[EAI 21st Presidential Election Poll Analysis] IV. Youth Candidate Choice: Are Millennials and Gen Z the Game Changers?

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvAIkf0s2hQ

Video Script

The Necessity of Analyzing the Political Tendencies of the MZ Generation

This is Han Jeong-hoon from the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University. One of the things I personally believe in as I study political science is the age effect. It's a theory that people are more progressive when they are young and gradually become more conservative as they age. The reasoning is that as people go through life, getting married, having children, and buying homes, their lives become more constrained, leading to a natural conservatism as their freedom decreases. I believe this is one of the most powerful and long-standing theories. However, we admire and consider great those who do not follow this trend, those who go against it. For example, those who, despite getting older,

have maintained liberal thoughts since childhood, or those who, while holding conservative views, try to communicate with others. Conversely, new generations with new ways of thinking are emerging among the youth. Despite their liberal thoughts, new generations are emerging who have different ideas about society and want to clarify their political preferences. These groups are likely the new groups that defy the age effect I believed in, and I am very interested in them. Personally, I am interested in why they exhibit such behavior and what thoughts stem from it. The MZ generation seems to fit this profile among the youth.

However, whether the MZ generation truly constitutes a generation is a matter that requires further discussion in political science and sociology. For it to be considered a generation, there must be something common that shapes their political preferences and orientations during their formative years, and it is not clear if the MZ generation shares this. It seems to have been a term created for the convenience of political scientists and sociologists to define a group for research, based solely on birth year. Yet, at some point, this group began to be perceived as having a distinct identity, culturally, socially, and politically different from other age groups, and the term MZ generation became popularized.

Furthermore, interest in the MZ generation is growing globally. This is likely because they exhibit clear differences in their adaptation to new civilizations, particularly since those born after the 2000s have had mobile phones since infancy. Research institutions in the UK and the US also seem to have a very high interest in the new characteristics of the MZ generation.

Korea is no exception. Interestingly, the characteristics of the MZ generation found abroad differ from those found in Korea. While abroad, their familiarity with online devices and new technologies, and their rejection of authority are highlighted, without deviating significantly from the age effect, in Korea, differentiation by gender is occurring, and they are generally perceived as more conservative than previous generations, with behaviors reflecting this. In fact, discussions about the MZ generation in Korea first emerged during the 2017 presidential election, where they were considered a rather progressive generation. However, after various issues, they have come to be recognized as a new young generation with conservative leanings.

Comparative Analysis of the 2022 and 2025 Presidential Elections

Therefore, in this election, focusing on the MZ generation—although I still consider it a generational theory—I will define them as the MZ youth group, encompassing those born from 1981 onwards, as is commonly understood in Western societies, meaning youth born over a period of nearly 20 years. I will then examine how this MZ youth group exhibits different characteristics and makes different choices compared to the middle-aged, older, and elderly populations in Korea during this presidential election. Fortunately, they participated in the 2022 presidential election and will participate again this year, for which I am once again grateful to the East Asia Institute.

The Exception of the MZ Generation to the Age Effect

Having participated in the 2022 presidential election research, I personally possess this data. I have the opportunity to compare it with the second panel survey of the 2022 presidential election, and today's presentation will be structured around comparing these two datasets. Firstly, regarding candidate support tendencies, the MZ generation showed quite consistent characteristics in both 2022 and 2025. In other words, they appear to be an exceptional generation that deviates from the age effect, which posits that younger generations are progressive and become more conservative with age.

The exceptional youth group in the age effect is the first characteristic that is continuously observed in the 2022 and 2025 presidential elections. Looking at the 2022 presidential election data from the front, it is divided by age on the X-axis and can be divided into four categories. These four categories can be seen as corresponding to the MZ generation. In the 2022 presidential election, the solid line represents Lee Jae-myung supporters, and the dotted line represents Yoon Suk-yeol supporters. At that time, the MZ youth group strongly supported candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, and although there was a group that supported candidate Lee Jae-myung similarly in the middle, overall support for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol was strong, with support rates exceeding 45% and approaching 50%. In 2025, there is more support for candidate Lee Jae-myung, indicated by the solid line.

Looking at the graph, it might appear that the MZ generation shifted their support to candidate Lee Jae-myung in the 2025 presidential election. However, numerically, about 5-6% of the proportion shifted to supporting Lee Jae-myung compared to that time. Even when comparing the four birth year groups within the MZ generation, approximately 5% of the MZ generation appears to have shifted their support to candidate Lee Jae-myung in 2025 compared to 2022, when categorized by birth year in five-year intervals. The remaining portion, as discussed in the previous debate, saw the People Power Party's candidate's support rate drop from over 45% to around 30%, a decrease of more than 15%. However, in reality, support for a third candidate, including Lee Jun-seok, significantly increased, with approximately 20% of the MZ generation's support concentrated there. Therefore, it appears that the support of the MZ youth group, which was clustered into four groups in the 2022 presidential election, has simply been dispersed to the People Power Party and a third candidate in this election, rather than a sudden shift in support to the Democratic Party. This is the second finding.

The first finding is that the MZ generation does not deviate significantly from the age effect in the 2022 and 2025 presidential elections. The second interpretation is that the approximately 5% shift towards the Democratic Party is due to political contextual factors such as constitutional amendment or impeachment, rather than being based on the political preferences of the MZ generation. The second characteristic is similar. It is being discussed that the MZ generation has become ideologically conservative. This graph shows the distribution of ideological tendencies according to age for all respondents. This section specifically shows supporters of candidate Lee Jae-myung.

Ideological Tendencies and Candidate Support of the MZ Generation

The graphs are very similar, but there are differences. Supporters of candidate Lee Jae-myung have lower scores on the Y-axis. This means they are ideologically left-wing, or progressive. The overall respondents on the right have higher scores, indicating they are centrist and right-wing. In the 20s to 40s age range, which can be considered the MZ generation, the overall respondents are generally distributed around the center point of 5. As mentioned in the presentation, the MZ generation's ideological tendencies show a significant concentration of center-right individuals, with a slightly larger number of center-left individuals. However, looking at the support for candidate Lee Jae-myung in 2022, even at that time, only MZ generation individuals leaning towards the center-left, rather than the center-right, supported candidate Lee Jae-myung. In the 2025 presidential election, the proportion of overall respondents has also significantly

decreased slightly, but the center point of 5 is still dominant, and in supporting candidate Lee Jae-myung, the MZ generation tends to support only those who are more left-leaning. If we consider the age effect, such an upward-sloping graph should appear, meaning that individuals are progressive at a younger age and gradually become more right-leaning. In Korea, this curve is observed from the middle-aged to the elderly population, but because the MZ generation largely comprises individuals with centrist or more right-leaning tendencies, it appears flat. Finally, to most easily show the choices made by the MZ generation, the results of a logistic regression analysis were presented. In the 2022 election, the tendency of the MZ generation not to support candidate Lee Jae-myung was statistically significant and clearly evident. On the other hand, in 2025, the MZ youth group is more

Political Stability and Steadfastness of the MZ Generation

likely to support or less likely to support than other age groups does not seem to have appeared. This table shows that the MZ generation does not significantly alter their voting behavior itself. First, their candidate support tendencies are maintained quite stably, with continued support for the People Power Party or a third candidate (including candidate Lee Jun-seok). Second, their ideological tendency towards the center-right, which is a characteristic of the MZ generation, is also maintained. As a result, despite very significant political situations such as constitutional amendment or impeachment, the MZ generation is acting in a way that does not shift their support to the Democratic Party candidate, Lee Jae-myung.

Intergenerational Differences in Foreign Policy Perceptions

Therefore, my analysis regarding whether the MZ generation in Korean society can truly be called a generation or just an observed phenomenon leads to the judgment that they are a generation that creates stable and consistent political tendencies. That is all. Thank you. You have analyzed the MZ generation, and next, we will move on to gender. For reference, intergenerational rifts are appearing in foreign policy, with perceptions of North Korea being a prime example. Those in their 20s have a considerably negative impression of North Korea, and this perception drastically contrasts as one gets older, particularly in their 40s and 50s. Perceptions of Japan are exactly the opposite.

Those in their 20s and 30s have a very high affinity for Japan, while those in their 40s and 50s have the lowest, and the next generation falls in the middle. Looking at this table, the theory of the MZ generation as progressive youth does not seem to fit our MZ generation well. Is there also a theory of progressive middle-aged people? It would be good to discuss topics showing progressive tendencies, including those from elections and policy matters, later. Ja.

■ Han Jeong-hoon_Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University; Director, Jean Monnet EU Center of Excellence, Seoul National University.

■ Responsible Editor: Song Chae-rin_EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | crsong@eai.or.kr

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | crsong@eai.or.kr