Glimpse into Kim Jong-un's Invasion Scenario

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XDR9388j-ao

Video Script

North Korea's Invasion Scenario and Nuclear Threat

If a war were to break out, who do you think would actually benefit the most? Kim Jong Un is the richest person on the entire Korean Peninsula, including both North and South Korea. Kim Jong Un also holds exclusive power over North Korea. I do not believe he would initiate such a war, knowing it would clearly lead to his defeat. Welcome, and thank you for watching Park Gun-gon's North Korea and the World. Today, we will examine whether North Korea could truly attack South Korea with nuclear weapons. Based on Kim Jong Un's recent actions, at the end of last year and the beginning of this year, he declared a 'determination to wage war.' He has consistently designated South Korea as a principal enemy and set the occupation of South Korean territory in case of emergency as the highest national objective. On February 9th, the event commemorating the founding of the Korean People's Army was held, and subsequently, South Korea conducted the 'Freedom Shield' exercise.

This is a combined exercise held in the first and second halves of the year. From March 4th to 14th, during that period, they clearly demonstrated a scenario of invading South Korea. Today, I will discuss this. First, I will explain the invasion scenario North Korea has shown, and then I will present my views on whether North Korea can truly invade South Korea. Observing the locations Kim Jong-un visited for military-related guidance and the content of those visits from March 4th to 14th reveals North Korea's invasion scenario. Before I explain that, if North Korea were to invade South Korea, this is likely the scenario. I'm not just saying this arbitrarily; in fact, Kim Jong-un and Kim Yo-jong have, over the past two years, through various means, shown the type of war they intend to wage and their war plans. I am offering my judgment based on a comprehensive assessment of these. Initially, there is a high probability that they will provoke a military clash near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea.

This is because North Korea has consistently made that area a disputed region, and sadly, this is clearly our territorial sea. I firmly believe we cannot concede any part of it, but from an external perspective, many people consider this area a disputed zone. Therefore, the Northern Limit Line becomes a region where North Korea can claim at least minimal justification. Thus, there is a possibility that North Korea will provoke a military conflict in this area, using it as a pretext to escalate their conflict and start a war. If they were to start a war in this manner, they would first deploy their long-range artillery and multiple rocket launchers positioned at the front lines, which have a range of about 30-40 minutes of travel time. They fire thousands of rounds per hour, but that's not something that can be simply dismissed; I will explain that on another occasion. In any case, they would use these long-range artillery pieces to attack Seoul and the metropolitan area, and then advance southward using armored divisions and tanks. And unlike before,

The scenario, in a way, resembles the Korean War, but what differs from the past is the potential use of low-yield nuclear weapons at the beginning of the war to secure initial initiative. Kim Yo Jong explicitly stated in April 2022 that if a war breaks out, they might use nuclear weapons against the southern part of the Korean Peninsula to secure the initiative early on. Therefore, in the war scenario I have described, such tactics could be employed at the outset. Furthermore, if a war were to begin, there is a combined operational plan between South Korea and the United States, known as Operation 5015.

This is being reorganized into Operation 5022. As I understand it, according to this operational plan, if a war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, large-scale U.S. reinforcements are to be deployed. To prevent these reinforcements, North Korea could utilize its developed medium-range missiles to attack U.S. territories like Guam or rear bases of the UN Command in Japan. This is how they would wage war. I believe this is the basic invasion scenario North Korea is envisioning. As I mentioned, Kim Jong-un's visits to various locations for guidance between March 4th and 14th, during the South Korea-U.S. combined exercises, serve to reaffirm this scenario. First, he visited a North Korean military base attacking the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea, a western sector operational training base, as the combined exercises began. Then, he supervised training for bomber units and tank combined units targeting the metropolitan area.

Next, he supervised firing drills for their super-large multiple rocket launchers, 600mm, capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons. Following that, he supervised tests of solid-fuel engines for new medium-to-long-range hypersonic missiles designed to strike the mainland and its surrounding areas within range. This confirms that Kim Jong-un's movements precisely followed the scenario I described. Therefore, I return to the initial question: Can North Korea truly invade South Korea? Have they decided on a second Korean War, or as some proponents of engagement with North Korea suggest, can Kim Jong-un really wage war after the Korean War? Furthermore, as the siblings Kim Jong-un and Kim Yo-jong have repeatedly declared, can they preemptively attack South Korea with nuclear weapons? I will address these points today.

Limitations of North Korea's Nuclear Strategy and the Balance of Terror

To state my conclusion upfront, I believe it is impossible. Initiating a war would very likely result in the end of the North Korean regime, a self-destructive act. First, let me explain North Korea's nuclear doctrine. North Korea's nuclear strategy involves the strategic use of nuclear weapons. Initially, after developing nuclear weapons, they realized they were useless without a means of delivery. They developed missiles, specifically Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). However, starting in May 2019, North Korea began to change the types of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. At that time, they developed short-range ballistic missiles called KN-23, which could carry nuclear warheads. The primary range of these missiles is designed to attack South Korea. Why did North Korea start this? There are difficulties for North Korea in this regard. Because even if they develop this further,

I believe it would be very difficult for them to possess nuclear capabilities that can effectively strike the United States. Therefore, it is very difficult to achieve a balance of terror between the United States and North Korea. A balance of terror is as follows: If two nuclear-armed states, for example, North Korea and the United States, were involved, and North Korea launched a preemptive strike against the U.S., with nuclear weapons landing on the U.S. mainland, the U.S. would naturally retaliate by attacking North Korea. However, for a balance of terror to be established, North Korea must possess the capability for a second strike, meaning they can attack the U.S. again even after being attacked. Yet, I state that this is very difficult. Generally, there are three elements concerning nuclear weapons: deterrence of use, defense during use, and retaliation after use. In all aspects, North Korea is at a significant disadvantage compared to the United States.

First, the use of nuclear weapons by North Korea can be detected in advance. While I cannot say it is 100% certain, it is possible to a significant extent. For those interested, you can refer to the article 'The New Era of Counterforce' published in the English journal International Security in 2017. It details to what extent the U.S. can detect and identify North Korean threats. To a significant degree, the U.S. can detect preemptive strikes. Therefore, if the use of nuclear weapons becomes imminent and it becomes certain that North Korea can attack the U.S., the U.S. could launch a preemptive strike. The U.S. has numerous means for preemptive strikes. Even without using tactical nuclear weapons, for example, the low-yield nuclear warhead W76-2, deployed in 2020 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), is highly precise and low-yield, capable of accurately striking and neutralizing North Korea's command structure. Furthermore, being on nuclear-powered strategic submarines, North Korea cannot detect them at all. This is how they can resolve the issue. If, by chance, the initial attempt fails, the U.S. has missile defense systems and missiles deployed in Alaska and on the mainland. As a secondary measure, they can attempt to intercept North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles heading towards the U.S. Finally, if even this fails and the U.S. mainland is attacked, what do you think would happen? Would the U.S. stand idly by? No. Utilizing its formidable nuclear arsenal, North Korea would be utterly devastated. In our conceptual terms, this would lead to assured retaliation. The U.S. possesses a vast array of capabilities. For instance, the Minuteman III, an intercontinental ballistic missile based at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, could devastate Pyongyang with a single warhead carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) in just three minutes.

In addition to that, missiles like the Trident II, launched from U.S. SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines), are strategic nuclear weapons with immense destructive power. Such missiles could completely devastate North Korea. My point is that if such a situation arises, North Korea would be incapable of launching a second strike. Therefore, if North Korea were to initiate a war, it would inevitably be an act of suicide. Despite this, North Korea continues its enigmatic actions, employing a combination of conventional and nuclear warfare, and continuously lowering the threshold for nuclear use, despite lacking a second-strike capability. Over the past two to three years, as clearly demonstrated by Kim Jong-un and Kim Yo-jong, and as you are aware, they have explicitly stated their intention to launch nuclear attacks on South Korea through their nuclear legislation. Most recently, on December 31st of last year, Kim Jong-un made the following statement. I will read it verbatim:

In case of war, we will mobilize all physical means and capabilities, including nuclear forces, to inflict a great catastrophe to pacify the entire territory of South Korea. He is explicitly stating his intention to use nuclear weapons. He is continuously lowering the threshold. North Korea is acting this way despite being at a significant disadvantage in nuclear capabilities. So, why is North Korea behaving like this? Typically, countries that develop nuclear weapons early on do so because their conventional forces are weak. Therefore, they display aggressive nuclear doctrines and capabilities to deter enemy nations from initiating conventional warfare. In this context, North Korea is emphasizing the use of low-yield nuclear weapons in conventional warfare scenarios to limit the military options of South Korea and the United States. While this is slightly different, it helps in explaining the situation, so I will mention this. Putin's Russia exhibits similar behavior. After invading Ukraine, Putin's Russia has continuously threatened to use nuclear weapons if NATO countries intervene.

This is to prevent NATO from directly intervening militarily in Ukraine. North Korea also holds a similar view. However, the biggest difference here is that South Korea and the United States have no intention of attacking North Korea, yet North Korea is engaging in such actions with conventional means. This is another enigma that makes North Korea difficult to understand. My assessment is that North Korea has the following intentions. First, they aim to demonstrate to the maximum extent their capability and willingness to engage in limited warfare using such low-yield nuclear weapons. Through this, North Korea essentially seeks recognition as a nuclear power. By avoiding large-scale war, they aim to separate these two aspects. That is, by possessing nuclear capabilities that can only attack South Korea, they intend to avoid large-scale U.S. retaliation by posing a risk to the U.S. without actually attacking it. This strategy is based on the clear limitations of North Korea's nuclear strategy doctrine. First and foremost, it is impossible to achieve their political and military objectives through limited attacks using low-yield nuclear weapons. Let me provide an example. North Korea might attempt to maximize fear by firing low-yield nuclear weapons at a small South Korean city or a sparsely populated area early in a war. If the U.S. attempts to counter this, North Korea might threaten to attack the U.S. with its ICBMs like Hwasong-15, 17, or 18, thereby deterring the U.S. Then, after occupying a portion of South Korean territory, they would declare victory in the war and negotiate with South Korea and the U.S. This scenario is often discussed. The idea is to achieve their political and military objectives through limited warfare without escalating to a full-scale nuclear war. I will now refute this.

The Impossibility of a Limited Nuclear Use Scenario

First, an attack by North Korea on South Korea using tactical nuclear weapons would inevitably lead to a full-scale war. This is because it is difficult for North Korea to inflict significant damage on South Korea with just one or two shots from its tactical nuclear missiles, such as the KN-23 or KN-24, due to South Korea and the U.S. missile defense systems. Therefore, North Korea would have to fire a large number of tactical nuclear missiles simultaneously. However, firing missiles on this scale would be no different from initiating a full-scale war. Furthermore, to inflict substantial damage on South Korea, they would need to use large warheads; smaller warheads would not achieve their desired objectives. Additionally, if they were to fire nuclear weapons at a small South Korean city or similar area, it would inevitably result in massive civilian casualties, as South Korea is densely populated. Moreover, if North Korea were to target a strategic objective, such as a military base, these bases are often jointly used by South Korea and the U.S., posing a significant risk. In summary, a full-scale war would be unavoidable. This would immediately escalate into a full-scale war, and naturally, if North Korea were to launch such nuclear missiles, South Korea would utilize its

three-axis system to launch a full-scale counterattack against North Korea. For example, South Korea possesses the Hyunmoo-5, capable of carrying the world's largest conventional warheads. They could utilize this, or their precision-guided missiles, to launch operations aimed at eliminating North Korea's leadership. Additionally, South Korea's F-35 stealth fighters, undetectable by North Korean radar, could be used to attack North Korean operational headquarters, leading to a full-scale war. So, the question arises again: would the United States stand idly by? According to the scenario I described, if North Korea fires a small, low-yield nuclear weapon and then threatens the U.S., would the U.S. remain passive? Let's consider this. This is a crucial aspect of extended deterrence. In a situation where North Korea convincingly demonstrates the threat of attacking the U.S. mainland, do you believe the U.S. would back down? Or do you think the U.S. would strongly retaliate and eliminate the threat through decisive action?

I believe it would be the latter. Considering U.S. war history and its nuclear strategy doctrine, if there is a perceived threat to the U.S. mainland, the U.S. is far more likely to employ powerful, high-yield nuclear weapons to neutralize North Korea's nuclear capabilities and carry out massive retaliatory strikes. This is not just my opinion; it is what U.S. strategists generally agree upon. Therefore, to reiterate, first, if North Korea initiates a conventional war and then attacks South Korea with low-yield nuclear weapons, it would escalate into a full-scale war, and they would have the capacity for retaliation, involving U.S. nuclear assets. This is the conclusion.

U.S. Extended Deterrence and the Possibility of Nuclear Retaliation

Unless Kim Jong-un makes an irrational decision that leads to his own destruction, he cannot wage war. If there were a war, who do you think would have the most to lose? The richest person on the entire Korean Peninsula, including both North and South Korea, is Kim Jong-un. Kim Jong-un also holds exclusive power over North Korea. I don't believe he would initiate a war that he would clearly lose. This is why North Korea, and Kim Jong-un, despite their recent invasion scenarios and continuous nuclear threats against South Korea, cannot actually implement them.

Thank you.

Conclusion: Kim Jong Un's Determination for War and Realistic Constraints

Unless Kim Jong Un makes an irrational decision that leads to his own destruction, he cannot wage war. If a war were to break out, who do you think would actually benefit the most? Kim Jong Un is the richest person on the entire Korean Peninsula, including both North and South Korea. Kim Jong Un also holds exclusive power over North Korea. I do not believe he would initiate such a war, knowing it would clearly lead to his defeat. This is why North Korea, and Kim Jong Un, despite recently showing an invasion scenario and continuously threatening South Korea with nuclear weapons, cannot practically implement it.

Park Gun-gon, Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies and Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

Park Gun-gon, Director of EAI's North Korea Research Center, predicts an invasion scenario based on Kim Jong Un's actions during the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises in March and examines the possibility of North Korea launching a nuclear attack on South Korea. While North Korea appears to be devising a war plan that involves initiating conflict at the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea and using low-yield nuclear weapons early in the war to secure initiative, Director Park argues that the possibility of Kim Jong Un, who stands to lose the most from war, making such a self-destructive choice is very low. Nevertheless, he explains that North Korea continues to pose nuclear threats to limit the military options of South Korea and the U.S. in a conventional warfare situation where they would inevitably be at a disadvantage.

Park Gun-gon, Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies.

Managed and Edited by Park Ji-soo, EAI Researcher
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr