← Back · ← Home · ← Back to list
[North Korea and the World] Kim Jong Un’s Sense of Crisis as Seen in the Announcement of '250 Missile Launchers Deployed to the Front Line'
Editor's Note
Park Won-gon, Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies and Professor at Ewha Womans University, argues that while North Korean leader Kim Jong Un recently showcased the country's military advancements by deploying 250 new tactical ballistic missile launchers to the front line, this is not a militarily effective measure due to limitations in North Korea's actual missile production capacity and its nuclear command and control system. He further explains that this announcement aims to pressure the ROK-US combined forces with greater military costs and to gain recognition as a nuclear-armed state. Moreover, Park emphasizes that as North Korea's threat level increases, the ROK-US combined forces' early warning capabilities and the ROK-US-Japan integrated deterrence capabilities are also strengthening, thus maintaining strong deterrence against North Korea.
YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SfAFSGWGWZQ
Video Script
North Korea's Display of New Tactical Ballistic Missile Launchers and Their Effectiveness
North Korea is also talking about invading South Korea. If that were the case, they would have to mobilize 250 launchers or other delivery systems to attack South Korea. Consider this: what would happen next if they used tactical nuclear weapons to attack South Korea? Therefore, they are making militarily unfeasible claims. Good afternoon. Thank you sincerely to everyone who has watched 'North Korea on the Korean Peninsula and the World.' Today, I would like to discuss North Korea's military capabilities. It was August 5th. I believe many of you may have seen it in the news, but North Korea showcased 250 launchers of a new tactical ballistic missile, as shown in the footage.
Kim Jong Un appeared, and Kim Ju Ae was also present. They held an event displaying 250 launchers lined up. The event, held during the flood season, garnered attention in various ways. This missile is a short-range ballistic missile. The first test launch was in April 2022, with a range of approximately 110 km. North Korea calls it the Hwasong-11na, and it is known to be capable of carrying low-yield tactical nuclear warheads. The launchers displayed this time are mounted on six-wheeled drive vehicles, and the launch tubes are configured to fire four rounds in quick succession, though not simultaneously. Thus, with 250 launchers,
if all were fired, it would mean approximately 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles are launched, demonstrating their capability. Of course, there are several issues with this. Some government sources suggest that some of the 250 launchers are fictitious. Furthermore, there are significant doubts about whether North Korea can actually procure that many missiles. Specifically, regarding the missiles, if we consider the approximately 1,000 mentioned earlier, and the claim that they can be equipped with low-yield tactical nuclear warheads, two conditions must be met: they must procure 1,000 missiles. North Korea, as you know, is under sanctions. Under sanctions, continuously supplying parts for long-range missiles is extremely difficult. Another issue is that to equip them with low-yield tactical nuclear warheads, they must produce them in two forms: highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Can they produce sufficient quantities of these? Moreover, they need to standardize and mass-produce them. Kim Jong Un himself appeared and claimed they have the capability,
North Korea's Intentions in Military Posturing: Costly Pressure and Recognition as a Nuclear State
but I have doubts about the practical feasibility. The crucial question is, despite these doubts, why is North Korea doing this? We need to understand North Korea's intentions, which I believe fall into two categories. First, by continuously producing missiles and, moreover, claiming to have 250 launchers, North Korea increases the response costs for South Korea and the United States. Especially if these missiles, as North Korea announced, are equipped with tactical nuclear warheads, then in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula due to a North Korean invasion, South Korea and the U.S. must identify and strike key tactical and strategic targets in North Korea. The list of targets to be struck grows. In case of war, naturally, key North Korean
command structures would be targeted. Beyond that, there is a list of other targets that South Korea and the U.S. have identified in advance. If the number of targets on that list continues to grow, then to strike them, South Korea and the U.S. would need to use missiles or air power, thus requiring them to secure more assets, which imposes costs on South Korea and the U.S. North Korea is very deliberately diversifying its delivery systems for nuclear weapons, including missiles. In the past, they have demonstrated launches from railway cars, from lakes, and, in the case of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), from the sea. They have created a variety of platforms. This time, they showcased 250 launchers. This imposes costs on the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and requires greater effort from us. One of North Korea's intended objectives is to continuously send a message that North Korea should be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state.
Kim Jong Un's ultimate goal is for the United States to effectively recognize North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state. As demonstrated this time, by possessing this quantity of nuclear weapons and having 250 launchers as delivery systems, the idea of complete denuclearization of North Korea is unrealistic. This demonstration of their capabilities is part of that effort. Let me elaborate on Kim Jong Un's actions this year within a broader context. Some of this was covered in my previous videos. As you know, Kim Jong Un's year-end and New Year pronouncements indicated a determination for war.
North Korea's Establishment of a Nuclear Command and Control System and Kim Jong Un's Security
He declared inter-Korean relations as 'relations between hostile states,' and on February 9th, in his speech commemorating the founding of the Korean People's Army, he clearly stated that the nation's primary objective is to pacify the territory of the Republic of Korea through the use of force. Since March, he has continuously demonstrated capabilities and intentions to attack South Korea. This includes the recent display of 250 launchers, and Kim Jong Un has essentially shown the entire invasion scenario through on-site inspections. Let me highlight a few key points. In April, North Korea first mentioned 'Volcanic Alert' and 'Nuclear Defense.' 'Volcanic Alert' refers to a warning system that would be activated if there are signs of an attack from South Korea and the United States. Under this warning system, they manage their nuclear weapons comprehensively, and the name of this system is 'Nuclear Defense.' Simply put, if war breaks out, there is a warning system to assess the severity of the conflict, and when this system is activated, they have a comprehensive system for using nuclear weapons.
This means they have a warning system to judge the intensity of their war efforts, and when this warning system is activated, they have a comprehensive system for nuclear use. They first introduced these two concepts in April, and at the end of May, Kim Jong Un personally appeared and detailed this entire system, explaining how it operates. North Korea itself provided these details. The process begins with the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea. This is the most crucial decision-making body for military matters within the North Korean system. Naturally, Kim Jong Un is the chairman. Therefore, if a Volcanic Alert is issued and Nuclear Defense begins, the Central Military Commission, with Kim Jong Un making the decision with the military commissioners, will decide to use nuclear weapons. The second step involves the Central Military Commission transmitting a secret coded directive to the relevant units. Upon receiving this secret coded directive, the unit prepares, and in the fourth step, they mobilize and launch nuclear weapons. North Korea has revealed this entire process and sequence. At that time, the final delivery system used was the KN-25 600mm multiple rocket launcher, which fires rounds sequentially from a standing position.
This is believed to be an extension of that. The most critical situation for North Korea to use nuclear weapons is when Kim Jong Un's safety or survival is challenged or threatened. In September 2022, North Korea passed a nuclear law through the Supreme People's Assembly, which states: 'If the command and control system of the state's nuclear armed forces,' referring to Kim Jong Un, 'is placed in danger by an attack from hostile forces,' meaning if Kim Jong Un is in danger, 'the nuclear strike capability will be carried out automatically and immediately.'
Analysis of North Korea's Tactical Nuclear Use Capability and Limitations
It is stated. The volcanic alert system and nuclear defense demonstrated in April, along with the various actions shown thus far, can be seen as North Korea's attempt to argue for their practical feasibility. Here, I will discuss North Korea's limitations or potential misjudgments. Firstly, has North Korea truly established a system for tactical nuclear use, and will they continue to do so in the future? I believe there are significant limitations. For automatic and immediate use, a highly perfected nuclear system must be in place, and as North Korea itself has stated, a certain level of delegation of nuclear use to frontline units is necessary.
Frontline units must use nuclear weapons by delegation, even if it is automatic and lacks decision-making capability. Can North Korea achieve this? I believe it is impossible given North Korea's system. If a unit delegated nuclear authority were to use nuclear weapons not as North Korea desires during a war, but against Pyongyang even before a war breaks out, what would happen? Given that the survival of the regime and the leader is paramount and constantly at risk in North Korea's value system, nuclear weapons must be under Kim Jong-un's 100% control; I believe delegating even a portion of that control is impossible. To create a system where it is immediate and automatic, even without such a regime, requires an extremely sophisticated system.
In the case of the United States, once the presidential decision is made, frontline units can utilize nuclear weapons. The entire process must be highly sophisticated, extremely secure, and protected from external interference. I have significant doubts about whether North Korea can construct such a cutting-edge system. This implies that the ROK-US intelligence authorities are highly likely to assess, understand, and preemptively detect this process if North Korea attempts to build it. Furthermore, if a war were to actually occur, would North Korea be capable of launching a tactical nuclear attack? I have considerable doubts about this as well. The biggest premise is that the ROK-US combined forces have no intention of preemptively attacking North Korea. As I have stated on this program multiple times, our operational plans do not include a plan for preemptive attack leading to collapse. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, North Korea's concept of territorial stability implies their intention to invade the South. If so, upon the outbreak of war, they would have to mobilize their 250 launchers or other delivery systems to attack South Korea and Seoul,
Consider this: if North Korea were to attack South Korea using tactical nuclear weapons, how would a subsequent invasion of the South be possible? Would North Korean troops advance into the South amidst widespread radioactive contamination and fallout? This would be an act of self-sabotage, blocking their own invasion routes. Therefore, the very notion is militarily infeasible. Moreover, if North Korea were to use nuclear weapons in such a manner, would South Korea and the United States stand idly by? Do they lack countermeasures? Countermeasures exist. As mentioned, costs would be incurred, but if North Korea were to use them, we possess various means to identify and respond to them, and we have far more such capabilities.
Consequently, North Korea cannot freely deploy its 250 warheads or 1,000 rounds as it might wish. Another critical point is that if North Korea were to use nuclear weapons against South Korea in any form, it would inevitably escalate into total war. If a few warheads were successfully launched towards South Korea, particularly Seoul, causing massive damage. In fact, our missile defense systems can intercept a significant portion of them before they arrive. Preemptive detection is possible, and we have means of attack, but even so, if North Korea were to breach these defenses and they detonated, catastrophic casualties would be unavoidable. At that moment, or even before, South Korea and the United States would utilize all their available strike capabilities to eliminate North Korea's key leadership. This includes our "three-axis system," which I briefly mentioned previously, involving F-35A stealth fighters and Hyunmoo series missiles. The United States, in particular, possesses tactical nuclear capabilities, such as
the W76-2 submarine-launched missile equipped with low-yield nuclear warheads. These, among other means, would be mobilized to eliminate key leadership. Eliminating key leadership at the outset of a war is a common operational plan worldwide. This is because decapitating the enemy's command structure is essential to gain initiative and swiftly conclude the war. Furthermore, for a regime like North Korea's, eliminating key leadership is of utmost importance. Some refer to this as a "decapitation strike," but I believe this term is highly inaccurate.
Strengthening ROK-US-Japan Integrated Deterrence and the Inefficiency of North Korea's Nuclear Threat
The term "decapitation" itself refers to actions taken by extremist religious terrorist groups. The accurate term, using English terminology, is 'headquarter targeting,' which means eliminating key leadership. I believe Kim Jong-un understands all of this better than anyone else. I also believe Kim Jong-un is the least willing to bear such risks. To use a slight analogy, I consider Kim Jong-un to be the wealthiest individual on the Korean Peninsula. This means he has the most to lose if things go wrong. In such circumstances, is it truly feasible for North Korea to strike South Korea with tactical nuclear weapons, deploying 250 warheads? From another perspective, the deterrence capabilities being developed by South Korea, the United States, and even Japan are on a different level than before.
For instance, the recent 'Freedom Edge' exercise conducted by South Korea, the United States, and Japan was the first joint exercise by the three nations to apply the multi-domain concept. North Korea, as mentioned earlier, emphasizes specific numbers like 250, remaining fixated on numerical concepts. However, South Korea, the United States, and Japan are responding based on domains and concepts that transcend mere numbers. This means that regardless of how many warheads North Korea possesses, South Korea, the US, and Japan are preparing in a different manner, employing what is known as integrated deterrence. Consequently, even if North Korea possesses a large number of nuclear weapons, that number becomes meaningless. I have discussed this point before and will elaborate further if the opportunity arises. To conclude, North Korea has presented a numerical concept of 250 warheads, but I question whether this numerical concept is militarily significant.
Instead, the more North Korea displays such aggressive tendencies, the more momentum is generated for strengthening the integrated deterrence pursued by South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Therefore, North Korea's intentions cannot be realized. I reiterate that integrated deterrence, involving not only South Korea, the US, and Japan but also potentially NATO in the future, will be strengthened, and the nuclear deterrence against North Korea will inevitably increase. Thank you for watching.
■ Park Won-gon, Director of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute and Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.
■ Managed and Edited by Park Han-soo, EAI Research Fellow
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.