[Global NK Commentary] The Reshaping of the World Order After China's Victory Day and North Korea's Rise: Options for South Korean Diplomacy

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The China Victory Day event held in Beijing on September 3rd and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit held in Tianjin from August 31st to September 1st are noteworthy for the increasing visibility of movements criticizing the US-led liberal international order. The Tianjin meeting was the largest in SCO's history, attended by heads of state from over 20 countries and leaders of 10 international organizations. Of particular interest was the attendance of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which raised many discussions about the direction of India's foreign policy amidst the Trump administration's tariff pressure on India. The US had previously imposed an additional 25% tariff on Indian imports of Russian crude oil, bringing the total to 50%. Although India had been in conflict with China over border disputes, it showed a shift towards a balancing diplomacy, cooperating with China amidst tensions in US-India relations. The Tianjin meeting strongly demonstrated China and Russia's will to build a new multi-polar system challenging the existing international order, and the adopted Tianjin Declaration signaled India's potential participation in anti-Western solidarity, as it opposed the existing US-centric order.

India, as a participant in the Quad, likely did not attend the Victory Day parade considering its future relations with the US and Japan, and because its views on historical interpretation do not necessarily align with China's. Nevertheless, the Victory Day celebrations, held consecutively after the Tianjin meeting, are of great interest as they collectively present an alternative to the US-led international order. Heads of state from countries representing half of the world's population participated in these two events. While many democratic nations were also present, the fact that authoritarian powers, including China, Russia, and North Korea, led the meetings clearly contrasts with the solidarity of liberal democratic nations. Furthermore, the participation of heads of state from five of the world's nine nuclear-armed countries holds significant military implications. The attendance of Iran, known to be close to developing nuclear weapons, is also noteworthy.

While past authoritarian solidarity was often confined to abstract principles or political discourse, the two events led by China demonstrated that the solidarity of authoritarian states is evolving beyond mere diplomatic rhetoric into a substantive pillar of global governance. In particular, the weapons displayed at the military parade confirmed that authoritarian solidarity can be backed by formidable military power. China has moved beyond the position of a follower trailing the US in advanced weapons production to become a leader in developing new weaponry.

However, the visions for the world order and the specific national interests among these countries do not fully align. Russia, while declaring the advent of a new global order, strongly criticized the existing Eurocentric order. This assertion is reminiscent of President Putin's declaration of a 'new world order' during his visit to Beijing in February 2022, and in that vein, Russia claimed its invasion of Ukraine was a legitimate response to Western-backed coups. The support for this narrative from many heads of state indicates that authoritarian solidarity is not merely diplomatic rhetoric but a substantive process of power consolidation that fundamentally questions the legitimacy of the existing international order. China, too, emphasized its opposition to US unilateral actions and advocated for a more just and equitable multipolar order. However, unlike Russia, China has not explicitly repudiated fundamental norms of the current international order, such as respect for other nations' sovereignty and nuclear non-proliferation. China, aiming to emerge as a leader in the future international order, emphasizes the importance of international organizations like the UN and seeks to strengthen its image as a more legitimate leader than the US by embracing existing international norms.

China has maintained a reserved stance on Russia's invasion of Ukraine and has not explicitly rejected international sanctions on North Korea's nuclear weapons development. Despite projections of advancing trilateral relations among China, Russia, and North Korea, China has engaged in bilateral meetings with North Korea and Russia but has not pursued trilateral meetings or institutionalized trilateral relations. China has focused on consolidating its advantage in its strategic competition with the US, gathering countries that share its vision and interests and require its assistance, thereby signaling the beginning of a new world order. This suggests that authoritarian solidarity is evolving into an international political order backed by military capabilities. If this solidarity continues to compete militarily with the US-led liberal alliance, it indicates that we are entering a phase where the US's unilateral victory is no longer predictable.

US Hegemonic Readjustment Strategy and Future Uncertainties

The United States is currently attempting a strategy of hegemonic readjustment. On one hand, it seeks to restore the economic foundations of its hegemony, and on the other, it is adjusting its foreign intervention priorities to strengthen US leadership. However, these attempts at change on both fronts are undermining the foundations of the international order. The process of reorganizing the liberal order based on unipolar US hegemony is exacerbating the overall instability of the order. The US strategy is being pursued with three logics that are not necessarily cooperative. The first is the logic of the US military strategy community, which seeks to maintain US hegemony while securing global influence. This strategy, which promotes the Indo-Pacific strategy, strongly counters China, and emphasizes alliances, is an attempt to preserve US military hegemony. The second is the economic logic championed by President Trump. It aims to rebuild the economic foundation of US hegemony through tariffs, increased domestic investment, and new technology investments, and ultimately to secure economic hegemony itself. This approach prioritizes the economy as a basis for military power but conflicts with the first logic due to pressure on allies. The third logic stems from President Trump's personal perspective. He views international relations as a business transaction, prioritizing economic interests over traditional diplomatic and military means. Conflict resolution often involves unconventional calculations, and personal achievements, such as winning a Nobel Prize, serve as significant motivators.

Depending on the future success of the US hegemonic readjustment strategy, the future of the US-led order can be predicted in several ways. First, the US restores its economic base and revives the liberal order led by unipolar hegemony. Second, liberal states, excluding the US, cooperate to build a multilateral liberal order. Third, the US itself evolves to accept a multilateral liberal order, dispersing responsibility and authority. This third scenario can be considered the most desirable path.

Regardless of the future of the liberal camp, a scenario pursuing a non-liberal order, excluding the US, is also materializing. As seen at the Victory Day event, authoritarian states like China and Russia are showing a tendency to form a hierarchical and exclusive order, even while maintaining the facade of multilateralism. In an intermediate stage, a path may emerge that professes multilateralism but actually converges towards an authoritarian order.

Ultimately, a multi-regional world may emerge where different orders coexist without a single established order. Each order will reflect its unique historical context and ideological underpinnings, and is likely to evolve into regionalized forms beyond a simple international order.

The Future of the North Korean Nuclear Issue Amidst Authoritarian Solidarity and South Korea's Response

Within this process of international order transformation, the North Korean issue has become even more significant with Kim Jong Un's participation in the Victory Day event. North Korea's participation is not confined to bilateral North-China relations or trilateral North-China-Russia relations. It demonstrates North Korea's participation as a member in the efforts of new states to form an order opposing the US. While democratic nations are experiencing domestic regression and observing the decline of the liberal international order, an ironic phenomenon is occurring where authoritarian and dictatorial states are advocating for the democratization of the international order and presenting themselves as guardians of legitimacy and equality. In this context, North Korea is bound to be emboldened and will gain confidence that it is a legitimate member of the new order. North Korea will strive to promote the perception of being an indispensable ally within the authoritarian solidarity, rather than seeking negotiations with South Korea or the US, and will intensify its diplomacy to enhance its importance within the hierarchy of this solidarity.

North Korea may judge that its possession of nuclear weapons is not merely legitimized by the acquiescence of China and Russia, but that the non-proliferation regime itself is weakening, thereby invalidating international sanctions and discourse on illegality. It may believe that UN sanctions can also be re-examined under new criteria and harbors expectations of securing international status and tangible benefits as a member of the authoritarian bloc. North Korean diplomacy is highly likely to shift towards an aggressive approach that pursues both nuclear armament and economic development within the framework of authoritarian solidarity.

In this situation, the fundamental premises for North Korean denuclearization are likely to be significantly shaken. In the past, it was assumed that denuclearization was principally legitimate within the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework, that UN sanctions would be maintained, and that China would largely accept this. There was also an expectation that China would cooperate with North Korean denuclearization if US-China relations eased. However, if the framework of the liberal international order weakens and authoritarian solidarity gains strength, these premises will no longer hold true. Ultimately, the North Korean nuclear issue is shifting from a matter of arms control talks or denuclearization negotiations to an issue that must be discussed within the context of a fundamental reshaping of the international order.

Just as many participants in the Victory Day event supported Putin's justification of the invasion of Ukraine as a response to Western-backed coups, North Korea may anticipate gaining similar recognition in the international community. This provides North Korea with a basis to strengthen its strategic position within the new global governance and legitimize its possession of nuclear weapons as a legitimate means of self-defense.

While there are predictions that Trump-style small-deal diplomacy could serve as a stepping stone for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, premature optimism is unwarranted. Trump's diplomacy is akin to business transactions and is limited by its disregard for diplomacy and military means, which are essential tools of international politics. Even if a small deal is reached, it is unlikely to fundamentally alter the strategic environment of the Korean Peninsula and could have significant ripple effects, such as domestic political division or the suspension of joint military exercises.

Within these structural changes, it is crucial to remember that South Korea's denuclearization efforts cannot be achieved solely through inter-Korean or North Korea-US bilateral approaches. North Korea is enhancing its strategic position within global governance and is adjusting its nuclear development and diplomatic stance based on the trajectory of the liberal order. Therefore, South Korea must first consider what kind of future outlook it will present for the international order and how it will lead the overall diplomatic landscape. Through the alliance with the US and solidarity with liberal nations, South Korea should monitor the authoritarian bloc and pursue a strategy of conflict mitigation through an ideal international order. Based on this, it must meticulously calculate the possibility of North Korean denuclearization.

While North Korea's current doctrine of two hostile states towards South Korea may be valid for now, it is conceivable that this could change again if the international order shifts and the balance of power between blocs changes. Leveraging the advantage of authoritarian solidarity, North Korea could potentially re-engage in unification efforts towards South Korea, and its attitude towards South Korea would change if its military strength, national power, and diplomatic capabilities are enhanced.

Ultimately, North Korea's vision for unification is formulated based on the balance of power. South Korea must not be swayed by this but should closely observe the direction of the international order and proactively formulate its own strategy for the future of the Korean Peninsula and unification. The South Korean government's policies must be adjusted to address denuclearization and unification issues from a long-term, structural perspective amidst the changing international order. What is needed now is not a short-term solution, but an active and independent strategic conception of the international order and unification vision that South Korea aims for. ■

■ Jeon Jae-sung_EAI President; Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Responsible for and edited by: Oh In-hwan_Senior Researcher, EAI; Chung Jong-hyuk_Research Fellow, Korea National Diplomatic Academy
omatic Academy
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