[North Korea and the World] The Possibility of North Korea's 'Hamas-style' Provocation and South Korea's Response Strategy

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ys53o4Z_pm8

Park Won-gon, Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies (Professor at Ewha Womans University), analyzes the vulnerabilities of the 'Iron Dome' revealed by Hamas's air raid on Israel and discusses the implications of Israel's 'strong military' defense failure for Korean Peninsula security. Director Park explains that while North Korea's possession of weapon systems capable of firing more than three times the number of rockets Hamas fired at Israel at the Seoul metropolitan area poses a serious security threat, the ROK-US combined forces have built defense systems capable of neutralizing North Korea's artillery attacks. Furthermore, Director Park suggests that South Korea should strengthen its air-raid shelters and warning systems, including civil defense drills, to prepare for North Korea's threats.

■ Park Won-gonDirector, Center for North Korean Studies, East Asia Institute. Professor, Department of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Contact and Editing: Park Ji-soo, EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

From the perspective of defending the Seoul metropolitan area, I believe this is the best approach. Some argue that since the Iron Dome was breached, we need to develop a stronger defense system. However, such comprehensive area defense is technically infeasible. Therefore, I believe that achieving perfect defense is an unattainable goal for us. Hello, and thank you for watching Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Today, I would like to discuss the military situation on the Korean Peninsula in connection with the ongoing Middle East issues.

The media and newspapers have extensively reported on the Hamas surprise attack on Israel and the various aspects of the conflict it revealed. This raises questions about its implications for South Korea, which faces existential threats from North Korea. Many discussions are underway, and I would like to share a couple of key points. The first point frequently raised is that Israel's air defense system, the Iron Dome, was reportedly breached during this conflict.

I will elaborate on this. The Iron Dome, which translates to 'Steel Dome' in Korean, was first developed by Israel in 2006. Hezbollah, a Shiite armed group in Lebanon supported by Iran and designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and European countries, had fired thousands of rockets at Israel at that time, causing significant damage. In response, Israel developed the Iron Dome, a defensive system, to counter these rocket attacks.

It has been highly effective to date. We have seen numerous instances, through the internet and various news reports, of the Iron Dome intercepting rockets fired by Hamas and Hezbollah, boasting an interception rate as high as 90%, and even 94% in some cases. It has been recognized as a highly effective defense system. However, as you may have seen, despite the Iron Dome's presence, it was reportedly breached by what are described as primitive rockets used by Hamas. I believe that rather than the term 'breached,' it is more accurate to say that the Iron Dome operated within its limitations and was effective up to a certain point. The primary reason for this is that Hamas claimed to have fired 5,000 rockets.

Israel, on the other hand, reported approximately 2,200 rockets fired. While there is a difference between 5,000 and 2,200, it is clear that the number exceeded the Iron Dome's interception capacity. Systems like the Patriot system and THAAD, as well as our own indigenously developed medium- and high-altitude systems, are familiar to us. These systems primarily consist of interceptor missiles, launchers capable of firing these missiles, and radar for monitoring enemy bombardment.

These components operate together as a unit with a command and control center. Israel's Iron Dome is known to have approximately 10 batteries deployed nationwide, with each battery reportedly equipped with four launchers capable of firing twenty interceptor missiles. This means that 20 missiles multiplied by 4 launchers equals 80 missiles per battery, and with 10 batteries, the total capacity is around 800 missiles. As mentioned earlier, Hamas fired far more than 800 rockets, exceeding Israel's defensive capacity. Therefore, while the Iron Dome likely maintained a high interception rate within its 800-missile capacity, a significant number of Hamas rockets inevitably landed on Israeli territory once this limit was surpassed. It is also important to note that Hamas preemptively attacked the batteries themselves, so a further assessment is needed on whether the Iron Dome's 800-missile capacity was fully utilized. However, the fundamental point is that although the Iron Dome operated, its effectiveness was limited due to the sheer volume of incoming missiles.

While there were significant casualties, the majority of these were reportedly not caused by Hamas rocket attacks but by Hamas militants entering Israeli civilian areas and indiscriminately killing civilians. As you know, they targeted civilians regardless of gender. This resulted in a large number of casualties. So, considering the broader context, it is true that Israel failed to adequately defend against Hamas's attack. How should we assess the reasons for this failure? At this point, I believe the Iron Dome functioned as intended, but more importantly, intelligence assessment was flawed. That is, detection and identification were inadequate, and intelligence was not properly utilized. One of the primary reasons for Israel's consistent victories in its past four wars with neighboring countries, despite facing difficult circumstances, was accurate intelligence assessment. Intelligence assessment involves detecting and identifying the enemy's attacks in advance. Typically, when a large-scale attack like the one by Hamas was imminent, Israel would detect it and launch a preemptive strike. However, this did not function properly this time.

I believe there are one or two contributing factors. Firstly, there might have been overconfidence in the Iron Dome. It is true that since its effective deployment, the Iron Dome has successfully intercepted attacks from Hezbollah and Hamas. This success may have led to complacency. Secondly, intelligence gathering regarding Hamas, which does not utilize advanced equipment for communication, is inherently difficult to intercept. Nevertheless, Israel's intelligence agency, Mossad, is renowned for its exceptional intelligence-gathering capabilities. Despite this, the failure to detect an attack prepared over such a long period in advance suggests a failure in intelligence assessment. There are various theories regarding this, but it is possible that the political instability under the Netanyahu government played a role. While detailed analyses will likely emerge in the future, I believe these factors were more significant.

I believe there are one or two contributing factors. Firstly, there might have been overconfidence in the Iron Dome. It is true that since its effective deployment, the Iron Dome has successfully intercepted attacks from Hezbollah and Hamas. This success may have led to complacency. Secondly, intelligence gathering regarding Hamas, which does not utilize advanced equipment for communication, is inherently difficult to intercept. Nevertheless, Israel's intelligence agency, Mossad, is renowned for its exceptional intelligence-gathering capabilities. Despite this, the failure to detect an attack prepared over such a long period in advance suggests a failure in intelligence assessment. There are various theories regarding this, but it is possible that the political instability under the Netanyahu government played a role. While detailed analyses will likely emerge in the future, I believe these factors were more significant.

Let's connect this issue to the North Korean threat. Many analyses have already been published. The first point is that the Seoul metropolitan area, including Seoul, is directly exposed to North Korean attacks. North Korea's long-range artillery, such as guns with a range of 40 to 70 kilometers, is being discussed. Typically, two types are mentioned: one is the 240mm multiple rocket launcher, referred to by North Korea as 'Bangaspo,' which we call a multiple rocket launcher or multiple launch rocket system. Approximately 200 of these are forward-deployed to target the Seoul metropolitan area. The other is the 170mm self-propelled howitzer. These are self-propelled artillery pieces, similar to South Korea's K-9 self-propelled howitzer, which resembles a tank with a cannon on top. North Korea possesses about 140 of these. In total, North Korea has approximately 340 long-range artillery pieces aimed at the Seoul metropolitan area. If these two types, the 240mm multiple rocket launchers and the 170mm self-propelled howitzers, were to attack the Seoul metropolitan area at maximum capacity, they could fire approximately 16,000 rounds within an hour. This raises significant concerns about whether the Seoul metropolitan area can adequately defend against these rockets and shells fired from more sophisticated weapon systems than Hamas's rockets.

The first point of discussion is that Seoul, and by extension the Seoul Metropolitan Area, is exposed to direct attack from North Korea. North Korea's long-range artillery, such as its multiple rocket launchers, has a range of approximately 40 to 70 km. Typically, two types are mentioned: one is the 240mm multiple rocket launcher, referred to by North Korea as 'Bangsapo,' which we call a multiple rocket launcher or multiple rocket system. Approximately 200 of these are forward-deployed to strike the Seoul Metropolitan Area. The other is the 170mm self-propelled artillery. A representative example of self-propelled artillery is South Korea's K9, which resembles a tank with a cannon on top. North Korea possesses about 140 of these. In total, North Korea has approximately 340 long-range artillery pieces aimed at the Seoul Metropolitan Area. If these two types, the 240mm multiple rocket launchers and 170mm self-propelled artillery, launch at their maximum capacity, they could fire about 16,000 shells within an hour. This raises significant concerns, as it is far more than the rockets used by Hamas.

First, a cautious comparison is necessary. The military conflict between Hamas and Israel involves a state, Israel, with a regular army, and Hamas, an armed organization. Therefore, the missiles they fire can be significantly outdated. North Korea, on the other hand, possesses a powerful military, including nuclear weapons, and its attacks are from a state actor, necessitating a very different response. South Korea's current response strategy is to attack North Korean artillery once it begins firing. Most of North Korea's long-range artillery, and indeed other artillery as well, is housed in hardened shelters. They excavate tunnels within mountains, as North Korea is adept at such work, and fire from within these tunnels, often using rails. This is because when the tunnels are sealed, it is difficult to detect and identify them, and they are also protected by the mountains.

This provides stability. However, if they were to attack, they would have to emerge from these tunnels. Conversely, the moment they emerge from the tunnels serves as an early warning sign of a potential North Korean attack. Therefore, both South Korean and US authorities are monitoring this closely. The moment large artillery pieces emerge from the tunnels and their barrels are oriented southward, it will be considered an attack. Consequently, upon confirmed detection, both South Korea and the US may utilize strike assets to attack. Alternatively, the current plan is to initiate a counterattack within five minutes of the first long-range artillery shell being fired, targeting its origin. South Korea has been preparing for this under the concept of counter-battery fire. If the ROK-US combined forces begin striking within a short period, North Korea will naturally be unable to fire 16,000 rounds per hour.

Therefore, the ROK-US alliance has focused on neutralizing North Korea's capabilities by blocking their tunnels, attacking their artillery, and destroying their multiple rocket launchers within the maximum possible timeframe. This effort has reached a considerable level of readiness. Of course, due to the military sensitivity of this matter, it will not be publicly disclosed. Furthermore, under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, the deployment of the L-SAM, originally planned for completion by 2030, has been accelerated to 2026. This refers to a missile defense system designed to intercept incoming missiles, similar to the Iron Dome. While it is realistically impossible for the L-SAM to intercept all 16,000 rounds North Korea could fire, its introduction is considered part of the effort to protect critical facilities in the Seoul metropolitan area.

In summary, a large-scale firing of long-range artillery by North Korea towards South Korea would signify total war. In such a scenario, we would engage in deep strike operations, targeting the core of the enemy's command and control structure, including the elimination of North Korea's leadership. This would involve the mobilization of all national resources for offensive operations, thus escalating into total war. From the perspective of defending the Seoul metropolitan area, I believe this is the best approach. Some argue that since the Iron Dome was breached, we need to develop a stronger defense system. However, such comprehensive area defense is technically infeasible. Furthermore, considering cost-effectiveness, it lacks military rationality. Therefore, achieving perfect defense is an unattainable goal for us. Nevertheless, while striving for it, I believe that deterring and attacking North Korea using strike capabilities, as previously mentioned, is crucial. So, what should we do? We must now truly prepare more actively, including civil defense drills, air-raid shelters, and warning systems.

Hamas's rockets did not cause significant casualties. This indicates that Israel's defense measures are still effective, with defensive walls in every home, defensive windows, and well-practiced drills. We, too, must inevitably prepare for the existing threat from North Korea by prioritizing the strengthening of air-raid shelters, warning systems, and civil defense drills. I feel a sense of gravity in saying this, but the threat posed by North Korea is a present danger to us. I will conclude my remarks here for today. Please subscribe and like. Thank you.

Thank you.