[The 21st Presidential Election and Korean Democracy: Crisis, Division, and Realignment] ⑦ The Dissolution of the 6070 Conservative Alliance and the Roots of the 4050 Pro-Democratic Party Voting Tendency

I. Introduction

This chapter examines the influence of martial law and impeachment among generations other than the 2030 cohort in the 21st presidential election, and their voting behavior in the election. Utilizing the analysis of the 21st presidential election's voter sentiment, commissioned by the East Asia Institute from Korea Research and conducted on June 4-5, 2025, along with other available survey data, this chapter compares generational voting patterns in the 21st and 20th presidential elections. It highlights the necessity for a detailed analysis of the voting behavior of generations other than the 2030 cohort, specifically the 4050 and 6070 generations. While recent years have seen a focus on the gender conflict within the 2030 generation in Korean society, leading to concentrated attention on generational voting within this demographic, the results of the last two presidential elections reveal several noteworthy phenomena in generational voting.

First, comparing the generational voting patterns confirmed in the 2022 and 2025 exit polls, the U-shaped curve of generational voting, which has strengthened since the mid-2010s, has been maintained. In the 20th presidential election (Figure 1), the 4050 generation, which is the focus of this chapter, showed a preference for the Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung; the 2030 generation showed a tight contest between Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol; and the 6070 generation showed a clear preference for Yoon Suk-yeol. Among the 40s, Lee Jae-myung received 61% support versus Yoon Suk-yeol's 35%; among the 50s, Lee Jae-myung received 52% support versus Yoon Suk-yeol's 44%, indicating a preference for Lee Jae-myung. In the 20s, Lee Jae-myung garnered 48% support versus Yoon Suk-yeol's 46%; in the 30s, it was a very close race with Lee Jae-myung at 46% and Yoon Suk-yeol at 48%. In contrast, among the 60s, Lee Jae-myung received 33% support versus Yoon Suk-yeol's 65%; among those aged 70 and above, Lee Jae-myung received 29% support versus Yoon Suk-yeol's 70%, showing a clear preference for the conservative candidate.

In the 21st presidential election exit polls by the three major broadcasters (Figure 2), support for the Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung was overwhelming among the 40s (72.7%) and 50s (69.8%), while support for the People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo was only 22.2% and 25.9%, respectively. The intensity of support for Lee Jae-myung, who is pro-Democratic Party, has strengthened compared to the 20th presidential election. The most noticeable change, however, is among the 60s. Among those aged 70 and above, Kim Moon-soo received 64% support, overwhelming Lee Jae-myung's 34%, and while the intensity of support for the conservative candidate has weakened compared to the last election, it still demonstrated a strong pro-conservative generational characteristic. However, among the 60s, who overwhelmingly supported the People Power Party's Yoon Suk-yeol in the last election, the support for the Democratic Party's Lee Jae-myung and the People Power Party's Kim Moon-soo was neck and neck at 48% versus 49%. Meanwhile, the 2030 generation, which saw a very close contest between Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol in the last election, continues to show a competitive landscape in terms of support for Lee Jae-myung versus non-Lee Jae-myung candidates. However, a notable feature is the dispersion of non-Lee Jae-myung votes between Kim Moon-soo and the Progressive Party's Lee Jun-seok. While Lee Jae-myung's support rates in the 20s and 30s were 41% and 48%, respectively, surpassing Kim Moon-soo's 31% and 33%, the competitive landscape can be considered maintained when adding the support for the Progressive Party's Lee Jun-seok at 24% and 18%.

[Figure 1] Generational Voting in the 20th Presidential Election (%), [Figure 2] Generational Voting Patterns in the 21st Presidential Election (%)

Source: 2022 Presidential Election Three Major Broadcasters' Exit Polls, Source: 2025 Presidential Election Three Major Broadcasters' Exit Polls

From the perspective of generational gender voting in Figures 3 and 4, there are clear differences in voting tendencies between men and women in the 2030 generation, whereas there are no differences in support for candidates between genders in the 4050 and 6070 generations. However, the 30s are noteworthy. Comparing generational gender voting trends during the 20th presidential election, the gender gap was mainly concentrated in the 20s, but in the 21st presidential election, the difference in voting behavior between men and women became clear not only in the 20s but also in the 30s.[1] In the 20th presidential election, the gender gap among 20-somethings was -22%p for Lee Jae-myung's support rate and +25%p for Yoon Suk-yeol's support rate. In the 21st presidential election, the gap widened to -34%p for Lee Jae-myung's support rate and +12%p for Kim Moon-soo's support rate, with an additional +27%p difference for Lee Jun-seok's support rate. In contrast, the gender gap among 30-somethings was only -7%p for Lee Jae-myung's support rate and +9%p for Yoon Suk-yeol's support rate in the 20th presidential election. However, in the 21st presidential election, the gap widened to -19%p for Lee Jae-myung's support rate, +4%p for Kim Moon-soo, and +17%p for Lee Jun-seok's support rate.[2][2]

[Figure 3] Generational x Gender Voting in the 20th Presidential Election (%), [Figure 4] Generational x Gender Voting in the 21st Presidential Election (%)[3]

Source: 2022 Presidential Election Three Major Broadcasters' Exit Polls, Source: 2025 Presidential Election Three Major Broadcasters' Exit Polls

These changes in generational voting raise several research questions. First, the consistent pro-Democratic Party political orientation and voting behavior observed in the 4050 generation are of research interest in themselves. Why do the 4050 generation exhibit such a consistent pro-Democratic Party orientation? Second, within the 6070 generation, traditionally considered the base of conservative support in Korean society, the tendency to support conservative candidates remained strong among those aged 70 and above, similar to the 4050 generation's pro-Democratic Party stance. However, among the 60s, support for Lee Jae-myung increased significantly compared to the previous election. This election shows clear signs of the dissolution of the 6070 conservative alliance. Why is there an erosion of the conservative base among the 60s? Is this a temporary phenomenon or a structural one? Third, what is the reason for the spread of the gender voting divide among the youth generation, symbolized by the conflict between '20s men' and '20s women'?

This chapter comprehensively examines three significant changes in generational political behavior (① strengthening of the pro-Democratic tendency among the 4050 generation, ② dissolution of the 6070 conservative alliance, and ③ expansion of gender conflict among the 20s). To empirically analyze the factors behind these changes, we will focus on the 'ACP effect (Aging, Cohort, Period)' related to age effects. In generational voting research, one perspective argues for the 'aging effect,' suggesting that political orientations change with age, while the 'cohort effect' theory posits that political orientations imprinted during formative years are maintained as individuals age. Period effects, on the other hand, refer to simultaneous attitude changes that affect entire generations, not just specific age groups or cohorts, such as the 'end of the Cold War' or the '9/11 terrorist attacks' (Kang Won-taek 2010; Park Won-ho 2013; Bhatti and Hansen 2012; Mannheim 1997; Tilley and Evance 2013).

In Korea, explanations based on cohort effects typically define the 6070 generation as the 'war, Yushin, and industrialization generation' and describe them as having conservative tendencies, or define the generations born in the 1960s and 1970s as the '386 generation' or 'Roh Moo-hyun generation' and describe them as having progressive/pro-Democratic Party tendencies. Meanwhile, the influence of issues such as 'martial law and impeachment,' including the martial law of December 3, 2024, and the Constitutional Court's impeachment ruling in 2025, can also be seen as a type of 'period effect' that has influenced recent changes in generational political behavior (Noh Hwan-hee et al. 2013; Park Jae-hong 2009; Bae Jin-seok 2022; Lee Sang-shin et al. 2020; Jeong Han-wool 2020; Heo Seok-jae 2014).

Finally, we will focus on the observation that the widening gender voting gap among the 20s is spreading to other generations, which may be a product of social changes where feminist attitudes, influencing gender voting, are spreading beyond the 20s to other generations. Although separate research is needed, the process of conservatism among '20s men' can be seen as originating from antipathy towards feminism, leading to backlash against President Moon Jae-in and the Democratic Party, who declared themselves 'feminist presidents,' and subsequently adopting an ideological conservative identity in policy preferences (Kook Seung-min et al. 2022; Cheon Kwan-yul & Jeong Han-wool 2019).[4]

II. Changes in Generational Alliances During the Martial Law and Impeachment Phases

1. The 22nd Presidential Election and Generational Voting

First, using the presidential election sentiment analysis survey by the East Asia Institute and other survey data, we confirm the phenomenon of strengthening pro-Democratic tendencies among the 4050 generation and the decoupling phenomenon between the 60s and 70s observed in the exit polls. In Table 1, which shows the supported candidates among respondents who answered they voted in the 2022 presidential election, broken down by age group (1,238 respondents), a competitive landscape was observed among the 2030 generation, with the support rate gap between Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol being less than 10%p (28-31% for Lee Jae-myung and 28-31% for Yoon Suk-yeol), and the undecided/unresponsive group being the most fluid at 24-33%. In contrast, among the 4050 generation, Lee Jae-myung's support rate (52%) was nearly double that of Yoon Suk-yeol's support (24-30%), showing a clear advantage. In the case of the 6070 generation, Yoon Suk-yeol's support rate (45-68%) was close to or exceeded a majority at this point, while Lee Jae-myung's support rate was low at 22-37%, indicating that the conservative support alliance of the 6070 generation was in effect.[5]

However, in the 21st presidential election in 2025 (Table 2), several changes are confirmed, as discussed earlier. First, among the 4050 generation, Lee Jae-myung's support rate (60% each) significantly surpassed the People Power Party's Kim Moon-soo support (20-26%). While the 20s generation remained competitive (Lee Jae-myung 25%, Kim Moon-soo 27%, Lee Jun-seok 18%, Kwon Young-guk 3%), the 30s generation also showed a strengthening pro-Democratic tendency, with Lee Jae-myung's support rate rising to 46%. The departure of support from the 60s is clearly confirmed in this survey as well. Among the 70s, 60% supported Kim Moon-soo and 30% supported Lee Jae-myung, a two-fold difference. However, among the 60s, 45% supported Lee Jae-myung, 42% supported Kim Moon-soo, and 2% supported Lee Jun-seok, making Lee Jae-myung's support rate comparable to the conservative candidate's support rate.

[Table 1] Supported Candidate in the 20th Presidential Election by Age Group (1,238 Voting Respondents)

EAI·Korea Research <Analysis of Voting Intentions in the 20th Presidential Election>

[Table 2] Preferred Candidate in the 21st Presidential Election by Age Group (Respondents Who Voted: 1,310)

EAI·Korea Research <Analysis of the 21st Presidential Election Voting Intent>

Generational political tendencies are also clearly confirmed in perceptions of candidates. [Figure 5] shows the results of evaluating the favorability of candidates Lee Jae-myung, Kim Moon-soo, and Lee Jun-seok on a scale of 0-10 (0 points very unfavorable ~ 5 points neutral ~ 10 points very favorable).

In the 40s and 50s, only Lee Jae-myung received a favorability score of 6.0 and 5.5, indicating favorability, while Kim Moon-soo received lower scores of 3.2 and 3.5, and Lee Jun-seok received very cold scores of 2.8 and 2.5. Among the 30s, who competed with the 20s in supporting candidates from both camps, Lee Jae-myung led with a favorability score of 5.0, surpassing the margin of error over Kim Moon-soo's 3.0 and Lee Jun-seok's 3.1. Conversely, among those aged 70 and above, reflecting the base of conservative politics, Kim Moon-soo received a favorability score of 5.9, Lee Jae-myung 3.3, and Lee Jun-seok 2.9, showing a clear pro-Kim Moon-soo sentiment.

The 20s and 60s also showed competition in their attitudes toward the candidates. In the 20s, Lee Jae-myung scored 4.2, Lee Jun-seok 4.1, and Kim Moon-soo 3.9, indicating an extremely close race within the margin of error. In contrast, in the 60s, Lee Jae-myung's favorability score was 4.4 and Kim Moon-soo's was 4.5, showing an extremely close race, while Lee Jun-seok scored only 2.9. This indicates that among the strong 60s and 70s demographic, Lee Jun-seok is perceived as unfavorably as Lee Jae-myung.

[Figure 5] Candidate Favorability by Generation (0 points Very Unfavorable ~ 5 points Neutral ~ 10 points Very Favorable)

Source: EAI·Korea Research <Analysis of the 21st Presidential Election Voting Intent>

As shown in [Figure 6], regarding the issues (1st and 2nd priority) that influenced the decision to support a candidate, the highest number of responses overall was "Yoon Suk-yeol government's emergency martial law and impeachment phase," accounting for 58% of the total responses (total 200% for multiple responses). Responses citing "Lee Jae-myung's moral and legal risks" accounted for 47% of total response cases, "Lee Jae-myung's emphasis on cooperation with China" 35%, "Kim Moon-soo and Han Duck-soo's unification and presidential primary process" 32%, "Lee Jun-seok's third-way independent path and criticism of the two-party system" 12%, "Lee Jun-seok's youth policies" 9%, and "Other" 7% (Total 200%).

Examining the actual voting candidates for each selected issue confirms which issue was favorable to whom. For "martial law and impeachment," 71% of respondents who cited this issue supported Lee Jae-myung, while 57% of those who chose "Lee Jae-myung's emphasis on cooperation with China" and 53% of those who chose "Kim Moon-soo and Han Duck-soo's unification and presidential primary process" supported Lee Jae-myung, with Kim Moon-soo receiving only 33% support. Conversely, 62% of those who selected "Lee Jae-myung's moral controversy and legal risks" supported Kim Moon-soo. For "Lee Jun-seok's third-way independent path," Kim Moon-soo received 38% support, Lee Jae-myung 32%, and Lee Jun-seok 20%. Those who selected "Lee Jun-seok's youth policies" showed 36% support for Lee Jun-seok and 17% for Lee Jae-myung. Lee Jae-myung appears to have led in support driven by the overwhelming influence of the martial law and impeachment issue. Kim Moon-soo did not gain support from any issue other than negative issues concerning opposing candidates. Instead, Lee Jun-seok demonstrated his presence by generating votes through his independent path and youth policies.

[Figure 6] Issues Influencing Support for Presidential Candidates: Combined 1st + 2nd Priority, %)

Source: EAI·Korea Research <Analysis of the 21st Presidential Election Voting Intent>

[Table 3] Presidential Support by Issue Influencing Decision: Multiple Responses

Source: EAI·Korea Research <Analysis of the 21st Presidential Election Vote>

Interestingly, the 20s and 30s age group showed an equal proportion of responses for issues favorable to the Democratic Party, such as "state of emergency and impeachment," and conservative-leaning issues, such as "candidate Lee Jae-myung's morality and legal risks." The proportion of respondents who chose "candidate Lee Jun-seok's independent path in the third zone" or "candidate Lee Jun-seok's youth policy" was higher than in other age groups. In contrast, the 40s and 50s age group overwhelmingly chose "the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's declaration of a state of emergency and impeachment process" (40s: 63%, 50s: 70%), suggesting it became an overwhelming factor for supporting the Democratic Party. Among those in their 70s, the proportion who chose "candidate Lee Jae-myung's morality controversy and legal risks," which serves as the justification for supporting the People Power Party, was the highest at 69%. However, for those in their 60s, the most influential issue was "state of emergency and impeachment" (60%), and simultaneously, the proportion who chose "candidate Lee Jae-myung's morality and legal risks," a factor that strengthened anti-Democratic Party voting, was also high at 54%. The fact that a considerable number of voters in their 60s shifted their support to candidate Lee Jae-myung, not unlike their support for candidate Kim Moon-soo, appears to be due to a significant portion of this age group reacting to the "state of emergency and impeachment" issue.

[Table 4] Analysis of Top 1+2 Priority Factors for Deciding Candidate Support by Age Group (Multiple Responses)

Source: EAI·Korea Research <Analysis of Voting Behavior in the 21st Presidential Election>

2. Generational Shifts in Party Support

In the presidential election, the generational divide in party support was clearly reflected in the pattern where the 40s and 50s leaned towards the Democratic Party, the 70s towards the People Power Party, and the 20s, 30s, and 60s were in a competitive range between pro-Democratic and anti-Democratic leanings. Figure 7, showing party support by generation, indicates that the Democratic Party held an advantage with 53% support among the 40s and 49% among the 50s. When combined with the 8% and 11% support for the Cho Kuk Innovation Party, respectively, and the support for the Progressive Party, the proportion supporting the broader pro-Democratic/progressive camp was overwhelming. Support for the People Power Party was 17% and 23%, respectively, and support for the Reform Party was around 3% for both age groups.

Among the 20s and 30s, support for the Democratic Party was 33% and 43%, respectively, falling short of the levels seen in the 40s and 50s. Support for the People Power Party was also only around 17% and 21%. However, a notable characteristic of the 20s and 30s was a higher proportion of support for the Reform Party (20% for the 20s, 10% for the 30s) and a higher rate of unaffiliated voters (21% for the 20s, 20% for the 30s) compared to other generations. It is noteworthy that differences in party support are also emerging between the 60s and 70s. Among those aged 70 and above, support for the People Power Party was 57% and for the Reform Party was 3%, while support for the Democratic Party was only 26%, for the Cho Kuk Innovation Party 2%, and for the Progressive Party 2%, with unaffiliated voters at around 10%. This clearly indicated a continued base of support for the People Power Party. In contrast, among the 60s, support for the Democratic Party was 34%, for the Cho Kuk Innovation Party 10%, and for the Progressive Party 1%, totaling 45% for the broader pro-Democratic parties. Support for conservative parties, including the People Power Party at 37% and the Reform Party at 5%, plus others at 1%, summed to only 43%, showing a distinct difference from their past base of support for conservative parties.

[Figure 7] Distribution of Party Support by Generation (%)

Source: EAI·Korea Research <Analysis of Voter Sentiment in the 21st Presidential Election>

These shifts in generational division patterns appear to be the cumulative result of continuous changes in party support coalitions over the past five years. Figure 8 illustrates the annual trends in party support rates from the National Basic Survey (NBS), aggregated from July 2020 to August 2025. Until the 2020 general election, the Democratic Party held a lead in support among the 20s and 30s over the People Power Party; however, this demographic became a competitive group following the 2022 presidential election. During the Yoon Suk-yeol administration and particularly after the 2024 general election and the December 3rd martial law declaration, the 20s and 30s have shown a trend of maintaining a competitive landscape overall, but with a gradual slight advantage for the Democratic Party.

Conversely, the 40s and 50s maintained their support advantage for the Democratic Party, which was further strengthened by the 2024 general election and the December 3rd martial law declaration. Support for the Democratic Party remained stable among the 40s across all periods. Among the 50s, support for the People Power Party approached the Democratic Party's support within the margin of error following the 2022 presidential election, indicating a competitive generational dynamic. During the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, following the general election and martial law, the People Power Party's support stagnated or declined, while the Democratic Party's support surged, solidifying the pro-Democratic coalition among the 40s and 50s.

The most significant changes in party support rates occurred among the 60s and 70s. From the 2020 general election through the 2022 presidential election, support for the Democratic Party among both the 60s and 70s declined to the late teens and early twenties, while support for the People Power Party rose to the 50-60% range. During this period, a conservative coalition among the 60s and 70s was solidified. However, during the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, following the general election and through the periods of martial law and impeachment, support for the Democratic Party rose to the 30-37% range for both the 60s and 70s and above, while support for the People Power Party continued to decline. Notably, among the 60s, support for the People Power Party, which exceeded 50% in 2022, dropped to the early 40s by 2025. When combined with support for the Cho Kuk Innovation Party and the Democratic Party, it became a competitive generation, nearly matching the combined support for the People Power Party and the Reform Party. Among the 70s, support for the People Power Party, which had approached 60%, fell to the low 50s by 2025, and support for the Democratic Party rose from the 20s to approach 30%. However, the gap between the two parties' support remained over 20 percentage points, maintaining a conservative advantage.

Examining the party support rates during the 2024 general election, martial law, and impeachment process reveals variations in the magnitude of change across generations. However, a common trend observed across all generations is the stagnation or decline in support for the People Power Party and a consistent rise in support for the Democratic Party, indicating that the issues of martial law and impeachment acted as a typical 'period effect' influencing all generations uniformly.

[Figure 8] Changes in Party Support by Generation Over the Past 5 Years

Source: National Basic Survey (NBS) (July 2020 - August 2025)

III. Factors Influencing Generational Divide Shifts: Attitudes Toward Martial Law and Impeachment, and Political Orientation

1. Short-Term Factors: The Period Effect of Martial Law and Impeachment Issues

Let us now examine the generational differences in perceptions of martial law and impeachment. According to a survey by the Progressive Policy Institute, Korea Society Research Institute, and Korea Research <2nd National Agenda Survey>, as shown in Figure 9, 84% of the 40s and 50s viewed the Constitutional Court's decision to impeach President Yoon Suk-yeol as a correct decision. Among the 20s and 30s, 73-76% also agreed with the impeachment. Notably, even among those aged 70 and above, 52% considered it a correct decision, while 43% viewed it as incorrect, indicating a slight majority favoring the decision. In particular, 62% of the 60s were positive about the impeachment.

Regarding the response to the Western District Court incident and the detained individuals, which sparked controversy over extreme right-wing elements in Korea, a significant majority across all generations agreed that "it should be strictly punished as it constitutes illegal violence" rather than "it should be leniently treated as it is a legitimate expression of dissent against President Yoon's unjust arrest." The stance that it should be strictly punished was particularly strong among the 40s and 50s, at 85-86%. Among the 20s and 30s, contrary to concerns about extreme right-wing tendencies, 79-82% held the view that it should not be tolerated. Even among the 70s, who have shown the strongest extreme right-wing tendencies in recent studies, only 43% held a favorable view that it should be leniently treated as a legitimate expression of dissent, while a majority of 54% took the position that "it is illegal violence and should be strictly punished." Among the 60s, who show signs of deviating from the conservative coalition of the 60s and 70s, over half, specifically 68%, demonstrated a principled stance of not tolerating the Western District Court violence incident. If candidates who advocate for martial law and impeachment are elected in the presidential election and subsequent People Power Party leadership elections, and if hardline voices are amplified, the phenomenon of conservative voters leaving the People Power Party among the 60s is expected to accelerate.

Examining the attitudes of men and women by generation towards martial law and impeachment in Tables 5 and 6, we find that even among young men aged 18-29, who have been criticized for extreme right-wing tendencies, 70% responded that the Constitutional Court's decision to uphold the impeachment was a 'correct decision,' and 81% responded that the Western District Court incident should be 'strictly punished as it constitutes illegal violence against a state institution, the court.' This suggests that classifying this group as extreme right-wing is problematic, at least based on their attitudes towards martial law and impeachment, when compared to young women. For analyses of the extreme right-wing tendencies among men aged 18-29 in recent studies, refer to Guk Seung-min (2025), Kim Chang-hwan (2025), Jeon Hye-won (2025), Choi Young-jun et al. (2025), and Jeong Han-wool (2025). While Kim Chang-hwan, Jeon Hye-won, and Choi Young-jun et al. generally acknowledge the possibility of conservatism or extreme right-wing tendencies among men aged 18-29, Guk Seung-min (2025) and Jeong Han-wool (2025) emphasize that diagnosing this group as extreme right-wing based on attitudes towards democracy, martial law, and impeachment is either unwarranted or exaggerated.

[Figure 9] Attitudes Toward the Constitutional Court's Impeachment Decision by Generation (%), [Figure 10] Punishment for the Western District Court Incident and Detainees by Generation (%)

Source: Progressive Policy Institute·Korea Society Research Institute·Korea Research <2nd National Agenda Survey> (May 2-4, 2025)

[Table 5] Attitudes Toward Constitutional Court Impeachment by Gender and Generation (%), [Table 6] Punishment for Western District Court Incident by Gender and Generation (%)

Source: Progressive Policy Institute·Korea Institute for National Studies·Korea Research <The 2nd National Agenda Survey> (May 2-4, 2025)

2. Long-Term Fluctuations: Ideological Realignment or Cohort Effect?

In the East Asia Institute's <Analysis Survey of Presidential Election Voting Intentions for the 21st Election>, when the age groups are subdivided into 5-year increments and the average of subjective ideological scores is calculated, the 20s and 30s are close to the center with scores of 5.0-5.1, while the 40s and 50s are slightly progressive with scores of 4.5-4.7. For the 70s, the first half up to age 74 has a score of 6.1, and those aged 75 and above show a score of 6.3, clearly leaning conservative. What is interesting is the 60s, which we are focusing on. The first half of the 60s (ages 60-64), which can be considered the core of the 386 generation, are closer to the progressive center with a score of 0.49, while the latter half of the 60s have a stronger conservative tendency compared to the first half, with a score of 5.6. This suggests that the shift of the 60s, which were previously a pillar of the conservative support coalition, was significantly influenced by the first half of the 60s, which has become more centrist and progressive.

What is the reason for the relative centrist progressivism of the first half of the 60s compared to the relative conservatism of the 50s and the latter half of the 60s? One hypothesis is that this may be a phenomenon caused by the relatively progressive "386 generation" entering their 60s. Considering that the oldest members of the 386 generation (born in 1960) are 65 years old, this can be seen as a reflection of the ideological gap between the generation preceding the 386 generation (born in the 1950s) and the 386 generation. If we operationally define those born in the 1960s as the 386 generation, they range from 56 years old (born in 1969) to 65 years old (born in 1960), meaning approximately 60% of those in their 60s (ages 60-69) are between 60 and 65 years old, thus belonging to the 386 generation. In fact, [Table 7] shows that by examining the birth years by age group in the East Asia Institute survey, 37% of respondents in their 60s were born in the 1950s, and 63% were born in the 1960s, i.e., classified as '386 generation'. In just four more years, all those in their 60s in Korea will be replaced by the 386 generation.

[Figure 11] Average Subjective Ideological Score by Age Group (0 = Very Progressive, 5 = Moderate, 10 = Very Conservative)

Source: EAI·Korea Research <Analysis Survey of Presidential Election Voting Intentions for the 21st Election>

[Table 7] Birth Cohort Size Based on This Survey Data

Source: EAI· 한국리서치 <Analysis of Voting Behavior in the 21st Presidential Election>

Of course, there is also the argument that upon empirical analysis, the 386 generation is not as progressive as commonly believed (Bae Jin-seok 2017, 2022), considering their voting behavior in presidential elections and subjective ideological leanings. Simultaneously, it is also true that research has consistently suggested the existence of a "386 generation effect," wherein this generation exhibits a preference for anti-conservative candidates or parties and shows relative progressivism on issues such as welfare and North Korea policy, compared to those born in the 1940s or 1950s who grew up during the authoritarian era, at least in electoral politics (Oh Se-jae·Lee Hyun-woo 2014; Noh Hwan-hee et al. 2013).[6]

First, let us briefly examine the presidential election voting results for the 386 generation (born in the 1960s) in the last two elections. Generally, except for 2007 when conservative candidate support was dominant overall, a linear relationship has been observed where younger individuals tend to support the Democratic Party/progressive candidates, and older individuals support conservative candidates. However, since the 2017 election, a U-shaped pattern has reportedly emerged, with the 40s and 50s demographic showing the strongest progressive voting behavior. Based on support rates for the Democratic Party or progressive candidates in presidential and general elections, the 386 generation is not the most progressive; rather, those born in the 1970s represent the peak of pro-Democratic Party/pro-progressive voting (Bae Jin-seok 2017; Jeong Han-wool 2020).

Indeed, the results of the East Asia Institute's survey show that for the 20th presidential election in 2022 and the 21st presidential election in 2025, the 386 generation, unlike the overwhelming support for Yoon Suk-yeol (61-76%) and Kim Moon-soo (55-71%) among those born in the 1940s and 1950s, shows relative progressivism with a dominant support for the Democratic Party's Lee Jae-myung (45% in the 20th election, 54% in the 21st election) compared to support for Yoon Suk-yeol (35%), Kim Moon-soo (32%), or Lee Jun-seok (3%). However, their pro-Democratic Party/pro-progressive voting behavior is relatively weaker compared to those born in the 1970s and 1980s. For those born in the 1970s, support for Lee Jae-myung increased to 45% in the 20th presidential election and 60% in the 21st presidential election, compared to 35% for Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th election and 22% for Kim Moon-soo in the 21st election. Those born in the 1980s also showed overwhelming support for Lee Jae-myung in the 20th presidential election (46% vs. 20% for Yoon Suk-yeol) and the 21st presidential election (56% for Lee Jae-myung, 21% for Kim Moon-soo, 4% for Lee Jun-seok), indicating they are the generation with the strongest aversion to the People Power Party. Among those born in the 1990s and 2000s, support rates for Lee Jae-myung and conservative candidates were neck and neck. Notably, support for Lee Jun-seok was high at 13-20% in the 21st presidential election, showing a distinct difference from those born in the 1970s and 1980s.

These results align with the author's 2013 paper, which pointed out that while the younger and middle-aged generation (born between 1963-1967 and after 1968-1972, the core of the 386 generation) showed a clear cohort effect of briefly leaning towards the conservative candidate Lee Myung-bak in the 16th, 17th, and 18th presidential elections before returning to a majority support for the Democratic Party's Moon Jae-in, the cohort born before 1958-1962 (then in their 50s and older) exhibited a strengthening age effect favoring conservative candidates (Lee Nae-young·Jeong Han-wool 2013). Observing voting behavior since then, the 386 generation showed a relatively pro-progressive/pro-Democratic cohort voting pattern, as evidenced by their overwhelming support for Moon Jae-in in the 2017 presidential election, driven by the impeachment verdict, and their consistent support for the Democratic Party's Lee Jae-myung in the 2022 and 2025 presidential elections.

[Table 8] 20th and 21st Presidential Election Voting Results by Birth Cohort (%)

Indeed, in this survey, when the average subjective ideological score is calculated not only by age group but also by birth decade, those aged 76 and above, born before the 1940s, show strong conservatism with an average score of 6.7. Those born in the 1950s (aged 66-75), who can be called the 'post-war industrialization generation,' are clearly conservative with a score of 5.9 [Figure 12]. Meanwhile, the so-called '386 Generation' (born in the 1960s), aged 56-65, shows a progressive tendency close to the center with a score of 4.9. Those born in the 1970s (aged 46-55) are the most progressive with a score of 4.6, and those born in the 1980s (aged 36-45) also show a progressive tendency with a score of 4.8. Those born in the 1990s show a moderate conservative tendency with a score of 5.2, and those born in the 2000s up to 2007 show progressiveness with a score of 4.8 [Figure 13].

[Figure 12] Subjective Ideological Tendency Score by Age Group (Points), [Figure 13] Subjective Ideological Tendency Score by Birth Decade (Points)

Source: EAI·Korea Research <Analysis of Voter Intentions in the 21st Presidential Election>, Source: EAI·Korea Research <Analysis of Voter Intentions in the 21st Presidential Election>

Figure 14 shows how the subjective self-ideology distribution of birth cohorts, divided into 5-year birth year units for each age group based on the 2002 election, has changed over six presidential election cycles from 2002 to 2025 as age increases.[7]This shows the trend of changes in subjective ideological evaluation scores for each birth cohort over the past six presidential elections, spanning 23 years (excluding two years due to early elections). An upward trend in the graph indicates a tendency towards conservatism with age, a downward trend indicates a tendency towards progressivism with age, and a horizontal movement suggests a cohort effect where political attitudes from youth are sustained.

The survey results show that, first, the generations born in the 1940s and 1950s, preceding the '386 Generation' we are focusing on, tend to become more conservative with age (upward trend). Although the trend of change, which cannot strictly distinguish between age, cohort, and period effects, is a combined result of age and period effects, it can be inferred that the age effect is relatively more at play compared to other generations (Lee Nae-young·Jeong Han-wool 2013).

Second, examining the 'born 1958-1962', 'born 1963-1967', and 'born 1968-1972' groups, which are close to the 386 Generation we are interested in, unlike the preceding generations, they show a tendency to become somewhat more conservative until 2007 and 2012 (upward movement), but after 2017, they decline again and return to their ideological positions from 2002. While there are fluctuations due to the life cycle and period effects, the characteristics of a 'cohort effect' are evident in that their political attitudes from youth are generally maintained and they return to those positions. However, it is noteworthy that in the 2002 survey results, the subjective ideological position of the 386 Generation was relatively progressive (between -0.5 and 0 points) compared to the preceding generations (born in the 1940s and 1950s) who were at +0.5 to +1.3, but it was generally located around the center, between -0.2 and +0.5.[8]

Meanwhile, generations born after the 386 Generation, from the 1970s to the 1990s, can be seen as having started from a progressive position (-) compared to the 386 Generation during their 20s and have generally maintained a progressive tendency since then. However, in the cohorts born in the 2000s, influenced by the conservatism of the male group, there is a tendency to start from a relatively moderate conservative position from their early 20s.

The history of South Korean elections is still short, and data has not yet accumulated to explain the changes in voting behavior of each generational cohort. Therefore, it is difficult to definitively predict whether the tendency of those born in the 1940s-1950s to become more conservative with age will continue, whether the 386 Generation, which has shown characteristics of a cohort effect so far, will shift to a path of conservatism like the older generations, whether the progressivism of those born in the 1970s and 1980s, who showed more progressive attitudes (in subjective ideology and voting choices) than the 386 Generation, will be maintained, and how the conservatism of those born after the 2000s will change.

[Figure 14] Changes in Subjective Ideological Tendency of Birth Cohorts Over 23 Years of Presidential Elections (Points)

Source: Jeong Han-wool (2020, p89 Figure 9), EAI Election Polls (2002; 2025), EAI Panel Surveys (2007; 2012; 2017; 2022) combined

3. Factors Expanding Gender Voting: Period Effect of Martial Law and Impeachment Issues

As examined earlier, it has been confirmed that the gender voting gap phenomenon is primarily spreading from the 20s to the 30s. Why has this change occurred? Above all, feminist conflicts are spreading across all generations, and this is presumed to be related to the phenomenon of feminist conflicts overlapping with ideological conflicts. First, [Figure 15] shows the trend of average scores for men and women by generation using a feminism index (from -12 points for very anti-feminist to 0 for neutral to +12 for very pro-feminist) based on six questions developed by the author through the '20s Male Project' in 2019.

In the 20s, where feminist conflicts were concentrated, the perception gap between men and women is fixed without variation. However, according to annual tracking surveys, the perception gap between genders is spreading beyond the 20s to the 30s, 40s, and 50s. Particularly in the 30s, the perception gap was comparable to that of the 20s, and this perception gap is presumed to have influenced political attitudes. Cheon Gwan-yul described this as the gender conflict between men and women in their 20s expanding 'at the intersection of power and gender,' and Guk Seung-min pointed out the phenomenon of gender conflict overlapping with ideological conflict (Cheon Gwan-yul·Jeong Han-wool 2019; Guk Seung-min 2022). [Figure 16] is a graph showing the correlation between the progressive ideology index and the feminism index, created by Guk Seung-min by synthesizing objective indicators from the SisaIN·Korea Research <Women in their 20s> survey, broken down by generation. In all generations, the feminism index strengthens progressive attitudes. [Figure 17] visualizes the relationship between the subjective ideology score and the feminism index using recent data from the Progressive Policy Institute's National Agenda Survey. While Guk Seung-min's graph shows the overlap between feminism and progressive ideology as a phenomenon across all generations, the slope (strength of correlation) indicates that the influence is greater in the 20s and 30s than in the 40s and above. Based on subjective ideology, the relationship between feminism and ideological identity is primarily evident in the 20s and 30s, and has not spread to the 40s and 50s or 60s and 70s.

In conclusion, this signifies that gender conflict (feminist conflict) is connecting to political and ideological cleavages. As gender conflict (feminist conflict) spreads across all generations and the phenomenon of this gender conflict overlapping with ideological conflict intensifies, it is a natural prediction that this will lead to a clash in political behavior based on gender. What is important here is that mobilization by the political sphere and triggers from the media, SNS, and online communities will likely be necessary conditions. If this assumption is correct, while the gender voting pattern was concentrated in the 20s and 30s in this presidential election, the possibility of a gender voting gap spreading to the 40s and 50s cannot be ruled out.

[Figure 15] Attitudes Toward Feminism by Gender and Generation

Source: Korea Institute for Social Research·Korea Research Political and Social Survey DB (2019-2025)

[Figure 16] Feminism Index and Progressive Ideology Index, [Figure 17] Feminism Index and Subjective Ideology Index

Source: Guk Seung-min (2022), Source: Progressive Policy Institute (2024)

VI. Exploratory Discussion: The Pro-Democratic Tendency of the 40-50s Generation and the Roots of Conservatism in the 70s Generation

1. Cohort Classification Based on Political Symbols (Presidents with whom a sense of unity is felt)

Due to the short history of democratization and political parties, attempts to capture the characteristics of political cohorts have been insufficient. While the characteristics of each generation's political tendencies and behaviors are analyzed, research on why and how these generational characteristics arise has been lacking. The author estimates that the historical experiences during the formative period of political attitudes, roughly between the ages of 18 and 25, and the emotional attachments formed at that time solidify into a unique 'generational identity' and influence long-term political preferences and behaviors. Existing research also suggests that shared historical events of major significance in Korean history or the experience of first elections in early adulthood during the 'impressionable years' lead to the formation of values and orientations that differentiate them from other generational groups (Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Mannheim 1997; Pilcher 1994). For example, generational cohort names are sometimes assigned based on historical events and the zeitgeist of that period, such as the 'Korean War Generation,' 'Industrialization Generation,' and '386 Generation.'

However, exploration into whether these generational cohorts possess a homogeneous identity as political cohorts, or what factors create such an identity, has been insufficient (Lee Nae-young·Jeong Han-wool 2013; Jeong Han-wool 2020). The author proposes to capture the orientation of political cohorts by using the presidents voted for during the early period of political socialization as objects of political identification, focusing on attitudes toward past presidents as an analytical indicator for understanding the characteristics of political cohorts in Korea. In Korea, similar to how the generation that voted for Roosevelt during the New Deal and Great Depression in the US is understood as the 'New Deal Democratic' cohort, the tendency for political preference and behavior to be influenced by the president and historical events of one's youth is observed. Therefore, the author suggests utilizing the president (symbol) who governed during that ideological period, based on the identification with the president experienced during one's youth.

For those born in the 1940s and 1950s, it is safe to say that 'President Park Chung-hee' is the political symbol that defines their historical experiences and political attitudes during the post-war recovery and industrialization process. Although not used as a formal academic term, the designation 'Park Chung-hee Generation' may be more appropriate than socioeconomic cohort designations like 'post-war generation' or 'industrialization generation' to explain their political attitudes. Furthermore, the symbol for the current 40-50s cohort is considered to be President Roh Moo-hyun. This generation not only largely supported him in presidential elections during their early political socialization but also created a 'generational politics' phenomenon that replaced the nation's destructive regionalism by realizing political reforms represented by anti-dictatorship and anti-regionalism through the symbol of Roh Moo-hyun. President Roh Moo-hyun was the political symbol and focal point. Although not frequently used academically, the term 'Roh Moo-hyun Generation' has been frequently heard in reality as a counterpart to the 'Park Chung-hee Generation.'

If President Park Chung-hee symbolizes the anti-communist regime and the era of industrialization shared by those born in the 1940s-1950s, then President Roh Moo-hyun, following the change of government, represents: (1) the generational/ideological politics that replaced destructive regionalism (Kang Won-taek 2002; Lee Nae-young 2002); (2) a generation familiar with new participation methods such as internet politics and World Cup culture, termed participatory government (Yoon Sung-yi 2003); and (3) a generation that shared organizational historical experiences through political campaigns via Roh Moo-hyun's supporters (Rohsamo) and online public forums (Cho Hwa-soon 2008; Yoon Yong-hee 2003). Considering these characteristics, we propose to classify the current 40-50s generation (who were in their 20s-30s around the 2002 presidential election) as the 'Roh Moo-hyun Generation/Roh Moo-hyun Cohort.'

2. Political Symbols Representing Each Generation: 'Park Chung-hee Generation' vs. 'Roh Moo-hyun Generation'

First, let us examine whether Presidents Park Chung-hee and Roh Moo-hyun actually function as political symbols that foster generational unity by looking at the favorability ratings (psychological attachment) each generation has toward presidents from their respective political camps. Let's examine the results of a favorability survey toward past presidents included in the <2nd National Agenda Survey> conducted by the Progressive Policy Institute, Korea Institute for Social Research, and Korea Research in May 2025. Based on the proportion who answered 'very favorable + somewhat favorable' in [Figure 18], President Roh Moo-hyun, from the progressive/Democratic Party, had a favorability rating of 72%, followed by President Kim Dae-jung at 61%, and President Moon Jae-in at 46%. On the conservative side, President Park Chung-hee had a rating of 50%, President Kim Young-sam 44%, President Syngman Rhee, revered as the founding father by conservatives, at 32%, and President Lee Myung-bak at 30%. President Park Geun-hye, who was impeached, received 27%, and President Yoon Suk-yeol 21%. Presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, who were punished for coups, had favorability ratings of only 16-18%. If we consider each president as a political symbol representing their respective camps, the current conservative political sphere shows a significant weakening of its political symbolic capital due to two impeachments.

[Figure 18] Favorability Ratings of Past Presidents (%)

Source: Progressive Policy Institute·Korea Institute for Social ResearchI·Korea Research <2nd National Agenda Survey> (May 2-4, 2025)

Let's examine the favorability ratings of past presidents by age group. What is important is the degree of favorability and attachment each generational group has toward the president during their period of political socialization. According to cohort theory, political experiences during the formative period of political attitudes and the first elections lead to identification with the corresponding political force, shaping one's values and attitudes over the long term. Therefore, it is unlikely that a generation would accept the shared orientation of that political group without positive evaluation and attachment to the symbol of that political entity (here, the president and historical events of that period).

In this context, the attachment of the 40-50s generation to President Roh Moo-hyun may suggest that it is the source of the cohort effect influencing their pro-Democratic Party orientation and political behavior. The favorability rating for President Roh Moo-hyun among the 40-50s generation, who underwent their early political socialization during his presidency, was overwhelmingly high at 80-82%. It was 69-75% among the 20-30s generation. Notably, even among those aged 70 and above, who are the most conservative, the favorability rating was 54%. It is noteworthy that among the 60s generation, who are deviating from the conservative coalition, the favorability rating for President Roh Moo-hyun was 69%, comparable to that for President Park Chung-hee. Next is President Kim Dae-jung, with a similarly high favorability rating of 70-72% among the 40-50s generation, 49-63% among the 20-30s, 62% among the 60s, and a lower 46% among those aged 70 and above.

Conversely, for conservative presidents, President Park Chung-hee serves as the political symbol and focal point. His favorability rating was high among those aged 70 and above at 75%, 67% among the 60s, and 52% among the 50s. However, it remained at around 32-36% among those in their 20s to 40s. Among the 20-40s generation, President Kim Young-sam had relatively high favorability. For other conservative presidents, only those aged 70 and above showed relatively high favorability ratings, and apart from President Park Chung-hee, no other conservative president received high favorability among the 20-30s, 40-50s, or even the 60s. The favorability ratings for Presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, who led the coup, were around 34-36% even among those aged 70 and above, and between 10-22% for other age groups.

[Table 9] Favorability Ratings of Past Presidents by Age Group ('Very Favorable + Somewhat Favorable' Rate (%))

Source: Institute for Progressive Policy Studies, Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements I, Korea Research & Data (May 2-4, 2025)

Notably, as shown in [Figure 19], prior to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in 2016, President Park Chung-hee garnered a similar level of emotional identification and favorability from citizens as President Roh Moo-hyun. This is a result of the backlash against the conservative forces following the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in 2017, which diminished respect and attachment towards them. Although there has been a gradual improvement since then, it appears to be a consequence of low favorability among the younger generations (20s and 40s). If the recent weakening of the conservative base (exemplified by the departure of the 60s demographic from the conservative political coalition) is solely attributed to short-term issues like martial law and impeachment, it might be reasonable to view it as a temporary realignment that could revert to previous conservative political tendencies once the so-called 'river of impeachment' is crossed. However, if, as I hypothesize, the favorability ratings of past presidents reflect the influence of political cohorts in shaping the political attitudes and behaviors of their respective cohorts, then the weakening of the conservative base and the departure of its supporters should be considered a phenomenon that will persist for a considerable period.

In other words, the 40s and 50s demographic, represented by Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung, still exhibits emotional attachment to these two political icons, and conversely, feels no identification with conservative presidents. On the other hand, among the 60s and 70s, identification with conservative presidents is evident only among those aged 70 and above. For the 60s demographic, favorability towards Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung is comparable to that for Presidents Park Chung-hee and Kim Young-sam. This signifies that the 60s demographic can no longer serve as a strong base for the conservative camp as it did in the past.

[Figure 19] Changes in Favorability Towards Progressive and Conservative Political Icons (%)

Source: East Asia Institute DB (2012-2016), Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements · Korea Research & Data DB (2021-2025).

V. Conclusion

Attention to generational voting patterns is concentrated on the so-called 'men in their 20s' and 'women in their 20s' phenomenon, and the political situation is rapidly normalizing, leaving behind concerns about political civil war that were feared after the martial law and impeachment. However, while the conservative party performed creditably in the presidential election, its support base has been significantly shaken in terms of party support and other political indicators since the election. The crisis in conservative politics is evident in the generational voting patterns of the 21st presidential election.

In the presidential election held after the martial law and impeachment, candidate Kim Moon-soo performed creditably with 41%, and combined with candidate Lee Jun-seok's 8%, it seemed to be a close contest with candidate Lee Jae-myung. This illusion has accelerated the tendency of the People Power Party to rely more on 'Yoon Again' and anti-impeachment asphalt conservatism rather than self-reflection, introspection, and reform of conservative innovation. However, as examined in this report, the relative success of the conservative candidate in the last presidential election was not a foregone conclusion until before the martial law. It was merely the result of a conservative consolidation based on antipathy towards candidate Lee Jae-myung's judicial risks and anti-Democratic Party sentiment; the winner was not reversed. Rather, the conservative base has been rapidly collapsing since the presidential election. Despite the unfavorable circumstances in the appointment process of the Lee Jae-myung administration and the Democratic Party, the president's approval rating remains high, and importantly, the support for the Democratic Party, its political base, has not been significantly impacted. Above all, the People Power Party's approval rating has fallen to the 10% range. Just as the Democratic Party achieved landslide victories in the 2017 presidential election, 2018 local elections, and 2020 general elections due to the power of the impeachment voter political coalition formed after the first impeachment in 2016-2017, a political structure favoring the Democratic Party has once again been formed through the recent martial law and impeachment.

A more critical crisis factor for conservative parties is, firstly, that the 40s and 50s demographic, which served as the base for the second impeachment voter political coalition, has developed a stronger pro-Democratic Party and anti-conservative party sentiment through the martial law and impeachment. Support for the Democratic Party candidate in the presidential election has strengthened, and attitudes against the People Power Party have also solidified. The fact that the core support base of the new government is consolidated suggests that the current pro-Democratic Party structure can be maintained with considerable stability. As argued in a theoretical section later in this paper, the 40s and 50s demographic, centered around the political symbol of 'Roh Moo-hyun,' shares a generational identity as a group that has experienced (1) the end of authoritarian mobilization and the old regional mobilization politics of the three Kims, and the political task of reform; (2) the emergence of a new generation represented by internet/World Cup culture; and (3) new political participation through political forums like Noh-sa-mo/the internet. This group is more homogeneous and action-oriented than any other political cohort. This generation has supported the Democratic Party's power transition and is strongly backing the governance of the Lee Jae-myung administration.

Secondly, it is a significant blow to the People Power Party that the 60s demographic, which remained steadfast during the first impeachment in 2016-2017, is now wavering. The conservative coalition of the 60s and 70s, which was as strong as the 40s and 50s, served as the base that enabled the power transition five years after the first impeachment. A crucial finding of this report is the confirmation of a crack in the strong conservative coalition of the 60s and 70s through the martial law and impeachment. The 60s demographic, which overwhelmingly supported the People Power Party in the election three years ago, has now become a competitive demographic similar to the 20s and 30s in this election. The fact that this change is based on a weakening of party support and subjective conservative identity suggests that the departure of the 60s demographic may not be a temporary phenomenon. The current 60s demographic is distinctly different from previous generations of 60s. The change in the 60s demographic is also difficult to view as temporary, given that the '386 generation,' which is relatively pro-Democratic Party/progressive, is aging and replacing the main cohort of the 60s. The 386 cohort, born in the 1960s, experienced a concentrated age effect where individuals born in the 1940s and 1950s, upon entering their 60s, exhibited stronger conservative tendencies. In contrast, the 386 generation, now replacing the previous cohort in their 60s, has maintained progressive tendencies across six presidential elections from 2002 to 2025, unlike previous generations.

Thirdly, this chapter has pointed out that the gender voting cleavage, which was prominent in the last presidential election, has spread to the 30s and has the potential to extend to the 40s and 50s demographic. It has been confirmed in various studies that the expansion of gender politics in Korea has been accompanied by an increase in political interest and influence as gender conflict surrounding feminism overlaps with political and ideological cleavages. I aim to point out that the conflict surrounding feminism is showing signs of intensifying not only among those in their 20s but also among those in their 30s and 40s, and even among those in their 50s, suggesting that gender conflict politics could spread across all generations under certain conditions. The process of gender politics spreading throughout society in 2022 involved the mobilization of political circles and the media, combined with an environment that triggered gender conflict in online spaces represented by social media and various online communities, resulting in immense social costs. Although gender conflict mobilization seemed to subside and lie dormant during the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, it has been confirmed that the storm of gender politics has once again spread to the 30s in this presidential election. Regardless of political gains and losses, the intense period of social conflict and hate politics caused by gender conflict over the past 5-6 years has indeed had a shockwave that has overshadowed other important social conflicts and discrimination issues in Korean society.

The changes in generational political behavior in Korea discussed above are important research questions that require empirical verification. This chapter has focused on sharing interpretations and opinions at a hypothetical level regarding these questions using survey data. I do not believe that the discussions in this chapter have sufficiently verified my concerns and arguments. Rather, I have focused on raising issues for discussion, and further data collection, in-depth analysis, and interpretation will be necessary for the discussions in this chapter to gain credibility. Although the discussion is currently limited to a theoretical level, considering the importance of these questions, follow-up research and verification cannot be postponed indefinitely. While future research on the questions and hypotheses raised in this chapter will be deferred, I hope that the political circles will not postpone their interest and consideration of the implications for generational politics raised in this chapter.

The strong cohesion of the 40s and 50s demographic and the collapse of one pillar of the conservative support coalition will be a significant crisis and challenge for conservative parties. The crisis of conservatism, brought about by the martial law and impeachment that led to the departure of conservatives, is severe, yet the People Power Party's leadership election raises questions about whether it recognizes these crisis factors. Consequently, the normalization of conservative politics is bound to be delayed, and if conservative politics is delayed, the normalization of Korean politics will also be difficult. Meanwhile, for the Lee Jae-myung administration and the Democratic Party, which must lead national governance towards stability and normalization beyond martial law and impeachment, the current situation is not entirely optimistic. It is hoped that the favorable political environment will not lead to arrogant unilateralism by the Lee Jae-myung administration and the ruling party. National challenges such as finding a path for South Korea amidst US-China competition, seeking national competitiveness in the AI era, low birth rates and aging populations, and regional decline, which concern a majority of the public, are also serious. If the focus shifts from these national tasks, which concern the majority of the public, to partisan tasks, even high approval ratings that seemed likely to last for over 20 years can disappear in an instant. A time for learning from the mistakes of the Moon Jae-in administration appears necessary.■

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[1] (Candidate A's support rate among men in their 20s) - (Candidate A's support rate among women in their 20s) signifies the gender gap in Candidate A's support rate. (+) indicates that men's support rate was higher than women's, and (-) indicates that women's support rate was higher.

[2] As the difference in voting propensity between men and women in their 20s and 30s is discussed in a separate chapter, this chapter focuses on the fact that the difference in voting propensity between genders has expanded beyond the 20s to the 30s compared to the last presidential election, while the gender difference remains nonexistent among those in their 40s and 50s [Figure 2].

[3] The classification criteria for support rates between genders by age group in the exit polls of the three major broadcasting stations are inconsistent. Sometimes, the classification includes those over 60 (20th Presidential Election), and other times it includes those over 70 (21st Presidential Election). As the raw data to reconcile these differences is unavailable, the results as reported by the media are presented here.

[4] Cheon, Gwan-yul described the conflict between men in their early 20s and women in their early 20s as "the point where 'power (attitude toward political forces)' meets 'gender (feminism)'" (Cheon and Jeong, 2019).

[5] Based solely on voters, excluding those who abstained or did not respond, Candidate Yoon Suk-yeol received 53% support among those in their 60s, compared to 44% for Candidate Lee Jae-myung.

[6] For a discussion on this matter, refer to Bae Jin-seok (2017) and Bae Jin-seok (2022). Due to the perfect linear dependency (Period=Age+Cohort) between cohort effects, age effects, and period effects, including the three variables of period (survey year), age (age), and cohort (birth year) leads to an 'identification problem' where the precise independent effect of each cannot be distinguished (Heo, 2014; Lee, Na-young and Jeong, Han-wool 2013; Bhatti and Hansen 2012). To resolve this, attempts such as imposing constraints or applying the Intrinsic Estimator (I.E.) or hierarchical APC models are necessary, which are beyond the scope of this chapter (Koo et al. 2024).

[7] To enable comparison with previous data, the scale was adjusted by subtracting 5 from the 0-10 scale, resulting in -5 (very progressive) to 0 (neutral) to +5 (very conservative) for calculating the average. The horizontal axis represents the respondent's age group in 5-year increments at the time of the survey. Since presidential elections occur every 5 years, the axis moves one step to the right with each election cycle. An individual born between 1963-1967, who was '35-39 years old' in the first election (2002), would be '40-44' in 2007, '45-49' in 2012, '50-54' in 2017, and '55-59' in 2022. In the final election of 2025, they would be 3 years older, making them '58-62 years old'. It is important not to confuse this with the graph's tick mark for '60-64 years old', which is an arbitrary adjustment for the 5-year interval axis. The interval between the fifth point (2022 survey) and the sixth (2025 survey) of the six points for each birth cohort is 5 years on the graph, but actually 3 years.

[8] This implies that the progressivism of the 386 generation should not be assumed a priori. Empirically, while they are relatively more progressive than the previous authoritarian industrialization generation, they are not particularly more progressive than those born in the 1970s or 1980s. This aligns with Bae Jin-seok's (2017; 2022) argument refuting the "progressivism of the 86 generation." However, it is clear that they possess a distinct progressive identity compared to the majority of the previous 60s generation (born in the 1940s and 1950s) and have consistently voted for progressive or pro-Democratic Party candidates, with a few exceptions (e.g., in the 2007 presidential election, a significant portion defected to support Lee Myung-bak or Moon Kook-hyun, siding with a judgment against the participatory government).

■ Author: Jeong, Han-wool_Director of the East Asia Institute.

■ Contact and Editing: Lim, Jae-hyun_EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhim@eai.or.kr

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