[Global NK Commentary] The Leader Variable in Individual-Level Analysis and the Resumption of Summit Diplomacy with North Korea

■ Go to the original text of Global NK Zoom&Connect

Introduction

The use of various levels of analysis in the study of international relations dates back at least to the “three images” classically established by Kenneth Waltz in his book *Man, the State, and War* (1959). Waltz showed how explanations for conflict differ depending on whether scholars emphasize human nature, domestic political factors, or the structure of the international system. These insights helped reshape the field of international politics theory. Subsequent work (Waltz, 1979) further systematized the study of state interactions and encouraged subsequent generations of scholars to examine a wider range of causal processes rather than simply assuming or advocating for their preferred drivers of international outcomes. Building on this tradition, the author teaches introductory international politics courses using a framework that students jokingly refer to as “Easley’s 3x3 Matrix” (though the author is likely not the only instructor using such a tool). The rows of the matrix represent the individual, domestic, and international levels of analysis, while the columns apply realist (power-centric), liberal-institutionalist (interdependence-centric), and constructivist (identity/idea-centric) theoretical approaches to international relations. The matrix aims to generate nine competing explanations for virtually any international trend or outcome. The educational utility of this tool lies in its encouragement of students to consider competing theories more analytically rigorously than broadcast pundits or political commentators, to articulate alternative hypotheses explicitly, and to evaluate empirical evidence. However, there is a long-standing academic debate about the ontological and methodological limits of analyzing beyond simply contrasting individual, domestic, and international factors (Singer, 1961). Given the increasing foreign policy importance of leaders such as Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin, this paper explores in greater detail the variables scholars seek to assess at the individual level of analysis. Drawing on insights from the scholarly literature, it outlines twelve categories and presents specific examples related to the potential resumption of high-level talks between the United States and South Korea and North Korea. While this framework is not intended to be representative of or exhaustive of the consensus in the literature, it can serve as an introduction to how political scientists study the role of leaders in foreign policy and global governance, especially as policymakers consider the possibility of summits with Trump and Lee Jae-myung and Kim Jong-un as early as April 2026 (Cronin, 2025; HJ Lee, 2025).

1. Personal Characteristics and Leadership Style

Scholars have long studied how personal dispositions, such as composure under pressure, principled decision-making, and personal integrity, shape foreign policy behavior (Hermann, 1980). Research on leader characteristics has shown empirical correlations between belief in one’s ability to control events, conceptual complexity, and needs for power, and behavior during crises and negotiation strategies (Hermann, 2003). These traits also influence how leaders interpret information, manage uncertainty, and respond to threats. Political biographers often make the analysis of leaders’ personal characteristics a primary research task. In Trump’s case, a dominant and conceptually simple style may account for rhetorical volatility as well as the use of blunt policy instruments, such as threats of tariffs and military force. These traits may also explain why Trump identifies with “great historical figures” engaged in high-stakes negotiations on the chessboard of geopolitics, expanding or contracting spheres of influence. His confidence in his ability to strike personal deals and his preference for improvisational and theatrical diplomacy suggest a likelihood that he will pursue another summit with Kim Jong-un, building on his past unconventional moves that resembled a television show.

2. Human Nature, Ethics, and Worldview

A leader’s assumptions about human nature—whether people are inherently good or selfish, and generally socialized to be cooperative or conflictual—pre-determine expectations about trust, deterrence, and the use of force. These beliefs provide the basis for judgments about reputation and credibility (Mercer, 1996). Studies in international politics tracing back to the classical realist tradition suggest that a leader’s ethics and worldview motivate foreign policy in ways not explained by domestic political constraints or international structural incentives (Lebow, 2009, 16). Kim Jong-un’s willingness to meet with the U.S. and South Korean presidents in 2018 reflected a temporary calculation that sanctions relief and regime security could be achieved through diplomacy. In contrast, his refusal to resume similar meetings after the COVID-19 pandemic reflects a deep distrust of the United States and South Korea, frustration over the failed Hanoi summit, and perhaps heightened concerns for his personal safety. Kim likely believes that cooperation with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, who offer diplomatic support and technical assistance, provides benefits with fewer risks to his security. His summits with Xi and Putin also suggest a preference for aligning with authoritarian counterparts rather than resuming negotiations with democratically elected leaders who do not share his worldview and whose terms in office are limited (Kotkin, 2025).

3. Political Ideology

Ideological orientation connects to a leader’s political priorities, perceptions of in-group versus out-group identity, and normative beliefs about what is right for the state and society. Foreign policy studies show how ideology structures policymakers’ assumptions about military operations, multilateralism, and engagement (Holsti, 2006, 175). While ideology does not fully determine outcomes, it contributes to constructing a cognitive map for understanding and interpreting events. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung demonstrates ideological flexibility and pragmatism, despite leading a progressive party during his time in opposition. His foreign policy stance emphasizes cooperative relations with the United States and Japan, and coordinated engagement with China (Easley, 2025). While skeptical of relying on the conservative South Korean approach of military deterrence and economic sanctions, he shows calculated patience in pursuing engagement with North Korea. He may pursue inter-Korean summits to re-institutionalize communication and exchange, depending on the progress of Trump-Kim summits.

4. Religious and Ethnic Identity and Forms of Nationalism

Identity drives a leader’s priorities and narrative justifications. Religious and ethnic identities tied to territorial claims or historical grievances can deter or encourage displays of force (Toft, 2003). Nationalism can both motivate and justify leaders’ foreign policy choices as they seek to consolidate popular authority and domestic control (Brubaker, 1996). Kim Jong-un has turned away from the identity of the Korean nation based on shared ancestry, culture, and history, suggesting Pyongyang’s distance from Seoul. Kim’s nationalism relies more heavily on the myths of *Juche* self-reliance and anti-imperialism to justify regime survival priorities and military modernization. His narrative frames external threats from the United States and South Korea as existential, thereby justifying nuclear weapons development as a guarantor of sovereignty. Given this nationalistic framing, it is unlikely that Kim Jong-un will be willing to relinquish his nuclear capabilities. He is likely delaying engagement with the United States and South Korea until he maximizes benefits from Russia and China, who provide support to enhance the status and capabilities of his missile and nuclear programs, before seeking additional economic benefits through summit diplomacy, which will likely resume.

5. Socioeconomic Background and Class Identity

A leader’s socioeconomic background can shape empathy for minority and marginalized groups, distributive priorities, and an attachment to particular economic models. The arts, music, and traditions enjoyed by leaders influence whom they identify with and their resonance with the public. Leaders from working-class backgrounds tend to favor different policies than financial elites, and studies show correlations between career paths and policy choices (Carnes, 2013, 95–107). In particular, differences in background can shape preferences for trade, diplomatic styles, and sensitivity to global inequality. Trump, a billionaire businessman and celebrity from a wealthy family, uses a combination of traditional media, social media, and popular culture and populism to reach his political base. At the same time, he embraces the notion that elite leaders must personally “make the deal,” a framework he explicitly invoked in his summits with Kim Jong-un. He appears more concerned with financial outcomes than legal principles or policy processes. Trump’s propensity for personal intimacy, status, and transactional negotiations led him to view engagement with Kim Jong-un as an interaction with someone with whom he “gets along very well” and shares an understanding of winning in terms of business and economic growth.

6. Educational and Professional Socialization

Educational background and professional networks foster a leader’s operational codes, which include both philosophical and instrumental beliefs that can unconsciously influence political calculations (George, 1969). Whether a leader was educated in law, has business experience, was a professional athlete, or served in the military is often considered not only in terms of qualifications but also as a source of potential biases. Knowledge of economics can serve to vet the realism of various policy proposals on an evidence-based basis (Christensen, 2018). Exposure to diverse organizational environments and sports can affect risk-taking propensities and the focus on strategic innovation (Horowitz, 2010). In Lee Jae-myung’s case, his formative experiences include working as a child laborer and suffering a severe industrial accident. He later pursued a career as a lawyer, focusing on human rights and labor rights (M Kim, 2025). His education and professional socialization provide the foundation for his political orientation of suppressing the strong and protecting the weak (Cho, 2021). Applied to inter-Korean relations, this orientation manifests in Lee’s emphasis on patient, process-oriented diplomacy. In his congratulatory speech on the 80th anniversary of Liberation Day, Lee clarified his approach to North Korea engagement: pursuing dialogue and trust-building, coexistence, respecting North Korea’s sovereignty, and pursuing denuclearization as a long-term goal rather than a prerequisite (JM Lee, 2025).

7. Historical Lessons and Interpersonal Interactions

Decision-makers learn from past negotiations, crises, and interpersonal encounters. Leaders may learn to cooperate through international interactions, or they may draw lessons that necessitate suspicion or even distrust, leading to non-cooperative outcomes (Larson, 2000, 155–162). References to historical examples and their interpretation can involve reasoning by analogy (Khong, 1992). Cognitive heuristics, mental shortcuts for understanding present challenges based on past experiences, can have psychological effects, such as distorting threat perceptions (Stein, 1988). The Trump-Kim summit diplomacy of 2018–2019 showed how interpersonal engagement can temporarily reframe adversarial relationships. However, the collapse of the Hanoi summit likely reinforced Kim Jong-un’s suspicion that U.S. leaders offer only diplomatic gestures without meaningful sanctions relief, leading him to focus more on perceived U.S. threats than on the opportunity costs of his Pyongyang policies. Kim appeared personally betrayed by Moon Jae-in over the Hanoi failure and may harbor deep resentments toward South Korean leaders. Lee Jae-myung has therefore sought to differentiate himself from his predecessors, particularly the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, which explicitly discussed regime change and flew drones over Pyongyang. While it is easy to blame Yoon Suk-yeol for the stalemate in inter-Korean relations following his failed attempt to impose martial law and subsequent imprisonment, Kim Jong-un’s designation of South Korea as a separate hostile state since December 2023 reflects a strategic rather than tactical decision (SK Kim, 2025). Trump’s pledge to aggressively defend U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere (White House, 2025b) reflects a self-perception as a historical figure akin to Presidents Monroe or McKinley during eras of expansion. His obsession with acquiring Greenland, which was not widely shared by other government departments or the U.S. public, appears driven by a personal desire to expand U.S. territory and receive credit for one of the greatest real estate deals in history (Svendsen, 2025). When European governments firmly rejected Trump’s maximalist demands, he declared victory through the announcement of a “framework agreement” with NATO to expand U.S. access to Greenland for Arctic security, missile defense, and critical minerals, backing down from threats of further tariffs and hints of military action. Kim Jong-un, considering this pattern, is likely to interpret Trump’s pressure as requiring initial resistance, followed by a vague compromise that can be renegotiated later.

8. Rational Calculation versus Affective Behavior

Leaders differ in their reliance on analytical reasoning versus intuition and affect. Decision-making can be non-rational rather than irrational, prioritizing values such as honor, sacrifice, and faith, as opposed to cost-benefit calculations. So-called bounded rationality uses psychology to explain how the human brain operates differently from computers or AI, thinking sometimes quickly and automatically, and sometimes slowly and deliberately (Kahneman, 2011). Even when leaders consider numerous variables and strive to maximize utility, some are more risk-averse than others. Game theory modeling shows how strategic calculations can become complex under uncertainty and differing utility concepts, especially when leaders selfishly equate their own interests with those of the state (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2012). Trump’s impulsive and norm-violating style stands out in U.S. diplomatic history. He is the only U.S. president to date willing to risk meeting the North Korean leader without extensive preparation or bureaucratic consensus. Such spontaneity can again lead to unconventional and unpredictable outcomes (Easley, 2019). Trump’s tendency to prominently display a photo taken with Kim Jong-un at Panmunjom in a conspicuous place in the White House (News1, 2019) and his repeated displays of personal intimacy with authoritarian leaders suggest an approach reliant on gut feeling rather than careful calculation for high-stakes summits.

9. Psychological Biases and Cognitive Limitations

Cognitive psychology has profoundly influenced individual-level analysis. Selective perception, attribution errors, and confirmation bias can affect threat assessments (Jervis, 1976). Age, health, and media-related information processing are inevitably important issues. Studies using experiments and simulations suggest that stress and physiological responses affect decision-making, especially in unfamiliar situations (McDermott, 2004). How actors assess the intentions of potential adversaries is also critical to understanding biases that can lead a leader to very different conclusions than their staff or intelligence agencies (Yarhi-Milo, 2014). Trump’s tendency to quickly redefine enemies, react to signals from television and social media, and interpret the flattery of foreign leaders as evidence of goodwill raises strong doubts about his judgment, especially in high-stakes environments such as the summit with Putin in Alaska in August 2025. However, Trump is not simply an isolationist, as some observers have claimed (O’Hanlon, 2026); his America First foreign policy can take the form of aggressive military operations, as seen in the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025 and the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January 2026. While Trump’s impulsive remarks could be seen as evidence of cognitive aging and severe forms of bias, his overt approach to politics and publicity involves a daily effort to dominate the news cycle, rendering the public desensitized to scandals and often forcing competitors to react rather than act proactively.

10. Personal Narratives, Legacy, and Motivation

Leaders often act with a sense of mission, recognizing their potential place in history. Personal self-perception can steer both coalition politics and foreign policy agendas (Kaarbo, 2012). Decision-makers may be driven by personal narratives, misled by overconfidence, or motivated by consciousness of their legacy. Interactions with other actors can rely as much on emotional intelligence as on rational calculation (Greenstein, 2009). Trump has openly pursued a Nobel Peace Prize and repeatedly framed diplomacy with North Korea as a legacy project for posterity. Lee Jae-myung leveraged Trump’s desired image as a unique negotiator capable of solving intractable problems by telling him during their first meeting at the White House in August 2025, “If you become the peacemaker, I will help you as the pacemaker” (American Presidency Project, 2025). While Trump likes to project a peacemaker image, he tends to favor pomp and personal display over substantive policy, as seen in the October 2025 Thai-Cambodian ceasefire press conference (White House, 2025a), the renaming of the U.S. Institute of Peace to the Trump Institute of Peace in December (Livesay, 2025), and the so-called “Board of Peace” launched in January 2026 to support ceasefire and reconstruction efforts in Gaza (Williams, Talmazan, and Duffy, 2026). Kim Jong-un may therefore be uninterested in a deal with Trump, doubting the sustainability of a grand bargain. South Korea’s developing military technology, its partnership with the United States and Japan, and its soft power could threaten the legitimacy of his regime, which is tied to human rights abuses and an economically inefficient system. Kim appears more concerned about the future of his own family and may be carefully introducing his daughter into politics as a potential successor. As Kim seeks to leverage Trump’s domestic political schedule and ego considerations for North Korea’s goals, analysts will be watching his remarks at the Ninth Party Congress for signs of policy direction (HR Lee, 2025).

11. Decision-Making Processes and Constraints

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) connects individual preferences to institutional contexts, often using a matrix of various factors to explain decision-making. Political actors link problems of domestic politics and international politics in elite competition processes (Rosenau, 1969). Staff and advisory bodies around leaders play a role at the intersection of material and ideational factors within decision-making units (Hudson, 2007). Leaders are susceptible to framing effects, especially in how they assess and seek to avoid potential losses (Levy, 1997). Bureaucratic processes and institutional constraints are also important for understanding path dependency in policy outcomes (Allison, 1971). Trump frequently bypassed established institutional and legal procedures, excluded interagency processes, and relied on informal advisors. Policy advocates around the president can appeal to the leader’s biases (disastrous immigration policies of past administrations), ego (only you can achieve the greatest things), grievances (your competitors must be punished for specific reasons or U.S. companies are being mistreated), and preferred agenda (enormous deals can be struck in real estate, oil, minerals, etc.). Conflicts of interest can also be an issue when family members or business ventures are involved. However, various types of constraints—such as laws, court rulings, bureaucratic pushback and delayed implementation, congressional oversight and budget approval, media coverage, and the incentives of upcoming elections—generally check a leader’s prerogatives. This provides a clue to understanding the collapse of the 2019 Hanoi summit, when Trump decided “better no deal than a bad deal,” considering how an agreement with North Korea would be interpreted domestically (Sigal, 2019).

12. Accountability, Learning, and Responsiveness

Some leaders adapt based on electoral incentives and experience, while others cling to prior beliefs and patterns to avoid accusations of cognitive dissonance and hypocrisy. Democratic peace theory research argues that accountability to democratic institutions affects foreign policy risk-taking, leading to a preference for negotiation over conflict with fellow democracies (Russett, 1994). However, this does not necessarily apply to autocracies. Leaders of various regimes can learn from errors of commission as well as omission (Walker and Malici, 2011). Yet they may be less sensitive to audience costs than scholars focusing on domestic and international levels of analysis expect, and they may not be frequently penalized for threats they make (Snyder and Borghard, 2011). Kim Jong-un likely learned from the failure of the Hanoi summit that he faces little pressure to admit leadership or policy failures when there is no electoral accountability and he has considerable control over the domestic political narrative. He may therefore push geopolitical limits further, as he did by sending troops to Russia, before returning to negotiations with the United States and South Korea. Trump, however, had to respond and change strategy in his trade war with China after Beijing weaponized its export of rare earth minerals and soybean purchases targeting Trump’s domestic supporters (Zhao, 2026). To return to the negotiating table, Trump currently appears to downplay threats related to China, the need for North Korean denuclearization, or concerns about human rights.

Conclusion: Leadership, Global Governance, and Future Summits

These twelve categories demonstrate that leader-level variables are useful, even essential, in explaining foreign policy change. The field of international politics continues to grapple with the relative weight of individual agency, domestic politics, and structural approaches while seeking generalizable explanations. International relations theory would struggle to explain the contemporary foreign policies of the United States, China, Russia, and North Korea without analyzing the decision-making processes of Trump, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong-un. These actors raise concerns not only about the form of summit diplomacy but, more importantly, about the future of multilateralism as applied to the public good of global governance. Political polarization, economic uncertainty, institutional decay, technological disruption, and myriad global challenges demand collective action, yet personalistic governments are weakening cooperation (Gunitsky and Sinanoglu, 2026). Xi Jinping’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated diplomatic decoupling between China and other major powers. Donald Trump’s reduction of support for foreign aid and international organizations weakened U.S. soft power and the capacity of multilateral institutions. Putin’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine triggered structural shocks and has led to gridlock at the United Nations on many issues. Kim Jong-un’s obsession with regime survival has frozen not only denuclearization efforts but also inter-Korean relations. However, even amidst the decline of global governance, which is not unrelated to the current decline of democracy (Diamond, 2025), minilateral cooperation persists, middle powers increasingly seek stabilizing roles, and leadership changes can reopen diplomatic space. Furthermore, leader-specific variables can yield unexpectedly suboptimal outcomes when they are not embedded within domestic legal frameworks and international institutional and alliance systems. Trump, Xi, Putin, and Kim may have personal rivalries, but ultimately, successful leaders in foreign policy are more likely to be those who can mobilize domestic support, manage crises responsibly, and invest sustainably in national resilience. Whether summit diplomacy with North Korea succeeds or fails will depend not only on geopolitical conditions but also on the psychological dispositions, worldviews, and decision-making styles of the leaders involved. Scholars will continue to study the interplay between individual, domestic, and international factors. Meanwhile, policymakers would be wise to steer summitry toward being firmly anchored in a rules-based order rather than driven by individual dispositions. Individual-level analysis will be a key part of understanding where diplomacy with North Korea is headed in the broader context of global governance. ■

References

Allison, Graham T. 1971. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown.

American Presidency Project. 2025. “Remarks Prior to a Meeting with President Lee Jae-myung of South Korea and an Exchange with Reporters.” University of California, Santa Barbara.

August 25. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-prior-meeting-with-president-lee-jae-myung-south-korea-and-exchange-with-reporters

Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2012. The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics. New York: PublicAffairs.

Carnes, Nicholas. 2013. White-Collar Government: The Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cho, Min-gyo. 2021. “이재명 ‘억강부약 대동세상 열겠다’ 출사표 [Lee Jae-myung’s candidacy declaration: ‘I will create a society of equality and shared prosperity by empowering the weak and restraining the powerful’].” Maeil Ilbo. July 1. https://www.m-i.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=841955

Christensen, Johan. 2018. “Economic Knowledge and the Scientization of Policy Advice.” Policy Sciences 51: 291–311.

Cronin, Patrick M. 2025. “Prospects for Renewed U.S.-North Korean Diplomacy: Stability, Realism, and Strategic Clarity.” ROK-US Policy Brief, No. 11. Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies. July. https://ipus.snu.ac.kr/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/ROK-US-POLICY-BRIEF-2025-JULY_ISSUE11.pdf

Diamond, Larry. 2025. “El estado y las perspectivas de la democracia en Asia”.East Asia Forum. 27 de junio. https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/06/27/the-status-and-prospects-for-democracy-in-asia/

Easley, Leif-Eric. 2019. “Las limitaciones de las cumbres en la península de Corea”.Asia Pacific Bulletin, N.º 451. East-West Center. Enero. https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/the-limitations-summits-around-the-korean-peninsula

_____. 2025. “Sin vaivenes: por qué la diplomacia de Seúl no se desvió tras unas elecciones anticipadas”.Global NK. https://www.globalnk.org/topic/view.php?cd=COM000190

George, Alexander L. 1969. “El ‘código operacional’: un enfoque descuidado para el estudio de los líderes políticos y la toma de decisiones”.International Studies Quarterly 13, 2: 190-222.

Greenstein, Fred I. 2009. The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gunitsky, Seva, y Semuhi Sinanoglu. 2026. “El orden global personalista: cuando los caprichos individuales impulsan la política de las grandes potencias”.Foreign Affairs. 26 de enero. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/personalist-global-order

Hermann, Margaret G. 1980. “Explicación del comportamiento de política exterior utilizando las características personales de los líderes políticos”.International Studies Quarterly 24, 1: 7-46.

_____. 2003. “Evaluación del estilo de liderazgo: análisis de rasgos”. En The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders, editado por Jerrold M. Post, 178-212. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Holsti, Ole. 2006. Making American Foreign Policy. Nueva York: Routledge.

Horowitz, Michael C. 2010. The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hudson, Valerie M. 2007. Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kaarbo, Juliet. 2012. Coalition Politics and Cabinet Decision Making: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy Choices. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. Nueva York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Khong, Yuen Foong. 1992. Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kim, Max. 2025. “Cómo un ex obrero de fábrica llegó a la presidencia de Corea del Sur”.Los Angeles Times. 3 de junio. https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2025-06-03/how-a-former-factory-worker-rose-to-south-koreas-presidency

Kim, Sang-ki. 2025. “Relaciones intercoreanas en 2025: perspectivas de cambios en la doctrina de la RPDC de ‘dos estados hostiles’”.Global NK. 25 de febrero. https://www.globalnk.org/publication/view.php?cd=COM000171&ctype=1

Kotkin, Stephen. 2025. “La debilidad de los hombres fuertes: ¿qué amenaza realmente a los autoritarios?”.Foreign Affairs. 16 de diciembre. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/weakness-strongmen-stephen-kotkin

Larson, Deborah Welch. 2000. Anatomy of Mistrust. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 2009. The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lee, Ho-ryung. 2025. “Los mayores logros del Octavo Congreso del Partido de Corea del Norte y las perspectivas para el Noveno Congreso del Partido.” Global NK. 5 de diciembre. https://www.globalnk.org/topic/view.php?cd=COM000207&cat=5&s_keyword=

Lee, Hyo-jin. 2025. “El viaje de Trump a Beijing en abril ofrece una ventana para una cumbre entre EE. UU. y Corea del Norte.” Korea Times. 5 de noviembre. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/northkorea/20251104/trumps-april-beijing-trip-offers-window-for-us-n-korea-summit

Lee, Jae-myung. 2025. “Discurso sobre el 80.º Día de la Liberación de Corea.” Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de la República de Corea. 15 de agosto. https://www.mofa.go.kr/us-en/brd/m_4497/view.do?seq=761899

Levy, Jack S. 1997. “Teoría de las perspectivas, elección racional y relaciones internacionales.” International Studies Quarterly 41, 1: 87-112.

Livesay, Brandon. 2025. “El Instituto de la Paz de EE. UU. cambia de nombre en honor a Trump.” BBC. 4 de diciembre. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp39qx4ledeo

McDermott, Rose. 2004. Political Psychology in International Relations. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Mercer, Jonathan. 1996. Reputation and International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

News1. 2019. “La foto del encuentro Trump-Kim Jong-un en Panmunjom se exhibe en el Ala Oeste de la Casa Blanca.” Dong-A Ilbo. 17 de julio. https://www.donga.com/news/Inter/article/all/20190717/96520203/1

O’Hanlon, Michael E. 2026. “La ilusión del aislacionismo: por qué nadie debería haber esperado que Trump se retirara.” Foreign Affairs. 5 de enero. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/illusion-isolationism

Rosenau, James N. 1969. Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems. New York: The Free Press.

Russett, Bruce. 1994. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sigal, Leon V. 2019. “Recogiendo las piezas de Hanoi.” 38 North. 5 de marzo. https://www.38north.org/2019/03/lsigal030519/

Singer, J. David. 1961. “El problema del nivel de análisis en las relaciones internacionales.” World Politics 14, 1: 77-92.

Snyder, Jack, y Erica D. Borghard. 2011. “El costo de las amenazas vacías: un centavo, no una libra.” American Political Science Review 105, 3: 437-456.

Stein, Janice Gross. 1988. “Construyendo la política en la psicología: la percepción errónea de la amenaza.” Political Psychology 9, 2: 245-271.

Svendsen, Otto. 2025. “La anexión de Groenlandia es peor que un mal trato.” Centro de Estudios Estratégicos e Internacionales. 21 de enero. https://www.csis.org/analysis/seizing-greenland-worse-

mal acuerdo

Toft, Monica Duffy. 2003. La Geografía de la Violencia Étnica: Identidad, Intereses y la Indivisibilidad del Territorio. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Walker, Stephen G., y Akan Malici. 2011. U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy Mistakes. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University Press.

_____. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Casa Blanca. 2025a. “Declaración Conjunta del Primer Ministro del Reino de Camboya y el Primer Ministro del Reino de Tailandia sobre los resultados de su reunión en Kuala Lumpur, Malasia.” 26 de octubre. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/10/joint-declaration-by-the-prime-minister-of-the-kingdom-of-cambodia-and-the-prime-minister-of-the-kingdom-of-thailand-on-the-outcomes-of-their-meeting-in-kuala-lampur-malaysia/

_____. 2025b. “Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional de los Estados Unidos de América.” Noviembre. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

Williams, Abigail, Yuliya Talmazan y Nick Duffy. 2026. “Lo que hay que saber sobre la ‘Junta de Paz’ de Trump.” NBC News. 22 de enero. https://www.nbcnews.com/world/europe/trump-board-of-peace-countries-davos-cost-nato-what-know-rcna255433

Yarhi-Milo, Keren. 2014. Conociendo al Adversario: Líderes, Inteligencia y Evaluación de Intenciones en las Relaciones Internacionales. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Zhao, Suisheng. 2026. “El Auge y Caída de una Nueva Guerra Fría: La Rivalidad de Grandes Potencias entre EE. UU. y China desde el Presidente Trump I hasta el II.” Journal of Contemporary China.. Enero. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2025.2601433

■ Leif-Eric Easley (Doctorado en Ciencias Políticas por la Universidad de Harvard) es profesor en la Universidad Femenina de Ewha, donde imparte clases sobre seguridad internacional y economía política. Agradece al asistente de investigación Jeremy Youngwoo Ahn por su excelente apoyo a la investigación.

■ Traducción y Edición: Lee Sang-jun_Investigador del EAI; Oh In-hwan_Investigador Principal del EAI

    Consultas: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr