[Global NK Commentary] From Regime Change to Leader Targeting: Venezuela's Crisis and North Korea's Narrowing Options

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The January 2026 incident, in which the United States arrested Venezuelan head of state Nicolás Maduro and transferred him to U.S. territory, signifies more than a singular military operation. The operation was conducted by U.S. special forces infiltrating a safe house in Caracas, Venezuela's capital, to secure President Maduro and his wife. The entire operation, from commencement to conclusion, took approximately 2 hours and 30 minutes. This operation, carried out without the prior consent of the Venezuelan government or approval from international organizations, is highly unusual in its direct military intervention against the incumbent leader of a sovereign state.

As the details of the operation became known, the U.S.'s intelligence and military capabilities were also revealed in concrete terms. It is reported that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had stationed small teams in Venezuela for several months, persistently tracking Maduro's movements, daily routines, security protocols, and frequency of changing residences. Local informants were embedded within Maduro's inner circle, providing real-time location information that was continuously updated until just before the operation. This was combined with intelligence from satellites, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and drone reconnaissance assets, allowing for a three-dimensional understanding of which buildings were actual safe houses, the structure of entry points, the deployment of security personnel, and the location of nearby air defense systems. This accumulation of intelligence efforts is assessed to have enabled the operation to be executed in an extremely short period and predicated on 'capture' rather than elimination of the target.

This incident comprehensively illustrates the extent of the changes in the U.S.'s attitude toward the rules-based international order it has long championed, its methods of foreign intervention, and its coercive strategies against leaders of adversarial nations. Notably, this operation is distinctly different from previous U.S. intervention models in that it directly neutralized the highest authority of a sovereign state without explicitly stating a goal of 'regime change.' While the overwhelming nature of U.S. military and intelligence capabilities is not new, this operation provides a different kind of shock by demonstrating that these capabilities can be directly applied not only against non-state actors or terrorist organizations but also against the incumbent leader of a sovereign state. This signifies that the U.S. has crossed the long-standing implicit taboo in international politics of 'direct military intervention against a head of state,' carrying significant policy implications.

Crucially, this incident is not confined to the Venezuelan issue. For countries in structural confrontation with the U.S., particularly authoritarian regimes like North Korea where power is concentrated in a single leader, this event is likely to be perceived not merely as diplomatic news but as empirical evidence of how U.S. threats actually operate. This paper aims to analyze the changes in U.S. coercive methods revealed by the Venezuelan incident and their international legal and strategic implications, and to examine their potential impact on North Korea's threat perception and strategic choices.

The Venezuelan Operation and the Cracks in the Rules-Based Order

The most striking feature of this operation is the change in how the U.S. interprets and utilizes international norms. Since the Cold War, the U.S. has consistently invoked normative language such as democracy, human rights, humanitarian protection, and international security to justify the use of force. Interventions in Iraq and Libya are prime examples of this logic. However, in the Venezuelan case, these value-based discourses were largely absent. Instead, the U.S. characterized Maduro as the 'leader of an international drug trafficking terrorist organization' indicted in U.S. federal court and described the operation as a high-risk law enforcement activity rather than a military action. The attempt to frame the operation as law enforcement is evident in the posting of a bounty, the presence of U.S. Department of Justice officials at the operation site, and the execution of a federal arrest warrant.

However, this explanation does not resolve the international legal questions. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter clearly prohibits the use of force and the violation of sovereignty, and the forced arrest and transfer of an incumbent head of state constitutes the most serious violation of sovereignty under customary international law. None of the existing exceptions, such as the exercise of self-defense, collective measures under a UN Security Council resolution, or highly limited humanitarian intervention, clearly apply to this case. Venezuela did not launch an armed attack against the U.S., nor was there explicit authorization from the Security Council. Even acknowledging the severe human rights abuses and democratic backsliding in Venezuela, it is difficult to consider the arrest and transfer of an incumbent head of state through military force as falling within the scope of humanitarian intervention agreed upon by the international community.

In this regard, the operation is less an 'exceptional application' of international norms and more a case demonstrating the U.S.'s political choice not to consider norms as a basis for voluntary self-restraint any longer. Considering President Trump's repeated statements that 'international law is not necessary for me, only morality is the sole restraint,' this incident shows that such thinking has moved beyond rhetoric to actual policy implementation. The message conveyed is clear: norms only function when they align with U.S. interests; otherwise, more direct means, such as military force, may be employed.

Intervention Without Regime Change: The Rise of Leader Targeting Strategy

Another notable change is the U.S.'s shift in intervention objectives from 'regime change' to 'leader targeting and management.' Even before entering politics, Trump cited the Iraq War as a prime example of failure, criticizing interventions that forcibly alter other countries' political systems as 'expensive and foolish choices.' This perspective was consistently reflected in the Venezuelan case. The U.S. did not present a post-Maduro blueprint for democratization, nor did it use issues like electoral fraud, suppression of the opposition, or media control as central justifications for intervention.

This shift is clearly evident in Trump's attitude towards opposition figures. Trump publicly stated that María Corina Machado, considered a symbolic figure of Venezuelan democratization, was 'not popular,' effectively excluding her from the alternative forces. Instead, the U.S. put Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, a close associate of Maduro, at the forefront, opting for a strategy of achieving U.S. objectives while maintaining the existing power structure. This demonstrates a choice for a management strategy that accepts the status quo rather than pursuing regime change.

This also differs from coercive diplomacy in the classical sense. While past coercive diplomacy aimed at specific policy changes in the target country, this case is different in that the target of pressure is not policy but the leader personally. The U.S. demonstrated a judgment that desired outcomes could be achieved by removing or neutralizing the individual at the apex of the regime, rather than negotiating or pressuring the entire regime. This approach minimizes costs and risks, as it can generate political effects in a short period through precise intelligence and special operations, without requiring large-scale troop deployment or long-term occupation.

North Korea's Evolving Threat Perception After the Venezuelan Incident

North Korea reacted relatively swiftly to the Venezuelan incident. On January 4th, the day after Maduro was transferred to the U.S., the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) stated that the U.S. had committed an act of 'sovereignty violation, wantonly trampling on Venezuela's sovereignty,' and that it was 'paying attention to this in connection with the increase in instability that may arise in the regional situation.' Subsequently, on January 5th, Kim Jong Un stated that 'various international incidents explain the need to enhance the nuclear war deterrence,' and it is entirely plausible to interpret that the Venezuelan incident was considered in the background of this statement.

From North Korea's perspective, the most immediate message would have been the U.S.'s military capabilities themselves. The fact that the U.S. could pinpoint the exact location of an incumbent head of state and deploy special forces to capture, not eliminate, him is not a distant concern. Given the nature of the North Korean regime, where all core authority is concentrated in the hands of the supreme leader, it is highly probable that North Korea indirectly confirmed through this incident that the U.S. could execute a 'key command decapitation operation' targeting the leader in the event of any military conflict. The Venezuelan incident served as a stark reminder to North Korea that precision and intelligence can be more lethal than the sheer size of military power.

Another factor that has alarmed North Korea is the realization that the perception that the U.S. has historically limited itself through existing norms and international law is no longer valid. In 2017, Trump did not hesitate to use expressions like 'fire and fury' and 'totally destroy' towards North Korea, and in September of the same year, he deployed three aircraft carrier strike groups to the East Sea and conducted large-scale joint air force exercises. While these were mere words and threats at the time, the Venezuelan incident likely made North Korea keenly aware that the U.S. could actually take action if it deemed it necessary.

Furthermore, the fact that this operation demonstrated a response strategy against an adversary that replaces only the leader, rather than aiming for regime change, requires North Korea to make new calculations. Unlike Iraq or Libya, North Korea does not have the conditions to accommodate large-scale anti-government forces or external occupation. However, if the strategy is to eliminate only the leader while preserving the existing elite structure, a calculation can be made that relative stability can be achieved quickly, even if short-term chaos is endured. This perception could exert considerable pressure on Kim Jong Un personally and is likely to lead to an even greater emphasis on nuclear weapons.

The Paradox of Nuclear Deterrence: North Korea's Narrowing Strategic Options

The Venezuelan incident is a symbolic event demonstrating a shift in the nature of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. no longer acts solely as an actor that self-restrains through norms; instead, it is utilizing more pragmatic means such as leader targeting and selective coercion, rather than the high-cost strategy of regime change. These changes are increasing uncertainty in the overall international order and hold the potential to fundamentally reshape the threat perceptions of countries in adversarial relations with the U.S.

In North Korea's case, this incident may be perceived in the short term as reinforcing the necessity of nuclear deterrence, given that it has demonstrated the U.S.'s willingness to actually use military force without being bound by international norms or diplomatic procedures. However, in the medium to long term, North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is increasingly likely to function not as a guarantor of regime security but as a constraint that narrows North Korea's own strategic options.

Nuclear armament has served as a means for North Korea to deter direct U.S. intervention, but it has simultaneously resulted in North Korea being entrenched as a 'nuclear threat to be managed.' Consequently, North Korea is consistently treated as an exceptional and provisional entity, rather than expanding its diplomatic space as a normal state. As long as it possesses nuclear weapons, North Korea conveys the perception to the U.S. and the international community that it could become a target for leader targeting or limited military coercion at any time, even if not a target for regime change.

Moreover, nuclear weapons structurally limit North Korea's strategic flexibility. As long as it does not abandon its nuclear program, sanctions relief and integration into the international financial and economic order will remain limited. Conversely, the more it advances its nuclear capabilities, the more its relationship with the U.S. becomes entrenched as a 'management case' or a 'risk factor.' This means that rather than providing North Korea with freedom of choice, nuclear weapons are increasingly acting to narrow its options in all areas: diplomatic, economic, and military.

The warning from the Venezuelan incident to North Korea lies precisely here. In an era where force precedes words, North Korea, possessing nuclear weapons, is not an actor that has secured deterrence but rather the target of the most precise surveillance and coercion. From the U.S. perspective, North Korea's nuclear weapons are not a basis for negotiation but a risk to be managed, and a target to be eliminated or neutralized if necessary. In this context, North Korea's nuclear card is likely to function not as insurance for regime survival but as a burden that continuously exposes the regime to crisis situations.

Ultimately, the options facing North Korea after the Venezuelan incident are becoming clearer. The more it clings to nuclear weapons, the more precise U.S. coercive strategies become, and the narrower North Korea's strategic space gets. Conversely, unless it reduces the nuclear issue to a manageable level, North Korea risks being perceived not as a 'dialogue partner' but as a 'target for action at any time.' Depending on how Kim Jong Un interprets the Venezuelan incident, North Korea's options may shrink further, or perhaps change within limited parameters. What is clear, however, is that nuclear weapons no longer grant North Korea freedom. ■

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Glennon, Michael. Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.

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■ Park Won-gon, Director of EAI Center for North Korean Studies, Professor at Ewha Womans University.

■ Responsible and Edited by: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow

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