[EAI Opinion Review] Evaluation of the April 11 General Election and Presidential Election Issues from Public Opinion

1. April 11 General Election Results: Park Geun-hye's Political Victory, Maintaining a Close Contest

1) Election Evaluation: Saenuri Party's Landslide Victory? Or Effectively the Opposition's Victory?

With a voter turnout of 54.3%, the Saenuri Party secured 152 seats, the Democratic United Party 127 seats, the Unified Progressive Party 13 seats, and the Liberty Forward Party 5 seats. The Saenuri Party achieved a political victory by securing an outright majority, overcoming the challenge from the opposition parties that advocated for a "regime judgment." Following the election, most media outlets evaluated it as a "Saenuri Party landslide, opposition party's crushing defeat" based on the strong performance of Saenuri Party candidates in most regions, excluding the Seoul metropolitan area and Honam (Figure 1).

[Figure 1] Party Affiliation of Constituency Winners and Election Results for the 18th/19th National Assembly Elections

Figure Source: Wikipedia (http://me2.do/5AxwTjB)

Figure Source: Naver (http://me2.do/GJQL3ou)

In response, some within the opposition camp, recovering from the shock of defeat on election night, argued that they had effectively won based on their landslide victories in the Seoul metropolitan area and their overall lead in the popular vote for constituency seats. Moon Sung-keun, acting party leader, also expressed dissatisfaction with the narrative of defeat, stating that the idea of the opposition losing due to arrogance is a logic peddled by the Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, and Dong-A Ilbo.

Based on opinion poll results conducted ten days prior to the election, the author predicted a close contest in the April 11 general election, with neither party gaining a significant advantage, despite a strong sentiment for "regime judgment," due to a majority of voters distrusting the current opposition parties (EAI Opinion Briefing No. 111). The election results appear, contrary to this prediction and most media reports, to show a landslide victory for the Saenuri Party and a crushing defeat for the opposition. However, is the assessment by some in the opposition camp, that they have made significant gains compared to the 18th general election and effectively won due to their landslide in the Seoul metropolitan area, justifiable? Has the balance of power been disrupted in this election?

2) Two Illusions

The Illusion of a Saenuri Party Landslide

A comparison of the party preferences for constituency and proportional representation votes in the second survey, conducted immediately after the election, with the first survey confirms that these predictions were maintained (Figures 2, 3). When considering the vote shares for both constituency and proportional representation for each party, the results indicate a close contest between the ruling and opposition parties, as predicted in the first panel survey and confirmed in the second panel survey.

Even when considering the seat distribution, while the Saenuri Party secured an outright majority, the seat count between the ruling and opposition parties is close. Furthermore, with the agreement on parliamentary reform bills to prevent unilateral legislative action immediately after the election, smooth parliamentary operations without ruling-opposition cooperation will be impossible in the 19th general election.

Moreover, according to this survey, the constituency vote support rates show a close race: 42.8% for the Saenuri Party, 42.3% for the Democratic United Party, and 4.7% for the Unified Progressive Party. Combined, the opposition parties' vote share is higher. For proportional representation votes, the panel survey indicated 41.9% for the Saenuri Party, 35.3% for the Democratic United Party, and 14.8% for the Unified Progressive Party, showing results very similar to the official vote shares announced by the National Election Commission: 42.8% for the Saenuri Party, 36.5% for the Democratic United Party, and 10.3% for the Unified Progressive Party.

Particularly in the Chungcheong and Gangwon regions, which yielded unexpectedly strong results, the opposition parties trailed in the overall vote share for constituency seats. In the PK region, although the opposition parties secured fewer seats, their combined support for the Democratic United Party and the Unified Progressive Party reached approximately 36.8%, making an interpretation of "landslide victory" difficult (Table 1).

[Figure 2] Changes in Constituency Vote Preferences (%)

[Figure 3] Changes in Proportional Representation Vote Preferences (%)

The Illusion of the Opposition's Landslide in the Seoul Metropolitan Area and the Effect of Candidate Unification

In terms of constituency seat distribution, the opposition parties secured twice as many seats in Seoul: 16 for Saenuri, 30 for the Democratic Party, and 2 for the Unified Progressive Party. In Gyeonggi Province, the opposition held an advantage of 10 seats: 21 for Saenuri, 29 for the Democratic Party, and 2 for the Unified Progressive Party. In Incheon, the seats were split evenly: 6 for Saenuri and 6 for the Democratic Party. Overall in the Seoul metropolitan area, the opposition secured a clear victory with 44 seats for Saenuri, 65 for the Democratic Party, and 4 for the Unified Progressive Party.

Looking at the proportional representation vote shares, the Saenuri Party ranked first in both Seoul and Gyeonggi Province, recording consistent vote shares in the low 40% range. Notably, the Saenuri Party performed relatively well even in terms of seats in Gyeonggi and Incheon. The assessment that the Saenuri Party suffered a crushing defeat in the Seoul metropolitan area is thus an illusion caused by the overwhelming number of opposition candidates elected in Seoul. For reference, nationwide, excluding the Honam and Jeju regions, the Saenuri Party was the leading party in terms of support. This indicates that the Saenuri Party's vote-getting power in the Seoul metropolitan area was not insignificant (Table 2). Given that the Saenuri Party would need to secure a larger margin in the Seoul metropolitan area when conceding an advantage to the opposition in the Chungcheong region and the recently opposition-leaning Gangwon region, the result of a mere 4-5% lead for the combined Democratic United Party and Unified Progressive Party in the Seoul metropolitan area should be considered a precarious advantage.

It is also important to consider that the synergy effect of candidate unification was not significant. While the Democratic United Party received relatively high support in constituency votes and the Unified Progressive Party in proportional representation votes, the combined support for both parties did not show a substantial difference. Although the combined support for the two parties surpassed that of the Saenuri Party, leading to numerous victories in the Seoul metropolitan area, on a national level, the synergistic effect beyond the arithmetic sum of the two parties' support did not appear to be substantial, even with candidate unification.

[Table 1] General Election Constituency Votes by Region (%) : Results from 1,479 Respondents

[Table 2] Proportional Representation Vote Share by Region (%) : Announced by the National Election Commission

3) Factors Contributing to the Saenuri Party's Victory

Consolidation of Conservative Support, Defection of Democratic Party Supporters, and Saenuri Party's Performance Among Moderates

The Saenuri Party's victory in this election, despite the public sentiment remaining competitive until the end, can be attributed to a higher level of consolidation among the ruling party's supporters compared to the opposition's. Utilizing the advantages of panel surveys, which allow for tracking attitude changes over time among the same respondents, we can observe the shifts in preferences for constituency candidates between the first and second surveys. In the first survey, 85.9% of respondents who expressed intent to vote for Saenuri actually voted for the party, with only 14.1% defecting. In contrast, only 77.1% of Democratic Party supporters maintained their support, with 22.9% defecting. Notably, the proportion of respondents who expressed support but ultimately abstained from voting was also higher among Democratic Party supporters (7.3% of Democratic Party supporters vs. 4.5% of Saenuri Party supporters). Ultimately, the strong consolidation of conservative support laid the foundation for the Saenuri Party's victory.

Furthermore, among undecided voters who had not yet decided on a candidate in the first survey, 36.8% supported the Saenuri Party, 38.2% supported the Democratic Party, and 3.5% supported the Unified Progressive Party. This indicates that these undecided voters did not overwhelmingly lean towards the opposition. Among those who responded that they would abstain in the first survey, 24.2% of those who actually voted supported the Democratic Party, 3.4% supported the Unified Progressive Party, and only 19.7% supported the Saenuri Party. While this was favorable to the opposition parties, the overall scale was insufficient to shift the overall balance.

[Table 3] Movement of Preferences for Constituency Votes between 1st and 2nd Surveys

Note: The question regarding party preference for constituency candidates in the first survey was administered to the "voting intention group." The second survey targeted respondents who indicated they had voted. The figures presented here are calculated including those who had no voting intention in the first survey and those who abstained in the second survey. Undecided voters in the first survey include responses of "have not yet decided" and "no candidate to support."

Suppression of the "Regime Judgment" Sentiment: Weakening of Negative Campaigning and Policy Debates

The consolidation of conservative support and the relatively larger defection of opposition supporters can be attributed to the impact of last-minute negative campaigning, which prevented the "regime judgment" sentiment from gaining the traction the opposition had hoped for. At the time of the first panel survey, intense conflict between the Blue House and political parties erupted over the alleged illegal surveillance of civilians by the Civil Servant Discipline and Integrity Division of the Prime Minister's Office. However, the subsequent controversy surrounding offensive remarks by candidate Kim Yong-min emerged as the biggest issue in the final days of the election, likely contributing to preventing the spread of the civilian surveillance scandal.

In the second survey, 17.2% of respondents cited the offensive remarks controversy as the most influential issue in their voting decision, alongside regional development issues (18.0%), thus overshadowing other election issues. This appears to be a result of the confusion within the opposition party's response following the offensive remarks scandal. The proportion of public opinion that considered the civilian surveillance scandal, to which the opposition parties had seemingly "all-in," as the most important factor showed little change, increasing from 13.3% to 14.5%. In contrast, the proportion of respondents who considered the plagiarism allegations against candidate Moon Dae-sung had a negligible impact, at 1.4%.

Furthermore, the influence of issues such as economic growth and welfare, which were deemed important in the first survey, was weakened. Consequently, the election failed to highlight the livelihood and socio-economic issues that were identified as the root causes of the initial sentiment for "regime judgment." Compared to previous general elections, the weakening of policy debates and the strengthening of regionalism were at similar levels to the 2008 general election. However, the perception that slander between candidates had intensified increased from 32.1% to 56.6%. Conversely, the perception of increased presidential and government intervention remained at 30.0%. This suggests that while disappointing voters who expected policy debates, the opposition's strategy to emphasize "regime judgment" was unsuccessful.

[Figure 4] Most Important Issues Influencing Voting Decisions in the April 11 General Election

[Figure 5] Factors for Saenuri Party Victory and Election Evaluation Changes

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Factors for Saenuri Victory: Opposition's Self-Inflicted Wounds 38.2% vs. Park Geun-hye's Leadership Effect 27.5%

The survey results indicate that the primary reasons for the Saenuri Party's victory were "the opposition party's mistakes" (38.2%) and "Park Geun-hye's effective leadership" (27.5%). "Saenuri Party candidates were better than opposition candidates" or "opposition candidates were inferior to Saenuri Party candidates" received 9.7% and 7.0% respectively. "The Saenuri Party performed well" or "President Lee Myung-bak performed well" received only 4.6% and 1.4%. The opposition camp, despite a surge in sentiment for "regime judgment" due to the worsening perceived economy and a series of corruption scandals, failed to translate this into actual votes due to internal conflicts during the nomination process and mishandling of the civilian surveillance scandal. In contrast, the Saenuri Party, which faced a situation where winning even 100 seats seemed difficult at the beginning of the year, succeeded in reforming the party, reorganizing its ranks, and deflecting the sharp edge of the "regime judgment" sentiment under the leadership of former party leader Park Geun-hye, who chaired the emergency response committee and oversaw party name changes, policy shifts, candidate nominations, and the entire election campaign.

Notably, there are differences in how political stances shape the perception of election results. In the first survey, among Democratic Party supporters, 44.0% cited the opposition's mistakes as the reason for their loss, while 20.0% attributed it to Park Geun-hye's leadership. Conversely, among Saenuri Party supporters, 40.4% attributed the victory to Park Geun-hye's leadership, and only 29.6% cited the opposition's mistakes. Among unaffiliated voters, 37.8% pointed to the opposition's responsibility, and 23.8% cited Park Geun-hye's role, suggesting that the opposition's internal turmoil played a more significant role.

Institutional Environment: Single-Member Plurality System

Overall, the close contest between the ruling and opposition parties is reflected in the actual voting results. However, considering that the opposition failed to achieve its political goals of "regime judgment" and a "minority opposition in a divided government," and that the Saenuri Party's target was only around 121 seats (the number won during the impeachment election) as late as February, the Saenuri Party's strong performance and the opposition's political defeat are evident.

The Saenuri Party's unexpected achievement of an outright majority, exceeding its actual support rate, can be largely attributed to the institutional effect of the single-member plurality system, where the candidate with the most votes wins. Excluding the Yeongnam region, where the ruling party was dominant, and the Honam region, where the opposition was dominant, the Saenuri Party was able to secure seats in the Chungcheong and Gangwon regions and perform well in the Gyeonggi-Incheon area under this system. Conversely, the opposition parties only benefited from the plurality system in the Seoul area.

2. Issues for the 2012 Presidential Election

1) Election Agenda: A Political/Security Election or an Economic/Livelihood Election?

Following the election defeat, debates have intensified within the opposition camp regarding the ideological identity of the Democratic United Party. While a faction centered around moderate lawmakers emphasizes the failure to attract centrist voters, the position advocating for a stronger ideological stance, championed by the '486 generation' within the party, remains influential. However, the results of this survey indicate that the 2012 election agenda was driven more by voters' expectations and concerns regarding economic and livelihood issues than by ideological or political disputes.

Most importantly, economic perceptions, which had been improving under the current government, have sharply deteriorated since the 2010 local elections, particularly following the livelihood crisis in 2011. Nearly 60% of respondents believe the national economy has worsened, a figure significantly exceeding the 52.4% recorded in the first panel survey of the 2007 presidential election, which showed a stronger tendency for retrospective voting on the economic crisis. Regarding household economies, while the proportion of those who perceive no change is the majority, 34.9% believe it has worsened, with less than 10% reporting improvement. Overall, concerns about the national economy are at a serious level.

Furthermore, responses prioritizing the mitigation of economic polarization as the top national task for the next government accounted for 35.2%, followed by economic growth at 21.5% and improvement of quality of life at 11.4%. Issues related to socio-economic agendas thus accounted for well over half of the responses. Political reform, national unity, and foreign policy/security issues each received single-digit percentages. When asked which party they believed could best address each task, respondents indicated that the Saenuri Party was perceived as more capable of handling economic growth, national unity, and national security, while the opposition was seen as better equipped to address the mitigation of economic polarization and inter-Korean relations. The failure of the opposition to highlight issues favorable to them in the recent general election appears to have been a major factor in their defeat. Similarly, the core agenda of the subsequent presidential election will likely be a crucial variable in determining the election outcome.

[Figure 6] Trends in Economic Perception

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[Table 4] Top National Tasks for the Next Government and Parties Perceived to Solve Them

2) Will the "Park Geun-hye Momentum" Reignite?

Park Geun-hye, the beneficiary of the general election, Ahn Cheol-soo's rising popularity as an opposition alternative, and Moon Jae-in's stagnant momentum in the race for the presidency.

4.11 General Election beneficiaries Chairperson Park Geun-hye and Professor Ahn Cheol-soo, who is expected to benefit indirectly, saw their approval ratings rise in a multi-candidate presidential race. Chairperson Park's rating surged from 31.8% in the first poll to 38.8%, and Professor Ahn's rating also rose from 21.2% to 24.4%. In contrast, Representative Moon Jae-in's rating stagnated, moving from 14.8% to 14.3%. Park's rise appears to be directly attributable to the evaluation of her leadership during the 4.11 General Election, and it seems to be the result of absorbing votes from some of the Saenuri Party's base and undecided voters.

Meanwhile, Professor Ahn Cheol-soo appears to be gaining traction not from undecided voters, but from the Democratic Party's base following the general election, as expectations for Representative Moon Jae-in stagnate, with support shifting towards Professor Ahn. While he received 28.6% support from the Democratic Party's base in the first poll, this increased to 38.8% in the second poll. Representative Moon Jae-in, on the other hand, is showing a trend of lagging behind Professor Ahn Cheol-soo among the Democratic Party's base.

[Figure 7] Changes in Presidential Multi-Candidate Race Approval Ratings Before and After the General Election

Note: Candidates with less than 5% approval rating were grouped with other candidates.

[Figure 8] Changes in Approval Ratings by Party Support for Park Geun-hye/Ahn Cheol-soo (%)

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Constraints on Park Geun-hye's Dominant Narrative: Still a Strong Conservative Image

While the victory in the general election and the subsequent surge in approval ratings have increased the likelihood of Park Geun-hye's dominant narrative re-emerging, in a one-on-one contest, she is neck-and-neck with Professor Ahn Cheol-soo within the margin of error. Chairperson Park leads with 46.3% against Professor Ahn's 49.7%, indicating a fierce competition. In contrast, in a one-on-one contest with Representative Moon Jae-in, Chairperson Park holds a relatively comfortable lead, with 55.7% compared to Chairman Moon Jae-in's 39.7%, a difference of 16 percentage points.

[Figure 9] Approval Ratings in One-on-One Presidential Contests (%)

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The reason Chairperson Park Geun-hye fails to gain an edge against Director Ahn Cheol-soo in a direct contest is that, despite strong cohesion and support from conservative voters, she still lags significantly behind Director Ahn among centrist and unaffiliated voters. In the ideological center, Chairperson Park trails with 41.6% compared to Director Ahn's 54.1%. Among unaffiliated voters, Chairperson Park's support is 28.6% versus Director Ahn's 62.4%, a substantial deficit. Conversely, in a one-on-one contest with Representative Moon Jae-in, Chairperson Park leads both centrist and unaffiliated voters. She leads in the center with 53.0% to 41.5%, and also among unaffiliated voters with 47.5% to 40.0%. For Chairperson Park to gain an advantage against Professor Ahn, and for Representative Moon to gain an advantage against Chairperson Park, overcoming the disadvantage among centrist and unaffiliated voters emerges as the most critical challenge.

[Figure 10] Park Geun-hye vs. Ahn Cheol-soo Approval Ratings by Ideological Tendency/Party Support

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[Figure 11] Park Geun-hye vs. Moon Jae-in Approval Ratings by Ideological Tendency/Party Support

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Voters: 5.2 (Center-Right)

Park Geun-hye's Ideological Score: 7.1, Ahn Cheol-soo: 4.3, Moon Jae-in: 4.1

Regarding Chairperson Park Geun-hye's significant disadvantage among centrist voters compared to Director Ahn Cheol-soo, it is necessary to consider that she has not been able to shed her relatively strong conservative image, despite the voters' ideological leanings. When asked to rate their ideological position on a scale where 0 is very progressive, 5 is centrist, and 10 is very conservative, voters rated the average ideological position at 5.2, placing them in the center-right.

Voters evaluated Chairperson Park Geun-hye's ideological position at 7.1, which is considered significantly more conservative than that of her party colleague Chung Mong-joon (6.2) and candidate Kim Moon-soo (5.6). Conversely, Professor Ahn Cheol-soo's ideological evaluation score was 4.3, indicating a perception of progressive-centrist leanings. Representative Moon Jae-in, on the other hand, was evaluated at 4.1, making him the most progressive candidate among those surveyed. Governor Kim Doo-kwan scored 4.3, and former representative Sohn Hak-kyu scored 4.9.

Looking at the distribution of responses by score, the ideological image evaluation distribution for Chairperson Park Geun-hye is significantly skewed to the right (conservative) compared to the ideological tendency distribution of voters. In contrast, the evaluation of Director Ahn Cheol-soo is predominantly centrist, with a general perception of progressive leanings. Based on the voters' ideological distribution and their ideological proximity to the candidates, Director Ahn Cheol-soo appears to be much closer to the voters. In terms of party ideological evaluation, the Saenuri Party is perceived as strongly conservative with a score of 7.2, the Liberty Forward Party at 5.7, the Democratic Party as progressive-centrist at 4.4, and the Unified Progressive Party as progressive at 3.4.

Chairperson Park Geun-hye has been emphasizing a welfare platform since her lecture at Stanford University in 2010 and has been pursuing a shift towards the center by advocating for economic democratization and revising party regulations since taking office as the interim committee chairperson. However, the results of this survey indicate that Chairperson Park and the Saenuri Party's efforts to move towards the center have not fundamentally altered the conservative image imprinted on voters. While it is true that her unexpected victory in the general election showcased the strength of Park's leadership and reinforced the brand of 'trust and principles,' somewhat diluting the limitations of her strong conservative image, her significant deficit against Director Ahn Cheol-soo among centrist and unaffiliated voters still demonstrates these limitations. Whether she can overcome these limitations ahead of the December presidential election will be a key point to watch.

[Figure 12] Evaluation of Major Candidates' Ideological Positions

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Source: JoongAng Ilbo

[Figure 13] Voter Ideological Distribution and Park Geun-hye/Ahn Cheol-soo Ideological Evaluation Distribution

3. Conclusion

Prior to the election, the author predicted that despite strong public sentiment for punishing the incumbent government in the 4.11 General Election, the opposition's nomination process, public dissatisfaction with it, failure to highlight socioeconomic issues underpinning the call for punishment, and immature handling of the whistleblowing on the civilian surveillance scandal would shift the favorable situation for the opposition earlier in the year to a close contest between the ruling and opposition parties.

Specifically, the "conflicted voters" who agreed with the sentiment for punishing the incumbent government but also harbored strong criticism towards the untrustworthy opposition constituted a majority (38%) of the electorate. It appears that these voters did not participate in the election as much as expected due to the dominance of negative campaigning in the final stages of the election. The high turnout compared to the 2008 general election, driven by strong mobilization of both ruling and opposition party supporters due to the close race, failed to sustain the increasing atmosphere of voter participation seen around the 2010 local elections. It is speculated that the non-participation of these voters was the main reason.

The votes of the centrist voters who actually participated in the election maintained a delicate balance rather than leaning towards either the ruling or opposition party. The strong mobilization of Saenuri Party supporters, who are more inclined to support the ruling party and are conservative, compared to opposition supporters, was the key factor that led to a result of ruling party majority rather than the expected ruling party minority in the 4.11 General Election, which had a high possibility of a ruling party minority, as this report demonstrates.

The strong conservative image of Chairperson Park Geun-hye and the Saenuri Party appears to be a hurdle to overcome in capturing the votes of centrist voters going forward. Conversely, although the opposition parties and their candidates were ideologically much closer to the average ideological position of voters (5.2 points) compared to the Saenuri Party and Chairperson Park, they failed to garner higher support, with the exception of Professor Ahn Cheol-soo. The subsequent debate within the opposition regarding a centrist line appears to have misplaced the focus of the issue.

The presidential race between the ruling and opposition parties is now in full swing. With the mobilization of ruling and opposition party supporters in balance, the December presidential election will ultimately come down to who can win the hearts of centrist voters. The crucial factor here is not abstract ideological debates, but rather how to console and offer hope to these centrist voters who harbor strong political distrust and social anxieties.

Immediately after the election, Chairperson Park Geun-hye of the Saenuri Party adopted a humble stance, stating, "The Saenuri Party has disappointed the people in various ways over the past four years, and I believe this is truly the last chance the people have given us." In contrast, cynical evaluations are emerging from the opposition, such as "the ruling party was trying to give a walk, but they swung and struck out on their own." Within the Democratic United Party, there are arguments that "the evaluation that the opposition was arrogant is a logic peddled by conservative media" and that "the largest number of opposition seats in the history of the Dan-gun era" effectively signifies a victory. For now, the ruling camp appears to have taken the lead in the initial "public opinion reading competition" of the presidential race. ■