[International Politics in the Age of Artificial Intelligence] XI. Gulf States' AI Securitization and Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy: Focusing on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates

I. Introduction

Today, Gulf states are expanding their efforts to apply artificial intelligence (AI) across various industrial sectors. Beyond actively investing in AI as a key means of economic diversification strategy, Gulf states are striving to expand their power and enhance geopolitical influence in diverse fields such as military, intelligence, finance, and healthcare. Specifically, Gulf oil-producing countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar, are accelerating investments in AI by announcing national AI strategies.

Most notably, amidst changes in the regional security environment, Gulf states are increasing their efforts to utilize AI in the military and security domains. This can be interpreted as a move to strengthen military and security capabilities based on advanced AI technology in a situation where regional cooperative security efforts are hindered by conflicting national interests. In particular, despite the consistent calls for security cooperation among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states, substantial progress has been slow. Within the traditional security dilemma between the GCC and Iran, attempts to establish an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Network have not yielded significant results. Furthermore, major Gulf powers such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have introduced advanced US-made defense systems like the PAC-3 and THAAD to counter Iran's missile threats, but an arms race has accelerated as Iran has strengthened its precision ballistic missile and drone capabilities in response (Atashjameh 2025).

As such, the GCC, launched as a regional security cooperation body after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, is assessed to have failed to achieve substantial security cooperation outcomes due to historical animosities among member states, leadership rivalries, and differences in diplomatic approaches. Although efforts are being made to seek a new vision for cooperative security and pursue joint military exercises and intelligence sharing following the resolution of the Qatar diplomatic crisis in 2021, limitations remain in establishing an integrated defense system. Therefore, GCC states can be seen as pursuing traditional security cooperation with external allies like the United States, rather than regional security cooperation, while simultaneously seeking self-defense and enhanced security autonomy through new technologies such as AI.

Most significantly, the Middle East War, triggered by the Israel-Iran military conflict in June 2025 and the US and Israeli attack on Iran in March 2026, has amplified the security anxieties of GCC states. As Iran launched retaliatory attacks against neighboring Gulf countries such as the UAE and Qatar, GCC states are assessed to be exposed to constant security anxieties (Alhasan 2025). Due to this increase in security concerns, it is expected that Gulf states will further intensify their efforts to integrate AI into the military and security sectors in the future. In particular, in the unstable security environment of the Gulf region, advanced AI technology, even without being converted into weapons, can be seen as a cause for heightened threat perception by other countries simply through its accumulation.

In this context, this study aims to identify the background of AI militarization pursued by Gulf states and the strategic path they are following amidst the US-China technological hegemony competition. To this end, the analysis focuses on the cases of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are most actively investing in AI. Saudi Arabia, under Saudi Vision 2030, regards AI as a core pillar of its post-oil economy, establishing the Saudi Data & AI Authority (SDAIA) in 2019 and leading AI investment through substantial capital infusion. The UAE, with its AI 2031 strategy, established the world's first AI Minister position in 2017 and founded the Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence (MBZUAI), thereby strengthening efforts to utilize AI across all aspects of national operations (Al-Amer 2025).

Most importantly, amidst the US-China competition, President Trump visited both Saudi Arabia and the UAE during his Middle East tour in May 2025, establishing a partnership to strengthen AI technology cooperation. While China continues to seek advanced technology cooperation with Gulf states, the Trump administration signed an 'AI Acceleration Agreement' with the UAE and launched the 'UAE Stargate' project. In Saudi Arabia, the AI investment company 'Humain,' led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, was unveiled, solidifying US-Saudi AI cooperation. Considering the escalating security concerns in the Gulf region and the increasing AI investment trends, this study aims to analyze the AI securitization and military utilization of Gulf states, and their pursuit of AI-based strategic autonomy amidst the US-China competition.

II. AI Securitization and Military Utilization in Gulf States

Saudi Arabia's military and security AI market is experiencing significant growth, driven by its defense modernization efforts. As AI emerges as a key technology for enhancing the precision and efficiency of operations in areas such as intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance, and autonomous weapon systems, Saudi Arabia is expanding its investments in security applications through cooperation with global defense and technology companies like Microsoft, IBM, Nvidia, BAE Systems, and Lockheed Martin. Advanced assets such as AI-based unmanned naval vessels were unveiled at the Riyadh World Defense Exhibition in 2024, and Saudi Arabia is exploring participation in the joint development of the 6th generation fighter jet (GCAP) with the UK, Japan, and Italy (Saab 2025; Ardemagni 2025). The UAE, centered around EDGE Group, is also seeking to enhance its defense capabilities through AI in various areas, including drones, autonomous vehicles, and cybersecurity.

The reasons behind the intensified efforts by Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to apply AI in the security sector are diverse. In this regard, Rossiter and Novella analyze that GCC's AI security investments are driven by the need to compensate for demographic limitations with a large foreign population through autonomous and unmanned systems, secure strategic advantages in future warfare, and enhance capabilities for offense, defense, and deterrence in the cyber domain (Rossiter & Novella 2025). Indeed, by applying AI in the military sector, GCC countries not only aim to enhance military efficiency but are also assessed to have the intention of mitigating demographic vulnerabilities stemming from a large foreign population.

Furthermore, Gulf states recognize the necessity of applying AI in the security sector to effectively respond to escalating emerging security threats amidst persistent regional instability. Following the Gaza War in 2023, Gulf states have keenly felt the need to prepare for various emerging security threats, including drones, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cybersecurity. In particular, the direct clash between Israel and Iran in June 2025 and the war between the US, Israel, and Iran in March 2026 starkly revealed the security vulnerabilities of GCC states. The US attempted to neutralize air defense systems using AI-based kill chains, eliminate military leadership, and attack nuclear and missile facilities during its airstrikes against Iran (Ardemagni 2025). Following the drone attacks on Saudi Aramco in 2019 and the Abu Dhabi airport in 2022, and facing emerging security threats such as drone and cyber attacks due to the recent escalation of Middle East conflicts, GCC states are keenly aware of the necessity of AI militarization (Mansour 2025).

Most significantly, the Shamoon attack in 2012, which caused damage to Saudi Aramco's computer network, served as a direct catalyst for Gulf states to strengthen their cybersecurity posture. Since this incident, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have focused on enhancing their cyber capabilities by utilizing Western companies and former intelligence agency personnel, and on this foundation, they are further concentrating on strengthening cybersecurity by integrating AI technology. Notably, the 2010 Stuxnet incident marked a significant turning point that underscored the importance of cybersecurity. The malware, believed to have been jointly developed by the US and Israel at the time, disrupted centrifuges at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility, delaying its uranium enrichment program. Subsequently, Iran is assessed to have fostered state-sponsored hacking groups and pursued attacks against GCC states using spear-phishing, malware, and AI-based methods (Mako 2025). Amidst the growing importance of cybersecurity in the Gulf region, the escalation of conflicts in the region following the Gaza War in 2023 has highlighted the necessity of AI-based cyber warfare, which offers precise attack capabilities at a low cost (Sexton 2025).

Furthermore, Gulf states are intensifying efforts to utilize AI technology for maintaining maritime security in the strategically vital Persian Gulf. The attack on an oil tanker in 2022, presumed to be carried out by Iran, made them realize the importance of freedom of navigation in the Gulf (Mosly 2023). AI is expected to be utilized in various aspects of enhancing maritime security in the Gulf, including collision avoidance, route optimization, surveillance of illegal fishing and piracy, port security, and cyber defense, as well as contributing to improvements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), mine countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, and coastal defense capabilities (Mazzucco 2025; Maritimes Crimes 2025). In particular, the Strait of Hormuz, located in the Persian Gulf, is considered a crucial chokepoint for the stability of the global energy supply chain. In the aftermath of the US-Israel-Iran war in 2026, Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 25% of the world's seaborne crude oil trade passes, has caused economic shocks affecting not only energy supply but also food, fertilizer, and the entire financial market (UN Trade and Development 2026). From this perspective, maintaining freedom of navigation and enhancing defense capabilities in the Strait of Hormuz through AI militarization are assessed to be major challenges for Gulf states.

III. Gulf States' Pursuit of AI-Based Strategic Autonomy Amidst US-China Competition

The AI strategies of Gulf states are unfolding under the structural influence of the US-China technological hegemony competition. In this context, the Trump administration, while partially easing the AI technology export restrictions on Gulf states that had been relatively strengthened during the Biden administration, demonstrated flexibility to preemptively secure a strategic advantage in the advanced technology competition with China. Specifically, the Trump administration adopted an open stance towards the adoption of AI chips and the expansion of advanced infrastructure in Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and is making policy efforts to integrate the Gulf region into a US-centric AI supply chain and technological ecosystem. As the Gulf region emerges as a key strategic space for US-China AI competition, the US is pursuing what can be called 'silicon statecraft' by strengthening AI cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to counter China's expanding technological influence and utilizing data centers and cloud infrastructure as new strategic bases (McKinley 2025). From this perspective, the future direction of US-China AI competition is likely to be significantly influenced by how effectively the US counters China's expansion in the Gulf region.

The actions taken by President Trump during his Middle East tour in May 2025 reveal that AI is playing a role as one axis of the US-China competition. China's Huawei is targeting niches in the Middle East AI chip market, seeking to expand sales of Chinese chips, and pursuing an expansion of influence in the global AI market by promoting Chinese AI models such as DeepSeek and Moonshot AI (Zhang 2025). There are also assessments that China is seeking expansion in the Gulf region through 'data and algorithms,' linking AI with its 'Digital Silk Road' strategy (Daniels and Dohmen 2025). In this context, as Gulf oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE are increasingly seeking to enhance their 'algorithmic power,' moving away from pursuing power based on traditional energy resources, Chinese AI companies are assessed to be strengthening cooperation with Gulf states by leveraging the Digital Silk Road (Ayaz 2025).

The strategic calculation by the US to counter China's technological expansion in the Gulf region lies behind the full-scale launch of major AI projects such as Saudi Arabia's Humain and the UAE's Stargate UAE during President Trump's Middle East tour. In this context, in March 2025, UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed met with President Trump in Washington and agreed on a long-term investment plan of approximately $1.4 trillion over the next decade in US AI infrastructure and semiconductor industries (Holland and Maccioni 2025). Subsequently, the UAE, centered around the state-owned AI company G42 in Abu Dhabi, has accelerated data center construction, signed an 'AI Acceleration Agreement' with the US, and officially launched the 'Stargate UAE' project, involving participants such as OpenAI, Nvidia, Oracle, Cisco, and SoftBank.

In Saudi Arabia, Humain, chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, was launched and attracted substantial investments from companies such as Nvidia, AMD, and Amazon Web Services (AWS). Under the leadership of the Saudi Data & AI Authority (SDAIA), the National Strategy for Data and AI (NSDAI) was announced at the 1st Global AI Summit in 2020, and under 'Saudi Vision 2030,' efforts are underway to establish a global AI hub by making AI a core driver of national growth by 2030. Furthermore, large-scale AI and technology agreements have been signed between US companies like Nvidia, Google, Oracle, and AMD, and Saudi Arabian companies. Through the US-Saudi economic corridor initiative, cooperation in finance, energy, and advanced industries is being solidified between the two countries (Maad 2025). In particular, through a defense agreement worth $142 billion, cooperation is being pursued in areas such as next-generation fighter jets, missile defense systems, autonomous drones, and cybersecurity, and cooperation between the US and Saudi Arabia in the defense industry is being strengthened, including efforts to enhance integrated capabilities in AI, space, and defense (Maad 2025).

However, Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which aim to foster AI as a key asset in the post-oil era, prioritize AI cooperation with their traditional ally, the United States, while also seeking parallel paths for cooperation with China. For instance, as part of 'Saudi Vision 2030,' Saudi Arabia is pursuing defense indigenization centered around SAMI, Aramco Digital, and Humain, while simultaneously discussing the establishment of a defense AI joint venture hub with China's CETC. From this perspective, amidst the US-China competition, Gulf states, while ostensibly prioritizing AI cooperation with the US, also intend to maintain and strengthen cooperative relationships with China.

In the case of the UAE, an environment conducive to strengthened US-UAE cooperation was created in April 2024 when Microsoft signed an investment agreement worth $1.5 billion (approximately 2.1 trillion KRW) with G42 (Lee Jieun 2024). In other words, through collaborations between UAE entities such as G42, MGX, and Mubadala with Microsoft, OpenAI, NASA, and IBM, the possibility arises for the UAE to be integrated into the US-centric order and build an AI ecosystem linked with US semiconductor and cloud infrastructure. However, companies like Lunate, an investment firm of the Al Nahyan family ruling Abu Dhabi, continue to invest in Chinese companies, and actual cooperation between China and the UAE is ongoing (Adamson 2025).

Furthermore, Gulf states are assessed to be pursuing strategic autonomy by simultaneously pursuing cooperation with both the US and China, while also seeking sovereign AI. In particular, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are pursuing a state-led AI sovereignty strategy through large-scale public investment in Arabic-based models and 'sovereign clouds,' which can be seen as based on managed openness that selectively accommodates global technological cooperation rather than self-sufficiency (Singh and Sengupta 2025). The UAE, through cooperation between G42 and Microsoft and its sovereign cloud, and Saudi Arabia, through its Arabic Large Language Model (ALLaM) and DEEM Cloud, are pursuing limited strategic autonomy based on data and compute capabilities and governance, combining domestic control with external technology utilization (Singh and Sengupta 2025). In this situation, AI functions as 'technological statecraft' through which both the US and China project influence in the Gulf region. While the US is reinforcing existing security alliances through military AI and defense networks, China is assessed to be expanding long-term technological interdependence through cooperation in AI, 5G, cloud, and unmanned systems (Miller and Wright 2025). Amidst this complex competitive landscape, Gulf states are seeking strategic autonomy through 'agile strategic positioning' by pursuing parallel cooperation with both the US and China, leading to the formation of a 'multi-layered regional order' where the US security order and the Chinese technological order overlap (Miller and Wright 2025).

In this context, the AI securitization and militarization of Gulf states can be interpreted in terms of mitigating reliance on US security and pursuing strategic autonomy amidst the US-China AI technology competition. The limited and lukewarm response from the US during the attacks on Saudi Aramco oil facilities in 2019 and the drone attack on Abu Dhabi in 2022 has deepened skepticism among Gulf states regarding the existing US-dependent security model (Calabrese 2024). Consequently, Saudi Arabia, under Saudi Vision 2030, is strengthening its defense self-reliance capabilities by pursuing AI-based integrated weapons systems and space-defense strategies centered around its state-owned defense company SAMI (Saudi Arabian Military Industries), while the UAE is accelerating defense industry self-sufficiency by integrating autonomous AI systems into key weapon systems through EDGE Group (Soliman 2026). From this perspective, AI is assessed to be functioning not merely as a technological innovation but as a key strategic asset enabling Gulf states to hedge, expand power, and ultimately project long-term influence in a changing world order (Soliman 2026).

As the Gulf region emerges as a key testing ground for the US-China AI technological hegemony competition, Gulf states are seeking to enhance their AI sovereignty and strategic autonomy by pursuing necessary cooperation with both the US and China. Simultaneously, the US is wary of the possibility of technology transfer to China via the Gulf region in this context and is seeking control strategies to manage it (Allen et al 2025). In other words, the US faces the challenge of deterring China's expanding influence in the Gulf region among its traditional allies. To this end, the US is attempting to guide the AI capabilities of Gulf states to be structurally integrated into the US-centric technological ecosystem by maintaining control over key technological bottlenecks such as advanced semiconductors, cloud computing, core algorithms, and defense AI. This approach is reflected in the 'America's AI Action Plan' announced in July 2025, which aims to strengthen global technological order leadership through the overseas expansion and standard-setting of US AI technology stacks (The White House 2025). Therefore, the US is assessed to be continuously pursuing a strategy to gain an advantage in the US-China technological competition surrounding the Gulf region by managing the strategic autonomy of Gulf states through technological standards and supply chain order.

In this context, the US, whose reliance on Middle Eastern oil has decreased due to increased shale gas production, can be analyzed as managing Gulf states seeking to expand their strategic autonomy through cooperation in AI and advanced technologies, thereby readjusting existing alliance relationships (Carchidi 2025). In particular, as Gulf states recognize AI investment as a new strategic asset in the post-oil era and seek to redefine their relationship with the US through it, the US-Gulf relationship is gradually evolving towards a technology-centric alliance. Consequently, beyond the so-called 'oil-security exchange alliance,' a new technology-based alliance structure centered on cooperation in digital infrastructure such as AI, semiconductors, cloud computing, and data centers is being formed (Carchidi 2025; Soliman 2025b). Ultimately, as US-China technological competition intensifies, continuous analysis is required regarding how the US-Gulf relationship will be readjusted through AI (Soliman 2025b).

IV. Conclusion

Today, Gulf states are making efforts to disseminate AI across industries while actively integrating it into the military and security domains, thereby pursuing the securitization and militarization of AI. While cooperative security initiatives at the GCC level have seen limited progress, the heightened regional security anxieties following the Israel-Iran conflict in 2025 and the US and Israeli attacks on Iran in 2026 have become factors accelerating Gulf states' efforts to enhance AI-based military capabilities and defense self-reliance. Accordingly, this study, focusing on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, has examined the background of AI securitization and militarization in Gulf states amidst escalating regional security concerns and US-China technological competition, and analyzed their pursuit of AI-based strategic autonomy.

First, it is assessed that complex factors, including enhancing military efficiency, mitigating security vulnerabilities due to a demographic structure with a majority foreign population, and responding to emerging security threats such as drone and cyber attacks, have cumulatively contributed to the background of AI securitization and military utilization in Gulf states. In particular, the heightened regional instability following the outbreak of the Gaza War in 2023 and the military conflicts in 2025-2026 are accelerating the securitization and militarization of AI by increasing the security instability of GCC states. Notably, the utilization of AI in areas such as cybersecurity and maritime security, including freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, is emerging as a major response challenge.

Furthermore, under the intensifying US-China technological hegemony competition, Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are assessed to be pursuing strategic autonomy by building sovereign AI while simultaneously pursuing cooperation with both the US and China. In response, the US is showing movements to reshape the existing oil-security exchange alliance into a technology-based alliance centered on AI, semiconductors, data centers, and cloud computing, by deterring the expansion of China's influence in the Gulf region using various policy leverages, including technological standards, supply chains, and AI technology exports. In this context, the AI hybrid strategy pursued by Gulf states amidst the US-China competition and their pursuit of strategic autonomy based on sovereign AI appear to be unfolding in a limited form under US technological control. In this context, AI can be seen not only as a key strategic asset for Gulf states but also as a crucial variable shaping the formation of a new order in the Gulf region, as US and Chinese technological strategies converge.■

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■ Author: Kim Kang-seok_Professor of Arabic, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.

■ Responsible Editor: Lim Jae-hyun_EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhim@eai.or.kr

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