[Global NK Commentary] The Gyeongju APEC, South Korea's Nuclear-Powered Submarine, and North Korea's Complex Inner Thoughts

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Since the establishment of the South Korean government in 1948, South Korea has traditionally excelled in bilateral diplomacy, primarily with the United States and Japan. Around 1990, the world changed, ushering in an international order where the Cold War structure collapsed. In short, the necessity of multilateral diplomacy, in addition to existing bilateral diplomacy, became acutely felt. Nevertheless, considering that the ROK-U.S. alliance is the most crucial diplomatic and security asset for a divided nation, multilateral forums dealing with security issues were burdensome in many respects. Ultimately, APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), which accounts for 40% of the global population and 60% of global GDP, was a highly attractive stage. South Korea has actively participated in APEC activities since its founding in 1989, collaborating with countries such as Australia, the United States, Canada, and Japan.

The key challenge now is how to effectively consolidate the fruits of South Korea's diplomatic endeavors, unveiled at the 2025 APEC Summit in Gyeongju. It is customary in the international arena for various bilateral diplomatic activities to unfold intensely before and after major multilateral diplomatic events. President Lee Jae-myung reportedly held a total of 13 bilateral summit meetings during the APEC period. Among these, the ROK-U.S. summit, the second since the current administration took office, and the ROK-China summit with President Xi Jinping, who visited South Korea for the first time in 11 years, hold particular significance. While it is difficult to summarize their outcomes and limitations in a single statement, stable ROK-U.S.-China relations are arguably the most critical factor for the fate of the Korean Peninsula from the perspective of South Korea's national interests. These ROK-U.S. and ROK-China summits have presented significant diplomatic agendas for the Korean Peninsula issue, and North Korea's internal reactions to these developments are presumed to be highly complex.

First, in their second summit since last August, President Lee Jae-myung and President Trump agreed on South Korea's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. President Lee Jae-myung publicly requested the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines from President Trump during the summit, and President Trump gave his final approval shortly thereafter. Initially, President Trump's approval seemed to be predicated on construction at a shipyard in Philadelphia, USA; however, due to various practical difficulties, both the South Korean and U.S. governments are reportedly now in agreement on construction within South Korea. At the time, President Lee Jae-myung clearly stated in front of the South Korean public and media that "diesel submarines have limited submerged capabilities, making it difficult to track North Korean or Chinese submarines." This statement could have easily provoked an open backlash from China and North Korea; however, the Chinese government responded the following day by stating its hope that the NPT regime would be maintained in the Northeast Asian region, thereby preempting potential diplomatic friction.

The issue lies in North Korea's complex position and calculations. North Korea has not yet issued any statement regarding this matter, and it is likely that they will find it difficult to find logical grounds to openly criticize the South Korean government. China is a nuclear-weapon state recognized within the NPT framework, whereas North Korea's success in developing nuclear weapons is a case of violating the rules of the NPT regime and repeating numerous deceptions to the international community over the past 30 years. Although the modification of the ROK-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement is necessary for the successful operation of nuclear-powered submarines by the South Korean government, as it implies the military use of nuclear fuel, it does not violate the obligations of the NPT regime as it is still premised on the deployment of conventional weapons. However, the successful operation of submarines requires a stable supply of nuclear fuel, and there is a possibility that the South Korean government may request indigenous fuel production from the United States in this process, indicating that sophisticated negotiations between South Korea and the U.S. lie ahead. North Korea, fully aware of this series of events, is likely contemplating the potential loss of its exclusive status in asymmetric weaponry, which it has maintained through nuclear weapons, as nuclear-powered submarines represent a clearly symbolic asymmetric capability in a narrow operational area like the Korean Peninsula.

Second, the ROK-China summit also appears to have presented significant strategic considerations for North Korea. President Xi Jinping appeared alongside Chairman Kim Jong-un at Tiananmen Square during the Victory Day celebrations in early September. Furthermore, the trilateral meeting of North Korean, Chinese, and Russian leaders, along with Russian President Putin, likely led North Korea to believe it had secured a highly significant diplomatic and security space. However, less than two months later, President Xi Jinping visited South Korea for the first time in 11 years, and during the ROK-China summit, both countries pledged cooperation in future areas for the peace and prosperity of not only their bilateral relations but also the international community, including AI. Despite the complex and subtle interplay of interests between North Korea and China, China has been a steadfast supporter enabling North Korea to withstand international economic sanctions. Notably, during the period of North Korea-U.S. summit diplomacy in 2018, the leaders of North Korea and China met five times in a year and a half, reaffirming their strategic cooperation. From North Korea's perspective, it had to witness the successful hosting of the ROK-China summit at a time when it believed trilateral cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia was stronger than ever before.

Third, a U.S.-China summit was also held at the Gyeongju APEC meeting. This situation is also presumed to have been highly uncomfortable for North Korea. This is because the roles of the United States and China are critically important for resolving issues on the Korean Peninsula, including eventual unification. Busan is located at the eastern end of the Eurasian continent and simultaneously at the western edge of the Pacific Ocean. The meeting between the leaders of China, the giant of the continent, and the United States, the giant of the Pacific, here seemed to symbolize the fate of South Korea, caught between these two superpowers. However, the U.S.-China summit held in Busan also demonstrated South Korea's superior position relative to North Korea in resolving the Korean Peninsula issue. While a U.S.-China summit in Pyongyang is theoretically possible, it is realistically unimaginable, at least for the foreseeable future. To reiterate, it is no exaggeration to say that almost all of South Korea's national interests, including the North Korean issue, depend on successful ROK-U.S.-China relations.

Since the advent of modernity, all nations have set two goals: economic development and political development. South Korea is no exception; despite having only human resources, it has achieved successful economic growth and political development, representing over 50 Asian countries. Given that over 80% of South Korea's GDP is generated through trade, the maintenance of the liberal international order is of paramount importance to South Korea. From this perspective, the achievements of the South Korean government through the Gyeongju APEC appear substantial. Ultimately, accurately analyzing North Korea's strategic calculations and pursuing successful diplomatic policies linked to them is crucial. Diplomacy, after all, is an extension of domestic affairs, making this a moment when national wisdom for the post-APEC era is more urgently needed. ■

■ Park In-hwi_Dean, Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Lee Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr