East Asia Peace Conference

The international situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula is rapidly changing. The Obama administration, which took office amidst the aftermath of the war on terror, such as the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and an unprecedented economic crisis, is dealing with international issues with a different global strategy than the Bush administration. In Japan, the Democratic Party, the first non-LDP government in post-war history, has come to power, implying various changes in domestic politics and foreign security policy. China, which continues to grow economically amidst the global economic crisis, is striving to emerge as a global power beyond a regional power, dreaming of realizing a harmonious world. North Korea, facing difficulties in achieving a strong and prosperous nation amidst international sanctions, is in a situation where it must pursue a power transition to a successor regime. Amidst these changing currents in the world and the East Asian order, a critical moment is approaching for the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula.

What path should Korea take as it stands at this critical juncture? How should Korea perceive and respond to the historical reality of the Korean Peninsula's potential for change, which has become even more unpredictable due to the new global diplomacy of the U.S. Obama administration, proceeding with a degree of anxiety in the wake of the unprecedented economic crisis; the diplomatic competition between China and Japan within the East Asian region under the unique slogans of 'harmony' and 'fraternity'; and the power transition to a successor regime in North Korea?

To analyze the current situation and explore future strategies for establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and a stable East Asian order, the East Asia Institute (EAI) and the Jeju Peace Institute (JPI) held the "East Asia Peace Conference" on Friday, September 11, 2009, at the Caradium Hall of the PJ Hotel, inviting prominent scholars and experts from Korea. The conference, held in three sessions, featured presentations and discussions by six speakers and discussants on East Asian security issues in the first session and North Korean issues in the second session. The final session was conducted in a round-table format with free discussion among all presenters and discussants, along with 16 EAI panel members.

This conference provided an opportunity to seek complex analyses and policy implications for Korea's future foreign and security national strategy by bringing together renowned experts in politics and economics from the United States, China, Japan, and North Korea to present diverse perspectives and engage in focused discussions on the immediate challenges related to 'East Asian peace'.

Session 1: East Asian Security: Alliance Transformation and Regional Cooperation

Moderator: Kim Byong-kook

Presenters: Lee Dong-seon, Lee Won-deok, Lee Dong-ryul

Discussants: Ma Sang-yoon, Park Young-joon, Lee Nae-young, Jeon Jae-sung, Han Seok-hee

The first session of the East Asia Peace Conference, moderated by Professor Kim Byong-kook of Korea University, focused on discussions regarding the regional strategies of the United States, Japan, and China in East Asia. Professor Lee Dong-seon analyzed the changes and continuities in U.S. security strategy after the Obama administration. Professor Lee Won-deok presented and evaluated Japan's regional strategy in East Asia, while Professor Lee Dong-ryul offered a forecast for China in 2020. The simultaneous presentation of the security strategies of the three countries most influential on the Korean Peninsula provided a crucial opportunity to contemplate Korea's security grand strategy based on a sober analysis of the surrounding geopolitical landscape.

Presentation 1 (Lee Dong-seon): "Changes and Prospects of U.S. Security Strategy"

Due to the United States' unparalleled position in the world order, its security strategy is a factor that profoundly influences the international community, including Korea. This paper seeks to answer the question of how U.S. security strategy has changed and how it will evolve. During the post-Cold War era, the United States pursued four distinct security implementation strategies: 1) the promotion of democracy and the realization of value-based alliances, 2) the expansion of economic ties, 3) the enhancement of international institutions, and 4) the maintenance of military superiority.

The current Obama administration also pursues these four implementation strategies, but it demonstrates a difference in the combination of these strategies compared to the previous Bush administration. Unlike the Bush administration, which emphasized the promotion of democracy and the use of military force, the Obama administration emphasizes 'balance' among the four implementation strategies. The characteristics of the Obama administration's security strategy can be summarized as 'restrained defense' and 'proactive diplomacy.' That is, while not fundamentally excluding the use of military force, it will exercise restraint in the independent use of force and adopt a cautious approach in promoting democracy and expanding value-based alliances. Simultaneously, it will actively pursue the use of liberal diplomatic policy tools such as international institutions and economic aid. The policy preferences of the President and key policymakers who believe in liberal values also support this 'proactive diplomacy' strategy. On the surface, this diplomatic strategy of the Obama administration may not appear to differ significantly from the policies of Bush's second term. The reason the Obama administration, which advocated for 'change' during the election campaign, opted for gradual adjustments rather than a comprehensive overhaul of U.S. security policy is due to the structural constraints facing the United States. The Obama administration faces the dual challenges of resolving immediate security issues in Iraq and Afghanistan while simultaneously overcoming domestic economic recession. The economic crisis has also significantly constrained the available policy tools. The Obama administration, recognizing these structural constraints, is pursuing strategic restraint in the short term while seeking limited withdrawals from various parts of the world in the medium to long term. Based on this realist policy orientation, it will attempt to maintain U.S. leadership in global politics by increasingly utilizing liberal strategic tools such as international institutions and economic cooperation.

Presentation 2 (Lee Won-deok): Japan's Regional Strategy and the 'East Asian Community'

This paper aims to examine how Japan is shaping the East Asian region and with what policy considerations it is pursuing regional integration. Regionalism refers to the movement of multiple political units to form a new region transcending national borders based on geographical proximity. Therefore, a region is not naturally given but is formed and constructed by states through strategic action, hence the term 'region-building'.

Japan began actively pursuing East Asian regionalism in the late 1990s. Prior to this, Japan focused on forming an Asia-Pacific regionalism that embraced both the United States and Asia, rather than pursuing East Asian regionalism. The establishment of APEC is a prime example. Since the launch of the first ASEAN Plus Three (APT) summit in December 1997, Japan has actively participated in the process of regularizing and institutionalizing APT. Japan played a significant role in the formation of East Asian regionalism, such as by announcing the 'New Miyazawa Initiative' in December 1997, providing $30 billion to Asian countries during the financial crisis, and providing crucial assistance for the formation of the Chiang Mai Initiative with $80 billion in funding by 2000. Furthermore, in the trade sector, Japan has continuously pursued FTAs with hub regions in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world since 1998.

However, Japan's East Asian region-building policy faces significant constraints and limitations. Japan's regional strategy in East Asia is more strongly characterized as a means of checking China rather than being solely focused on the formation of the East Asian region itself. Japan's strategy for regionalism in East Asia has a strong element of competition for regional leadership with China, and it is particularly a response to China's assertive outreach towards Southeast Asia since the early 2000s. Moreover, while Japan is active in regional integration in East Asia in areas such as finance, trade, and investment, it continues to adhere to its existing strategy in security, where the U.S.-Japan alliance remains central. Japan strives to ensure that its East Asian region-building policy does not conflict with its existing foreign policy centered on the U.S. alliance and is deepening the U.S.-Japan security system to pursue military integration with the United States. This regional strategy of Japan implies that East Asian regionalism is pursued not as an end in itself but as a means for its policies toward China and the U.S., and therefore, it is bound to have fundamental limitations. Examining the potential changes in Japan's East Asian policy following the establishment of the new Democratic Party government, it is unlikely that Japan's foreign policy will realistically deviate from its U.S.-centric diplomacy. Although Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's pledges and Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada's speeches strongly emphasize diplomacy focused on Asia, and the Democratic Party advocates for the establishment of an East Asian community and discusses the promotion of a Northeast Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone, there is skepticism about whether these policies can be practically implemented beyond election rhetoric.

Presentation 3 (Lee Dong-ryul): "Future Prospects through China's 2020 National Strategy"

This paper is written with the objective of forecasting China's 2020 national strategy. Within China, discussions are ongoing to redefine the national strategy with the goal of becoming a developed nation by 2050, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Forecasting China in 2020 is crucial because the China of 2050 could differ depending on how China addresses the problems arising from its reform and opening-up policies by 2020, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party and the 30th anniversary of reform and opening-up. While China's reform and opening-up has yielded remarkable economic growth, economic system reforms, and political stability without political reform, it has also created challenges such as income inequality, the 'three rural issues' (sannong wenti), unemployment, and issues of systemic identity. The emergence of discussions within China to redefine its national strategy stems from the need for a concrete national strategy to complete the goal of China's rise, alleviate concerns about the 'China threat' theory, and address the challenges associated with economic growth while pursuing comprehensive development.

The content of the national strategy emerging from within China indicates a pursuit of national consensus and integration domestically, and a goal of peaceful rise as a responsible great power internationally. However, a closer examination of these strategic objectives reveals a tendency towards reactive measures rather than future-oriented planning, and they often remain as political rhetoric or slogans, showing limitations in concrete systemic reforms.

Looking ahead to China in 2020, its rise will remain a dominant trend and will continue, but it will be difficult to resolve the challenges stemming from its growth process within the next decade. China will emerge as a new type of nation, rising as a great power while still grappling with the challenges of a developing country. This is the future China will face: a great power retaining the identity of a developing country. Within China, this is referred to as a 'transitional hybrid phenomenon.' China, on one hand, shows an intention to strategically leverage this duality. It tends to maintain its developing country status to maximize benefits available to developing nations in the international arena. China claims this as a new model for emerging powers, but in reality, it is merely pursuing short-term gains. However, it will become increasingly difficult to exploit this dual identity in the future. China faces the challenge of establishing its own firm identity... (continued)

Moderation

Kim Byong-kook (Korea University)
Oh Joon (Ambassador for Multilateral Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade)
Ha Young-sun (Seoul National University)

Presentations

Lee Dong-ryul (Dongduk Women's University)
Lee Dong-seon (Korea University)

Lee Sung-woo (Jeju Peace Institute)
Lee Won-deok (Kookmin University)

Jeon Bong-keun (Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security)
Han In-taek (Ewha Womans University / Jeju Peace Institute)

Discussion

Ko Bong-joon (Jeju Peace Institute)
Kwak Joon-hyuk (Korea University)
Kim Sang-joon (Yonsei University)
Nam Ki-jung (Seoul National University)
Ma Sang-yoon (Catholic University of Korea)
Park Young-joon (Korea National Defense University)
Shim Heung-soo (Kyungnam University)
Lee Nae-young (Korea University)

Lee Dong-ryul (Dongduk Women's University)

Lee Dong-seon (Korea University)

Lee Sook-jong (East Asia Institute)
Lee Yong-wook (Korea University)
Lee Won-deok (Kookmin University)

Lee Tae-hwan (Sejong Institute)
Jang Hoon (Chung-Ang University)

Jeon Bong-keun (Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security)

Jeon Seung-hoon (Institute for Unification Studies)

Jeon Jae-sung (Seoul National University)
Cho Dong-ho (Ewha Womans University)
Cho Yang-hyun (Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security)
Cha Doo-hyun (Korea Institute for Defense Analyses)
Han Seok-hee (Yonsei University)
Han In-taek (Ewha Womans University / Jeju Peace Institute)

Hwang Ji-hwan (Myongji University)