[EAI Opinion Review] Analysis of the Political Behavior of the 30s Generation, the Anti-Grand National Party Generation

▶ This report is a revised and supplemented version of the author's columns published in <JoongAng Sunday> "Even in elections where the Grand National Party won overwhelmingly, the 30s generation's vote showed strong 'wildness'" (No. 217, May 8, 2011) and the author's column published in <Donga Weekly> "'See, do politics properly,' the middle class's anger explodes" (No. 785, May 2, 2011).

The Rise of the 3-Dis (Dissatisfaction, Distrust, Anxiety) Generation and Its Political Implications

1. Generational Voting Behavior in Past Elections: The 30s Generation as the Origin of Anti-Grand National Party Sentiment

The birth of the Roh Moo-hyun administration in 2002 signaled the emergence of a rift between the young and old generations as a key axis of social conflict in Korean society. The overwhelming support for candidate Roh Moo-hyun from the 2030 generation and the overwhelming support for candidate Lee Hoi-chang from the 5060 generation and above brought generational divides to the forefront as a key variable in analyzing voting behavior in Korean society. However, while the gap in generational voting preferences narrowed considerably in the 17th presidential election, it has widened again in last year's election (Kang Won-taek 2004; Lee Nae-young 2011). Nevertheless, looking at voting patterns in elections since 2002, while the magnitude of the gap has changed, the 30s generation has consistently shown a relatively critical tendency towards conservative party candidates ([See Figure 1]).

In the 16th presidential election, the generational vote share between Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Hoi-chang showed a stark contrast. At that time, Roh Moo-hyun received overwhelming support with 59.0% vs. 34.9% among the 20s and 59.3% vs. 34.2% among the 30s. In the 40s, the vote shares were nearly equal at 48.1% vs. 47.9%. In contrast, Lee Hoi-chang received overwhelming support with 40.1% vs. 57.9% among the 50s and 34.9% vs. 63.5% among those aged 60 and above.

Five years later, in 2007, with the discourse of judging the participatory government gaining momentum, Lee Myung-bak's approval rating surpassed that of Chung Dong-young across all age groups. However, even then, the gap in approval ratings varied by generation, with Lee Myung-bak's approval rating being lower among the younger generation compared to the older generation, and Chung Dong-young's rating being relatively higher. Lee Myung-bak held an advantage with a 24.5%P gap (45.8% vs. 21.3%) among the 20s, a 13.1%P gap (41.4% vs. 28.3%) among the 30s, and a 19.9%P gap (50.0% vs. 21.3%) among the 40s. However, the gap widened significantly among the 50s to 31.6%P (57.6% vs. 26.0%), and among those aged 60 and above, Lee Myung-bak's support was overwhelming with a staggering 50.7%P gap (70.3% vs. 19.6%).

What about the 18th presidential election? Let's look at the results of the EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, YTN, and Korea Research survey conducted in April 2011, one year before the presidential election, immediately after the April 27 by-election. Assuming a one-on-one contest between former Grand National Party leader Park Geun-hye and unified opposition candidate Sohn Hak-kyu, Park would lead by 19.5%P (54.2% vs. 34.7%) among the 20s, 7.7%P (45.7% vs. 38.0%) among the 30s, and 10.6%P (48.6% vs. 38.0%) among the 40s. In contrast, Park's lead is more pronounced among the 50s with a 22.5%P gap (53.0% vs. 30.5%) and among the 60s with a 38.5%P gap (61.3% vs. 22.8%). Although some in the 30s generation have shifted their support to Grand National Party candidates in the three elections since 2002, they continue to be the primary source of anti-Grand National Party sentiment.

[Figure 1] Generational Gap in Presidential Candidate Support (%)

2. The X Generation (Born in the 1970s): Why Anti-Grand National Party?

Until now, the anti-Grand National Party sentiment since 2002 has largely been understood as a characteristic of the 386 generation, who directly experienced authoritarian regimes and possessed strong progressive ideologies (Kang Won-taek 2009). However, nearly a decade later, as the 386 generation has entered their 40s and the 20s generation of 2002 has become the 30s generation, it is important to pay attention to why the anti-Grand National Party sentiment is currently stronger among the 30s generation than among the 386 generation or the newly enfranchised 20s generation. While one could attribute this to the relative conservatism of the 386 generation and the 20s generation, it is first necessary to clarify the socio-political characteristics of the 30s generation itself.

An analysis of the socio-political consciousness of the 30s generation reveals that class dissatisfaction, political distrust, and anxiety about the future are the most serious issues. This political cynicism can be interpreted as dissatisfaction with the mainstream of Korean society and the current ruling party that represents it. The current 30s generation was once called the 'privileged generation' that benefited from democratization and the IT revolution, and was recognized as the main driver of individualistic depoliticization. However, in reality, the 30s generation has experienced periods of socio-economic instability, such as the 1997 IMF crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis, and it can be inferred that these generational characteristics have fueled their class dissatisfaction and sense of deprivation.

The 30s Generation: A '3-Dis' Generation of Dissatisfaction, Anxiety, and Distrust

According to the public opinion barometer survey conducted by EAI, JoongAng Ilbo, YTN, and Korea Research in February of this year ([Figure 2]), the 30s generation reported the highest relative deprivation in class perception among all age groups. The proportion of those who consider themselves to be in the 'lower class' was highest among the 30s at a striking 62.7%. This figure was 51.7% for the 40s and 52.8% for the 50s. Among the retired generation (60s and above), the perception of belonging to the lower class was relatively high at 59.2% compared to the 40s and 50s, but still lower than among the 30s. In contrast, only among the 20s, who have not yet fully entered the harsh realities of the job market, was this figure the lowest at 35.5%.

Furthermore, as polarization in Korean society deepens and the risk of middle-class collapse increases, pessimistic views on upward mobility are spreading, particularly among the 30s. In the same survey mentioned above, the response 'I do not agree' to the statement 'There are opportunities for upward mobility in Korean society' was highest among the 30s at 79.7%. This is a higher figure than that of the 20s, who face severe youth unemployment issues, at 65.4%. While the middle-aged generations, the 40s and 50s, also showed high rates of disagreement at 64.6% and 61.6% respectively, they did not reach the level of the 30s. Only among the 60s, who have lower expectations for upward mobility due to their life stage, was the negative response low at 38.4%.

The sense of deprivation in class perception and anxiety about the future among the 30s generation appears to be reinforcing political distrust. The proportion of those who disagreed with the statement 'The government represents the interests of the entire nation rather than the interests of a minority group' was a staggering 76.1% among the 30s. This was followed by 71.3% among the 20s and 67.1% among the 40s, and the rate dropped sharply to 58.2% among the 50s and 40.1% among those aged 60 and above. Distrust and cynicism regarding the representativeness and fairness of government policies are most severe among the 30s. In the 4th panel survey of the 17th presidential election conducted by EAI, SBS, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research in 2007, the statement 'Lee Myung-bak's proposed economy is a survival-of-the-fittest economy only for those with money and land' garnered agreement from 56.3% of the 30s, indicating that the incumbent Grand National Party candidate Lee Myung-bak's camp had a stronger image of vested interests compared to other generations ([See Figure 3]).

The pessimistic reality of Korean society perceived by the 30s generation and the resulting distrust led them to express demands for reform in 2002, becoming the main force behind the 'Roh wave.' However, as expectations for the participatory government turned into disappointment, some shifted their support to candidates Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. Nevertheless, strong political distrust maintains their antipathy towards the current ruling party, which has a relatively strong image of vested interests.

[Figure 2] Generational Differences in Socio-Political Class Perception (%)

[Figure 3] Agreement with the Statement: 'Lee Myung-bak's Economic Policy is a Survival-of-the-Fittest Economy Only for Those with Money and Land' (%)

Source: 4th Panel Survey for the 17th Presidential Election (2007) by EAI, SBS, JoongAng Ilbo, Korea Research

3. The 2012 Election Landscape and the 30s Generation's Vote: Strong Call for Regime Change, but Weak Opposition Presence

Policy Competition for the Working Generation is Urgent, More Than Vote Counting

So, how will the 30s generation's vote be expressed in 2012? Their political distrust is primarily manifested as a demand for judgment against the Grand National Party candidates and for a change of regime. In the April survey, 70.7% of the 30s agreed with the statement 'We must judge the ruling Grand National Party and achieve a change of regime in the next presidential election.' The 386 generation of the 40s also agreed by 69.5%, indicating that the core generations who created the Roh Moo-hyun phenomenon in 2002 are once again leading the public opinion for a change of regime against the Grand National Party.

The recent worsening of the perceived economy due to escalating price instability and the housing crisis, among other factors, appears to be intensifying concerns about social polarization and strengthening the call for regime change among the 30s generation, who harbor strong dissatisfaction, distrust, and anxiety. Indeed, according to a regular survey by EAI and Korea Research in September 2010, when asked about the 'top priority national governance task that the government should pursue,' the 30s generation ranked agendas directly related to the improvement of the national and personal economy highest, such as 'Alleviating economic polarization' (32.0%), 'Improving quality of life' (17.0%), and 'Economic growth' (17.0%). Responses for 'Political reform' or 'National integration' were 9.5% and 7.5% respectively, and even important national agendas such as 'Strengthening national competitiveness' (5.4%), 'Improving inter-Korean relations' (5.4%), 'Educational reform' (4.1%), and 'Strengthening security' (1.4%) were significantly lower in priority.

[Figure 4] National Governance Agendas Preferred by the 30s Generation and Evaluation of Political Forces (%)

What is noteworthy is that despite strong support for regime change and a high emphasis on opposition-friendly agendas such as polarization and quality of life, this favorable environment for the opposition does not directly translate into support for opposition parties. When asked which party they believed could best address issues like polarization and quality of life, the Democratic Party received the highest response at 34%, but this is still a low figure. Those who responded that there was no party to solve these issues or remained undecided accounted for 29.8%, and surprisingly, 17.0% chose the Grand National Party. Ultimately, the alternative is uncertain. This also explains why, although the approval rating gap between former leader Park Geun-hye and leader Sohn Hak-kyu has narrowed among the 30s, Park remains ahead.

However, beyond the calculations of who the 30s generation's vote will favor, it is a national misfortune in itself that there is such significant political pessimism and cynicism among the 30s generation, who are poised to become the leading force in society. Ahead of the 2012 presidential election, the political sphere should prioritize policy competition to find solutions, rather than a competition for votes to win over the 30s generation, and reflect on their responsibility for reducing politics to an object of distrust. Votes are a result of this process. Currently, the opposition parties, which have partially succeeded in garnering the expectations of the 30s generation following the April 27 by-election, are in a more advantageous position, but a firm belief in the opposition parties has not yet been established. There still appears to be an opportunity for the ruling party to position itself as the political representative of the 30s generation. We look forward to fierce policy competition for the sake of the 30s generation■.