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[EAI-CISS NASD 2010 Security Briefings Series No.2] The Cheonan Incident and Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Viewed from the Strategic Perspectives of South Korea and China toward North Korea

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Others
Published
January 17, 2011
Related Projects
Understanding North Korea Properly (Global NK Zoom & Connect)

1. Introduction

To understand the crisis in East Asia triggered by the Cheonan incident and its connection to the denuclearization process of the Korean Peninsula, an understanding of the East Asian geopolitical dynamics and the strategies of major powers is necessary. This paper posits that a new cooperative-competitive framework between the United States and China is emerging in East Asia, where the Cold War structure has not been fully dismantled. Against this backdrop, an analysis of the strategies of South Korea and China, which have the most direct and close relationship with the situation in North Korea, is required. Based on this research, the paper will explain the perceptions and dilemmas of South Korea and China regarding North Korea and suggest the necessity of South Korea-China cooperation.

The South Korean government's strategy toward North Korea is expressed as a policy of 'mutual benefit and common prosperity.' The Lee Myung-bak administration announced that it would lay a substantial foundation for the unification of the Korean Peninsula by proactively developing inter-Korean relations based on pragmatism and productivity, rather than ideological criteria (Ministry of Unification 2009). The relationship between China and North Korea is described as a 'traditional friendly cooperative relationship,' which Premier Zhou Enlai characterized as 'lips and teeth' (Zhou Enlai 1990). However, with the changes in China's national strategy following its reform and opening-up, and particularly in the wake of North Korea's nuclear tests, voices within China calling for a redefinition of Sino-North Korean relations have grown louder (Shen Jiru 2003; Kim Kang-il 2008). China's policy toward North Korea can be summarized by its policies toward the Korean Peninsula: 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,' 'maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula,' and 'supporting the independent unification of the Korean Peninsula.' Both South Korea and China's strategies toward North Korea are judged to generally favor the status quo. However, the strategic relationship between South Korea and China, which had maintained a similar context outwardly, revealed its contradictions and vulnerabilities with the Cheonan incident. Therefore, are the relations between South Korea and China destined to be contradictory and clash over North Korea? Can South Korea and China create space for cooperation in crisis situations like the Cheonan incident? With these questions in mind, this paper will discuss the strategic considerations of both South Korea and China, and the relationship between the Cheonan incident and the denuclearization process of the Korean Peninsula.

Chapter 2 will describe the Cheonan incident and the resulting crisis situation in East Asia. Chapter 3 will discuss the geopolitical dynamics in East Asia, and Chapter 4 will analyze the strategic security considerations of both South Korea and China regarding the North Korean issue. The concluding chapter will describe the impact of the Cheonan incident on the denuclearization process of the Korean Peninsula.

2. The Cheonan Incident and the Crisis in East Asia

On March 26, 2010, the South Korean naval patrol vessel 'Cheonan' sank near Baengnyeong Island in the West Sea (China's Yellow Sea). On April 20, an international joint investigation team announced that the Cheonan had sunk due to a surprise torpedo attack by a North Korean submarine. On May 24, President Lee Myung-bak delivered a televised address to the nation from the War Memorial of Korea in Yongsan, Seoul, defining the Cheonan incident as 'a military provocation by North Korea that attacked the Republic of Korea' (Cheong Wa Dae 2010). This confirmed the South Korean government's official position on the Cheonan incident, and South Korea submitted the investigation report of the international joint investigation team to the UN Security Council. On July 9, the UN Security Council issued a presidential statement 'condemning the attack that caused the sinking of the Cheonan' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010). Although the presidential statement did not include expressions or phrases identifying North Korea as the perpetrator, the international community's position on the Cheonan incident was thus finalized.

The crisis in East Asia, which began with the Cheonan incident, developed with the characteristics of a typical 'security dilemma.' Ultimately, this crisis transcended the boundaries of the Korean Peninsula and escalated into a power competition between China and the United States in the East Asian region. South Korea conducted an anti-submarine exercise in the West Sea on May 27, and South Korea and the United States announced plans for joint military exercises in the West Sea in June. These plans included the entry of the US aircraft carrier 'USS George Washington' into the West Sea (China's Yellow Sea), which provoked a strong reaction from China. While South Korea and the United States stated that the purpose of the joint military exercises was to deter North Korean provocations, China objected, stating that its core regions, including Beijing, would be exposed to the threat of a US aircraft carrier. Prior to the South Korea-US military exercises, China conducted live-fire drills in the East China Sea from June 30 to July 5. However, despite China's objections, the South Korea-US combined forces conducted the military exercises 'Invincible Spirit' and 'Ulchi-Freedom Guardian' (UFG) in July and August, respectively, and the US aircraft carrier 'USS George Washington' entered the East Sea (Sea of Japan). During this process, the crisis seemed to intensify as high-ranking officials in the Chinese government, particularly the military, made strong statements regarding the South Korea-US joint exercises (Luo Yuan 2010; Yang Yi 2010). On July 23, at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held in Hanoi, Vietnam, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in relation to the South China Sea issue that it was 'an issue directly linked to US interests,' and Vietnam raised territorial issues with China. In early August, the US 'USS George Washington' visited Vietnam, and the United States and Vietnam conducted joint military exercises. Although not directly related to the Cheonan incident, the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands (Japan: Senkaku Islands) on September 7 also acted as pressure on China. In response, China conducted at least nine military exercises in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea starting in June, immediately after the Cheonan incident (<Global Times> 2010/9). South Korea felt a security threat from North Korea and strengthened the ROK-US alliance, while the active involvement of the United States caused security anxiety for China. China's strong opposition and military responses were expressed through a higher level of deterrence policy by the United States, eventually developing into a security strategy conflict between China and the United States. China is likely to be dissatisfied with South Korea's involvement of the United States in regional affairs during this crisis. South Korea, in turn, would have been dissatisfied with China's 'unreasonable' 'coddling of North Korea.'

Analyzing the Cheonan incident and the subsequent developments, it is clear that the biggest losers are South Korea and China. South Korea lost 46 soldiers in the Cheonan incident. Relative to its population of 48 million and military strength of 600,000, this represents approximately one in a million of the population and one in 12,000 of the military. Applying this proportion to China's population and military strength would yield an enormous number. China's strategy of 'building a stable surrounding environment for economic construction,' which it had maintained for 30 years since its reform and opening-up, has been damaged. Discord has arisen in Sino-US relations, which had been proceeding smoothly, and concerns have emerged that the United States might be initiating a containment policy against the 'great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.' North Korea, identified as the perpetrator, although facing comprehensive international sanctions, appears to have suffered minimal losses due to its weak ties with the international community. On the other hand, from the perspective of attracting US attention, retaliating against the South Korean navy, and strengthening domestic regime cohesion, the incident can be considered quite successful for North Korea. Russia, by dispatching its own investigation team and asserting findings different from those of the international joint investigation team, is showing a move to expand its influence in the North Korean issue and subsequent Korean Peninsula affairs. As part of the US strategy in East Asia, extending from the Cheonan incident, Japan experienced the resignation of Prime Minister Hatoyama due to the issue of relocating the Futenma base, but gained the privilege of participating as an observer in the South Korea-US military exercises on July 25. Vietnam, although seemingly gaining US support on the South China Sea issue, its long-term positive effects remain to be seen. The United States can be seen as the biggest beneficiary of the Cheonan incident. As an extra-regional power in East Asia, the United States has been involved in regional affairs by utilizing 'crises of manageable proportions' in the region (Kim Kang-il 2004). The Cheonan incident provided an opportunity for the United States to 'return to Asia,' pressure North Korea, and contain China.

As can be seen from the analysis above, both South Korea and China are direct or indirect victims of the Cheonan incident. North Korea shares a 1,334 km border with China and a 248 km border with South Korea, in addition to a 17.5 km border with Russia. Due to geopolitical characteristics, South Korea and China are inevitably sensitive to the situation in North Korea and are simultaneously the countries that can exert the greatest influence on North Korea. Having common concerns and objectives implies that a broad space for cooperation exists between South Korea and China. In this context, South Korea and China need strategic mutual understanding and cooperation on the North Korean issue, including the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. While the strategic differences between South Korea and China were once again demonstrated through the Cheonan diplomacy, both countries need to review their strategies in light of this incident. It is time to discuss the mutual needs and importance of both South Korea and China on a broader scale and at a higher level, while contemplating whether South Korea's unilateral 'US-centric' strategy is rational and whether China's continuous 'coddling of North Korea' is also rational.

3. The Cold War Structure and the US-China G2 System in East Asia

East Asia is currently experiencing a period where the Cold War structure formed after World War II has not ended, while simultaneously a 'joint management' system between the two great powers, the United States and China, is being formed and developed. The Cheonan incident served as an occasion to prove that the East Asian region is still caught in the Cold War structure. China's strong response to the ROK-US joint military exercises also suggests that East Asia is no longer a region that the United States can unilaterally dominate.

(1) The Cold War Structure in East Asia

As World War II was drawing to a close with the victory of the Allied powers, the United States and the Soviet Union reached agreements on post-war arrangements and spheres of influence through a series of conferences, including the Yalta, Cairo, and Potsdam Conferences. The Yalta system divided East Asia into the socialist bloc, represented by the Soviet Union and mainland China, and the capitalist bloc, represented by the United States and Japan. The Korean War in 1950 and the armistice agreement three years later formalized the establishment of the Cold War structure in East Asia, with the Military Demarcation Line at the 38th parallel of latitude dividing the Korean Peninsula.

The global Cold War, which had lasted for 45 years, seemed to come to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia became its legal successor, and the former socialist Eastern European bloc was incorporated into the capitalist system of the United States and Europe. However, the two alliance organizations that symbolized the Cold War met different fates. While the Warsaw Pact, the socialist bloc's military alliance, was dissolved, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the capitalist bloc's alliance, was strengthened. At the same time, the division of the Korean Peninsula and Russia's occupation of the Northern Territories indicate that the Cold War structure in East Asia has not yet been dismantled.

The state of Cold War in East Asia is represented by the conflict between South and North Korea, symbolized by the division of the Korean Peninsula, and the confrontation between the United States and North Korea. Furthermore, North Korea's pursuit of nuclear development and armament is further destabilizing the regional situation. Due to the accumulated difference in national power over a considerable period, North Korea's strategic objective, even if not the unification of the southern half of the Korean Peninsula, will pose a substantial threat to the United States and South Korea. This confrontational structure compels China to maintain a cooperative structure with North Korea due to its sense of threat from US power, and furthermore, it contributes to the long-term perpetuation of the Cold War structure in the East Asian region... (to be continued)

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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