (tremendous deals can be made on real estate, oil, minerals, etc.). Conflicts of interest can also be an issue when family members or business ventures are involved. However, various types of constraints—such as laws, court rulings, bureaucratic pushback and delayed implementation, congressional oversight and budget approval, media coverage, and the incentives of upcoming elections—generally check a leader’s prerogatives. This offers a clue to the collapse of the 2019 Hanoi summit, when Trump decided “better no deal than a bad deal,” considering how an agreement with North Korea would be interpreted domestically (Sigal, 1919).

12. Accountability, Learning, and Responsiveness

Some leaders adapt based on electoral incentives and experience, while others cling to prior beliefs and patterns to avoid accusations of cognitive dissonance and hypocrisy. Democratic peace theory research argues that accountability to democratic institutions affects foreign policy risk-taking, leading to a preference for negotiation over conflict with fellow democracies (Russett, 1994). However, this does not necessarily apply to autocracies. Leaders of various regimes can learn from errors of commission as well as omission (Walker and Malici, 2011). Yet they may be less sensitive to audience costs than scholars focusing on domestic and international levels of analysis expect, and they may not be frequently penalized for threats they make (Snyder and Borghard, 2011). Kim Jong Un likely learned from the failure of the Hanoi summit that he faces little pressure to admit leadership or policy failures when there is no electoral accountability and he has considerable control over domestic political narratives. He may therefore push geopolitical limits further, as he did by deploying troops to Russia, before returning to negotiations with the United States and South Korea. Trump, however, had to respond and change strategy in his trade war with China after Beijing weaponized its restrictions on rare earth exports and soybean purchases targeting Trump’s domestic supporters (Zhao, 2026). To return to the negotiating table, Trump currently appears to downplay threats related to China, the need for North Korean denuclearization, or concerns about human rights, to the United States and its allies.

Conclusion: Leadership, Global Governance, and Future Summits

These twelve categories demonstrate that leader-level variables are useful, even essential, for explaining changes in foreign policy. The field of international politics continues to grapple with the relative weight of individual agency, domestic politics, and structural approaches while seeking generalizable explanations. International political theory would struggle to explain the contemporary foreign policies of the United States, China, Russia, and North Korea without analyzing the decision-making processes of Trump, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un. These actors raise concerns not only about the form of summit diplomacy but, more importantly, about the future of multilateralism as applied to the public good of global governance. Political polarization, economic uncertainty, institutional decay, technological disruption, and myriad global challenges demand collective action, yet personalistic governments are undermining cooperation (Gunitsky and Sinanoglu, 2026). Xi Jinping’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated diplomatic decoupling between China and other major powers. Donald Trump’s reduction of support for foreign aid and international organizations weakened U.S. soft power and the capacity of multilateral institutions. Vladimir Putin’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine triggered structural shocks and left the United Nations deadlocked on many issues. Kim Jong Un’s obsession with regime survival has frozen not only denuclearization efforts but also inter-Korean relations. Yet, even amidst the decline of democracy and stagnation of global governance (Diamond, 2025), minilateral cooperation persists, middle powers increasingly seek stabilizing roles, and leadership changes can reopen diplomatic space. Leader-specific variables can also produce unintended suboptimal outcomes when they are not embedded within domestic legal frameworks and international institutions and alliances. Trump, Xi, Putin, and Kim may have personal rivalries, but ultimately, successful leaders in foreign policy are more likely to be those who can mobilize domestic support, manage crises responsibly, and invest sustainably in national resilience. Whether summit diplomacy with North Korea succeeds or fails will depend not only on geopolitical conditions but also on the psychological dispositions, worldviews, and decision-making styles of the leaders involved. Scholars will continue to study the interplay of individual, domestic, and international factors. Policymakers, meanwhile, would be wise to guide summitry to be firmly anchored in a rules-based order rather than driven by personal disposition. Individual-level analysis will be a critical part of understanding where North Korea diplomacy is headed in the broader context of global governance. ■

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■ 레이프 에릭 이슬리(Leif-Eric Easley)_(哈佛大学政治学博士) 现任梨花女子大学教授，讲授国际安全与政治经济学。感谢为本研究提供大力支持的Jeremy Youngwoo Ahn 研究助理。

■ 翻译与编辑：李尚俊_EAI 연구원; 吴仁焕_EAI 수석연구원

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