[The 21st Presidential Election and Korean Democracy: Crisis, Division, and Realignment] ⑤ Realignment of Regionalism and Spatial Differentiation

I. Introduction

The 21st presidential election was an unusual snap election held amidst a grave crisis for the constitutional order. In late 2024, former President Yoon Suk-yeol's attempt to declare martial law unconstitutionally sent shockwaves both domestically and internationally, and was perceived as an event that severely damaged the democratic political order of South Korea, which had developed under the 1987 system. As a consequence, South Korea once again experienced the unfortunate event of an incumbent president's impeachment, leading to a snap election held approximately two years earlier than scheduled, on June 15, 2025. This emergency situation served to heighten voters' demands for political accountability, institutional checks against the abuse of power, and the restoration of democracy.

It was also anticipated that this election would naturally become a single-issue election, where voters' choices would be determined by the controversy over responsibility for the constitutional crisis and the restoration of democracy, rather than by traditional political cleavages such as ideological alignment, region, or generation. Amidst voter fatigue with partisan polarization and camp confrontation, some predicted that regionalism would also recede relatively in this election. These were hopeful speculations that accountability for the crisis and sensitivity to democratic values might lead to voter judgments transcending regional boundaries.

However, the actual election process and results raise questions about whether these expectations were indeed realized. Despite former President Yoon Suk-yeol's unconstitutional attempt at martial law and the crisis of the constitutional order, a trend of conservative forces consolidating, intertwined with public opinion against impeachment, became prominent. The approval ratings of the ruling People Power Party, which should share political responsibility for the martial law incident, also showed an upward trend. This demonstrates that the deep-rooted structure of confrontation between progressives and conservatives and partisan polarization continue to strongly influence voter choices in South Korean society.

Furthermore, during the election process, despite internal conflicts and factional strife within the People Power Party during its primary, conservative voters once again consolidated, making the outcome unpredictable until the very end, contrary to some predictions that the opposition candidate would win easily. In the actual election results, the consolidation of progressive and conservative voters, the voting gap between generations and genders, and the traditional cleavage structure between the eastern and western regions were reproduced to some extent. In short, it was confirmed that despite being a snap election held under the extraordinary circumstances of illegal martial law and presidential impeachment, the familiar traditional political landscape and division patterns in Korean elections were still effectively at play.

Amidst the persistence of these traditional political cleavages, a particularly noteworthy point is the ruling party's election strategy, which relied on the sentiment of consolidation within the conservative camp, centered around the Yeongnam region. The 21st presidential election was held in a unique political environment of constitutional crisis, and within that context, the ruling People Power Party pursued an election strategy dependent on the sentiment of consolidation within the conservative camp, centered around the Yeongnam region. Of course, the actual effect of this strategy on voter choices needs to be carefully evaluated through empirical analysis.

Indeed, regionalism has long served as a core cleavage factor defining the landscape of Korean elections. However, since the mid-2000s, analyses have suggested that the influence of regionalism has gradually weakened as various alternative political cleavages such as ideology, generation, class, and gender have emerged (Choi Jun-young & Cho Jin-man 2005; Kang Won-taek 2003; Kim, Choi & Cho 2008). In particular, the series of nationwide elections held after the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, including the 2017 presidential election, the 2018 local elections, and the 2020 general elections, saw the Democratic Party perform well in the Yeongnam region, a traditional support base for conservative parties, especially in Busan, Ulsan, and Gyeongnam (PK). This led to discussions about the possibility of regionalism weakening and party realignment, centered around the Yeongnam region (Jeong Jae-do & Lee Jae-mook 2018; Kang Won-taek 2019; Yoon Ji-seong 2023; Do Myo-yeon 2024).

The background for these claims of weakening regionalism lies in the trend of gradually narrowing party-based gaps between the Yeongnam and Honam regions in nationwide elections over the past few years. In fact, President Moon Jae-in ranked first in Busan (38.7%) and Ulsan (38.1%) in the 19th presidential election, and performed well in Gyeongnam (36.7%), Daegu (21.8%), and Gyeongbuk (21.7%), achieving relatively balanced results nationwide. In the 20th presidential election held five years later, Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung received strong support in Busan (38.2%), Ulsan (40.8%), and Gyeongnam (37.4%). In the same election, People Power Party candidate Yoon Suk-yeol secured double-digit support in Jeonbuk (14.4%) and Jeonnam (11.4%). A similar pattern continued in the 21st presidential election, where candidate Lee Jae-myung exceeded 40% in Busan and Ulsan, and received 25.1% support in Gyeongbuk, his home region.

Of course, contrary to the theory of weakening regionalism, there are also cautious views that argue against the claim that regionalism has faded. According to various studies, region still plays an important role in shaping voters' political attitudes and party choices, and it continues to exert its influence by overlapping with new cleavage factors. In other words, even if its weight as a single determining factor has decreased, regionalism remains a meaningful variable in the multi-layered structure of Korean politics. In fact, although a trend of party realignment by region continued for some time after the 2017 presidential election, the overwhelming victory of People Power Party candidate Park Hyung-joon in the Busan mayoral by-election in 2021 demonstrated the political fluidity of the PK region, while also suggesting that regionalism is not simply disappearing but operating in a reconstructed form. Furthermore, a close examination of several nationwide elections held after the 2022 presidential election reveals numerous empirical evidences supporting the sustained effect of regionalist voting behavior (Yoon Kwang-il 2012; Kim Yong-cheol & Cho Young-ho 2015; Moon Woo-jin 2017; Noh Ki-woo et al. 2018).

The snap election of 2025 was expected to be a single-issue election driven by the unprecedented political event of former President Yoon Suk-yeol's unconstitutional attempt at martial law and impeachment, leading to a weakening of the influence of regionalism and party politics that had operated in previous nationwide elections. However, given the observed trends of spatial differentiation and weakening of regionalism, particularly in the Yeongnam region, in recent elections, this election provides an important opportunity to examine the current state of regionalist voting behavior in South Korea. Analyzing whether voters' choices were still based on regional loyalty to a particular party, or were more influenced by ideology, generation, gender cleavages, or nationwide issues such as the martial law incident, will be a crucial starting point for evaluating the persistence and potential for change in regionalism.

Against this backdrop, the purpose of this study is to comprehensively analyze how regionalist voting behavior of South Korean voters operates today, focusing on the 2025 presidential election. Here, 'regionalist voting behavior' refers to the political act where voters in a specific region overwhelmingly support the dominant party or the traditionally affiliated party of that region. Such region-based biased behavior can weaken the dynamism of party competition, hinder the emergence of alternative forces, and ultimately undermine the functioning of representative democracy based on responsible party government. Therefore, even if there are claims of weakening regionalism recently, confirming whether it is actually disappearing or transforming and persisting in a more sophisticated and multi-layered manner remains an important academic and empirical task for verifying democratic theory.

In particular, this study moves beyond the conventional approach in regionalism research, which has primarily measured regional affiliation based on static questions about voters' place of birth or residence. Instead, it proposes a more dynamic and forward-looking analytical framework for the sustainability of regionalism by utilizing questions about the intention to continue supporting specific parties (particularly the Democratic Party or the People Power Party). Through this, the study offers a distinct contribution by exploring not only vote share analysis but also the political durability of region-based party support and the potential for long-term realignment.

According to the research findings, as it was a snap election due to the impeachment of the incumbent president, a pattern of somewhat weakened regionalist voting tendencies was observed in some regions compared to the election three years prior. However, the regional differentiation in regionalist voting behavior, consistently observed in nationwide elections over the past few years, was still maintained in this special environment. In particular, in the Honam region, where regionalism is strong, especially in Gwangju/Jeolla, and in Daegu/Gyeongbuk, traditional regionalism remained relatively strong. In contrast, in Busan, Ulsan, and Gyeongnam (PK), where a trend of weakening has been ongoing, this change trend was even more clearly confirmed in this election. Furthermore, this study empirically confirmed that significant potential for change exists in regionalist voting behavior regarding future party support intentions in both the Yeongnam and Honam regions. These findings provide important implications for the direction of political reform aimed at alleviating regional cleavages and strengthening responsible party politics in South Korean society in the future.

II. Research on Regionalism in Korean Elections: Change and Persistence

Regionalism in Korean elections has long been a central theme in voting behavior research, and discussions regarding its changing patterns have often presented contrasting arguments. Some studies argue that regionalism is weakening or diminishing due to factors such as generational change among voters, political and social transformations, and changes in the media environment. Conversely, other studies point out that regionalism remains strong and persistent in specific regions, particularly in traditional political strongholds, or that it has persisted in a reconstructed form. This section systematically reviews these conflicting research findings and compares and analyzes various perspectives that explain the change and persistence of regionalism.

There are two prevailing views on when regionalist voting behavior first appeared in Korean elections: one that dates it to the 7th presidential election in 1971 between Park Chung-hee and Kim Dae-jung, and another that points to the 13th presidential election, the first after democratization in 1987 (Kang Myung-se 2001). Regardless of these differing views on the 'founding election of regionalism,' there is a general academic consensus that regionalism has functioned as the most powerful and persistent political and social cleavage structure in South Korea since democratization. In particular, the stark differences in voting behavior between the Yeongnam and Honam regions, evident in the first direct presidential election and the general election the following year after democratization in 1987, became the basis for solidifying the pattern of regional voters overwhelmingly supporting a particular party for an extended period (Korea Election Studies Association 2011, cited in Yoon Ji-seong 2024). This regionalist voting behavior has weakened the accountability and representativeness of representative democracy, hindered the dynamism of party competition, and acted as a structural constraint on the emergence of alternative forces.

According to existing research, the formation of regionalism in Korea is explained from three main perspectives. First, the political-economic perspective posits that economic favoritism towards the Yeongnam region and relative neglect of the Honam region during the authoritarian era deepened regional disparities in economic development and perceptions of socio-economic discrimination, thereby forming the structural basis for regionalism (Choi Jang-jip 1996). Second, the elite political mobilization theory interprets that political elites, such as the 'Three Kims' (Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, Kim Jong-pil) after democratization, institutionalized and solidified regionalism by employing election strategies based on their respective regional bases (Son Ho-cheol 1996). Third, rational choice theory explains that voters strategically choose region-based voting to maximize their own and their regional group's interests (Cho Ki-sook 2000). Each of these perspectives, by setting different units of analysis—structural conditions, elite leadership, and voter behavior—has theoretically and historically explored the mechanisms of the emergence and persistence of regionalism.

Since the 2000s, some studies have begun to point out that the influence of regionalism is gradually weakening, and alternative cleavages such as generation and ideology are emerging (Kang Won-taek 2003; Choi Jun-young & Cho Jin-man 2005; Kim, Choi & Cho 2008). For example, Kang Won-taek (2003) showed through an analysis of elections in the early 2000s that while regionalism was still maintained, it was acting as an independent variable in voting choices as the ideological gap between generations widened. Choi Jun-young and Cho Jin-man (2005) also analyzed the results of the 17th general election and empirically demonstrated that generational and ideological cleavages had partially mitigated the strength of traditional regional cleavages even in the Yeongnam and Honam regions. The emergence of ideological cleavages after the IMF crisis, generational change including the rise of the '86 generation' following the departure of the 'Three Kims,' and other changes in the political environment of the 2000s are cited as major background factors that promoted the weakening of regionalist voting behavior and the emergence of alternative cleavages.

Conversely, other studies empirically demonstrate that even with the emergence of new political cleavages such as generation, ideology, and class, regionalism still has a decisive impact on the political attitudes and voting behavior of South Korean voters. Yoon Kwang-il (2012, 2013) analyzed presidential and National Assembly election data and confirmed that regional party support in the Yeongnam and Honam regions remains strongly persistent. Kim Yong-cheol and Cho Young-ho (2015) proved that regardless of generational or class divisions, voters' party choices in traditional regions like TK (Daegu/Gyeongbuk) and Honam are consistently dictated by regional divisions.

Moon Woo-jin (2017) revealed through opinion polls and socio-psychological indicator analysis that regional identity and in-group bias continuously shape intergroup political attitude differences. Furthermore, Noh Ki-woo et al. (2018) demonstrated through experimental research that while voters in the Yeongnam and Honam regions do not exhibit strong animosity towards other groups, a sentimental preference for their own region (in-group) still exists, and this 'sentimental regionalism' operates significantly even in voting situations. In summary, these findings indicate that even with the recent emergence of alternative cleavages, regional background is deeply ingrained in the political attitudes and behaviors of South Korean voters at both spatial and psychological levels.

Some existing regionalism studies, from a different perspective than the discussion of change and persistence, have focused on spatial differentiation and regional variation within the sphere of regionalism's influence (Jeong Jae-do & Lee Jae-mook 2018; Kang Won-taek 2019; Do Myo-yeon 2024). Spatial differentiation studies have analyzed the differences in regionalism patterns between Daegu/Gyeongbuk (TK) and Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam (PK) in Yeongnam, and between Gwangju/Jeonnam and Jeonbuk in Honam. In the Yeongnam region, regionalism remains strong in TK, whereas a clear trend of weakening has appeared in PK since the 2000s. For example, in the 2018 local elections, the political attachment of PK voters to traditional conservative parties significantly weakened, but this did not immediately translate into unilateral support for progressive parties. These results suggest that regionalism in the Yeongnam region is structurally differentiated, and that the 탈지역화 (de-regionalization) and fluidity of party support intentions are expanding in PK. Yoon Ji-seong (2017, 2020) has characterized this change as a 'three-way division of Yeongnam-Honam confrontation,' arguing that within the redrawn structure of TK, PK, and Honam, the political fluidity of PK enables voting patterns similar to those in the Seoul metropolitan area or other regions, depending on the election situation.

Meanwhile, studies have also focused on border regions rather than spatial differentiation. Regional variation is closely related to the neighborhood effect observed at the borders of existing regionalist strongholds. Park Jeong-hee and Lee Jae-mook (2023) empirically demonstrated that geographical proximity, shared living spheres, and exchange activities contribute to the weakening of regionalism through an analysis of towns and townships along the administrative borders of Yeongnam and Honam. This study presented the phenomenon of 'Honam within Yeongnam, Yeongnam within Honam,' and provided a concrete explanation of the spatial and social mechanisms behind the weakening of regionalism.

From another perspective, the measurement methods of regional sentiment, changes in the political and social environment, and shifts in group identity due to social change can lead to the weakening or change in the nature of regionalism. Studies that indirectly measured regionalist attitudes have reported that regional sentiment between Yeongnam and Honam voters has weakened compared to the past (Choi Jun-young 2008; Noh Ki-woo, Jeong Min-seok, & Lee Hyun-woo 2018). In particular, Noh Ki-woo et al. (2018) empirically demonstrated that regionalism in Yeongnam and Honam is shifting from exclusive animosity to in-group sentimental preference, suggesting the possibility of a gradual weakening of negative regional sentiment with generational change. Changes in the political environment are also identified as factors weakening regionalism. Lee Jae-mook and Kim Ki-dong (2017) analyzed that new media such as social networking services (SNS) can contribute to the weakening of regionalism by forming and spreading bridging social capital. Studies on identity change also support this trend. Kim Ki-dong and Lee Jae-mook (2022) reported that residential identity is stronger than birthplace identity, and that residential identity, particularly centered around the Seoul metropolitan area, is strengthening. This suggests the possibility of a change in the nature of regionalism amidst the concentration in the Seoul metropolitan area and the deepening disparities in regional development.

As examined so far, previous studies have elucidated the structural origins and solidification mechanisms of Korean regionalism (political economy, elite mobilization, rational choice), while also presenting possibilities for its weakening, such as the emergence of alternative cleavages since the 2000s, the fluidity of the PK region, changes in the media environment, and shifts in identity. More recently, studies are increasingly focusing on the variability and potential for reconfiguration of regionalism by comprehensively analyzing micro-level and spatial factors, including differentiation within the Yeongnam region, the mitigating effect in border areas, family socialization and cross-regional ties, and the strengthening of residential identity.

Based on these discussions, this paper aims to empirically verify whether traditional regional cleavages will continue to persist in the changing political and social environment and to present future prospects. In particular, it focuses on analyzing the persistence of regionalist voting behavior in a context where political cleavages are becoming more complex due to deepening political polarization and socio-economic inequality, generational change, and digital transformation.

III. The 21st Presidential Election and Regionalism: A Comparison with the 20th Presidential Election

The 21st presidential election, held on June 3, 2025, was conducted under the abnormal political circumstances of an illegal martial law incident, leading to a prevailing expectation before the election that issue- or ideology-centered voting would be more dominant than regionalism. The actual election results showed that the trend of weakening regionalism, identified in previous studies, persisted to some extent, including the weakening support for conservative parties in the PK region and trends of de-regionalization in the Seoul metropolitan area and some parts of the Yeongnam region. Furthermore, the spatial differentiation between TK, PK, and Honam was maintained in a similar form to the past. However, in the final stages of the election, short-term political mobilization effects occurred, leading to the consolidation of traditional regional support bases in each region amidst candidate unification and a political crisis. As a result, traditional party biases remained strong in TK and Honam. This suggests that while the 2025 presidential election shows a long-term trend of weakening regionalism and increasing fluidity, there is still a structural potential for regionalism to be reactivated depending on short-term political situations.

Figure 1 above compares the regional vote shares of major party candidates in the 21st presidential election with those of the 20th presidential election held three years prior. In particular, the significant progress of Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung, indicated in blue in the PK (Busan, Ulsan, Gyeongnam) region, is noteworthy, but it is also true that the increase in his support rate in that region was not very dramatic compared to three years ago. Furthermore, the persistent regionalist voting behavior in the TK and Honam regions was still strongly observed in this snap election.

<Figure 1> Regional Vote Share of Major Party Candidates in the 21st Presidential Election (Comparison with the 20th Presidential Election)

Source: National Election Commission Election Statistics System

As in the past, the weakening of regionalism in the Yeongnam region was consistently observed in Busan, Ulsan, and Gyeongnam (PK) rather than in Daegu and Gyeongbuk (TK). The Democratic Party secured approximately 40% support in PK in the 21st presidential election, and in Busan, specifically, it garnered 40.14% of the vote, surpassing 40% for the first time for a Democratic Party presidential candidate. This figure exceeds the vote share in Busan during the 20th presidential election (38.15%) and is a record that neither former President Roh Moo-hyun (16th presidential election: 29.85%) nor former President Moon Jae-in (18th presidential election: 39.87%, 19th presidential election: 38.71%), who were politically based in Busan, achieved.[1]

In Busan's Nakdong River Belt (Gangseo-gu, Buk-gu, Sasang-gu, Saha-gu, etc.), Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung significantly narrowed the gap with conservative candidates or even led in some areas, including Gangseo-gu (45.75%). This is because these areas are densely populated with new towns and industrial complexes, have a high proportion of young people and outsiders, and possess socio-structural characteristics where traditional conservative tendencies are weakening. In addition, the regional base built by the Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in administrations, combined with tailored campaign pledges such as regional balanced development and new airport promotion, proved effective. Furthermore, with the increase in young and mobile populations and the expansion of undecided voters, party loyalty is weakening, leading to an increase in competitive areas within PK. These results demonstrate a deepening trend of 'de-regionalism' where the existing conservative-exclusive political structure is structurally and continuously differentiating, particularly in the Nakdong River Belt and new town/industrial complex areas of PK. This can be interpreted as a result of the complex interplay of various factors, including candidate-specific policy effects, demographic changes, generational change, and local issues.

Meanwhile, in Ulsan, a city known as a representative industrial city with dense industrial complexes, similar to Busan's Nakdong River Belt, candidate Lee Jae-myung received 42.54% of the vote, trailing People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo (47.57%) by only 5.03 percentage points. Lee's vote share exceeded the 40.79% he received as a candidate in the 20th presidential election three years prior, marking the highest figure ever for a Democratic Party candidate.[2]

IV. Analysis of Voter Voting Behavior in the 21st Presidential Election: Descriptive Statistics Analysis

To determine the independent effect of regional factors compared to other influencing factors in the 21st presidential election, and to elucidate the impact of regional variables on election results within the context of alternative cleavages such as ideology, party, and generation, or the specific political context of this election, such as martial law and impeachment, precise analysis of micro-level individual data is required.[3]

To examine changes in regionalist voting behavior at the micro-level, survey data from voters immediately after the 21st presidential election in 2025 was utilized. The survey was conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) through Korea Research from June 4 to 5, 2025, for two days immediately following the election. The sample was randomly selected from 1,509 online panelists, composed according to proportional allocation by region, gender, and age group. A total of 6,701 individuals were requested to participate, and 1,509 responded, resulting in a response rate of 22.5%. The margin of error is ±2.5%p at a 95% confidence level.

The trend of weakening regional cleavages observed in this snap election was confirmed not only in the actual voting results by metropolitan area presented earlier but also in the EAI opinion poll conducted immediately after the election. Analysis of the question 'Which candidate did you choose in the 2022 election and this election?' showed that Lee Jae-myung's vote share increased across all regions, including the Yeongnam region, compared to three years ago. In contrast, People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo recorded somewhat lower vote shares in all regions, including Yeongnam, compared to Yoon Suk-yeol's vote share in 2022.

<Figure 2> Voting Choice by Residential Region (2022 Presidential Election and 2025 Presidential Election)

Figure 2 compares the distribution of candidate choices in the 20th presidential election in 2022 (hereinafter referred to as the 20th presidential election) and the 21st presidential election in 2025 (hereinafter referred to as the 21st presidential election) by residential region. The analysis utilized two questions: 'Which candidate did you choose in the last presidential election (20th presidential election)?' and 'Which candidate did you choose in this 21st presidential election?'

As shown in the figure, even at the micro-level analysis based on voting choices by residential region, clear spatial differentiation of regionalism, centered around the Yeongnam region, is evident. First, the contrast between Gwangju/Jeonnam and Daegu/Gyeongbuk, the two poles of traditional regionalism, is clearly maintained. In Gwangju/Jeonnam, the overwhelming support for candidate Lee Jae-myung in the 20th presidential election (92.8%) remained high at 85.6% in the 21st presidential election. In contrast, in Daegu/Gyeongbuk, support for the conservative party, represented by candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election (65.6%) and candidate Kim Moon-soo in the 21st presidential election (54.4%), remains dominant.

In contrast to these regions, notable changes are observed in the Busan, Ulsan, and Gyeongnam (PK) region, even at the micro-level of voting choices. While candidate Yoon Suk-yeol received 50.8% of the vote in the 20th presidential election, candidate Kim Moon-soo received 49.2% in the 21st presidential election, a slight decrease. In particular, the increase in candidate Lee Jae-myung's support rate in this region from 45.6% in 2022 to 49.2% in 2025 supports the political fluidity and 'de-regionalist' trend in the PK region.

Meanwhile, in the Seoul metropolitan area (Seoul, Incheon/Gyeonggi), the support rate for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol was 51.3% and 59.4% respectively in the 20th presidential election, but in the 21st presidential election, the support rate for candidate Kim Moon-soo decreased to 48.7% and 40.6% respectively. This suggests a weakening of the support base for conservative parties in the Seoul metropolitan area and an expansion of undecided voters or progressive supporters. Some changes are also detected in Gangwon/Jeju and Daejeon/Chungcheong. In Gangwon/Jeju, the support rate for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, which was 60.9% in the 20th presidential election, significantly decreased to 39.1% for candidate Kim Moon-soo in the 21st presidential election. In Daejeon/Chungcheong, the magnitude of change is relatively small, but there is a trend of a slight decrease in support for the conservative candidate and an increase in support for candidate Lee Jae-myung.

These results show that regions where the traditional regionalist structure still operates strongly (Gwangju/Jeonnam, Daegu/Gyeongbuk) coexist with regions where de-regionalism is gradually spreading (PK, Seoul metropolitan area, Gangwon/Jeju). In particular, the changes in PK and the Seoul metropolitan area can be interpreted as a result of the combination of structural factors such as generational change, population movement, and the expansion of politically unaffiliated voters, along with the specific political environment of the 2025 election.

<Figure 3> Favorability towards Politicians by Residential Region (0=Very Unfavorable, 10=Very Favorable)

Next, the box plots in Figure 3 show the results of analyzing the regional favorability towards the major candidates in the 21st presidential election. Favorability was measured on a scale from 0 (very unfavorable) to 10 (very favorable), with 5 representing 'neutral'.

The analysis results confirm that the traditional regionalist structure is consistently reflected in candidate favorability. First, in the Gwangju/Jeolla region, candidate Lee Jae-myung's average favorability was very high at 7.57, while that of conservative party members Kim Moon-soo (3.66) and Lee Jun-seok (3.93) was relatively low. This suggests that strong positive evaluations of Democratic Party candidates and low preference for conservative candidates are still maintained in this region.

Conversely, in Daegu/Gyeongbuk, candidate Kim Moon-soo's favorability was the highest at 6.15, while that of candidate Lee Jae-myung (5.39) and candidate Lee Jun-seok (4.83) was relatively low. This indicates that preference for conservative party candidates still prevails in the TK region. Interestingly, despite candidate Lee Jae-myung's origin in the Gyeongbuk region (Andong), appeals based on regional ties were not significantly effective. In Busan, Ulsan, and Gyeongnam, the favorability ratings for candidate Kim Moon-soo (6.30) and candidate Lee Jae-myung (6.14) were similar, showing a reduced gap in preference between conservatives and progressives compared to the TK region. In particular, the fact that candidate Lee Jae-myung's favorability is higher in the PK region than in TK supports the political fluidity and de-regionalist trend in this region.

In summary, based on favorability towards the leaders of the two major parties, an asymmetric change in regionalist voting sentiment is observed. While traditional regionalist sentiment remains strongly maintained in Honam, there are clear signs of weakening negative sentiment towards non-conservative politicians in the TK region. Overall, the analysis of candidate favorability by region shows that while the traditional regionalist structure still persists, there is also a coexisting trend of weakening, such as the narrowing gap in favorability between candidates, particularly in the PK region. This result is consistent with the spatial differentiation and de-regionalist trends identified in the vote share analysis and suggests the possibility of a weakening of fixed regional support bases in certain regions and a fluid realignment of support structures depending on the election context and issue environment in the future.

<Figure 4> Perception of Responsible Party for Martial Law and President Yoon Suk-yeol's Impeachment

The 21st presidential election was held as a snap election due to the unprecedented political event of former President Yoon Suk-yeol's illegal attempt at martial law and impeachment. Under these special political circumstances, it is highly likely that voters' evaluations and perceptions of responsibility for these issues significantly influenced the election results. Therefore, this study examined the regional perception of responsibility for the martial law and impeachment incident using opinion poll data (see Figure 4).

The analysis results show that nationwide, the highest response was that the ruling People Power Party was responsible. This indicates that perceptions of responsibility for the martial law and impeachment incident largely align across regions. However, in Daegu/Gyeongbuk, a core support base for conservative parties, the response 'both parties are responsible' was relatively high (29.9%) compared to other regions. This suggests that while voters in the TK region acknowledge some responsibility of the People Power Party, there is a coexisting perception that the Democratic Party is also not free from responsibility for the incident.

The perception of sole responsibility for the Democratic Party was low across all regions, but it was higher in the TK region and some PK areas compared to other regions. These results suggest that the perception of responsibility in the TK region is moving away from traditional one-sided party bias towards a multi-layered perception that criticizes both parties depending on the issue. In other words, even in regions with strong conservative support bases, there is a shared 'both parties responsible' view regarding the evaluation of the martial law and impeachment incident, which can be interpreted as a sign foreshadowing future changes in the regional political structure.

Regionalism in Korean politics has historically had the structural characteristic of binding voters with specific regional affiliations as 'political hostages' without alternatives. This structure has constrained the existence of competing parties that could challenge regional parties or existing hegemonic regional parties, and consequently, has solidified a fixed regional confrontation structure between the two major parties. However, if the establishment of regional parties or the emergence of substantial competitive forces against existing hegemonic regional parties were permitted through amendments to the Political Parties Act, the current regionalist structure would likely undergo significant changes.

With this problem awareness, this study included questions in the survey asking about the intention to support the two major parties in the future. Unlike questions asking about 'choices in the current election,' these were designed to grasp voters' potential for political realignment through their future support intentions. Specifically, the intention to support the Democratic Party/People Power Party in the future was measured on a 4-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much).

<Figure 5> Future Party Support Intentions (by Residential Region)

<Figure 5> compares the average future support intentions for the Democratic Party and the People Power Party, broken down by respondents' residential regions. In Gwangju/Jeolla, traditionally a stronghold for the Democratic Party, support intention for the Democratic Party was very high at 3.13, while that for the People Power Party was only 1.63, showing a clear gap. Conversely, in Daegu/Gyeongbuk (TK), the gap was minimal with 2.31 for the Democratic Party and 2.26 for the People Power Party, but the Democratic Party's slight lead is noteworthy.

Notably, even in Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam (PK), once a core base for conservative parties, the intention to support the Democratic Party (2.45) surpassed that for the People Power Party (2.18), confirming a trend away from the traditional conservative dominance. These results indicate that support for the Democratic Party is expanding compared to the past in both TK and PK, with a more significant change observed in PK. Gangwon/Jeju also showed a reduced gap, with the Democratic Party (2.70) scoring higher than the People Power Party (1.95). In the Seoul Metropolitan Area (Seoul, Incheon/Gyeonggi), the Democratic Party recorded a slightly higher average, but the difference was relatively limited.

In summary, the analysis of future party support intentions more clearly reveals changes in regionalism within the Yeongnam region. Particularly in the PK region, the gap in support intentions between the two parties is not large, clearly demonstrating a trend toward a more diversified and de-regionalized party support base. These changes suggest a fracturing of the traditional one-sided support structure across the Yeongnam region and an expansion of political choices.

The analysis of 'Future Party Support Intentions' examined earlier confirmed the possibility of regionalism mitigation under future political environmental changes, as the support gap between the Democratic Party and the People Power Party in some Yeongnam regions, particularly PK and TK, was small or nearly equal. To verify if this trend is also observed in actual voting behavior by generation, this study analyzed the vote share distribution by generation in the Gwangju/Jeolla, Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam (PK), and Daegu/Gyeongbuk (TK) regions using post-election survey data (see <Figure 6>).

The analysis revealed that in Gwangju/Jeolla, support for the Democratic Party candidate was overwhelmingly dominant across all age groups. However, among those aged 70 and above, who tend to be more conservative, support for the People Power Party was relatively high at 21.1%, indicating a generational difference. In the PK region, a typical generational divide pattern was observed: younger age groups showed higher support for the Democratic Party, while older age groups showed increasing support for the People Power Party. For example, among those aged 18-29, the Democratic Party (52.6%) was favored over the People Power Party (47.4%), but among those aged 70 and above, the People Power Party was overwhelmingly dominant at 90.0%.

Meanwhile, in the TK region, the People Power Party's strength persisted, but the Democratic Party was dominant among those aged 18-29 (Democratic Party 53.8%, People Power Party 46.2%) and those in their 40s (Democratic Party 63.2%, People Power Party 36.8%). Conversely, the People Power Party regained the lead among those in their 30s, 60s, and 70s and above. The gap was particularly wide among those in their 30s (People Power Party 68.8%, Democratic Party 31.2%) and those aged 70 and above (People Power Party 72.2%, Democratic Party 27.8%).

These results suggest that political orientations are clearly differentiated by generation within the Yeongnam region, and that the traditional regionalist framework is weakening among younger generations. This aligns with the observed reduction in the party support gap in the 'Future Party Support Intentions' analysis, indicating that the mitigation of regionalism in the Yeongnam region could accelerate through generational change, especially in the context of future political environmental shifts or institutional reforms.

<Figure 6> Generational Voting Choices by Residential Region (Gwangju/Jeolla, Daegu/Gyeongbuk, Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam)

Overall, it was projected that regionalism would significantly weaken in some areas due to the focus on political polarization and the single issues of martial law and impeachment in the early presidential election of 2025. In reality, while a trend of regionalism mitigation, similar to past elections, was consistently observed, particularly in the PK region, it was also confirmed that the traditional regionalist framework is still in operation. This suggests that regionalism, even if partially influenced by short-term political environmental changes, retains a strong structural and psychological foundation. However, the possibility of accelerated regionalism mitigation cannot be ruled out, considering the complex interplay of factors such as future political institutional reforms, changes in the party system, and generational shifts among voters.

In recent South Korean elections, changes and persistence in regionalism have been consistently observed within the spatial differentiation, particularly in the Yeongnam region. Simultaneously, questions are being raised about whether regionalist voting behavior will continue among South Korean voters, given the deepening political and ideological polarization, and the rise of alternative political and social cleavages such as generational and gender divisions. In this context, another way to assess the persistence of regionalism is to compare how different the ideological distributions of voters in the Yeongnam and Honam regions actually are. In other words, examining whether the dichotomy of 'Yeongnam is conservative, Honam is progressive' still holds true, and how ideologically similar or different voters in TK (Daegu/Gyeongbuk) and PK (Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam) are within Yeongnam, can be a useful approach to scrutinizing the political and ideological structure of regional cleavages.

<Figure 7> Distribution of Voter Ideological Tendencies by Residential Region (Daegu/Gyeongbuk, Gwangju/Jeolla, Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam)

Reference Group: Ideological Tendency Distribution of Voters Residing in the Seoul Metropolitan Area

<Figure 7> presents the kernel density estimation results comparing the distribution of self-reported ideological tendencies (0=progressive, 10=conservative) of voters in Gwangju/Jeolla (Honam), Daegu/Gyeongbuk (TK), and Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam (PK), using voters residing in the Seoul Metropolitan Area as the reference group. The analysis shows that Honam's distribution is generally skewed towards progressive tendencies, while Daegu/Gyeongbuk exhibits strong conservative tendencies. In contrast, the distribution in Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam is evenly spread across the spectrum, indicating the coexistence of diverse political orientations rather than concentration in a specific ideological spectrum. These findings suggest that while the traditional ideological dichotomy remains relatively firm in the Honam and TK regions, PK is experiencing a greater diversification of the ideological spectrum and political fluidity.

V. Comprehensive Analysis of the Effects of Regionalism in the 21st Presidential Election

To more comprehensively verify the differences in voting behavior and party support tendencies by region, confirmed through the descriptive statistical analysis above, this study conducted regression analyses with three main dependent variables. First, a binary logistic analysis with the candidate choice in the 21st Presidential Election (Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung=1, People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo=0) as the dependent variable. Second, an OLS analysis with the difference in favorability towards the two candidates as the dependent variable. Third, an ordinal logistic analysis with future support intentions for the Democratic Party and the People Power Party as the dependent variables.

Each empirical analysis model included party identification dummy variables (i.e., party identification) and self-ideological orientation (0=most progressive, 10=most conservative) as key political variables, while controlling for major socioeconomic variables such as age, gender (female=1), education level, and income level. Additionally, to precisely control for the gender gap between men and women in their 20s and 30s, an interaction term of age and gender (age × gender) was included. The focus of the analysis was to confirm the independent effect of the residential region variables (Gwangju/Jeolla, Daegu/Gyeongbuk, Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam) on each dependent variable.

<Figure 8> visualizes the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from the binary logistic analysis with 'Voting for candidate Lee Jae-myung (Democratic Party)=1, Voting for candidate Kim Moon-soo (People Power Party)=0' as the dependent variable. The analysis revealed that the effect of the party identification variable was overwhelmingly large, which can be seen as reflecting the increasing partisan polarization in recent South Korean politics. Supporters of the Democratic Party had a significantly higher probability of choosing candidate Lee Jae-myung (positive direction, p<.001), while supporters of the People Power Party, conversely, had a significantly higher probability of choosing candidate Kim Moon-soo (negative direction, p<.001). Self-ideological orientation also operated significantly, with a clear tendency to support candidate Kim Moon-soo as conservatism increased, and candidate Lee Jae-myung as progressivism increased.

Among the regional variables, residing in Gwangju/Jeolla was a significant factor increasing the probability of choosing candidate Lee Jae-myung (p < .001). In contrast, residing in Daegu/Gyeongbuk and Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam both showed negative coefficients, but these effects were not statistically significant, indicating that the effect of regionalism was not clearly confirmed in this election. These results suggest that while party identification and ideological orientation remain the most powerful explanatory factors for candidate choice, the significant effect of the regional variable was observed only in the Gwangju/Jeolla region, implying that the persistence of regionalism is confined to specific areas. Conversely, in Daegu/Gyeongbuk and Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam, the effect of residential region was not statistically significant, indicating that the distinct Yeongnam regionalism observed in past elections did not clearly operate in this election.

<Figure 8> Voter Choice in the 21st Presidential Election (Dependent Variable: Choice of Democratic Party Candidate Lee Jae-myung)

To gain a more refined understanding of the determinants of candidate choice identified in the preceding binary logistic analysis, this study additionally conducted an OLS regression analysis with the difference in favorability between candidate Lee Jae-myung and candidate Kim Moon-soo as the dependent variable (see <Figure 9>). The favorability difference was calculated as the difference in favorability ratings (0-10) for each candidate (Lee Jae-myung – Kim Moon-soo), with a positive value indicating higher relative favorability towards candidate Lee Jae-myung.

The analysis showed that the influence of the party identification variable was very strong, consistent with the voting choice model. Supporters of the Democratic Party had significantly higher favorability towards candidate Lee Jae-myung compared to candidate Kim Moon-soo, and supporters of the People Power Party showed a strong negative effect in the opposite direction (p<.001). Self-ideological orientation also had a significant impact, with stronger progressivism leading to higher relative favorability towards candidate Lee Jae-myung, while stronger conservatism led to increased favorability towards candidate Kim Moon-soo.

<Figure 9> OLS Analysis Using the Favorability Difference Between Candidates Lee Jae-myung and Kim Moon-soo (Dependent Variable: Lee Jae-myung Favorability - Kim Moon-soo Favorability)

Similar patterns were partially observed in the regional variables compared to the voting choice model. Residing in Gwangju/Jeolla significantly increased favorability towards candidate Lee Jae-myung, which can be interpreted as a representative example of the persistence of regionalism. In contrast, in Daegu/Gyeongbuk and Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam, relative favorability towards candidate Kim Moon-soo was slightly higher, but the coefficients for these regional variables were not statistically significant, indicating that regionalist sentiment in the Yeongnam region did not clearly operate at the favorability level in this presidential election. Notably, the smaller coefficient size in PK compared to TK suggests that the degree of regionalism mitigation may vary within the Yeongnam region. Overall, not only candidate choice but also favorability ratings were primarily explained by party identification and ideological orientation, with regional variables showing no significant explanatory power except for Honam. This once again supports the weakening of regionalism in the Yeongnam region compared to previous elections.

<Figure 10> Future Support Intentions for the Democratic Party and the People Power Party (Ordinal Logistic Analysis)

While the preceding analyses primarily focused on actual candidate choices and political favorability in the specific political environment of the early presidential election of 2025, the most original contribution of this study is its direct measurement of sustained support intentions for the two major regional hegemonic parties, extending beyond immediate choices. This approach is qualitatively different from traditional regionalism studies, which have primarily inferred the possibility of regionalism's persistence or mitigation based on past election results and fixed party support structures. <Figure 10> visualizes the results of an ordinal logistic regression analysis with future support intentions for the Democratic Party (left) and the People Power Party (right) as dependent variables. As in the previous analyses, the statistical analysis included party identification, self-ideological orientation, age, gender, education level, income level, residential region (Gwangju/Jeolla, Daegu/Gyeongbuk, Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam), and an age × gender interaction term to account for the gender gap among those in their 20s and 30s.

The analysis results with future party support intentions as the dependent variable showed that residential region variables in Gwangju/Jeolla, Daegu/Gyeongbuk, and Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam, all known for strong regionalist tendencies, did not have a statistically significant impact on support intentions for either the Democratic Party or the People Power Party. Specifically, in the Gwangju/Jeolla region, although the coefficient direction in the Democratic Party support intention model was positive, the confidence interval included 0, indicating a statistically insignificant level. Similarly, in the Yeongnam regions (TK and PK), the effect of the residential region variable was not statistically significant for support intentions for either party.

This contrasts with the findings where certain traces of regionalism were detected in candidate choice and favorability evaluations. It suggests that voters' attitudes towards future party support are more influenced by political factors such as ideological orientation and party identification. In other words, unlike the choice of a presidential candidate or emotional favorability at a specific point in time, party identification and ideological self-identity appear to be more decisive explanatory factors for long-term party support. Furthermore, these results suggest that there may be some potential for the long-term mitigation of regionalism not only in Yeongnam but also in Honam. The fact that absolute support for the Democratic Party was not a significant variable even in Gwangju/Jeolla, considered a core base of traditional regionalism, signals a potential for restructuring the regional party landscape in the future.

In this context, if new regional parties emerge in addition to the existing hegemonic regional parties in both Yeongnam and Honam, or if political pluralism within regions expands, the current confrontational structure of regionalist parties could gradually weaken. This can be evaluated as a significant empirical implication that simultaneously demonstrates the possibility of spatial differentiation in the South Korean party system and structural change in regionalism.

In conclusion, the three regression analyses consistently showed that party identification and self-ideological orientation remain the most powerful determinants of political behavior, and that residential region also had a significant impact on candidate choice, candidate favorability, and future party support intentions, even after controlling for these factors. In particular, the clear contrast between TK/PK and Honam supports the persistence of traditional regionalism, while the weakening effect observed in the PK region and among younger generations in some parts of TK suggests the possibility of regionalism mitigation. Notably, the analysis of future party support intentions revealed a trend of reduced gaps between the two parties compared to actual election results or favorability ratings, indicating that structural realignment of regionalism could accelerate when combined with changes in the political environment, institutional reforms, and generational change. Therefore, this study, by confirming the current persistence of regionalism to some extent while empirically presenting long-term change possibilities through spatial differentiation in the Yeongnam region, generational shifts, and the fluidity of future party support structures, offers meaningful implications for forecasting the regional structure and party system changes of South Korean politics.

VI. Conclusion

It can be argued that the early presidential election of 2025 was a single-issue election, driven by the unprecedented political events of former President Yoon Suk-yeol's attempted illegal martial law and impeachment. Given this unusual and specific political environment, some predicted that traditional key determinants of national elections, such as regionalism and the party political landscape, would not be significantly highlighted in this election. However, as trends of spatial differentiation and mitigation of regionalism have been consistently observed in recent elections, particularly in the Yeongnam region, it is necessary to examine how regionalist voting behavior operated in this presidential election within the broader context of change and persistence.

Previous research has elucidated the structural origins and entrenchment mechanisms (political economy, elite mobilization, rational choice) of South Korean regionalism, while also presenting possibilities for regionalism's weakening due to the rise of alternative cleavages since the 2000s, the political fluidity of the PK region, changes in the media environment, and shifts in identity. In particular, recent studies have increasingly focused on the variability and reconstructability of regionalism through analyses encompassing micro-level and spatial factors such as differentiation within Yeongnam, mitigation effects in border regions, family socialization and cross-cutting ties, and the strengthening of residential identity.

Based on this research trend, this paper aimed to empirically verify how traditional regional cleavages actually operated within the specific political environment of the early presidential election of 2025 and to forecast their potential for change. To this end, considering the increasing complexity of political cleavages due to deepening political polarization and socioeconomic inequality, generational change, and digital transformation, the study focused on simultaneously identifying the persistence and patterns of change in regionalist voting behavior by comprehensively utilizing descriptive statistical analysis and regression analysis.

Empirical analysis results confirmed once again that traditional regionalist voting behavior, centered on the Yeongnam and Honam regions, still exists at a macro level, even in this early election held after the impeachment of the incumbent president. However, upon closer examination, a clear weakening of regional cleavages was observed, particularly in the Yeongnam region. Support for the Democratic Party has continuously expanded in the Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam region, and this election saw vote shares exceeding 40% in both Busan and Ulsan, setting new records. Furthermore, examining individual voting behavior at the micro level, it was empirically confirmed that regionalist voting tendencies in the Yeongnam region, unlike in the Honam region, are generally weakening across all aspects, including candidate choice, candidate favorability gap, and future party support intentions.

The analysis of future party support intentions revealed a further pronounced possibility of Yeongnam region voters defecting from the People Power Party. In both Daegu/Gyeongbuk and Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam, a trend of diversified and segmented party choices was observed across age groups, with high support for the Democratic Party confirmed among younger generations. These generational shifts were consistently reflected in future party support intentions, with the People Power Party receiving lower average evaluation scores than the Democratic Party in all major regions, including Yeongnam. This serves as empirical evidence of structural changes occurring in the regionalist voting behavior of the Yeongnam region, along with generational change.

These research findings offer important policy implications for institutional reforms aimed at mitigating regionalism. Specifically, consideration could be given to amending the current Political Party Act, which prohibits the establishment of regional parties, to alleviate the monopoly of regional hegemonic parties and institutionally guarantee the emergence of regional or alternative parties that can compete in the same locality. This would provide regional voters with practical alternative choices and reduce structural dependence on specific parties. Furthermore, to institutionally reflect generational and regional political diversity, institutional improvements such as strengthening the proportional representation system, readjusting electoral districts, and lowering entry barriers for new political candidates are also necessary.

Future research should track the long-term trends in regionalism, considering that the current analysis was conducted in the specific political environment of an early presidential election. In particular, research is needed to comprehensively analyze the impact of generational change and political socialization processes, inter-regional population movement, and the online/SNS-based political information environment on the structure of regional cleavages. Additionally, verifying whether the weakening of regionalism actually leads to the mitigation of political polarization and an improvement in the quality of democracy remains an important task.

In conclusion, this study, using the early presidential election of 2025 as a case study, simultaneously confirmed the persistence of traditional regionalism and the trends of mitigation and realignment within the Yeongnam region. These changes, when combined with institutional reforms, party system shifts, and generational change, hold the potential to accelerate the structural weakening of regionalism in South Korean politics. This can serve as a starting point for discussions on practical institutional reforms aimed at democratizing regional politics and invigorating party competition.■

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[1] For reference, the vote share for candidate Lee Jae-myung in the Busan region during the 20th presidential election held three years prior was 38.15%.

[2] For reference, in the 19th and 18th presidential elections, candidate Moon Jae-in received 38.14% and 39.78% of the votes in the Ulsan region, respectively.

[3] In this study, regional voting refers to voter behavior based on residential ties rather than place of origin.

■ Author: Lee Jae-mook Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.

■ Contact and Editing: Lim Jae-hyunResearcher, EAI

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhim@eai.or.kr