[EAI Fake News Conference] Responding to Disinformation: International Regulatory Trends and South Korea's Response Measures

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0qqPCvui9_g

Editor's Note

Lee Sook-jong, EAI Senior Fellow (Distinguished Professor, Sungkyunkwan University), points out that South Korea also faces the threat of disinformation originating from abroad and proposes active response measures based on an analysis of international regulatory trends. Senior Fellow Lee explains that while the European Union has enacted the Digital Service Act (DSA) to regulate and penalize illegal content that intentionally spreads false and manipulated news and the platforms that distribute it, while maximally guaranteeing freedom of the press, the United States is focusing more on establishing disinformation response mechanisms within the executive branch rather than enacting comprehensive legislation. She emphasizes that South Korea should actively respond by creating regulations and institutions tailored to its media environment within the flow of these international regulations, but that social and media literacy education should precede strengthening civil and criminal penalties.

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Lee Sook-jong (EAI Senior Fellow): The title was set as 'Responding to Disinformation: International Regulatory Trends and South Korea's Response Measures.' There is a reason for this. As I work extensively with international civil society organizations, I felt it was necessary to first organize the terminology used in the international community. The international community does not widely use the term 'fake news.' While one professor previously referred to disinformation as 'misinformation,' a search revealed that in Korea, it is often translated as 'heo-wi-jo-jak-jeong-bo' (disinformation). Therefore, I will also unify the term to 'disinformation' rather than using the foreign word 'disinformation.' The reason 'fake news' is not frequently used is because it implies intentionality. As many pro-democracy organizations I am involved with are increasingly being labeled and suppressed by authoritarian governments as spreading 'fake news,' the term is being avoided due to its malicious misuse. As the previous professor pointed out, 'disinformation' encompasses false photos, videos, and unsubstantiated claims, thus having a broader meaning. Especially with the prevalence of deepfake videos, and although artificial intelligence (AI) can now perfectly replicate videos and voices, it is reportedly becoming increasingly difficult to detect them. Therefore, 'fake news' can be considered a small part of 'disinformation.' Furthermore, the international community distinguishes between 'disinformation' and 'misinformation,' where misinformation primarily refers to unintentional errors.

In other words, with disinformation, the 'intention to deceive' is crucial. Consequently, concepts often confused with fake news, such as hate speech and parodic expressions of mockery, are generally not considered disinformation. These fall within the realm of individual freedom of expression. Typically, the scope is limited to content deemed illegal. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, it is defined as 'intentionally and often secretly spread false information,' while the European Union defines it as 'content that causes public harm by being false or misleading, with the intent to deceive or for economic or political gain.' In Korea, since the term 'fake news' has been used, if one asks whether there is a unified definition of fake news, there is no such definition. Therefore, the Korea Creative Content Agency has defined it as 'falsehoods, fabrications, and incitement deliberately manipulated through photos and videos for the purpose of hatred, presented as news.'

In fact, there were two legislative movements related to fake news in 2018. The 'Act on the Prevention of the Spread of Fake News' did not clearly define fake news but rather referred to violations of existing laws as fake news. The 'Act on the Establishment and Operation of a Fake News Countermeasures Committee,' proposed by the then-opposition Liberty Korea Party, defined fake news as 'false or distorted information produced in newspapers, online newspapers, broadcasts, or information and communication networks for political or economic gain.' As I will mention later, both of these bills were abandoned without proper discussion.

My research topic is 'Regulatory Issues Surrounding Disinformation.' Regulation is difficult. Many argue that it threatens freedom of expression, leading to caution against broad regulation. Furthermore, perceptions and interpretations based on partisanship, as many professors have discussed with data, mean that in politically polarized societies like Korea, people accept fake news to support their genuine beliefs or their favored political party. Even if laws are enacted to regulate it, enforcement is difficult due to high costs. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, there is a significant risk of authoritarian regimes misusing such regulations.

So, how is the scope of regulation defined internationally? Reports from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the UNESCO Broadband Commission outline four approaches. First, there is the need to recognize what disinformation is, so response measures typically involve monitoring and fact-checking. In Korea, there are fact-checking organizations, including one at Seoul National University. This constitutes one category. Second, there is the response to producers and distributors, which primarily involves legislative or policy measures. Third, there is the response to the mechanisms of production and distribution. This includes technical measures such as curation algorithms or preventing monetization. Fourth, there is the response to the target audience of disinformation campaigns, which involves educational measures or the application of credibility labels. Another researcher has provided a table comparing different response methods—legal regulation, self-regulation, fact-checking, and literacy education—along with their advantages and disadvantages. You may refer to this table.

Next, I examined how the European Union is responding. Major European countries have enacted domestic laws to combat disinformation. At the EU level, all 27 member states are subject to this law, which was enacted in October 2022. Briefly introducing the DSA (Digital Service Act), by February of this year, all EU member states were required to appoint national digital service coordinators for policy alignment. This means a position was created with the directive, 'You, the coordinator, shall perform this role.'

What is important is that the scope of regulation includes various entities such as online intermediary platforms, marketplaces, and social networks. The most significant regulatory targets are highly influential platform companies. Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs) are the primary regulatory targets. You might wonder how large these entities are in the EU. They are defined as platforms and search engines with an average monthly user base exceeding 10% of the EU's population of 450 million. These are the main regulatory targets. Then, there are obligations for these designated entities.

These companies must identify risks themselves, report to the European Commission for supervision, and take measures to mitigate these risks. There are various measures, and failure to comply with these obligations can result in fines of up to 6% of their global revenue—not just within the EU, but worldwide—starting from February 17th. For example, if a social media platform failed to filter disinformation during a recent election in a European country, that company would face a 6% fine.

The situation in the United States is different. While Europe seeks to balance freedom of expression with regulation, primarily by targeting platform companies, the US places a greater emphasis on individual freedom. Instead, it focuses on countering disinformation, particularly propaganda and manipulation originating from foreign sources. Various departments are involved. Notably, in 2017, Congress enacted legislation to counter foreign propaganda and disinformation, leading to the establishment of the Global Engagement Center (GEC) within the Department of State—equivalent to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs—to combat disinformation. Similar centers have been established within the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense.

Consequently, to coordinate these efforts, the Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC) was established in September 2022 within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to serve as a central coordinating body. While the European Union focuses more on issues arising within the societies of its member states, the United States primarily addresses foreign interference through disinformation that impacts national security or election integrity.

In South Korea, efforts to regulate fake news began during the Lee Myung-bak administration in 2008, leading to the establishment of the Korea Internet Self-Governance Organization (KISO) for self-regulation. However, as this organization was limited to member companies, it was deemed insufficient. Consequently, two legislative proposals were introduced in the 20th National Assembly.

Regarding public opinion on regulation, based on the EAI survey, when asked whether to protect individual freedom of expression or to regulate, the public opinion strongly favors taking action even at the risk of infringing upon freedom of expression. Notably, the demand for regulation is stronger among supporters of the People Power Party and increases with age.

Second, concerning public opinion on regulation, as mentioned by the professors, responsibility is attributed to various actors including YouTubers, politicians, and the media. However, a significant ideological gap is observed, with differences of up to 20% when terms like 'conservative politicians,' 'conservative media,' or 'conservative' and 'progressive' are applied. This highlights the extent to which responsibility is assigned along partisan lines.

Third, the survey results regarding regulatory responsibility indicate that the Korean public strongly believes the creators or organizations that produce information bear responsibility. This is followed by politicians who utilize such information, then platforms that fail to filter it, and finally, individuals and the government, with the latter receiving only 3.4% of the responsibility. There is not strong support for the government taking the lead in regulation. Regarding how to address this, there are specific regulatory measures proposed, such as the expulsion of individuals involved. Expulsion received significant support. However, expelling individuals is practically difficult. Therefore, regulating this issue is challenging.

To conclude, the reason why legal regulation of disinformation is difficult is its partisan nature, making any attempt challenging. Therefore, self-regulation or public-private cooperation would seem ideal, but these are also highly insufficient. Although a rapid response mechanism was attempted, it has stalled due to political controversy; however, its introduction would be desirable. I agree with Professor Han Gyu-seop that there is a difference between the Western concept of disinformation and our 'fake news.' In the West, where there are not many traditional media outlets and established media are not major producers of disinformation, responsibility is placed on social media platforms. In Korea, however, with ten thousand registered media outlets, and with major online news organizations playing a role in the production and dissemination of fake news, regulating these entities effectively is the key.

Nevertheless, it would be beneficial for platform companies in Korea, similar to the EU's DSA, to strengthen penalty systems. As Professor Lim Sung-hak presented, information agencies are gradually developing measures against foreign disinformation. Needless to say, citizen education on media is essential, and restoring the credibility of traditional media organizations is of utmost importance. This concludes my presentation. ■

■ Lee Sook-jong, EAI Senior Fellow. Distinguished Professor, Sungkyunkwan University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Kim Sun-hee, EAI Senior Researcher, Park Ji-soo, EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr