[Global NK Zoom & Connect Online Seminar] “2022 North Korea Grand Outlook: Analysis of Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Message and Response Strategies”

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1m4nAvY8RV8

The East Asia Institute (Director Yeol Son) held an online discussion titled “2022 North Korea Grand Outlook: Analysis of Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Message and Response Strategies” as part of the Global NK Zoom & Connect project. Director Jaesung Lee of the East Asia Institute's National Security Research Center (Professor, Seoul National University) presented prospects for inter-Korean relations and North Korean denuclearization in 2022, and discussed denuclearization policy for the next administration, alongside Professor Leif-Eric Easley of Ewha Womans University, Director Ki-Young Sung of the Institute for National Security Strategy, and Senior Fellow Evans Revere of the Brookings Institution.

Date: January 7, 2022 (Friday) 10:00 – 11:00 (KST)

Speakers: Leif-Eric Easley (Professor, Ewha Womans University), Evans Revere (Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution's East Asia Policy Studies Center), Ki-Young Sung (Director, Foreign Policy Research Department, Institute for National Security Strategy)

Moderator: Jaesung Lee (Director, National Security Research Center, East Asia Institute; Professor, Seoul National University)

I. The 4th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea

Main Contents of the Plenary Meeting – Economic Recovery

According to Dr. Ki-Young Sung, Director of the Department of Foreign Policy Research at the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), the key priority for this year's plenary meeting was the revival of the North Korean economy. This comes as no surprise, given that North Korea’s GDP fell by 4.5% in 2020, the second largest drop recorded in history.

Dr. Leif-Eric Easley, Professor at Ewha Womans University, notes that worsened economic conditions due to border lockdowns are likely to have especially affected the livelihood of women. Women are reported to have a significant, yet unrecognized role in the North Korean economy; they are known to be actively involved in informal trade, essential to the imports of household and other goods. He views that the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly curtailed women’s opportunities for entrepreneurship and market activity.

Contrary to assumptions that the regime would introduce bold, dramatic plans to reinvigorate the economy, none were suggested. However, Dr. Sung adds that the dire state of the economy is likely to affect the political foundation of leadership in North Korea. For instance, he notes that the leadership has been tackling subpar economic performance with the idolization of the leadership. State media have recently referred to Kim Jong Un as suryong, a term only used for Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

Dr. Easley also notes that the Workers’ Party's policy ideas were "uninspiring.” He points out that although Kim Jong Un is willing to manifest his ambitions for economic growth, his clampdown on informal markets and pursuit of juche self-reliance have failed to distance him from the failures of his predecessors.

Limited Media Coverage on the Plenary Meeting – Strategic Maneuver?

Mr. Evans Revere, Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, deduces that North Korea is suffering economically and agriculturally, as evidenced by the plenum, but further notes that "our ability to understand the actual depth of its current crisis … is very limited by the way that the regime reported the Korea Workers’ Party Plenum.” In particular, he notes that while Kim Jong Un’s remarks were referenced in North Korean official media, no actual text of his statement was released. He raises the possibility that much has been left unreported regarding the full extent of North Korea's difficulties. Furthermore, Mr. Revere claims he finds it “incomprehensible that Kim did not dwell on foreign affairs, relations with the U.S., defense and security matters, including the nuclear and missile programs, North-South relations, and ties with China in his remarks at the plenum.” The absence of reporting should not be interpreted as the absence of content.

II. Prospects for North Korea's Commitment to Denuclearization

North Korea’s Willingness to Denuclearize

Mr. Revere states that while North Korea is aware that renewed nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missile testing would anger China and push the U.S. to adopt harsh measures, it has a record of defying what we perceive to be in its best interest. Although North Korea should find ways to alleviate pressures from sanctions and maintain good ties with China, it remains firm in its belief that it can simultaneously possess weapons and obtain sanctions relief. Dr. Sung sees that North Korea would be unwilling to resume dialogue with the U.S. unless the resumption of talks with the U.S. or South Korea proves helpful in achieving domestic stability or consolidating Kim Jong Un's power. Additionally, the air of uncertainty in South Korea regarding the presidential elections and U.S. midterm elections will keep North Korea in a "wait-and-see” position.

The Role of the U.S. and Allies in Accelerating Progress

Dr. Easley views that North Korea is likely to push ahead with its military modernization and resume weapons testing in 2022. Bringing North Korea to denuclearize would not only require a unity of purpose among the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, but also a more cooperative China and pressures inside North Korea for political-economic reform. However, the Biden administration does not seem keen to place North Korea at the top of its priority list at present. Mr. Revere points out that given relations with China and Russia, the internal political situation in the U.S., and the pandemic, the Biden administration will remain in a “wait-and-see” posture in the absence of a major provocation by North Korea. While progress on the road toward denuclearization seems limited, Dr. Easley emphasizes that “Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo are capable of managing the North Korea threat by increasing security cooperation for deterrence, reinvigorating international sanctions while granting sanctions for aid and expanding multilateral pressure on both Pyongyang and Beijing.” It should, however, also be noted that North Korea has a tendency to reject UN assistance. Dr. Easley explains that this is due to three reasons. One is concerns over virus transmission – novel viruses pose a serious threat to survival in a country devoid of adequate medical infrastructure. Additionally, North Korea does not appear to be convinced that vaccine rollout would serve as an antidote to the pandemic. Furthermore, North Korea’s concern over regime legitimacy overrides practical concerns for healthcare.

III. North Korea in the Context of U.S.-China Strategic Competition

The Implications of U.S.-China Strategic Competition

According to Mr. Revere, the U.S. aims to push back against China's aggressive approach in East Asia, deal with China's attempts to intimidate its neighbors, and respond to China's desire to become the dominant actor. While other major international actors are aligning themselves with the U.S., China seems to have accepted, albeit reluctantly, the fact that North Korea is now a nuclear state and shares North Korea's goal of undermining the U.S.-ROK alliance. China regards North Korea as a “buffer zone” and refers to their relations as “lips and teeth.” Dr. Sung notes that China strives to maintain its economic leverage over North Korea and use North Korea’s geostrategic position as a buffer against the U.S. Under such context, it will be difficult to find a breakthrough in the denuclearization negotiation process. Dr. Easley views that the U.S.-China rivalry is not the main obstacle to denuclearization talks; he instead sees that the Kim regime’s own version of “strategic patience” is the biggest stumbling block above all.

Prospects for South Korea

Mr. Revere states that high tensions between the U.S. and China have placed South Korea in a very difficult situation. While Seoul believes that it can balance strong security relations with the U.S. and a robust economic relationship with China, he is skeptical that this is possible. He views that the next South Korean administration “will need to make a decision about Korea’s future, keeping in mind the vital importance of its alliance with the U.S., preserving South Korea’s independence, and the need to find a way to coexist with China.” Dr. Easley states that “Seoul should not give in to Chinese pressure, whether in the form of economic coercion against deployments like THAAD, attempts to shift blame onto U.S. alliance defense exercises, or maritime and airspace security challenges caused by China’s fishery and military expansion.” He underscores that South Korea should not use the great power competition as an excuse for the slow progress its North Korea policy has made. Most importantly, he states that the competition should not prevent South Korea from defending its own national interests and sovereignty. ■

IV. Speaker, Discussant, and Moderator Bios

■ Leif-Eric Easley_ is a Professor at Ewha Womans University where he teaches international security and political economy. He publishes in academic journals regarding U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral coordination on engaging China and North Korea. He has degrees from UCLA and Harvard and is frequently quoted in the New York Times, Washington Post, and elsewhere on diplomacy in Asia.

■ Ki-Young Sung_ is a Director of the Department of Foreign Policy Strategy Research at the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS). Dr. Sung’s main research area covers U.S.-DPRK relations, inter-Korean relations, and regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. He received his Ph.D. in International Studies from the University of Warwick (UK) and conducted postdoctoral research at the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California. After returning to South Korea, he worked for the Yonsei Institute for North Korea and the Korea Institute for National Unification as a research fellow.

■ Evans J.R. Revere_ is a Senior Advisor with the Albright Stonebridge Group, a leading global strategy firm. He is also a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies. He is an active participant in international dialogues dealing with U.S. relations with the PRC, the two Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, and East Asian regional security issues. His commentary appears frequently in major U.S., Korean, and Japanese newspapers, and he has appeared on CNN, MSNBC, CNBC, the BBC, NHK, and other major international news networks.

■ Chaesung Chun_ is the Chair of the National Security Research Center at the East Asia Institute, and a Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in International Relations at Northwestern University in the United States, and serves on the policy advisory committee to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Unification. His main research interests include international political theory, the ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsula affairs.

■ Responsible and Edited by: Seungyeon LeeEAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

Happy New Year to all of you. We will begin the very first webinar of this year by Global NK Zoom & Connect. Global NK is a web journal and a project of the East Asia Institute to provide various views and materials on North Korea, inter-Korean relations, and Korea's relations with international society. My name is Chaesung Chun, the moderator today. I work for the EAI as a member of the editorial board committee of Global NK. At the beginning of this year, Kim Jong Un made a wrapping-up speech of the five-day plenary meeting of the ruling

Workers’ Party Central Committee. He primarily focused on domestic agendas, especially economic challenges and the anti-virus campaign that lie ahead, without mentioning much about diplomatic engagement with the South and the United States. North Korea claimed that they tested a hypersonic missile on January 5th, and they said it has strategic significance in that it hastens the task for modernizing the strategic armed forces of the state put forward at the Eighth Party Congress and helps fulfill the most important core

task out of five top priority tasks for the strategic armament sector in the five-year plan. So we have only North Korea's actions, but not much talk to anticipate what the year 2022 will be in relation with North Korea. To discuss these matters, we have a very impressive panel today. I will introduce them very shortly in alphabetical order of the last names. First, we have Professor Leif Eric Easley, a close colleague of mine at Ewha Womans University. He's also a member of the editorial board committee of Global

NK, and he actually coined the subtitle of Global NK Journal, Zoom & Connect. Next, we have Mr. Evans Revere, Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution. He's very well known internationally and has provided valuable insights on Korean and regional matters. Next, we have Dr. Sung Ki-young, Director of the Department of Foreign Policy Research at the Institute for National Security Strategy. He's a specialist in international affairs and security issues, and also in Korean matters, including North Korean problems.

So, in this webinar, I have three questions, and I will ask each panelist to give their insights to each of them. So, the first question is about the New Year's report by Kim Jong Un: What are the main strategic contents shown in the Central Committee's plenary meeting and the plenum report by Kim Jong Un, and what was the strategic priority manifested in the plenary meeting? So, let me invite Dr. Sung first, please. So, you are on mute. Thank you very much for organizing this timely event. Um, regarding your first question, uh,

my first impression about the outcome of this plenary meeting was that there is no dramatic wording or a new eye-catching slogan at this time, but still, the top priority of this plenary meeting was the economy: how to recover the North Korean economy. Let me briefly sketch out, uh, where the North Korean economy is right now based on the, uh, some statistics. Uh, as you know, the worst period of the North Korean economy over the last several decades was the mid-1990s, during which North Korea faced the Great

Famine that killed many millions of people. North Korea recorded minus GDP growth for nine consecutive years in the 1990s. The worst economic achievement for North Korea was 1997, at which time the GDP growth of the country was minus 6.7% compared to the previous year. And if you look at the recent Bank of Korea data, North Korea's GDP in 2020 contracted by 4.5%, which recorded the second largest fall in the recent economic history of North Korea, following 6.7% in 1997.

This shows that the North Korean economy is in a really, really dire situation right now. So, it was my assumption that North Korea will present any drastic idea or plan to revive its economy in the New Year's message, but as we know, no meaningful and drastic idea was suggested. For example, the first-year accomplishments of the five-year economic development plan, which was declared in January last year, should have been announced in this plenary meeting, I think, according to past practices of North Korean politics,

but North Korea failed to announce, uh, even whether or not it met the first-year target. This is my first takeaway. And secondly, the food problem was, uh, discussed intensively in this plenary meeting. Basically, there were six major agendas in this plenary meeting. Among the six agendas, uh, the economy and the socialist way to increase agricultural productivity were the only, uh, real policy-related agendas in the five-day meeting. The rest of the meeting agendas were about, for example, the restructuring of the party

organization, or the revision of the party bylaws, or the national budget, et cetera. North Korea has, why, recently been emphasizing nationwide support for the agricultural industry, such as improvement of the rural village environment and technological support, and consolidation of state leadership to boost food productivity. But at the same time, this state-led campaign is expected to be pursued not only by government efforts for technological innovation or incentive systems but by requiring ideological armament of the people

and cultural renovation of the people. The significance of the so-called trilateral combination of ideology and technology and culture in pursuing agricultural innovation in North Korea was already declared by Kim Jong Un last year in November at the so-called the event, Three Revolutions Red Flags Achievement Movement. However, again, I'm still pessimistic in predicting the prospect of North Korea's economy to resolve this chronic food problem following the decision of this, uh, plenary meeting because

very few policy tools to achieve the goal were presented in this meeting, apart from, uh, psychological mobilization of the people and ideological armament and a series of measures to improve the living environment of farmers. So, I'm still pessimistic. Thank you. Uh, let me give you a follow-up question. You may want to answer after one round of talks. So, we have 10 years of Kim Jong Un's rule, but the economic situation is still very dire. So, do you think this economic situation will affect his political foundation

in the short or long term? So, that's my question. Second, let me invite Professor Easley, please. Thank you so much. It's an honor to join distinguished colleagues for this timely discussion. The Fourth Plenary of the Workers’ Party 8th Central Committee outlined new policies, including for developing rural areas and defending socialist culture. As has been mentioned by my colleagues, we can expect, I think, these, uh, policies, at least some of them, to be passed into law by the Supreme People’s Assembly early this year.

These high-profile meetings are meant to show responsiveness to domestic challenges in North Korea and a sort of normalization of governance compared to the past, but I'm afraid that they are largely Kim Jong Un's attempt at maintaining loyalty and discipline. Kim is trying to show he has the will and ability to lead North Korea through and beyond COVID-related challenges. Yet, as far as one can glean from the readout of the plenary, the Workers’ Party's policy ideas are really uninspiring.

When the third generation of leadership took the helm in North Korea, there could perhaps have been some significant changes in policy. But despite a taste for the international and obvious ambitions for economic growth, Kim has prioritized nuclearization over the benefits of denuclearization. He has repeated the failures of his predecessors—juche self-reliance and socialist ideologies—while cracking down on the informal markets that many North Koreans use to survive. Pyongyang's economic policies are thus

unsustainable, but also its strategy of blackmailing its neighbors appears to currently be on hold. Yes, the North Koreans tested what they claim is a hypersonic missile on July 5th, on January 5th, excuse me, but I think further military provocations will be on hold for some time because of the Beijing Olympics. At the same time, a meaningful diplomatic initiative is implausible during the spread of a novel coronavirus variant like Omicron. I don't expect the North Koreans to be coming out for diplomacy.

So, it looks to me like North Korea in 2022 is going to be working to survive the pandemic, and they're going to be doing that largely by staying the course, playing up self-isolation as self-reliance, and continuing to rely on Chinese aid. Thank you. A very comprehensive overview. Let me ask you one, a little bit different question. You've been working on women's rights or women's situations in North Korea, which is quite much under-researched but a very important agenda. So, uh, can you talk a little bit more about

women's health situation or human rights situation in north korea after after the around peace with pleasure hey yep sure uh let me now that uh turn the floor to mr river please thank you very much uh dr chun and uh it's an honor for me to be able to participate in this webinar sorry i can't be in seoul to do it i'm here in spain but i was particularly eager to join this distinguished group and be a part of a very timely discussion it's pretty clear from what we've seen of the outcome of the plenum that north

korea is struggling economically and agriculturally and so economic recovery and food production are predictably going to be central elements of the parties and the nation's work plan for 2022 but to be frank our ability to understand the actual depth of its current crisis and the full range of plans that north korea has for this year is very limited by the way that the regime reported on this korean workers party plenum uh this is something that my my two colleagues touched on a moment ago but i

really want to underscore this that the the way that the regime rolled out to the results of the plenum is curious indeed kim jong-un's remarks were referenced of course in the north korean official media but no actual text of his statement was released nor of course did he deliver a new year's speech to the nation that we've often seen him deliver in the past uh there was surely more much more to his remarks at the plenum than has been revealed publicly what he told the central committee may well have been franker and blunter

than what we have heard reported today to me this suggests that the regime may have felt it important not to allow the outside world to know the full extent of its difficulties uh nor to permit its adversaries including the united states to understand the dprk's plans for dealing with all of the challenges that it faces secrecy and hiding its cards have always been part of the regime's approach to the outside world and i think it's fair to assume that they still are as a long-time north korea watcher

i find it incomprehensible that kim jong-un did not dwell on foreign affairs on relations with the united states defense and security matters including the nuclear and missile programs north-south relations and ties with china and his remarks at the plenum all of these things have been central components of kim's game plan as leader and some of them have even been areas where he has managed to achieve major success uh at least from his perspective so are we supposed to believe that kim jong-un did not lay out his priorities

and talk about his strategy for achieving them at this important end-of-year party meeting on the issues that i just mentioned the absence of reporting on these matters by the north korean media should not be interpreted in my view as meaning that they were not raised and i think we need to be careful about that i also think it's important for us to be very careful in our judgments about what north korea is up to or not up to and what pyongyang intends to do in the coming months it's possible that the strategic

priorities revealed by the limited reporting on the plenum that we've seen so far will give us a hint about pyongyang's plans and intentions but i also think it's possible that they may also be designed to misinform and mislead us so i think a note of caution is an order here as and we ought to be careful about jumping to any conclusions about what north korea plans to do in 2022 thank you uh very interesting so the limited uh revelation of the party platinum's contents is very interesting how do you think it will be accepted by

american specialists or pulse makers this a little bit exceptional uh change of the new year's situation and also probably i will ask later but will this situation affect the american priority in their foreign policy agendas because usa is confronted with many domestic issues and other foreign policy issues as well so generally after one year of president biden's taking office probably the priorities falling down from the list i don't know so please give me some insight okay let me turn to dr sung again for

the question please oh yeah um as you said in the question uh i agree that the economic situation will do affect the political foundation on political leadership but i think the way the kim jong-un is going to respond to this situation is slightly different for example north korean state media uh has recently begun to use the word sriyan or kim jonganism and in uh portraying the what's going on inside north korean leadership and north korean politics xiang is something that is called uh that is used

when the state media and north korean people call only kim il-sung and kim jong-il especially after they died but what the fact that the north korean state media began to use the word uh young and kim kim jong-un ism uh during his reign what it means is uh north korean leadership is going to tackle this dire situation by strengthening the idolization of their top leader so what kim jong-il wants to deliver is that north korean people are required to endure this economic difficulties by threat strengthening

their ideological um armament and by putting a more higher level of economic and i mean the ideological indoctrination that is the way the kim germany is going to tackle uh to prevent the economic difficulties from developing into the political crisis thank you very much so with this economic difficulties how longer can kim jong-un can survive politically i think that will be a important question uh professor eastley please thank you so much for asking about women's rights in north korea of course before the pandemic the

situation for women's rights in the dprk was dire indeed with very poor public health conditions for public health issues that are a particular concern for women with very severe and frequent incidents of sexual violence without without significant legal recourse and protections and of course many other forms of human rights violations that women and men uh suffer uh in north korea these were all very serious and i think uh well um outlined by the commission of inquiry uh report which i believe all our uh

colleagues are familiar with but one of the things that my uh co-author sarah kim and i wrote about in ethics and international affairs was despite uh the terrible women's rights situation in north korea women were also an under-recognized part of success stories in north korea regarding their economic activities so women are disproportionately the actors engaged in informal markets uh engaged in lifting up the the north korean economy through informal trade and of course uh were essential to the the trade in household and other

goods across the north korea-china border in order to uh bring items that were in demand by north korean families but also to raise revenue and bring income to many north korean families who were having difficulty surviving uh on the the state-controlled uh or or state-led uh economic system so really female entrepreneurs are as important uh an overlooked story in north korea as north korean women's rights but then with the pandemic of course north korea locked down its borders to uh to an extent and now at a duration

that far exceeds its previous border lockdowns in instances of of sars and mars for example and these north korean female entrepreneurs are largely cut off from supply chains in china their their activities have been clamped down uh because of virus prevention measures but also because of the ideological campaigns that have been mentioned by my colleagues and so what you have uh under the current coronavirus situation which as uh evans revere very correctly cautioned us makes it very difficult to

look inside north korea even more difficult than it was before the pandemic but i think i can say with some confidence what you have is a situation in north korea where the women's rights conditions uh have worsened and and yet the women's opportunities of entrepreneurialism and market activity uh have have been curtailed significantly and so the pandemic is really dealing uh a double blow to the conditions of women in north korea both in terms of public health and freedom on the one hand and in terms of their their economic

abilities and activities on the other thank you very much uh the purpose of global nk actually is to uh do research on the very broad basis of north korea uh social cultural and political base and i think in this sense prophecy easley's research and remarks are very important okay uh mr revere please uh yeah in response to the the two points to two questions that you posed uh first of all i think it's incumbent on uh all of us who watch north korea carefully to be uh at least a bit skeptical about what

we've seen uh in this recent plenum uh uh not enough of us have pointed out the the uh the concern that i i laid out in my opening remarks that the this is an unusual way of rolling out the results of a uh of a major uh party central committee plenum uh and uh a couple of people have pointed to this and and noted that there's something odd going on here i think rudiger frank in a recent article said uh uh expressed some curiosity and suspicion about what is happening uh by virtue of the fact that so little has

been reported and very almost no quotes have been provided about what kim jong-un actually said so i think all of us going forward need to give this a hard look and a skeptical look particularly on the issue that i raised about how likely is it that a major party meeting took place and there were no references to the united states nuclear weapons strategy china south korea north-south relations etc it just once again it just defies credibility for me on the other point that you made about the biden administration

uh it's pretty clear uh based on what we've seen so far that north korea is not a top priority for the united states right now there are other things going on particularly relations with china relations with russia our internal political situation in the united states uh the pandemic all of those things are urgent matters for this administration and in the absence of a a major provocation by north korea uh the biden administration has settled into a sort of uh wait and see posture uh some people have uh have called it

uh well wait and see posture is probably the best way to to describe what the administration is doing right now uh the the mantra of u.s willingness to be uh to sit down with north korea and to engage with north korea is still repeated periodically but you don't see the the administration uh making uh any significant uh steps or taking any significant measures to re-engage with north korea and so there's a certain interesting stability to where we are right now the united states doesn't feel compelled

to do anything because there's not a lot of excitement going on in the korean peninsula right now and north korea is not provoking uh for a change but at the same time uh north korea uh is sitting on its new status as a de facto nuclear weapon state and uh reaping the benefits thereof uh and uh does not seem to uh have any uh sense of urgency about re-engaging with the united states so at least at this point things seem to be calm and will probably remain so until one day when they're not and we can talk

some more about that as we respond to the next couple of questions thank you very much that uh last remark lead us to the second question which is about the future of denuclearization negotiation which is very difficult to anticipate and there are many webinars i think uh in seoul or in the states about this problem so what uh will be north korea's strategy for the negotiation with the united states and south korea will this economic hardship be a driver for kim jong-un to come to the negotiation table

and what will be the future of this current government south korean government's efforts for the end of war declaration we have only two months before the uh south korean presidential election so everything um is not very certain and also we have a beijing olympics uh one month after today so north korea's testifier of the so-called hypersonic missile probably will irritate china's thinking so everything is happening without a very clear clue for the future but we have to tackle with this idea of the future of

nuclear denuclearization negotiation so let me first go to purpose easily please well thank you i'm i'm joining some of the best uh north korea watchers on this call so what i'm going to say will not be a surprise to my colleagues here but i think that kim's nuclear and missile programs have exceeded the projections of many analysts and continue to develop despite relative uh outward quiet and what we presume to be some pretty significant internal suffering inside north korea so i think that uh the dprk is likely

to push ahead almost certainly push ahead with many of its military modernizations in 2022 and sometime after the beijing olympics i'm not willing to put a wager on whether they will do so uh before the next south korean president enters the blue house or or relatively soon thereafter but i do expect them to resume their weapons testing later this year and you know at this point it's it's frankly hard to imagine the kim regime seriously engaging in denuclearization unless it believes that the continuation

of the regime depends on it and bringing about that sort of calculus in pyongyang would likely require a unity of purpose among washington seoul and tokyo a much more cooperative beijing and uh some bottom-up pressures inside north korea for political economic reform uh which would uh increase the desire for sanctions relief and international cooperation i think all three of those conditions are goals worth working toward but progress this year will probably be limited and uneven in the meantime what i'd like to stress

is that washington seoul and tokyo are capable of managing the north korean threat by increasing security cooperation for deterrence reinvigorating international sanctions while granting exemptions for aid and expanding multilateral pressure on both pyongyang and beijing you know the pandemic has shown a light on geopolitical rivalries domestic political divisions and frankly dysfunctional governance around the world the world has bigger concerns than north korea right now and pyongyang likes to pretend that it

can do without the world but i think we shouldn't give up hope that the kim regime will finally accept international offers of humanitarian assistance there should be more multilateral planning to help the north korean people with food medicine vaccines and essential supplies delivered in creative ways that can overcome virus transmission concerns and many political obstacles okay you touched up on many important questions uh so let me ask two questions the first one is at the later part of your remark you

touched upon the some multilateral humanitarian assistance but so far north korea rejects any you know vaccine support or so so what will be the reason for that probably uh they are afraid of the inflow of the virus uh purely the medical reasons but also probably all the reasons so i want to hear your perspective on that and second one you touched upon trilateral thing so there is a general trend that east asia is bifurcated between two camps so there will be another trilateral between north korea china and

russia and kim jong last year uh probably in august he himself defined the current international situation as a new cold war so it's very interesting that kim jong-un wants to have a normal country not in the sense of the shape of his country but also in his perception of international situations so he tried to put forth some more views on international situations at the general so if you have any uh you know ideas about how kim jong-un perceives the current regional situation rather than the peninsula situation it

will be very important question uh point to discuss about thank you very much and next uh mr review please uh as i suggested earlier what we've seen thus far from pyongyang's very limited revelations about the uh the party plummen plenum tells us very little and possibly nothing about the regime's game plan vis-a-vis its external strategy and its nuclear program in my view we would be foolish to think that the regime intends to focus solely on economic and food related matters and also foolish to think that it doesn't

have a very well calibrated plan for dealing with the united states the rok and china uh north korea is now a de facto nuclear weapons power and it has as my colleague just suggested it has every intention of remaining as one we should expect the regime to take steps to strengthen its nuclear arsenal as well as its missile related capabilities and indeed as it's already been suggested the missile test that we just saw is evidence that the regime has every intention of doing just that this is now business as usual for north korea

but the regime also knows that renewed nuclear weapons and or long-range ballistic missile testing would almost certainly recreate the crisis that we saw back in 2017 it would anger and alienate the chinese and it would also cause the united states to adopt harsh measures in response uh the good news i think is that this understanding may make the pyongyang regime more cautious than it has been in the past but the bad news is that north korea has often over the years defied what we perceive to be in its best interests

and it has acted in dangerous and provocative ways often just because it can north korea has achieved remarkable success in ensuring that the republic of korea continues to pursue a concessionary policy towards the dprk almost regardless of the north korean regime's behavior and certainly regardless of north korea's often contemptuous treatment of south korea so we should expect pyongyang to as it as often done over the years to find a way to to cast a vote uh in the upcoming south korean presidential election

uh in order to try to ensure a progressive victory and the continuation of this concessionary policy by seoul meanwhile north korea's difficult economic and food situation requires the regime to find ways to alleviate the pressure of international sanctions secure adequate food and energy supplies and ensure stable economic growth and of course good relations with china are important to these goals so we should expect the regime to continue its efforts to stabilize and further improve ties with beijing

but quite frankly we shouldn't rule out the possibility that pyongyang will also reach out to the united states to explore whether washington is amenable to a dialogue on sanctions easing but don't expect that the north korean regime will be willing to do this year what it was not prepared to do at the hanoi summit and that is commit to serious irreversible denuclearization steps in return for sanctions easing north korea remains convinced in my view that it can have nuclear weapons long-range ballistic missiles and obtain

sanctions relief and finally the north korean regime is counting on south korea to help it achieve a number of goals by making the case to washington for preemptive sanctions easing steps by the united states and pyongyang also hopes that a sympathetic government in seoul will continue to urge the united states to downsize or end joint exercises and military exercises and accept an end-of-war declaration that pyongyang in my view would ultimately use as a pretext to demand the end of the us military

presence and they are okay let me stop there thank you very much very accurate account of what north korea is thinking and will do this year in south korea there are many analysts and also public uh curious about the u.s response to korean affairs especially we have midterm elections in the united states so the factor of midterm election uh will it uh make the baidu administration more focused on domestic issues rather than north korea making north korean issue fall down in priority and also there is some prospect we don't know yet

but if uh the current administration loses you know their seats in both congresses then probably from next year it's too only but they will focus much more on foreign issues because they cannot do much with the great opposition from the congress so uh will there be more chance for uh you know american government focus more on north korea after the meeting election it's a very wild guess but we anyway want to know the effect of midterm election thank you uh now let me turn to dr song please thank you

um let me start uh by slightly touching on the recent launch of hypersonic missile of north korea what north korea claimed at this time is this test successfully showed a high technology such as irregular maneuvering of the missile and the ability to avoid radar detection if that is true north koreans are joining a small number of countries such as the united states and russia and china that has successfully developed hypersonic missiles so this launch should be taken very seriously in terms of the future

possibility of our denuclearis denuclearization talk to us with north korea what is more there is pretty long list of uh strategic weapons development plan in north korea this plan was announced at the par ace party congress january last year a year ago if you look at the detail of this plan the plan includes not only a hypersonic missiles development but also much more than that for example even nuclear submarine or even spy satellites so north korea is expected to continue to develop its military

capability without relying on external powers furthermore there is five-year national defense technology and weapon system development plan in north korea this is also announced at the eighth party congress a year ago this plan uh aims at building and developing a variety of ecosystem to to efficiently operate its current nuclear capability therefore north korea is expected to put focus on further developing its military capability along with its uh self-rehabilitation strategy on economic side which was already declared in 2009

rather than considering the resumption of nuclear dialogue so my conclusion is that the resumption of nuclear talks is unlikely to happen at least for the time being uh although north korea claimed the triumph of their beyonce policy in in april 2018 after they declared the completion of nuclear force as a result of the launch of hassan 15.

actually they continue to develop their nuclear capability based on what they call diversification and miniaturization strategy of the nuclear arsenal and this year once again it was proven that north korea's top priority is still domestic stability and power consolidation of kim german so unless pyongyang reaches a conclusion that the resumption of talks with the united states or south korea will be helpful or will be effective means in accomplishing such a strategic goal power consolidation of kim jong-un were

strengthening domestic stability north korea seems not willing to come back to the negotiation table anytime soon as my colleague said uh another possibility the future uncertainty coming from the result of south korea's presidential election in march and u.s midterm election in november these factors also led north korea to to maintain latency position and the spread of omicron variant and the continued blockade caused by the kobit 19 keeps preventing north korea from from resuming interactions

with outside words though all in all i'm really pessimistic about the possibility of the resumption of nuclear talks thank you a very important point so the test firing of this series of strategic weapons is it a part of the negotiation tactic or is it a part of a more long-term military buildup roadmap especially in terms of as i said the the coming of new cold war situation in kim jong's mind so kim jong is only uh 38 this year so he is planning probably 40 years planned for his rulership so he's planning to have a very militarily

strong and economic uh economically prosperous country uh in his mind so how we can evaluate his his ways of you know uh test-firing these new strange weapons is it uh probably they have dual function for negotiation also the military building up for the longer future so can you add something about this uh military aspect of integral relations and also we have to strengthen our military deterrence posture which also affects the kim jong-un's perception that south korea is becoming very much aggressive

applying the so-called to standards from the united states and south korea so how can we overcome that well it's a big subject but let me hear some well rather you know concise answers from all three uh panelists first purpose easily please thank you you asked about why north korea rejects humanitarian assistance and i think there's at least three reasons uh why we observe this the first is their virus transmission concerns because north korea has such a inadequate health uh infrastructure uh their

response to such a threatening infectious disease as a novel coronavirus is to maintain severe isolation so they don't want to open the door a crack and and let the virus in at this point i think that's reason number one reason number two is that they don't appear to be convinced that uh the vaccines would get them out of uh the pandemic and uh and they're also concerned about the safety or efficacy of vaccines the number of vaccines that have been offered to them is insufficient for a fast and rapid

massive vaccine campaign in the country so i think that they want a lot of uh effective safe vaccines at the same time so that they can vaccinate their population very quickly and of course it's difficult to do that uh if if the world doesn't have uh sufficient shipments to send them as we're all uh going after booster shots and so on and as north korea doesn't have the cold chain uh infrastructure to uh transport the uh the mrna vaccines uh inside the country so those are things that can be addressed but as of now i think it makes

the north koreans hesitant to accept humanitarian assistance because vaccines are probably the first humanitarian assistance they really need and a third reason i think has to do with uh regime legitimacy they as my colleagues have said are are very uh fixated on uh avoiding uh signs of internal or external uh weakness and uh ultimately i think they they may be willing to manage some trade-offs of external assistance and regime legitimacy but the priority now it seems is to crack down and increase control

first the second question you ask me is about trilateral cooperation and i think that you know we see korea-japan relations strained uh by how two democracies are dealing with uh history issues much much older than the cold war but i'm optimistic uh that these two us allies will be able to make progress uh this year with uh with new leadership uh in both capitals and um in the meantime you know if you you asked about north korea's perspective on on the regional situation and uh trilateral cooperation

i think north korea's approach is rather than pay for benefits in uh in an exchange in negotiations north korea wants free concessions by exploiting divisions among its neighbors and north korea has a very impressive track record of implementing that sort of strategy so perhaps north korea wants to exploit a new cold war but i don't think what we're observing uh in in northeast asia or in the world for that matter is is really a new cold war i think we're not in a a new bipolar order there is an international order and it

is under tremendous stress and the question is whether states will rally to defend and upgrade the order including by dealing with challenges amending from beijing and i think that's a primary question for trilateral cooperation among washington seoul and tokyo and it's one that pyongyang is hoping that the united states and its allies will have a lot of difficulty uh pursuing because the north korean regime wants to exploit the divisions for its benefit thank you very much uh mr beer please uh you posed a very good question about

u.s politics and where things may be headed uh at this moment in time uh america is very much fixated uh on what is largely a domestic agenda uh driven by the pandemic driven by the uh the shocking events of january 6th of last year and the effect that that has had on political stability and the political fortunes of of the united states uh and i expect the united states to be very much uh focused on on those things continually throughout the rest of the year through the midterm elections uh to the extent that foreign affairs

uh becomes a hot topic if you will during and after the midterm elections uh the the number one issue is likely to be u.s china relations and the the perceived threat from china uh secondarily perhaps russia will be a uh a concern uh not the least of which is because the the russians obviously had been uh making some efforts to interfere in american politics in recent years uh but i i just don't see uh the north korea issue rising to the top of the heap in the context of our midterm election or even thereafter

unless and this is an important caveat unless once again north korea returns to an old game plan of using provocation using nuclear and or ballistic missile tests again and if that's the case then you'll see the the north korea issue once again rise to the top of the heap but at least at this point uh if you're looking for foreign policy and its connection to the uh the midterm election uh look to issues like china and russia uh which i think will be a lot more likely than north korea at this point

the uh the united states as i suggested earlier the administration is is largely in a passive mode with respect to the north korea issue some people have described it as strategic patience 2.0 uh it's probably not an unfair characterization but for now it's china russia and uh and internal developments that i think are going to be driving the political conversation in the united states in the run-up to and through the midterm election yes that's very helpful lastly oh i think first of all we need to remember

that the fact that uh in the presidential election in march whoever elected he is going to be the third south korean counterpart of kim jong-un one of the most stressful factors in north korea in designing and implementing any kind of agreement with external powers is the power change in democratic country so what kim jong-un has in mind is he will need a long-term plan regardless of power change in south korea and the united states so i think there was a dual purpose of the recent development of strategic

assets and strategic weapons negotiation tactics and their long-term plan, but I think the second one is going to be strengthened in Kim Jong-un's calculation. That is why, for the time being, North Korea wanted to further develop strategic weapons based on their own five-year military buildup plan and strategy. How can we overcome or prevent that kind of strategy? I have no definite answer, but what I can say is that, as we remember in the Singapore Declaration, we have three key elements of that. First one is establishing a

US-DPRK new relationship and a lasting peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and the full, deep, complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We have been much talking about the technically defined denuclearization process of the Korean Peninsula, and roadmaps, verification, declaration, and full denuclearization, something like that. But we did not talk about, not much talk about, the first and second ones: the US-DPRK normalization of relations and the lasting and durable peace regime.

So what North Korea wants is, let's build up military capability in preparation for the future where the relevant parties can gather together and discuss how to assure North Korea's security. That kind of military capability is going to be the leverage and assets in preparation for the future negotiation. Also, the next president is going to need to consider seriously the role of China, as long as China is going to be ready to spoil the Korean Peninsula peace process, unlike China's constructive role in the

Six-Party Talks as an honest broker from 2003 to 2008. The real progress of the Korean Peninsula peace process is not easy. So the task of the next president in dealing with North Korea's nuclear problem is, I think, how to hammer out China's constructive role in pushing forward the Korean Peninsula peace process. Well, thank you very much. The purpose of the song's last remarks also leads us to the last question. We are running off time, so let me ask you, what should we do or

should we not do in terms of ROK-US alliance or thinking of US-China rivalry? So please give me the last, relatively short remarks without follow-up questions from me. So let me turn to Mr. Revere first this time. Thank you very much. A very timely question. Increased US-China tensions, greater strategic rivalry between the United States and China, and intense great power competition, I think, are likely to characterize the East Asia region for a long time to come. We are witnessing the birth of what some

have called a new Cold War with important new characteristics, including the fact that the two contending powers, the United States and the PRC, are not only ideological rivals but are also economically interdependent. The United States is currently embarked on an effort to build a coalition of the willing to push back against the PRC's aggressive approach in the region, to deal with Beijing's attempts to intimidate its neighbors, to try to contend with the PRC's efforts to dominate key technologies, and

also to respond to China's desire to become the dominant actor in the region and beyond. There is also deep concern about China's internal situation, including its terrible human rights abuses, its suppression of basic freedoms, and its disturbing treatment of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet. Japan, Australia, the UK, India, and other major international actors are aligning themselves with the United States in this effort to deal with China's behavior. I think others are going to follow. As for Pyongyang's relations with

China, North Korea took steps to, as I called it at the time, took steps to renormalize ties with China in 2018-2019 after the serious downturn in relations witnessed between the two in 2017. Pyongyang is, of course, deeply dependent on China and on Beijing's willingness to look the other way instead of enforcing international sanctions. This seems unlikely to change in the coming months. The PRC has also come to accept, albeit reluctantly, the fact that the DPRK is now a de facto nuclear state, and Beijing, of course, shares Pyongyang's

goal of trying to undermine the ROK-US alliance and remove US forces from the peninsula. The growing US-China rivalry has placed the ROK in a very difficult position. Seoul believes that it can balance the strong security relationship with the United States and a robust economic relationship with China. It's not clear to me, quite frankly, that this is going to be possible, especially if US-China ties take a turn for the worse. There are already voices in the United States calling for the ROK to make clear

where it stands. The next ROK government will need to make a decision about Korea's future, keeping in mind the vital importance of its alliance with the United States and the role of that alliance in preserving South Korea's independence, also including the need to find a way to try to co-exist with the PRC, and of course, the knowledge that at the end of the day, the PRC is allied with North Korea, whose goal remains the reunification of the Korean nation under its rule. As the next ROK government tries to make its decision of what

to do, I remain hopeful that the Republic of Korea will make the right choice. So let me just stop there. Thank you very much. Next, Dr. Song, please. I'm sorry, let me try to be quick. I'm going to just touch on the North Korea's calculation and China's strategic consideration on US-China rivalry in the North Korea problem on the Korean Peninsula. If you look at the recent exchange of messages between President Xi Jinping and Chairman Kim Jong-un, the messages contain, I think, three common elements. First one

is traditional bloodlines between the two countries, and second one is friendship and reciprocity from their father's generation. Those are traditional ways of describing the relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing. But the third one is emphasizing the changing political environment. The changing political environment, specifically emphasized by Pyongyang, means no other than US-China's strategic competition. Actually, from the beginning, North Korea observantly defined the US-China relations as a new Cold

War and consistently emphasized the confrontational nature of the mutual competition between the two superpowers. In doing so, North Korea makes an attempt to utilize the development of US-China rivalry for its own survival under the prolonged economic sanctions. We need to remember that such a diplomatic maneuver of North Korea between the two rival superpowers was pretty much a familiar behavior in North Korea's diplomacy. That is, Kim Jong-un's father has done, and that is Kim Jong-un's grandfather, Kim Il-sung, has done between the two

superpowers. If you look at China's side of things, the strategic calculation of China that regards North Korea as a buffer zone and regards the relations with North Korea as lips-and-teeth relations seems to be strengthened in the future. And China's old perception which regards the countries joining the Korean War as a proud determination to resist the United States' aggression and by aiding North Korea, what we call 'Hangyi Wanjoo', this notion seems to be revived in the wake of the

escalated tension between the United States and China. China wants to maintain its economic leverage, not to give up the country's political influence on North Korea, and to use the geo-strategic position of North Korea as a buffer zone against the US. So the denuclearization negotiation process is captured by this kind of geopolitical situation. It's going to be very difficult to find a breakthrough. Last but not least, the next president of South Korea, he's also expected to face very tough

conditions with regards to how to jump-start dialogue with North Korea. Whoever is elected, he will face two very tough conditions: one in Washington and the other in Pyongyang. In Washington, he will face very widespread fatigue in dealing with North Korea, and in Pyongyang, he will face distrust toward his government. So I would like to argue that both Seoul and Washington governments are required to raise the priority of the North Korean issue to prevent Pyongyang from returning to the diplomatic stage around the Korean

Peninsula with a renewed threat and another round of crisis. That kind of approach should be a priority for both governments here in Seoul and Washington. Thank you very much. Lastly, Professor, please. I want to thank my colleagues for their sobering insights, but I also want to wish success for President Moon's eleventh-hour efforts at engagement. I think it's a good strategy to try to institutionalize inter-Korean relations, to provide guardrails against conflict, and to develop incentives for sustainable cooperation. It's desirable

also to have continuity in ROK policy from administration to administration. The Moon government has been consistent about dialogue over its years in office, an attempt to build trust with North Korea. The reason this hasn't worked is because of policy choices in Pyongyang. US-China rivalry isn't the main obstacle to denuclearization talks, an end-of-war declaration, or even diplomacy on the sidelines of the Beijing Olympics. The main obstacle is the Kim regime practicing its own version of strategic patience toward Washington

and its own hostile policy towards Seoul, and that's why South Korea is investing more in its own security. The next government can be expected to continue many of the Moon administration's capability upgrades, and Seoul shouldn't give in to Chinese pressure, whether in the form of economic coercion against deployments like THAAD, attempts to shift blame onto the US-ROK alliance's defensive exercises, or maritime and airspace security challenges caused by China's fishermen and military expansion beyond the peninsula.

South Korea has a major stake in the international order for its economic security. So I expect the next administration will uphold that order out of national interest and international responsibility, even if Seoul's contributions to global public goods, support of the US-ROK alliance, and defense of international norms upsets Beijing. So, in conclusion, Seoul should not allow US-China rivalry to be an excuse. It should not be an excuse for South Korea's policy toward the North not working. It should not be a reason

for the ROK to hold back in contributing to global public goods, and it certainly should not prevent South Korea from defending its own national interests and sovereignty. Paul, thank you very much. I think we covered many issues at the very first week of this year. There are so many uncertainties. I think we need to get together again, and Global NK will probably invite you again. And especially, I thank Mr. Revere; it's very late at night, so it must be difficult in your time zone. So I think we did a lot in terms of

evaluation, prediction, and also prescription. So thank you very much, and I'll see you again. So let me close the session. Thank you very much. Thank you. Wonderful. Thank you very much. Thank you.