[Global NK Commentary] China's New Evolution in US Strategy in 2026 and the Korean Peninsula

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1. Changes in China's Perception of the International Order: The Decline of American Hegemony and the US-led International Order

Since the second half of 2025, Chinese academia has recognized that the collapse of the existing international order, led by the US since the post-war era, is inevitable and has already begun discussions to prepare for a new international order. China perceives the decline of American hegemony as the primary background triggering the collapse of the existing international order. An analysis of US power in terms of political influence, economic strength, military power, and technological level suggests that American hegemony is structurally weakening from within (Zuo Xiying 2025).

The second Trump administration seeks to delay the weakening of hegemony, caused by internal issues, through tariffs and by shifting more defense costs and international responsibilities onto allies and partner countries. This approach is characterized as a shift from 'benevolent hegemony' to 'predatory hegemony' (Zuo Xiying 2025). While predatory hegemonic actions by the Trump administration may temporarily delay the decline of American hegemony, some in Chinese academia argue that in the long run, it will not only fail to prevent the decline but may even accelerate it.

Consequently, it is analyzed that the global system is experiencing accelerating instability due to the decline of the existing order without the establishment of a new international order. The second Trump administration is undermining a significant portion of the US-led international order since the Cold War, and it is projected that even if a Democratic administration takes office after 2028, it will be difficult to restore it. Due to the Trump administration's isolationist and protectionist policies, major powers have significantly weakened trust in the Trump administration, and it is highly likely that they will not actively support and participate in the US-led international order as before.

In this era of transformation in the international order, occurring once in a century, the prevailing opinion is that China should establish long-term strategic plans while strengthening its position as a nation that protects world peace and safeguards its core interests, rather than directly confronting and competing with the US.

China believes that the rapid changes and increasing uncertainty in the international order caused by American 'America First' policies present more opportunities than challenges. China anticipates that the US-led bloc expansion based on systems and values, and the confrontational 'new Cold War' dynamics that troubled China during the Biden administration, will not be replicated. Instead, China sees emerging space and opportunities to expand its influence and role in the international community, thereby enhancing its national interests. China is sending a message that it can seek pragmatic compromises and policy coordination with the Trump administration in areas other than its core interests, such as the Taiwan issue.

However, China is also wary that despite the decline of American hegemony, the US still possesses overwhelming advantages in science, technology, and military power, and is determined to control China's development. China is concerned that the US may concentrate its strategic resources from global expansion to core areas essential for maintaining hegemony and implement 'targeted containment' against major strategic competitors to overcome its declining hegemony. Although the US National Security Strategy (NSS) report released in December 2025 may appear to adopt a more relaxed stance towards China compared to previous ones, China remains vigilant, believing that the underlying intention is to implement more precise, pragmatic, and sustained 'targeted containment' against China as a major strategic competitor (Wang Peng 2025).

Based on its changed perception of the international order, China's foreign policy agenda for 2026 is evolving towards designing and creating scenarios for a multipolar order led by China through a unique, China-centric great power diplomacy that differentiates itself from that of the US. Therefore, instead of directly targeting the US and intensifying confrontation and competition, China aims to focus its diplomatic efforts on Europe, ASEAN, the Global South, and multilateralism to build a multipolar order led by China. This indirect approach is strategically judged as a more effective choice for containing and responding to the US in the long run.

2. Evolution of China's Perception and Strategy Regarding US-China Relations

The fact that China is actively discussing the decline of American hegemony is not unrelated to its increased confidence in US-China relations since the second half of 2025. When Trump's election victory in 2024 became certain, China was considerably concerned and wary of the second Trump administration due to the harsh experiences of trade friction during Trump's first term. In his first phone call with President-elect Trump in January 2025, President Xi Jinping congratulated him and emphasized China's core interests and respect for its major concerns. He specifically requested that the US handle the Taiwan issue with caution, as it is directly related to China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2025a).

In the first half of 2025, US imposition of 'reciprocal tariffs' and strengthening of export controls, met with strong countermeasures from China, led to a confrontational dynamic in US-China relations. However, after intense conflict and confrontation, both countries entered a new phase of seeking compromise more quickly than expected. US-China tariff negotiations were held five times starting in May, and a summit was finally held in Busan on October 30, 2025. At this meeting, the leaders of both countries agreed to a provisional suspension of tariffs and export controls, reaching a one-year strategic truce.

China assesses that it has achieved remarkable results by responding firmly and resolutely to US tariffs and export controls in 2025, based on the experience accumulated since 2018 in responding to US pressure, and its enhanced national strength in economy, technology, and military power. China highlights that it was the only major power to retaliate with equivalent countermeasures against US trade pressure, without any compromise. It is even evaluated that China was able to control the Trump administration's offensive by retaliating with rare earth export controls in response to US export restrictions imposed in September 2025.

China now believes that the US strategy of pressuring China has entered a phase of weakening. Some argue that Trump is using China as a tool rather than a direct target in his 'Make America Great Again' (MAGA) movement. China claims to now possess the experience, confidence, and strategy to respond to and manage US offensives. Furthermore, some suggest that China should take the lead in designing the future of US-China relations and its scenarios (Diao Daming 2025).

Since the Trump administration initiated the trade war against China in its first term in 2018, China has accumulated over eight years of experience and now considers itself capable of negotiating with the US on an equal footing. There is even an interpretation that a situation of 'mutual assured disruption' has been created, similar to how 'mutual assured destruction' in nuclear powers deters nuclear use, where through China's strong and effective countermeasures, both the US and China have confirmed their ability to severely disrupt each other's economies and supply chains. Based on this, China predicts that trade conflicts with the US will not excessively escalate in the future. China expects that while the pattern of countermeasures and negotiations with the US may continue, the overall trend will move towards stabilization. China views the resilience of US-China relations, transitioning from confrontation and conflict to compromise, as strengthening.

It remains uncertain whether the Trump administration will indeed favor compromise over containment and pressure as China expects. However, it is clear that optimistic arguments and discussions are actively emerging within China, with an unusually high level of confidence in US-China relations since the second half of 2025. It is necessary to observe more closely how this change in China's perception and attitude will be reflected in actual policies and strategies through a series of events, such as the successive summit meetings in 2026. Nevertheless, the message China appears to be conveying recently is clear: China is no longer content to remain in a reactive and passive position in its relationship with the US, but is demonstrating its willingness to actively take steps to lead the relationship with the US stably from an equal footing.

3. Creating a 'Stable Coexistence Relationship' through US-China Negotiations and Strategic Intentions

1) Possibility of Compromise and Deal-making towards a 'Stable Coexistence Relationship' between the US and China

The increased confidence in US diplomacy within China is expanding into discussions about establishing a new paradigm for US-China relations. The attempts by leaders Xi Jinping and Trump at the Busan Summit in 2025 to seek compromise by restraining conflict and confrontation, albeit unexpectedly, and their promise of reciprocal summit visits in 2026, have created greater expectations than ever before for the possibility of compromise between the US and China.

A subtle but significant change is also detected in the keywords China has recently emphasized in its diplomatic engagements with the US. China has always emphasized core interests and red lines in summit meetings, never hiding its wariness and suspicion towards the US. For example, President Xi Jinping stated in his virtual summit with President Biden in November 2021, "If secessionist forces advocating 'Taiwan independence' provoke, pressure us, or even cross the red line, we will have no choice but to take firm action," referring to the red line.

In the summit with President Biden in November 2023, President Xi Jinping consistently stated his efforts to build stable, healthy, and sustainable US-China relations, while also emphasizing that China has interests to protect, principles to uphold, and bottom lines to adhere to. Furthermore, at the Lima Summit in November 2024, he explicitly stressed that the Taiwan issue, democracy and human rights, systems and institutions, and the right to development are the four major red lines that China will absolutely not tolerate (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2024).

However, since the second half of 2025, while maintaining a firm principled stance on the Taiwan issue, China has been emphasizing stability, mutual benefit, and cooperation more, sending stronger messages of compromise rather than wariness towards the US. For instance, at the meeting with President Trump in Busan on October 30, 2025, President Xi Jinping no longer mentioned red lines. At that time, he emphasized economic cooperation, stating that trade and economic cooperation should be a balancing force and driving force for US-China relations, not a source of obstacles or conflict. Both sides should consider the long-term benefits of cooperation and avoid falling into a vicious cycle of mutual retaliation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2025b). In a phone call with President Trump on November 24, 2025, President Xi Jinping reiterated the importance of cooperation, stating that cooperation benefits both countries and confrontation harms both, a common sense repeatedly verified through practice, and that mutual achievement and common prosperity between the US and China are achievable realities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2025c).

The change in summit keywords aligns with the positive outlook and trends regarding US-China relations among Chinese researchers mentioned earlier. While this internal shift in China may be the result of objective analysis and judgment, it more clearly confirms that China has a policy objective to actively negotiate with the US from an equal footing and thereby stabilize US-China relations.

Furthermore, China is expressing its willingness to proactively propose new directions and scenarios for bilateral relations, rather than being passive and reactive. In his speech at the annual 'International Situation and China's Diplomacy' seminar in December 2025, Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed the need for a new paradigm in relations with the US (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2025d). Specifically, he stated, "We will create a new paradigm of mutually beneficial interaction between the US and China. And we will promote the development of sound, stable, and sustainable US-China relations," thus presenting the direction of new US-China relations envisioned by China.

In the future, China envisions a situation where competition proceeds with each side pursuing its own strategy based on equal capabilities, allowing both countries to adjust the intensity of confrontation and competition and move towards peaceful coexistence by accommodating each other's strategic changes (Da Wei, 2025). For example, US-China relations are seen as having transformed into a relationship between two nationalistic great powers for the first time in history. Trump's 'Make America Great Again' and Xi Jinping's 'Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation' both advocate nationalistic goals, which are not necessarily conflicting, and it is argued that the US and China may at least avoid hindering each other. With several US-China summit meetings expected in 2026, including Trump's visit to China in April, the APEC summit in November, and the G20 summit in December, China believes it must use these opportunities to seek reasonable coexistence arrangements suitable for a new era.

Specific measures for building a stable bilateral relationship that meets the realistic needs of both the US and China are also being discussed. For instance, Professor Wu Xinbo of Fudan University (Wu Xinbo 2026) proposes a 'Grand Bargain' between the US and China. Wu suggests that since a Grand Bargain is difficult, it would be better to start negotiations in relatively easily agreed-upon areas such as trade and economy to build mutual trust, and then, based on this trust, gradually expand negotiations to more complex regional security issues and global issues.

For example, China proposes a deal where it increases imports from the US, such as soybeans, and investment in US manufacturing, in exchange for the US easing export controls and reducing regulations on Chinese private companies. In the science and technology sector, China proposes a deal where the US relaxes regulations on technology import and export to China, and China correspondingly moderates its export restrictions on rare earths and critical minerals. Building on agreements in trade and economy, the proposal suggests advancing to discussions for risk management in more complex geopolitical competitions, such as on the Korean Peninsula, in the South China Sea, and regarding Taiwan. The Taiwan issue, in particular, is identified as the most critical challenge that will determine the future of US-China relations; to prevent escalation of conflict, the US would be expected to urge restraint from Taiwan and exert influence to prevent overt 'independence' actions, while China would show goodwill by reducing military activities around Taiwan.

In the global arena, it is believed that consultations are needed to clarify each side's role in the international order. China clarifies that it does not seek to completely overthrow the existing US-led order, but rather aims to enhance the efficiency of some multilateral organizations and strengthen the representation of non-Western countries while maintaining overall stability, and must gain the substantive trust of the US and the international community in this regard.

Professor Wang Jisi proposes that it is necessary for both sides to mutually provide 'strategic clarity' by 'the US abandoning attempts to subvert China's system, and China not challenging US global leadership' (Wang Jisi, 2026). Professor Wang also suggests that instead of trying to 'improve' US-China relations, the goal should be pragmatic 'coexistence' within clearly defined red lines, where each side pursues its own interests. In summary, the discussions within China, including the proposals by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, indicate that China aims to establish a stable coexistence model through pragmatic trade and negotiations based on mutual interests from an equal footing, in this era of international order transformation occurring once in a century.

2) China's Strategic Intentions and Challenges

China's new proposals are largely intended to capture and proactively leverage President Trump's pursuit of 'America First' and his transactional instincts. Nevertheless, there are significant constraints and limitations to the actualization of compromises or deals. First, due to the nature of its political system, China fundamentally assumes the possibility of a Grand Bargain led by Presidents Xi and Trump. However, while President Trump is exceptionally autocratic and transactional for a US president, unlike the Chinese system, the US president has a term limit and checks on power, limiting his ability to unilaterally enforce a deal. Even if a deal between Xi and Trump is reached, it may not guarantee the long-term stabilization of US-China relations.

Second, in any negotiation, trust is as important as the equitable exchange of benefits. However, the majority of mainstream politicians and high-level policymakers in the US still harbor strong distrust towards deals and negotiations with China. Therefore, there is suspicion that the recent discussions on negotiations and deals within China are merely 'buying time' proposals focused on building the foundation for China's modernization roadmap, set for 2035. The US fundamentally distrusts the Chinese government and its strategic intentions, making it likely to oppose deals like a 'Grand Bargain'.

The fact that compromise and deal proposals are being actively put forth by both the government and academia in China can be seen as an intention to stabilize relations with the Trump administration. However, given the high probability that compromises may not materialize as China expects, there may be other strategic considerations and intentions underlying China's negotiation proposals.

First, it is possible that China's proposal for coexistence with the US is partly intended to buy time by resolving the instability and uncertainty during Trump's presidency and temporarily evading US pressure and controls. China judges that President Trump, facing political difficulties due to issues like the crackdown on illegal immigration ahead of the midterm elections, might consider a temporary compromise through a deal with China. From President Trump's perspective, proposals from China such as purchasing US agricultural products like soybeans and energy (LNG), cooperating on blocking fentanyl precursors, increasing direct investment in US manufacturing, and lifting rare earth export restrictions could be worth considering for a deal.

From China's perspective, 2026 is the first year of the '15th Five-Year Plan,' a period when it needs to focus on domestic development more than ever. The stable launch and success of the 15th Five-Year Plan are crucial variables for stabilizing the Xi Jinping administration and for Xi's long-term rule. Therefore, the Xi Jinping government must not only minimize confrontation and conflict with the Trump administration to focus on economic structural reform, revitalization, and technological self-reliance but also faces the significant challenge of breaking through US trade and technology controls. Consequently, China may be considering a fallback option of achieving a 'small deal' in trade and economic areas, even if not a full Grand Bargain with the US, to extend the temporary truce.

Second, while China is proposing stable coexistence to the US, the proposal may also be intended to appeal to the international community excluding the US. That is, China may be seeking to secure global leadership by actively projecting diplomatic rhetoric emphasizing its stability, certainty, and responsibility, leveraging the diplomatic space created by the Trump administration's isolationism and 'America First' policies. Indeed, China is actively approaching US allies and partners, as well as countries in the Global South, who are weary of the US administration's coercive and unpredictable policy actions, by highlighting policy continuity and predictability.

In this regard, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in his December 2025 speech, unusually emphasized five major roles for China in the international community. He asserted that in the turbulent global landscape, China serves as an 'anchor of stability,' a 'strong backbone' in the new geopolitical environment, a 'guiding star' in the changing international order, an 'engine of growth' driving global economic development, and a 'ballast stone' in times of international moral crisis. China aims to secure global leadership by actively expanding its role in the international community during this period of international order transition, starkly contrasting with the isolationism of the Trump administration. While continuously proposing stable coexistence to the US, China is simultaneously pursuing comprehensive and broad diplomacy to seize the opportunities presented by the decline of US hegemony and strengthen its international influence and leadership. In fact, China is leading reforms in global governance and strengthening practical cooperation and solidarity with countries in Europe, the Middle East, ASEAN, and the Global South to bolster a multipolar order.

4. Changes in China's US Strategy and Their Impact and Implications for Korean Peninsula Policy

China is actively expressing its intention to pioneer a new horizon of great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, targeting 2026. The reason China is newly emphasizing great power diplomacy is that the launch of the 15th Five-Year Plan and the securing of a stable coexistence relationship with the US are, in fact, the most crucial diplomatic tasks for 2026. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the 15th Five-Year Plan and US diplomacy are closely intertwined. Securing stable coexistence in US-China relations is a critical variable for the success of the 15th Five-Year Plan, and the success of the 15th Five-Year Plan can serve as an important foundation for securing China's initiative in its diplomacy with the US.

The seven major diplomatic tasks for 2026 proposed by Foreign Minister Wang Yi include building a community of shared future with neighboring countries. However, neighborhood diplomacy is also a background and dependent variable for the achievement of the 15th Five-Year Plan and US diplomacy. The Korean Peninsula is a strategically very important object of China's neighborhood diplomacy. However, the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula is highly fluid, influenced by China's development strategy and its diplomacy with the US.

The recent, highly unusual occurrence of two consecutive South Korea-China summit meetings within two months confirms that both governments have a strong desire to restore relations. However, it is undeniable that complex external variables, such as Sino-Japanese tensions, South Korea-Japan summit, potential US-China summits, and the possibility of North Korea-US talks, played a role in the sudden arrangement of these summit meetings early in the year. While the instability and uncertainty of the international situation, including US-China relations, can serve as an opportunity for restoring South Korea-China relations, conversely, they could also lead to the worst-case scenarios, as seen in the THAAD conflict in 2016.

While the two summit meetings confirmed the will to restore relations, they also served to reconfirm the existence of a strategic 'dreaming different dreams' situation, where both countries still have mutually divergent expectations and demands. The factors of North Korea and the US, which have consistently been the biggest variables and obstacles in the 34-year history of South Korea-China relations, have once again been brought up as divergent demands from both countries at a crucial juncture for restoring relations. While South Korea is focusing its summit agenda on the North Korean issue and other Korean Peninsula issues, China has confirmed its expectations regarding South Korea's strategic choices concerning US-China strategic competition and the Taiwan issue.

Furthermore, China is proposing deals and negotiations for coexistence with the US, albeit potentially temporary. In Professor Wu's proposed 'Grand Bargain,' the Korean Peninsula issue is also presented as an agenda item that requires sequential negotiation between the two countries. Regarding the Korean Peninsula issue, Professor Wu suggests shifting from deterrence policies to a management approach through a peace mechanism jointly guaranteed by the US and China, such as resuming the Four-Party Talks. Currently, neither the US nor China is prioritizing the North Korean nuclear issue, and both are effectively avoiding mentioning denuclearization. Although this is merely an academic proposal, given the current trend, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the US and China may exploit the Korean Peninsula issue as a bargaining chip without consulting South Korea to achieve a temporary truce.

The Lee Jae-myung administration is pursuing the modernization of the ROK-US alliance and the full restoration of ROK-China relations under the banner of pragmatic diplomacy, objectives that could potentially conflict. Simultaneously, given South Korea's stance that it can never accept North Korea as a nuclear power, it must monitor and prepare for North Korea-US dialogue, but also consider the possibility of a sudden compromise between the US and China and prepare accordingly. South Korea's pragmatic diplomacy in 2026 may face a critical test. The complex interconnections and influences among ROK-US, ROK-China, US-China, and North Korea-US relations could lead to unpredictable situations, raising concerns that South Korea may be marginalized or sacrificed. More than ever, strategic consideration and preparation are crucial for navigating diverse scenarios and solving complex equations.

First, in terms of South Korea-China relations, while restoring relations is important, it is essential to promptly restore strategic dialogues at various levels that have been suspended to prepare for unpredictable changes and secure close communication channels between the two countries. Maintaining continuous strategic dialogue between South Korea and China is necessary to gain a clearer and more objective understanding of each other's maximum expectations and minimum red lines. Through this, preventing and managing a sudden deterioration of the situation on the Korean Peninsula due to the complex challenges of external variables should be the priority task for restoring relations. ■

References

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Da Wei. 2025. “US-China Relations: Resilience and New Prospects Amidst Fierce Storms.” World Affairs. December 26. https://cn.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/2025-12/26/content_118247640.shtml

Diao Daming. 2025. “Seize the 'Script' for Shaping US-China Relations and the International Order in Our Own Hands.” World Affairs 08-29. https://cn.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/2025-08/29/content_118048563.shtml

Zuo Xiying. 2025. “The Trump Administration and the Formation of American Predatory Hegemony.” World Economy and Politics, Issue 12.

Professor Wang Jisi in conversation with former US Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg (January 15, 2026). https://m.thepaper.cn/baijiahao_32441494

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Министерство иностранных дел Китайской Народной Республики. 2025c. «Си Цзиньпин провел телефонный разговор с президентом США Трампом». 24.11. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202511/t20251124_11759124.shtml

Министерство иностранных дел Китайской Народной Республики. 2025d. «Ван И выступил с основным докладом на Международном семинаре по международной ситуации и дипломатии Китая в 2025 году». 30.12. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202512/t20251230_11790364.shtml

Министерство иностранных дел Китайской Народной Республики. 2024. «Си Цзиньпин встретился с президентом США Байденом в Лиме». 17.11. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202412/t20241218_11497766.shtml

Wu Xinbo. 2026. "The Case for a Grand Bargain Between America and China."Foreign Affairs. Jan/Feb

■ Ли Донъюль_Старший научный сотрудник EAI, профессор Университета Дондок.

■ Ответственный за публикацию и редактирование: Ли Санджун_Научный сотрудник EAI

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