[EAI Opinion Review] April 27 By-election and the Middle Class's Choice

▶ This report is a revised and supplemented version of the author's columns published in <JoongAng Sunday> "Grand National Party's Landslide Victory Election, but the 30s Vote Was Strongly 'Wild'" (No. 217, May 8, 2011) and the author's column published in <Donga Weekly> "'See, Do Politics Properly,' Middle Class Anger Explodes" (No. 785, May 2, 2011).

Will a War for the Heartland Ignite Between the Ruling and Opposition Parties?

1. April 27 By-election: The Driving Force Behind the "Bundang" Revolution: "The Role of the Middle Class"

In the 2008 general election, the Bundang constituency in the Seoul metropolitan area, which gave an overwhelming 71% support to Grand National Party candidate Lim Tae-hee and elected a Grand National Party candidate for the third consecutive time with over 50% party support, saw Sohn Hak-kyu emerge as the victor in the by-election. Given that the middle class in their 30s and 40s in the Seoul metropolitan area played a decisive role in President Lee Myung-bak's election and in the Grand National Party becoming an overwhelming majority party after facing a crisis due to impeachment, one can easily imagine the shock the Grand National Party will suffer from the defeat in Bundang with the 2012 general election and presidential election just around the corner.

Various analyses are emerging regarding the factors behind Representative Sohn Hak-kyu's victory in this election, including election strategies that framed the contest as a battle of individuals rather than parties, the effect of candidate unification, and the spread of anti-government sentiment. Most of these points are persuasive and valid. However, I believe more attention should be paid to the political decision of 'gambling everything' by entering a 'death zone' to break through the lethargic by-election atmosphere and the effect of the election campaign that advocated for the "Role of the Middle Class." In particular, considering the future presidential race, the "Role of the Middle Class" warrants special attention as it could become the most significant battleground for victory between the ruling and opposition parties.

2. The Power of the "Middle/Centrist Class Role Theory": The Source of Public Distrust in Government and Political Dissatisfaction

Generally, a robust middle class and a significant proportion of ideologically centrist voters are considered indicators of democratic health and social cohesion. In a society like Korea, where the ruling and opposition parties, and progressive and conservative camps, are firmly entrenched in conflict, the public opinion of the middle stratum, free from specific class or ideological affiliations, has historically served as the center of gravity for overall public sentiment. The shift in public opinion among the middle and centrist classes was the primary factor behind the judgment of the participatory government in its later stages, leading to the birth of the pragmatic government of Lee Myung-bak, and it is also the main reason for the current public's growing alienation from the Lee Myung-bak government, which was initially elected with overwhelming support. This is why attention is focused on the middle class, particularly those in their 30s and 40s in the Seoul metropolitan area, who act as the balance of public opinion in every election, and the Bundang by-election, where the votes of those in their 30s and 40s determined the outcome, serves as a prime example.

It is not a recent phenomenon that the middle/centrist class, which played the largest role in the current government's ascent, has emerged as a potential veto group against it. The results of the "Middle Class Perception Survey" conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in 2009 in collaboration with the JoongAng Ilbo revealed that this group harbors more political dissatisfaction and distrust than any other class, even more so than the impoverished. As shown in [Figure 1], when asked, "Which class does government policy best represent?", 56.7% of the impoverished, 60.6% of the upper class, and a striking 67.1% of the middle class responded, "The government represents the upper class," thereby raising questions about the fairness of government policies. The middle class also exhibits the greatest distrust regarding the fairness of law enforcement and the democracy of the government. When asked, "To what extent do you believe law enforcement is equal in our society?", the proportion responding "unequal" was 51.5% among the impoverished and 55.7% among the upper class, but it was highest at 60.0% among the middle class. Regarding the statement, "A minority controls the government and politics," while a high percentage of other classes agreed, with 74.4% of the impoverished and 78.8% of the upper class, the middle class showed the highest agreement at 81.2%, indicating they are the most dissatisfied group regarding the government's lack of democracy (Kang Won-taek 2009).

[Figure 1] Evaluation of Political Representation, Fairness, and Democracy by Class (%)

Source: EAI Public Opinion Briefing No. 59 (2009)

3. Why Has the Middle/Centrist Class Become the Largest Veto Group?

Doubts about the Authenticity of the MB Administration's Centrist Pragmatism

Interestingly, it was President Lee Myung-bak and the ruling party that paid attention to this middle/centrist class. It is undeniable that efforts were made to 'restore the middle class' after the economic crisis, and I have consistently pointed out in various forums that the 'centrist pragmatism' played a decisive role in raising President Lee Myung-bak's approval ratings, which had hit rock bottom early in his term.

As can be seen in [Figure 2], the centrist pragmatism significantly contributed to raising approval ratings from the 20% range during the peak crisis period of June-September 2009, following the candlelight vigils and the funerals of former Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung, to the 40% range. In fact, as shown in [Figure 3], by ideological leaning, approval ratings for the administration rose by a remarkable 18.6 percentage points among centrists (from 28.4% in July to 47.0% in October), far exceeding the maximum increase of 8.2 percentage points among conservatives (from 43.2% in August to 51.4% in September) and 12.7 percentage points among progressives (from 18.8% in June to 31.5%). The problem is that as soon as approval ratings recovered, the administration pushed forward with core agendas such as the Media Bill, the revision of the Sejong City plan, and the Four Major Rivers Project, thereby causing a decline in approval ratings, creating a crisis of authenticity, and self-inflicting political distrust.

[Figure 2] Rise in National Approval Ratings Following the Political Instability of 2009 and the Centrist Pragmatism (%)

Source: EAI·Korea Research Public Opinion Barometer Survey (2009)

[Figure 3] Rise in National Approval Ratings by Ideological Leaning During the Political Instability of 2009 (%)

Source: EAI·Korea Research Public Opinion Barometer Survey (2009)

The Opposition's Leftward Shift Failed to Represent the Middle/Centrist Class with Conflicting Attitudes

The opposition parties, particularly the main opposition Democratic Party, also contributed to the severe political cynicism and distrust among the middle/centrist class due to their political misjudgments. While the ruling party and the government made efforts to win over the middle/centrist class through policies such as centrist pragmatism, pro-commoner policies, and the theory of a fair society, the Democratic Party, after experiencing the success of the free school lunch initiative in the 2010 local elections, progressively emphasized progressive ideology and policies, shifting leftward towards universal welfare, which evolved from free school lunches to broader free welfare. Especially after the election of a new leadership in the party's national convention in October 2010, they engaged in welfare debates with the Grand National Party from the stance of a Nordic social democratic welfare state.

Although the issue of free welfare and universal welfare initially gained traction in the early stages of the June 2010 local elections, the situation reversed when the Grand National Party actively countered with arguments for selective welfare and "welfare for the rich." This led to a significant decline in public support for the Democratic Party's free school lunch and universal welfare proposals, not only among the upper class/conservatives but also among the middle/centrist class. As shown in [Figure 4], regarding policy preferences for free elementary school lunches, even among the centrist group, support for universal free lunches was 34.4%, selective free lunches was 54.7%, and complete prohibition of free lunches was 9.9%. Consequently, when examining only the ideologically centrist group, the Democratic Party, which had been in a close race with the Grand National Party in terms of party support, began to fall behind after the October national convention, as evidenced by surveys from November onwards. However, with the victory in the April 27 by-election, support from the centrist group rose to 38.0%, surpassing the Grand National Party's stagnant 34.1%. This foreshadows a fierce battle for the heartland in the future [Figure 5].

[Figure 4] Preference for Free School Lunch Proposals Among Ideologically Centrist Voters (%)

Source: EAI·Korea Research Public Opinion Barometer Survey (February 2011)

[Figure 5] Changes in Party Support Among Ideologically Centrist Voters After the Welfare Debate (%)

Source: EAI·Korea Research Public Opinion Barometer Survey (July 2010 - March 2011)

4. Can Sohn Hak-kyu's Election Strategy, Championing the Middle Class, Become the Democratic Party's 2012 Presidential Election Strategy?

I believe the stagnation of the Democratic Party's approval ratings stems from a misjudgment of its party positioning. The choice made by the Democratic Party's supporters in last year's party leadership election focused on potential vote-winning capabilities among the middle/centrist class in the next presidential election, rather than clear policy distinctiveness. This led to the election of Representative Sohn Hak-kyu, a former member of the Grand National Party. However, the Democratic Party merely focused on criticizing the authenticity of the Lee Myung-bak administration's centrist pragmatic approach, and instead of developing policies for its core support base, the middle/centrist class, it underwent a sudden (?) shift towards a progressive line. This caused confusion in the party's identity and led to the alienation of the middle/centrist class, resulting in a listless campaign until just before the by-election.

In fact, Representative Sohn Hak-kyu has experienced an identity crisis since returning as party leader. Sohn himself felt pressured by the leftward trend within the Democratic Party after becoming party leader and was unable to effectively voice his support for a middle/centrist approach. This weakness, stemming from his past affiliation with the Grand National Party and his centrist tendencies, caused his approval ratings as a potential presidential candidate, which had risen to the 15% range immediately after the national convention, to drop to the 3-6% range, similar to his level before his political return, and he was indeed outpaced by Representative Yoo Si-min.

This desperation likely prompted Representative Sohn's decision to enter the Bundang election, which was akin to a death zone. However, in Bundang, a representative middle-class area in the Seoul metropolitan region, Representative Sohn Hak-kyu, instead of adopting the Democratic Party's previous leftward trajectory and a "comprehensive welfare line," advocated for the "role of the middle class" and ultimately engineered the "Bundang Revolution." This created an atmosphere where he could compete not only against candidate Yoo Si-min, who left a negative impression of "losing the forest for the trees," but also potentially against the Grand National Party's presidential contenders. Consequently, Representative Sohn Hak-kyu demonstrated through this election how crucial the battle for the heartland, securing the support of the middle/centrist class, is for the Democratic Party's strategy to win the presidency, and how strong his own position is in that battle.

However, the Bundang election is merely the starting point, not the destination. Given Sohn's past and the Democratic Party's consistent leftward drift, their content for the battle for the heartland appears inadequately prepared. Within the party, there is considerable opposition to shifting the focus to the battle for the heartland, partly due to Representative Sohn's emergence. Notably, policy agreements with progressive parties for opposition candidate unification often conflict with overall public opinion and the sentiments of the middle/centrist class.

As examined earlier, regarding the selective meal provision debate that emerged during the Democratic Party's progressive shift, and in the cases of the Korea-EU FTA and the Korea-US FTA, contrary to the expectations of the progressive segment, overall public opinion and the middle/centrist strata are leaning towards selective meal provision and the swift ratification of FTAs. In the regular survey conducted in February by EAI, YTN, JoongAng Ilbo, and Hankook Research, 65.8% agreed that the Korea-US FTA should be ratified swiftly, and 71.5% agreed that the Korea-EU FTA should be ratified swiftly (Jeong Han-ul, Jeong Won-chil 2011). Therefore, the position of Representative Sohn's leadership on issues where progressive and centrist stances are sharply divided will serve as a litmus test for whether Representative Sohn and the Democratic Party's approval ratings will continue to rise or fall again.

Immediately following the April 27 by-election, the process of passing the Korea-EU FTA, where Floor Leader Park Jie-won's agreement with the ruling party was overturned, raises questions about whether the issue and policy positions under the Sohn Hak-kyu leadership will shift from emphasizing progressivism to prioritizing the middle/centrist class. Conversely, progressive parties pursuing a grand alliance of the opposition are increasingly dissatisfied with the Democratic Party's ambiguous stance. The middle/centrist class, which had hoped for a shift towards a centrist approach, and the progressive parties could both become alienated. In such a scenario, it would only be a matter of time before the hard-won rebound in approval ratings is eroded.

If, intoxicated by the election results, the party fails to move beyond the tried-and-true "MB judgment" and "candidate unification" arguments and neglects content development and strategic responses to policy targets, it is highly likely to repeat the experience of facing public backlash immediately after the 2010 local elections. The Gimhae-eul by-election clearly demonstrated the potential consequences of relying solely on "MB judgment" and "candidate unification" without a clear policy vision and strategy. The distrust and dissatisfaction of the middle/centrist class are not limited to the current administration and ruling party but also extend to the Democratic Party. These voters, rather than adhering to a progressive-conservative dichotomy, exhibit conflicting attitudes, flexibly shifting towards progressive positions on some issues and conservative positions on others depending on the situation (Jeong Han-wool 2011). It is realistically difficult to win over the middle/centrist class with a universal welfare-first approach and opposition to FTAs.

Furthermore, the next presidential election will be a stage for prospective evaluation, requiring the demonstration of future vision and governing capabilities, as much as a retrospective evaluation of the current administration. Ultimately, the ability of Sohn Hak-kyu and the Democratic Party to formulate a vision and strategy that aligns with the demands for change from the middle class in the remaining presidential election period will be one of the key variables determining the direction of the upcoming 2012 presidential race■.