Overview of the U.S.-China Relations Series

Interest in China's rise is higher than ever. This is believed to stem from the perception that fundamental changes are occurring in the post-Cold War U.S.-led international political structure, as China has maintained near double-digit economic growth rates, in contrast to the relative decline of the United States since the 2008 global financial crisis. Coincidentally, these structural changes have become intertwined with discussions of an "assertive China" that emerged in 2010 due to issues such as the Google incident, arms sales to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to the U.S., and the appreciation of the Chinese yuan. (Swaine 2010) Consequently, as the power gap between the U.S. and China narrows, concerns are escalating that a full-blown conflict may be imminent between the existing hegemon, the U.S., and the rising power, China, as warned by power transition theory. (Chan 2007, 2; Kugler and Lemke 1996, 7-10)

Looking at past precedents, these concerns have merit. Changes in the international political "structure" have always led to upheavals in "process." (Nye 2000, 34-35) The rise of Germany in Europe eventually led to World War I and World War II, and the U.S.-Soviet Cold War era began with the Korean War. The end of the Cold War, rather than being the "end of history" (Fukuyama 1993), triggered a cascade of problems that had been suppressed by ideological debate, drawing various actors beyond states to the center of the international political stage, ultimately leading to the 9/11 attacks. However, in response to the complex international political structure after 9/11, the U.S. opted for a policy of "unilateral internationalism," initiating wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which led to a crisis of legitimacy for U.S. leadership in the international community. If this crisis of legitimacy, coupled with the decline in material capabilities following the 2008 economic crisis, leads to a genuine decline in U.S. capacity, China's continued rise will once again bring about a change in the international political structure. The process of upheaval that this structural change will trigger remains uncertain.

One thing is clear: this structural change will be more perplexing for South Korea than for any other country. Just as a divided Korea found itself at the center of the structural change of the Cold War era, caught between the two great powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, during the Korean War, South Korea is highly likely to find itself at the center of upheaval once again in the context of the structural changes occurring since 2008. South Korea has maintained a military alliance with the U.S. for over half a century, and the U.S. holds immense significance for South Korea's security, as the alliance forms the backbone of South Korea's foreign and security strategy. Simultaneously, however, South Korea has the highest trade dependency on China among all its trading partners. Last year, China already accounted for over a quarter of South Korea's total exports. Considering that exports account for nearly 50 percent of South Korea's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), one can grasp the importance of China to the South Korean economy. Therefore, if a sharp conflict between the U.S. and China persists, South Korea will inevitably face a more difficult situation than any other country.

In this context, the most ideal strategy for South Korea to pursue is an "asymmetrical strategy of engaging both the U.S. and China" (EAI Comment No. 17, 1/31/2011). While the "asymmetrical strategy of engaging both the U.S. and China" proposes a more complex and sophisticated foreign policy than the "dual hedging strategy" (Heginbotham and Samuels 2002) in that it emphasizes the need to form different levels of networks with the U.S. and China respectively ("adjacent networks" and "connected networks," Ha Young-sun 2010, 11-13), it fundamentally shares the risks inherent in the dual hedging strategy. That is, it risks being abandoned by both parties with whom hedging is sought. While this risk can be mitigated to some extent through effective diplomacy in the short term, it is a highly unstable strategy. Ultimately, playing a "bridging role" between the two powers is crucial. South Korea's strategic vulnerability, namely its high level of asymmetrical interdependence with both the U.S. and China, higher than any other country, paradoxically implies that it has more room to play a mediating role than any other country.

Therefore, the most crucial task for South Korea is to identify the key variables driving the U.S.-China relationship towards confrontation and to respond proactively. This is important because only by understanding the fundamental sources of dissatisfaction or distrust between the two powers can we truly grasp the nature of the tangled issues and, in turn, actively engage in mediating diplomacy.

In this context, the East Asia Institute (EAI) hopes to foster more in-depth research on U.S.-China relations and has planned the U.S.-China Relations (UCR) series as follows.

The UCR Statement Factsheet categorizes official statements from the U.S. and China, collected daily, by issue and provides a compilation of key excerpts as quotes. It will be published monthly, aiming to continuously track the official positions of the U.S. and China on various current affairs.

The UCR Briefing analyzes the content of the UCR Statement Factsheet, focusing on the most critical variables and key issues for understanding the present and future of U.S.-China relations, and presents trends and prospects for the relationship.

The UCR Watch analyzes the power gap between the U.S. and China and public perception of both countries based on public opinion data. In particular, the UCR Watch focuses on understanding the key variables that influence public perception of U.S.-China relations.■