[EAI-KAIS] 北 웨비나 시리즈 - Backsliding, Stephan Haggard

YouTube 링크 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rJJKlV-JFUQ

东亚研究员（EAI）赞助了韩国国际政治学会于6月18日公开的“北方网络研讨会系列 - Backsliding, Stephan Haggard”。本网络研讨会系列旨在介绍政治学及相关社会科学领域的最新著作并进行深入讨论，旨在提高对国内外主要著作的关注度，并提供交流各种问题和意见的机会。本次图书网络研讨会介绍了Stephan Haggard的著作《Backsliding》。金南奎（高丽大学）、南润民（公州大学）、赵元彬（成均馆大学）教授参与了讨论，郑周妍（高丽大学）教授主持了会议。

项目

图书网络研讨会

负责人

徐贞惠，东亚研究员（EAI）研究员

视频脚本

hello everyone uh welcome to the book webinar series on distinguished books in political science the book webinar is a new project organized by the korean association of international studies this year we have just successfully completed the very first book seminar last month and today we have the second seminar of the series sponsored by east asia institute by the way i am chongjin at korea university the moderator of today's webinar let me introduce today's participants to the audience uh first of all i'm excited

that we have professor stephen haggart as the presenter today i don't think that we need a long introduction for him since korean scholars are very familiar with his works but to briefly introduce him to the audience professor haggard is the lawrence and sally cross professor of korea pacific studies and the director of the korea pacific program at the school of global policy and strategy at uc san diego as we well know already he has extensively researched and written on north korea transitions to

and from democracy and east asian economic development today he'll be presenting his most recent book titled backsliding this book published in 2021 by cambridge university press we also have invited three specialists on democracy and authoritarian regimes as discussions first of all professor juan bin at san giungren university professor kim namgyu at korea university and professor nam new min at kungju national university um just to explain you how we will proceed today first ask professor heger to present on

his book for about 20 to 30 minutes and then ask each of the discussions to make comments for about 10 minutes each and then get back to professor haggart for his answers and then if there is any remaining time i will have further discussion hopefully uh including uh korea as well now without further ado let us welcome today's presenter professor hagen thanks very much julian for for hosting this i really it's uh it's great to see so many old friends and some unexpected ones as well uh chanchezong i didn't know that

he was going to be joining us as well and i'm very happy for the involvement of the east asia institute um if you'll permit me i'm going to share my um my screen and i hope people can see this and is everyone seeing that yes okay great so um let me just give a little background on this project um i started a project with robert kaufman my colleague at rutgers we've written three books together and edited another one on on the concept of transition on the concept of transitions to and from democratic rule

that came out as dictators and democrats in 2016 and this was looking at the effect of theories of inequality and regime change particularly theories advanced by assam ugly robinson and bosch and we were interested in in looking at those but then in the course of doing that book we started to look at cases um uh that that were outside of the developing world that were outside of transitions to outright uh authoritarianism including most notably the united states and we wrote this piece in perspectives on politics called

democratic decline in the united states what we what we can learn from middle-income countries and it was that a project which ultimately got us into uh this short book for cambridge and the elements series on backsliding so um backsliding and we we started a conversation on this it has a very particular meaning this is not any transition to authoritarian rule and it's not an authoritarian country becoming more authoritarian um it's it's a type of democratic regress and that involves the incremental

erosion of democratic institutions rules and norms but undertaken by a government which is itself duly and fairly elected so this is this is an important point you know this is not a theory about about what happens in in regimes that are already authoritarian and it's not about coups which dominated transitions to authoritarian rule in the post-war period it's about a process which we call purposeful institutional change in which elected incumbents are seeking uh to weaken a democratic rule and particularly the

three core components of it that we define as the existence of horizontal checks that is the classic conception of of checks and balances of government what we call the separation of powers political rights and civil liberties including media freedom which is quite quite consequential as we'll see and then ultimately the integrity of the electoral system the idea that elections can be counted on by publics to be free and fair and i want to emphasize an important point because i think it's an

open question and that is that backsliding may or may not result in reversion to outright authoritarian rule in other words you can have an incremental erosion in the quality of democracy without a country necessarily becoming authoritarian which we can define in terms of the chances our likelihood of opposition seizing powers basically dropping to zero so um on on the process the way we proceeded was was really empirical in large part we wanted to first identify cases that fit this concept empirically

and so we selected on the outcome variable and and we can talk about the method here in more detail we looked at the period from 1974 to 2017 and we basically set a threshold of crossing a certain standard using vdem the the vdem electoral democracy index and the idea of having eight years above this threshold was we wanted to capture democracies that had consolidated to some extent so we weren't just interested in in countries that had been democratic for a very short time but those would cross some threshold for some

meaningful period of time and then backsliding is defined as an episode during which liberal democracy scores which capture some of these core features of democracy that i talked about fell significantly below their peak so so we're trying to capture a phenomena where a country has achieved a certain level of democracy it may be a democracy over a very long period like the united states or more recently like poland and then it experiences a drop and then we also tried to triangulate that with some

other um indicators some other data sets to make sure that our choices weren't idiosyncratic and the cases that emerged were somewhat surprising to us i mean they're very heterogeneous group of countries um some in in the andes bolivia ecuador venezuela of course is very well known as a kind of pioneer of backsliding hungary poland are also well-known turkey is a classic case that everyone knows but there were some less well-known cases as well such as the dominican republic um serbia ukraine and also of course more

recently sadly brazil has joined that list particularly under a bolsonaro so the method that we undertook was in part to undertake a comparative analysis of these cases against regional benchmarks so we were interested in looking at causal factors that might differentiate them from countries in their region and so for example we would consider indicators such as polarization you know this is these are measures i'm just showing these measures of polarization in brazil and ask questions is this country more polarized than its

regional comparators but most of the work in the book was done by what we call within case causal inference uh of a postulated causal sequence in which we did extensive case studies of each of these 16 and those case studies by the way are posted online in an appendix to the book which runs to several a hundred pages and actually a former student of mine in buckwheat who is currently at the kdi school played a big role in in helping us with this and and that um that um appendix both provides some of the

quantitative data that we use to identify these episodes so for example these are our 16 cases and showing exactly when they they recede including in the united states many of these as you can see are quite recent and then this is an example of the type of case material which we provide to validate our judgments about some of the underlying causes of of this backsliding process so basically we have in the book what i call a causal mechanism figure i'm a big fan of these anyone who's not doing a formal game theoretic model um

should probably consider in their books and articles to to um give this kind of uh provide this kind of causal mechanism figure but our basic intuitions uh were to focus on three uh underlying causal factors one was the existence of political polarization which we saw as a quite significant feature of all of these backsliding episodes but probably the and this is this is widely noted in the literature on backsliding i think this idea of polarization but probably one of our contributions to an understanding of backsliding is our

focus on the role that's played by legislatures because executives whether in parliamentary systems or presidents obviously inherit a lot of powers on coming to office there's lots that they can do by themselves often invoking or using or pushing the envelope of powers which they have as chief executives but it's often the legislature which is quite crucial to delegating powers to the executive or simply faltering on their exercise of oversight powers and so the executive um isn't doing this alone but is typically

doing this with support of legislative coalitions and we take that up in chapter three and then in chapter four we talk about the incremental nature of the process which is i'll explain also we think has causal effect so let me just go through each of these quickly um so on polarization one point i want to make clear is that bob and i are agnostic on the ultimate sources of polarization because if you look at this list of countries one of the things that's striking is that some backsliding cases backslide

from the left so to speak for example of venezuela and nicaragua the latin american case is actually ecuador and bolivia as well and um and other cases outside latin america like greece and arguably the united states were clearly affected by socio-economic inequalities so polarization having this kind of economic foundation but then a number of countries polarized from the right around ethnic racial religious or tribal commitments and of course we have this broader phenomena of cultural resentments that we see

both in the united states and in a number of the post-communist cases where the main axis of polarization is in part between uh cosmopolitan and nationalist ideologies but for our purposes the these sources of polarization are less significant than what happens to the polity both to elites and publics in polarization which is this creation or this emergence this process by which uh political adversaries opponents come to see each other in these us them binaries in which poland polarization actually becomes an issue

of affect or even identity and those of you who have have followed the work on effective polarization in the united states know that in the united states right now you know if you're a democrat republicans are just treated as a kind of other and vice versa and and this kind of effective polarization kicks in which has a number of adverse effects we think for democratic rule so three effects of polarization in particular uh attracted our attention first it can contribute directly to government dysfunction

um polarized parties polarized polities find it difficult to act collectively because it's difficult to reach agreement which in turn undermines faith in political institutions more broadly and so there's a reservoir of distrust of institutions that comes from polarization by definition polarization weakens the center and incentivizes anti-system and populist appeals that demonize oppositions and and what we see in most of these backsliding cases is a resurgence of what we call majoritarian or for those of you who are political

theorists might know as republican conceptions of democracy and these are conceptions of democracy which place much less emphasis on rights and checks and much more emphasis on the right of majorities to rule and what we argue is that in these kind of polarized settings these factors kind of combine to incentivize acquiescence to bad elite behavior they they incentivize acquiescence to bad elite behavior and what i mean by that is captured in this very nice formal model by milan's folic in which he points out that if you

believe that your political adversary is really an enemy who is going to be destructive of the polity then you will support the actions of your guy whatever those might be to prevent that from happening and that kind of effect of polarization of generating support for anti-democratic actions is really in some ways the starting point of the backsliding process the fact that you would be willing to tolerate this kind of behavior because you believe that the alternatives are so much worse now the point about legislatures i think

can be stated very simply there's an irony here because um of course autocratic control of legislatures can weaken the very power of the legislature and and so there's a kind of irony that that legislatures would be complicit in this process but in the chapters that deal with the legislature we show how legislative coalitions are quite crucial to the backsliding process and we talk about how the autocrats come to control legislatures in venezuela bolivia and ecuador they autocrats just simply formed parallel constitutive assemblies

in some cases the the electoral process there's a kind of collective failure of oppositions to check an autocrat i you know in an odd way the israeli case is very interesting here i mean you know netanyahu has benefited from the fact that it's been very difficult for oppositions to form against him and you see the tremendous coordination difficulties of challenging the potential autocrat i mean there's an eight-party coalition now which is finally formed in israel to get rid of netanyahu but but it's a very fragile coalition so

it's difficult to stop these movements um and then we find that disproportionality actually is quite significant that many of these systems it's not that the the autocrats enjoy uh majority or super majority support but they benefit from disproportional electoral systems which both the united states and korea have by the way and as you know in the united states it's the uh electoral college which which allowed president trump to be elected the popular vote went uh against him by a quite significant

margin in 20 um in 2016. so um what do legislatures do well first of all um they they uh give up on oversight they abandon their oversight function they support appointments to the judiciary and the executive branch which basically ensconce the cronies of the autocrat so the appointment function is quite important and then we also find that they can delegate powers outright to the executive um and and we see in in places like turkey where constitutional amendments result in a in a parliamentary system

actually being um transformed into a presidential system and erdogan's power is being quite significantly increased as a result of constitutional amendments and obviously a common feature of these backsliding cases is the relaxation of term limits this comes up in a number of these cases so not only do autocrats have more power but they're granted the authority to exercise that power over much longer time horizons and at the extreme we have people like chavis who is in power for a dozen years putin and erdogan going on

20 years now so legislatures play a role in delegating those powers and extending presidential term now the last stage in this process which we found interesting and i think there's a lot of potential here for experimental and other types of work to to push this along is the fact that that backsliding occurs incrementally this is not like a coup it's not as if all at once the political system is fundamentally transformed you don't have a general standing in front of a bank of microphones announcing you know a change in

government for example has happened in thailand uh this is this is democratic regress by stealth as adam schwarzki put it and and what we argue in the book is that this incremental nature of backsliding itself has causal effect it has causal effect because first the components of democratic rule are mutually constitutive so if i attack and can control the courts for example if i can weaken the independence of the courts then one of the effects of that is i can use the courts to go after my political

opponents and reduce their civil liberties i can enter i can attack the integrity of the electoral system so so these core components of democracy are mutually constitutive and if i i'm capable of undermining them incrementally then undermining one component of the system result can result in the undermining of the next component of the system and i think there's still a lot of work to be done on these this particular feature of of backsliding the way in which the component pieces of backsliding are interrelated

how an attack on civil liberties or on the media affects the um the separation of powers how that in turn affects uh civil liberties and the integrity of the electoral system but there's also um we think an interesting social psychology of incrementalism and this is the area where i think it'd really be interesting to see some experimental research which is that um uh the actions of the autocrat become normalized and i know that anyone who lives and has lived in the united states or in putin's russia will know what i'm

talking about masha giesen talks about this and her fantastic work on on the putin system that that that you get used to this process and you can't tell whether it's going on or not because disinformation is rampant and so publics are disoriented it's difficult to know you know is this really happening i mean this was a debate again referring to the united states which we see in many of these backsliding cases is this going on um hungary again as an example and even the european union was unclear

at what point do we say that orban is really dismantling hungarian democracy well it took a long time to figure that out and by the time it was figured out he had moved the the the needle he had moved the center of gravity in that system in a more authoritarian direction but we were really struck you know in how long it often took these backsliding processes to unfold you know you think of venezuela for example as being a country in which you know chavez comes in and you know the the the political system is

fundamentally changed but even in a case like venezuela it's not true this is a country these are just indicators of you know the repression of civil society groups the integrity of the of the electoral monitoring uh system the high court independence the independence of the media these are things that were declined in venezuela over two decades you know this didn't happen all at once and so there's something about incrementalism which we think is um you know is really worth uh considering uh let me just conclude by by raising a

few issues for further debate and research and the first thing i want to say is you know this is a short book and we by no means have solved this problem and this is a very complicated issue and and i'm sure there are other causal factors that might come into play but but let me let me just um uh close by three uh you know by by raising three questions that we might uh you know might have a discussion about the first is is whether um backsliding is stable so to speak or does it necessarily not only erode democracy but

lead to outright uh autocratic rule and here you know the the news is kind of mixed because one thing that's really quite interesting here is if we look at if we divide the cases the 16 cases we look at into those that began as liberal democracies and those that began as uh electoral democracies that is that that had a somewhat lower standard of democracy you know these are countries in which you had some electoral freedom some checks and balances but there weren't what we would call consolidated liberal democracies

it's interesting that that among this group at the time we wrote the book none of the consolidated liberal democracies reverted to authoritarian rule now i think that question that might be challenged now by poland i mean i think i would now say that poland is probably an authoritarian regime but notice that most of the middle income countries that started this backsliding process ended up as being authoritarian regimes so there's a question here about can backsliding be stopped i mean what what are the risks to to the

advanced industrial states can you get rebounds are we seeing a rebound now in the united states where the backsliding process has stopped i would argue we are but that may be more difficult in countries that are are less consolidated the second area which is is something i'm i'm conducting research on now myself uh in other settings is this question of the international context and the role that external forces might play in the backsliding process so we now have two authoritarian great powers russia

and china and they are exercising influence in their neighborhoods and beyond them and there's a question about whether there's they provide external supports for regimes which are engaged in backsliding such as orban um in in hungary and the polish case uh and and so you know we also want to look at at international institutions whether whether authoritarian international institutions are playing a role in this backsliding process of protecting our regimes that are that are are sliding backwards

and and then we also have to ask about the role that that the the core countries in the system play if if democracy in europe uh the united states and japan korea is not seen as an attractive proposition then obviously it makes it more difficult for defenders of democracy elsewhere to uh to to support it in the face of challenge and then the final question of course and in some ways i think the most profound one is uh and again this is speaking as an american is just you know the the whole social

psychology of democracy and i think this is probably one of the most significant policy issues to come out of these backsliding episodes is is whether democracy can survive in what might be called a post-truth world can you have democracy in a setting in which the competing parties just can't even agree on basic sets of facts and what independent role might technology media and disinformation in particular play in the erosion of democracy i would say this last question is probably the one of the most

significant policy questions because obviously thinking about how to control social media um and and regulate social media uh plays very importantly into the question of of whether democracy itself will survive i'm going to stop sharing my screen but i just want to thank all of you for joining me here today those who are both sitting in the room now and who are watching online and i hope that if you have thoughts on any of these things you'll feel free to contact me i'm always interested in talking about these ideas

thank you thank you professor hegart for a presentation on such an important topic so now let us invite comments uh from our discussions and why don't we go by alphabetical order um so professor joe uh professor kim and then professor nam so first of all professor joe please okay really i really enjoy the book and then also you present it wonderfully and while i reading this book i really it is quite easy for me to follow up because i'd like to first mention my background and i'm studying democracy and typically

democracy in emerging democracies and the i'm more interested in african cases but i'm also interested in the political institution so those the components actually when i read this book you know even though you you categorize the democracy backsliding but most of the euro the you know the theoretical framework actually well fit for many african emerging democracy or young democracy right now except one that is the you know i'd like to start the my questions or comments on this book and first one is

no political polarizations i think that is a very you know fundamental the beginning of your books right and then many you know existing democracy and younger democracy right now facing those political civilizations and then you mentioned you just simply describe you know what is the origins of the political polarization and you mentioned and the socio-economic inequality will be one of the resources and then social structures as you mentioned the ethnicity or religious etc and when i read those foundations i also would like to

raise some questions how about the political institution more broadly how about the regime so we don't i mean maybe i'm not good at many australian regime but do you think any authoritarianism has a political colonization no i don't think so and you you mentioned at the last you know you raise also questions about the rules of the two authoritarian regimes like china also russia and so i'm what i'm asking you know whether this political polarization is because of democracy you know because democracy allowed you

know competitions and participations i said those are very key components of democracy because the regime allowed competitions and it means the political alert can mobilize their supporters so this political polarize and education is due because of the democracy so in an and also if that is the case then how about you know because i'm interested in the political institutions and you know about the government types so usually among those 16 cases majority of them are having a presidential system right usually those president system

unlike the united states many emerging democracy power of the president the degree of the power of the president is very strong so you know whether those the political polarization is more occurred under the presidential system or parliamentary system have you thought about those the issues so i think you know maybe you can you know elaborate you know existing your the socio-economic origins and cultural or the social structuralism but also as a in origin for the political polarization i would like you to think

关于政权本身，或者在民主体制内部，是否存在任何政府类型实际上也会加剧政治两极分化，这也是我的第一个问题。第二个问题是，我希望在您的理论框架中再次审视那些场景和序列。在研究许多非洲年轻民主国家时，这些场景和序列对我来说都非常熟悉，不像赞比亚那样，在非洲的16个案例中，

大陆，实际上许多国家在20世纪90年代中期经历了民主转型，这确实令人惊讶。当然，您可以看到非洲大陆的选举民主国家数量在28个或29个，所以实际上大多数撒哈拉以南的非洲国家都经历了民主转型，然后定期举行多党选举。然而，正如您所设想和描述的那样，很少有国家经历权力交接或权力

更迭。因此，那些在裙带资本主义下执政的精英和政党引入了多党选举，但他们已经拥有了自己的网络和资源。而且，正如您所知，由于这些年轻的民主国家通常反对党非常薄弱，执政党总是能够占据主导地位，即使在资源方面，他们也可以动员，他们可以建立联系，他们甚至可以使用官僚网络，并且拥有资源，他们可以轻易击败那些反对党，

他们可以轻易赢得议会中的多数席位。甚至正如您所知，赞比亚可能不成功，但乌干达却成功地改变了宪法，当他们引入多党选举时，他们设定了两次任期限制，但随着时间的推移，他们取消了对第一任总统的限制。因此，我很容易从许多非洲的选举民主国家中看到这些序列。

根据您的理论，非洲没有光明的前景。我知道这是真的，但即使您没有提到，您也提出了一个问题，即民主侵蚀是否应该稳定。但从我的角度来看，即使在非洲国家中，也有像加纳这样的国家，我认为我喜欢加纳，因为它经历了民主转型，并且至今已经进行了三次权力交接。

所以非洲仍然有一些好案例，我们仍然需要弄清楚是什么造就了这些好案例，而不是像您所说的那样。这是一个非常聪明和及时的警告，尤其对于年轻的民主国家而言，它们经历了转型，人们对此非常满意。但现在，正如您所说，那些政治精英或执政党实际上利用这种机制来巩固他们的权力，而不是巩固他们的民主。

所以我想在这种情况下，这是一个非常有见地的警告，对我这样研究非洲年轻民主国家的人来说。但我的第二个问题将与另一种政府类型有关。通过这种机制，在这16个案例中，许多都是总统制，但实行议会制。总统制实际上可能会导致分裂政府，这在总统制下是可能的。但正如您

所说，执政党实际上可以动员支持者，他们可以占据议会多数席位。但议会制在机制上，执政党更容易占据议会多数席位，因为行政政府依赖于立法机构多数支持。那么，您是否考虑过，对于实行议会制的年轻民主国家或民主国家来说，这种渐进式进程是否更容易？

因为这两种政府的制衡机制运作方式不同？还有，您最后提到，我完全同意您，因为您知道，现在中国，如果您看看，因为我研究非洲年轻民主国家，我看着非洲的报纸，中国政府真的在动员非洲人民，他们的制度比美国等国家更具消失性。所以现在，在那些边缘地区，

被称为非洲案例，中国政府实际上投入了大量资源，将他们的模式带给那些在经济上挣扎的发展中国家。我认为这对我来说是一个非常大的担忧，我们必须真正考虑许多边缘地区年轻民主国家的未来。我就说到这里，谢谢。您提出了很好的问题。是的，谢谢，谢谢。是的。您希望我一一简要回应，还是？嗯，我们先听听评论，然后

再回应，好吗？好的，这将是一个很长的列表，我会尽量简短。嗯，那么，金南奎教授，请。是的，好的。能听到我说话吗？好的，好的。谢谢您的演讲。非常享受您的演讲和您的书，说实话。我一直非常喜欢您最近关于民主转型、民主崩溃和这次的民主滑坡的书籍和文章。是的，我想先谈谈我喜欢这本书的哪些方面。我认为这是一本写得很好的书。每次阅读时，我都会发现

我发现自己提出的问题稍后就会得到解答。我还发现这本书与经典的民主崩溃研究以及最近的民主滑坡和政治两极分化研究都很好地关联。它还对民主滑坡提出了清晰且有说服力的解释。特别是，我同意滑坡的渐进性质对滑坡的加速具有显著的累积效应，并且我也同意控制

立法机构是滑坡过程中的关键一步。在方法论上，它使用了跨案例追踪方法、过程观察，并试图从前因条件到滑坡来识别干预性文化机制。为此，我们首先识别了，是的，所有完整的普遍滑坡案例，并检查了他人提出的文化机制是否确实存在于案例中。是的，这与其他定性研究抽样特定案例并侧重于

它们不同。鉴于因变量滑坡是一个罕见事件，我认为分析它是一个非常有用的策略。我还发现，这本书具有额外的 منهج优势。我认为这本书很好地说明了学者们如何将定量跨国数据用于案例研究。这本书的最后一个优势是，它不仅提供了滑坡案例的完整列表，还提供了附录中由有创意的统计数据支持的案例叙述。我认为附录是学者们

和对滑坡现象感兴趣的学生们非常有用的资源。在阅读完这本书后，我还有三四个问题。第一个问题是，我很好奇您如何看待民众抗议在阻止民主滑坡中的作用。在许多情况下，对领导人的制度性制约未能保护民主，即使是美国案例也表明了制度性制约的优势和劣势。我认为这与温加斯特的论点是一致的。是的，那是他著名的1997年文章，他强调，为了使民主和法治能够自我执行，公民应该协调他们的反应，反对领导人的反民主行为。只有当公民协调他们的反应时，他们才能阻止领导人侵犯他们的权利。话虽如此，我也理解高两极分化和滑坡的渐进性质使得公民之间的协调更加困难。尽管如此，我认为或我猜想动员可能是

保护民主免受滑坡领导人的侵害的最后手段。因此，我想问您如何看待群众抗议在阻止或减缓民主滑坡中的作用。此外，这与一个更普遍的问题有关。这本书试图调查民主滑坡的过程，因此它并不试图解释，什么可以阻止民主滑坡的发生，或者减缓或停止正在发生的滑坡过程。嗯，可能有一些因素可以阻止或停止滑坡，

所以如果您对这些潜在因素有任何想法，请与我们分享。我的第二个评论与乔治教授的评论有些相关。这本书简要地讨论了政治制度安排，如政府类型和选举制度的影响。我很好奇，是否某种类型的制度设置或安排更容易导致滑坡。例如，书中提到了政府类型对独裁者选举及其立法支持的潜在影响，但没有给予

充分考虑总统制可能如何影响政治两极分化的程度和行政扩张。我不是政府类型、总统制或议会制的专家，但我猜想，也许总统民主国家更容易出现政治两极分化或民粹主义的兴起以及行政权力的集中。当然，美国案例的特点是强大的制衡和权力分立，但许多总统民主国家都显示出赢者通吃的政治。权力分立

并不奏效。一些总统制允许制度上强大的总统。所以我认为这些因素有助于行政权力的集中。您知道，这种总统制更有可能允许政治局外人窃取政治权力。所以，也许存在总统制和民粹主义之间的一些联系，即使总统制和议会制都存在于滑坡案例中。我想知道，您如何看待总统制政权和滑坡之间的这种联系？

嗯，下一个是关于帝国问题。我想问您关于两极分化的衡量问题。实际上，我曾考虑过一个类似的项目，该项目考察了政治两极分化与滑坡之间的关系。对我来说，一个重要难题是，如何在国家层面实证衡量政治两极分化？您使用了《自由主义社会项目》的数据集。嗯，我很好奇，也许您考虑过其他在国家层面衡量两极分化的方法？

嗯，也许您考虑过使用个人层面的调查数据或政党层面的数据？我很好奇，您为什么选择使用费登兹的两极分化衡量标准？是的。再次感谢您的演讲，以及那些精彩的评论。我会对所有这些都发表看法。好的。谢谢金教授。然后，南教授，请。谢谢。谢谢您的演讲。首先，我非常喜欢读您的书，也非常喜欢您的演讲。是的，这本书很棒，我认为这本书

清晰地描绘了民主滑坡。我认为它将深入的理论解释与出色的案例研究相结合。但是，作为讨论者，我将提出几点评论和问题。我理解民主滑坡过程主要有三个阶段：首先，它始于两极分化；然后，民选政府控制立法机构；最后，他们摧毁民主制度和民主规范。我认为这在理论上非常清晰和简单，这三个阶段的滑坡使我容易理解复杂的因果过程。您对巴西、波兰和美国等几个滑坡国家进行了案例研究，以展示他们的政治和社会如何变得两极分化。但我想，每个滑坡案例在两极分化方面都有不同的故事。我认为在巴西，经济危机导致了两极分化；但在波兰，名为Pis的政党在

社会和政治两极分化方面发挥了重要作用；而在美国，两极分化的故事更为复杂，因为种族或文化冲突与经济困难或不平等相结合。因此，我知道民主滑坡的共同先决条件是两极分化，但我理解民主国家可能面临各种不同的两极分化风险。因此，我想问，两极分化的主要触发因素是什么？两极分化的共同自变量是什么？

两极分化？是的，我们预计，如果我们的民主国家经历两极分化，我们可以预期民主国家将准备崩溃。但我们很难预测一个国家何时会两极分化。而且，我也理解您的书认为，一旦发生两极分化，独裁者就会出现，他们会动员他们的追随者，妖魔化反对派，并最终一点一点地摧毁民主制度和规范，而没有任何公民社会的反抗。因此，我认为您的书中，民主滑坡主要由民选政府驱动。我理解民选政府是滑坡过程中的主要行为者，他们可以削弱对行政部门的横向制约，并最终废除选举制度。因此，虽然民主制度被民选政府所破坏，但公民社会在哪里？您的书中提到，您研究的案例中，公民社会在做什么，但对民主滑坡的反应，在您的论证和案例研究中并没有引起太大的关注。我不知道我的理解是否正确，但我认为这本书假设公民社会在两极分化之后已经软化或削弱，并且案例研究将公民社会视为被动的参与者，他们只是对民主滑坡保持沉默。但我认为公民社会可以在监督腐败、

总统选举、抗议威权政府和登记民主滑坡方面发挥重要作用。这本书还认为，社会心理机制在民主滑坡的最后一个阶段发挥作用，即渐进过程。因此，公众变得非理性，他们很容易被威权政府控制的宣传或社交媒体所欺骗，并且他们已经适应了新的非民主规范和威权规则。那么，这意味着公众选举或支持

滑坡者是因为他们对民主的支持减弱了，还是公众仍然保持对民主的支持，并试图抵抗民主滑坡？公众或抵抗力量是否在滑坡过程中受到威权政府的反对？我问这个问题是因为这本书说，威权政府是宣传大师，也是两极分化的大师，他们可以操纵公民的偏好和对民主的支持。

但是，是的，我知道社会心理机制在渐进的滑坡过程中起着关键作用。但我认为这是一个不同的问题。我认为这本书需要表明，公众的偏好确实被民选政府在民选政府期间所损害。但这本书只关注民选政府如何让公众对非民主制度和威权规范麻木不觉。即使威权政府

是威权领导人，他们也试图通过社交媒体或宣传来逐步操纵公民的偏好或对民主的支持。公众可能仍然对民主抱有潜在的热情。因此，如果他们的国家真的完全沦为威权政府，公众和人民可能会重新燃起对民主的热情，并开始抵制民主滑坡和威权政权。是的，虽然这本书展示了

总统选举、抗议威权政府和登记民主滑坡方面发挥重要作用。这本书还认为，社会心理机制在民主滑坡的最后一个阶段发挥作用，即渐进过程。因此，公众变得非理性，他们很容易被威权政府控制的宣传或社交媒体所欺骗，并且他们已经适应了新的非民主规范和威权规则。那么，这意味着公众选举或支持

滑坡的程度和两极分化的程度，但在国家层面。但公众及其对民主的偏好是否真的被民选政府所损害，这仍然值得怀疑。我认为这本书需要表明，公众不再喜欢民主价值观了，在个人层面。我认为这表明了社会心理机制是否真的有效。总而言之，这本书对民主的未来提出了一个黯淡的看法。

您担心像中国和俄罗斯这样的威权主义兴起的某种精神效应，您也提到了美国，它不再是世界上民主的传播者，尤其是在特朗普时代。我认为民主滑坡不仅是国内的活动，它也受到外部因素的加速。滑坡可以从国际背景来理解。这意味着，全球

滑坡现象似乎非常非常困难。但我希望并相信，民主，尤其是长期存在的民主，具有韧性，它们可以应对挑战，它们可以从危机中恢复，并最终再次繁荣。您和拜登政府，拜登就任总统，拜登政府有望恢复民主的自由精神，并展示民主失败和未知的全球共鸣。因此，我希望并期待您能对民主的未来提供更乐观的看法。

您认为是否有任何可能性或任何方法可以使滑坡国家反弹？这就是我的问题。好的，谢谢。这是一个艰难的听众，他们非常棒，非常棒的问题，而且问题太多了，我几乎不知道从何说起。我认为我可能会按相反的顺序来回答，并把一些问题归类在一起，因为云敏南最后的发言触及了整个公民社会的问题，并给了我一个机会来谈谈我们在做这个项目时遇到的一些问题。所以，你们几个人都提出了公民社会的作用问题。我认为云敏南建议，嗯，你们把公民社会描绘成被动的。我并不认为那是我们的意图，因为请记住，滑坡最显著的特征首先是它是一种需求驱动的现象。必须如此，因为因为它是

定义为一种公众投票支持承诺滑坡的政治候选人的情况。所以，从某种意义上说，公民社会从一开始就是讨论的一部分，因为你有愿意投票给承诺这种多数主义政治的政客的选民。所以，我认为，我认为这本书没有像它应该的那样清楚地说明的是，我们并没有试图解决两极分化是精英现象还是大众现象的问题。你知道，它显然是两者兼而有之。你知道，

so backsliding phenomenon but i hope and i believe so democracy is especially its long-standing democracies they have the resilience and they can't cope with challenges they can christ they can recover from the crisis and they finally thrive again and you and also the biden so by then took the office and the biden administration is expected to to return to the liberal spirit of democracy and to to demonstrate global resonance of democratic failure and and unknowns so i want and i expect more optimistic perspective on the future of

公众是分裂的，精英也是分裂的，精英分裂公众，公众分裂精英。而且我认为我们无法完全解决这个问题，尤其是在这本书中。但我不得不说，其中一些人，比如美国莫菲·阿瑞纳，声称两极分化完全是精英现象，我只是不认为那是正确的。你知道，美国的公众也分裂了，这涉及到您提出的另一个观点，他们对民主也分裂了。

他们对民主也分裂了，因为请记住，两极分化的概念意味着那些将独裁者视为威胁并试图反击的人。所以，公众并非普遍地被这个过程所愚弄。你知道，两极分化甚至延伸到关于滑坡是否正在发生的观点分歧。你知道，所以，所以我认为我们必须从一开始就将公民社会视为本身就是分裂和两极分化的，分为那些更容易接受独裁解决方案的人和

那些不太能接受独裁解决方案的人。那么问题就变成了，这两股争夺力量之间的平衡在不同的环境中如何发挥作用？公民社会能否像南奎教授所说的那样，重新崛起，作为对这种独裁行为的一种制约？所以，我不确定我是否很好地回答了您的问题，但我认为需要牢记的重要一点是，公民社会是异质的。

对这些独裁者，你知道，他们确实面临反对，并不是所有人都支持特朗普总统在美国，因为这个制度是两极分化的。这是其定义特征。有人强烈反对特朗普，就像有人强烈支持特朗普一样。现在，让我来谈谈一组非常有趣的问题，这些问题来自云敏的发言和南奎的发言，那就是民众抗议是否起制约作用。我认为这将是未来研究的一个重要领域，因为我真的不知道答案。一方面，你可以说，是的，民众抗议是反对独裁行为的最后手段。你知道，看看白俄罗斯的事态发展。如果你不能让人们走上街头，那么独裁者就会得胜。但，但，你知道，看到这些独裁者如何利用抗议作为借口来

收紧独裁控制，这很有意思。所以，我再次使用了很多美国例子，但我们可以复制它们。你知道，2020年夏季，特朗普政府关注的是BLM（黑人生命很重要）运动，并说，威胁就来自这里，来自社会，来自这些抗议者。因此，抗议的影响有些模糊。你知道，再举一个例子，普京的俄罗斯。你知道，抗议的存在是进行更严厉干预和镇压的借口。

那些不太能接受独裁解决方案的人。那么问题就变成了，这两股争夺力量之间的平衡在不同的环境中如何发挥作用？公民社会能否像南奎教授所说的那样，重新崛起，作为对这种独裁行为的一种制约？所以，我不确定我是否很好地回答了您的问题，但我认为需要牢记的重要一点是，公民社会是异质的。

这样我才能更好地看到您，但我能听到您。所以，请，朱利安，请您开始吧。是的，当然。嗯，那么，我们进行第二轮问答，好吗？首先，如果您有任何后续问题或评论，三位讨论者将首先有机会，然后我将收集听众的问题，然后让哈克教授回答您的问题。我可以提个程序建议吗？当然。如果我们没有回答您的问题，

因此，其中存在着模糊的动态，抗议是起制约作用，还是独裁者可以利用抗议来继续他们的步伐，试图限制政治领域？让我来谈谈另一个非常有趣的问题。我不想垄断，我真的很想有更多的讨论，但让我来谈谈另一个问题，那就是制度是否重要，在意义上

是否，嗯，总统制或议会制更容易发生滑坡。我发现这很有趣，因为尽管你们几个人提出了总统制可能更容易发生滑坡的问题，但你们实际上提出了相反的论点，因为当然，在威斯敏斯特式的体系中，行政和立法职能是融合的，这似乎更危险。而在总统制下，至少有立法机构可以起到制约作用。再次以美国为例，这很有趣，美国国会当然支持特朗普，共和党国会在2018年之前当然支持特朗普，但美国国会绝不会将更多权力转移给特朗普总统。他们非常警惕自己的特权，并相信国会权力的完整性。因此，他们在任命等问题上当然会服从，但你绝不会看到美国国会投票中止任期限制，或者将更多权力直接转移给行政部门。即使是共和党人也希望保留他们的特权。所以我对此持中立态度。我认为这是一个很好的未来研究课题，制度是否重要。但我只想指出，尽管我们没有进行

系统的经济计量学分析，但样本中肯定包含这两种类型的系统，因为波兰、匈牙利、乌克兰在不同时期，土耳其最初，这些最初都是议会制，或者总统职位是弱总统的系统。现在有趣的是，在土耳其的体制中，从议会制转变为总统制，但那里的滑坡现象始于议会制。而且我可以，我可以讲讲议会制也有制约作用的故事。即使在英国这样的威斯敏斯特体系中，政党内部的后座议员、司法机构的实力以及你可能认为会制约滑坡的规范，也有各种制度化的制约。但天哪，英国是一个潜在的案例，关于脱欧的分歧表明，在鲍里斯·约翰逊领导下，滑坡过程。这里有太多好的问题了。我

民主化的国家变得两极分化，那么是否会有这种风险？这让我提出了最后一个问题，部分是针对您，因为我知道我还没有问完所有问题，我们可以回头讨论。您如何看待韩国这样的国家？因为，你知道，韩国显然不是一个民主国家，它正在变得越来越两极分化，它似乎变得越来越两极分化，是否存在这种两极分化可能赋予行政部门权力，让他们利用，正如云敏所指出的，你知道，强大的

行政部门去对付政治敌人？我认为部分答案是，这种情况在韩国已经发生。你知道，至少在某种程度上，现在韩国肯定在辩论这些力量是否可能在过去、现在或未来发挥作用。我意识到还有最后一个问题，我真的必须回答，那就是关于这些两极分化的根源。我认为云敏非常正确地提出了这个问题，所以我想

我忽略了您的问题，不是因为我不认为它重要。我有一长串的评论。但同样，我认为进行更多讨论可能很有用。但让我回到云敏提出的一些问题，也就是如何看待这与更广泛的威权主义倒退过程的关系。让我再次强调这一点，即我们讨论的系统并非从一开始就仅限于竞争性威权主义。如果你能想出一种方法将此与竞争性威权主义联系起来，那么我们或许应该写出来并发表一些相关内容。但，但，你知道，这些，你知道，这些滑坡案例的独特之处在于，正是这些民选的、公平选举的民主领导人正在引领这场运动。因此，我认为，在非洲案例中，那些没有跨越某些民主门槛的国家，你知道，加纳未来可能面临风险。但如果你谈论的是竞争性威权主义系统，那些系统中的行政部门已经拥有了可以打破平衡的权力杠杆，使得民主力量能够运作。因此，我认为这是另一套不同的问题。我对非洲案例或其他我们尚未看到滑坡的地区的担忧是，如果那些民主国家，如果非洲那些已经

回到他身上。那就是，你知道，是否存在一种“单一水龙头”的路线，借用霍布森的说法，你知道，是否存在一种共同的两极分化根源？我认为我们得出的结论是我们不想走那条路，因为我们没有在世界上看到它。我真的看到了各种不同的两极分化根源。所以，在某些情况下，可能是经济不平等被动员起来。可能是民族问题。可能是宇宙主义者和民族主义者之间的区别。可能是宗教问题，就像土耳其，或者甚至在某种程度上是波兰和匈牙利。但我认为我们争论的是，两极分化的根源不如两极分化这个事实重要。你知道，这可以来自许多来源。你有右翼民粹主义者动员民族主义和反宇宙主义的怨恨。你有左翼民粹主义者动员经济不满。这发生在希腊，发生在联合王国，

系统的经济计量学分析，但样本中肯定包含这两种类型的系统，因为波兰、匈牙利、乌克兰在不同时期，土耳其最初，这些最初都是议会制，或者总统职位是弱总统的系统。现在有趣的是，在土耳其的体制中，从议会制转变为总统制，但那里的滑坡现象始于议会制。而且我可以，我可以讲讲议会制也有制约作用的故事。即使在英国这样的威斯敏斯特体系中，政党内部的后座议员、司法机构的实力以及你可能认为会制约滑坡的规范，也有各种制度化的制约。但天哪，英国是一个潜在的案例，关于脱欧的分歧表明，在鲍里斯·约翰逊领导下，滑坡过程。这里有太多好的问题了。我

我忽略了您的问题，不是因为我不认为它重要。我有一长串的评论。但同样，我认为进行更多讨论可能很有用。但让我回到云敏提出的一些问题，也就是如何看待这与更广泛的威权主义倒退过程的关系。让我再次强调这一点，即我们讨论的系统并非从一开始就仅限于竞争性威权主义。如果你能想出一种方法将此与竞争性威权主义联系起来，那么我们或许应该写出来并发表一些相关内容。但，但，你知道，这些，你知道，这些滑坡案例的独特之处在于，正是这些民选的、公平选举的民主领导人正在引领这场运动。因此，我认为，在非洲案例中，那些没有跨越某些民主门槛的国家，你知道，加纳未来可能面临风险。但如果你谈论的是竞争性威权主义系统，那些系统中的行政部门已经拥有了可以打破平衡的权力杠杆，使得民主力量能够运作。因此，我认为这是另一套不同的问题。我对非洲案例或其他我们尚未看到滑坡的地区的担忧是，如果那些民主国家，如果非洲那些已经

以在未来。我意识到还有最后一个问题，我真的必须回答，那就是关于这些两极分化的根源。我认为云敏非常正确地提出了这个问题，所以我想

民主化的国家变得两极分化，那么是否会有这种风险？这让我提出了最后一个问题，部分是针对您，因为我知道我还没有问完所有问题，我们可以回头讨论。您如何看待韩国这样的国家？因为，你知道，韩国显然不是一个民主国家，它正在变得越来越两极分化，它似乎变得越来越两极分化，是否存在这种两极分化可能赋予行政部门权力，让他们利用，正如云敏所指出的，你知道，强大的

民主化的国家变得两极分化，那么是否会有这种风险？这让我提出了最后一个问题，部分是针对您，因为我知道我还没有问完所有问题，我们可以回头讨论。您如何看待韩国这样的国家？因为，你知道，韩国显然不是一个民主国家，它正在变得越来越两极分化，它似乎变得越来越两极分化，是否存在这种两极分化可能赋予行政部门权力，让他们利用，正如云敏所指出的，你知道，强大的

强大的行政部门去对付政治敌人？我认为部分答案是，这种情况在韩国已经发生。你知道，至少在某种程度上，现在韩国肯定在辩论这些力量是否可能在过去、现在或未来发挥作用。我意识到还有最后一个问题，我真的必须回答，那就是关于这些两极分化的根源。我认为云敏非常正确地提出了这个问题，所以我想

我想回到他身上。那就是，你知道，是否存在一种“单一水龙头”的路线，借用霍布森的说法，你知道，是否存在一种共同的两极分化根源？我认为我们得出的结论是我们不想走那条路，因为我们没有在世界上看到它。我真的看到了各种不同的两极分化根源。所以，在某些情况下，可能是经济不平等被动员起来。可能是民族问题。可能是宇宙主义者和民族主义者之间的区别。可能是宗教问题，就像土耳其，或者甚至在某种程度上是波兰和匈牙利。但我认为我们争论的是，两极分化的根源不如两极分化这个事实重要。你知道，这可以来自许多来源。你有右翼民粹主义者动员民族主义和反宇宙主义的怨恨。你有左翼民粹主义者动员经济不满。这发生在希腊，发生在联合王国，

并且，这才是民主政治变得非常危险的领域，当你将你的政治对手视为不是像你一样试图尽最大努力的人，而只是想尽最大努力，而在你与他们不同、你的偏好不同，而是视为真正属于外部，并试图从内部摧毁系统的人。而这，而这才是民主政治变得危险的时候。所以，我想我该停了。我只是要打开我的灯，

在美国，也发生在许多地方。但重要的不是根源，而是你将你的政治对手视为敌人，你真的看到了鲜明的二元对立，要么是我们的人，要么是他们的人。如果你有一个政治体，存在如此尖锐的分歧，那么你就会容忍这种滑坡过程，因为你认为独裁者实际上是在保护你免受敌人的侵害。他们保护你免受敌人的侵害。

而这，而这正是民主政治变得非常危险的领域，当你将你的政治对手视为不是像你一样试图尽最大努力的人，而只是想尽最大努力，而在你与他们不同、你的偏好不同，而是视为真正属于外部，并试图从内部摧毁系统的人。而这，而这才是民主政治变得危险的时候。所以，我想我该停了。我只是要打开我的灯，

那么，我们该怎么办？好的。这可能是一个漫长的过程。我会尽量做到简短。好。那么，金南奎教授，请。是的，好的。能听到我说话吗？好的。谢谢您的演讲。我非常喜欢您的演讲和您的书，说实话。我一直非常喜欢您最近关于民主转型、民主崩溃和这次的民主滑坡的书籍和文章。是的，我想先谈谈我喜欢这本书的哪些方面。我认为这是一本写得很好的书。每次阅读时，我都会发现

it's it's not because it wasn't a good question i just didn't want to do all the talking so if you ask a question before would you feel i didn't answer then just briefly restate the question and i'll come back to it because you know i want to have this kind of exchange to the extent we can yes of course um any follow-up questions or comments um including um the case of south korea actually okay let me because you know even the haggard already includes in his book about rising those authoritarian countries like china

and russia but oh yeah i'd like to you know again you know what is your perspective you know on the impact of the china on this the democratic backsliding and we are coming back to kind of the new four-door era what do you think briefly thank you yeah well i i have a paper which you know i've had a hard time getting published but i'll i'll cert i'll circulate an older version of it if anyone is interested but with a graduate student named christina cortiero we've done some econometric work where we're basically looking at whether

the membership in autocratic authoritarian institutions that is international institutions which are dominated by authoritarian governments whether that has an effect on political liberalization and the likelihood that you will democratize and we find that it does it has an adverse effect so if you're a member of an autocratic io a regional international organization whether it be in in the middle east or in africa or increasingly in central asia then the prospects for you democratizing go down so so i you know we have you know we

have some a little bit of econometric evidence in this paper for this one proposition but i think that the the the tools of influence here are much broader than just through these um and international organizations like the shanghai cooperation organization because they also extend to things like the bri and the belt and road initiative and i don't know what the discourse is in south korea on the bri but it's it's gotten much more alarmist in the united states and western europe over the last just two years because there's a

perception that the bri can be used and and and particular investments that are undertaken by the bri including in things like media and telecommunications and chinese internet firms you know that are investing very widely that these are actually facilitators of either authoritarian rule or potentially backsliding you know to go back to one bin their points at which these two sets of arguments converge and you know clearly putin has tried to build connections with and support the governments in poland and

and hungary you know as a way of kind of dividing the european union and we see we see that these international organizations are operating in africa with the purpose of supporting you know semi-democratic or competitive authoritarian regimes to to shore up autocratic regimes there and you know i think the the most interesting place to look at this uh going forward is going to be in in the bri you know in the in the whole area to china's west where it's clearly seeking to stabilize uh central asia in a way to prevent

color revolutions from from from recurring as they did in georgia and ukraine so so i think i think this is i think this is going to be a major area of research going forward and and again to to put a little korean spin on this you know when when president moon came to to uh to to washington for what i thought was a very successful summit overall this whole issue of korea standing for values and whether it would make value-oriented statements in support of democracy how its southern initiative would link with what

the united states was trying to do in in in southeast asia you know that these kinds of issues are are very much alive any further comments follow-up comments from professor kim or nam no um then um let's open it up uh to the floor uh professor huang chun li um do you have any question comments yes professor han uh thanks a lot for your wonderful uh the presentation and the discussion uh by other the commentators and then actually like uh professor kim namguro i'm a great fan of your the books and

arguments but not in this field but in north korea and international relations because i study uh the ayal and the north korea's foreign policy so i would like to ask a question uh that is related to your previous you know the connection between your previous book that you authored with the market's knowledge the hard target with this book then you in your previous previous book had a target you talked about you mentioned about the international you know that economic uh sanctions and the investment on north

korea like the you know north korea is also like the authoritarian and ecology regime although it's not like the the backsliding uh country so i my question is uh simple and uh what is the the international effect on uh the backsliding uh countries although you know that the political leaders in the backsliding countries are less likely to give up their the power you know and their grip on uh power uh but anyway so i think there is some kind of implication that uh the you know that the international

effect on external you know the effect on the the domestic backsliding uh backsliding effect in those uh the uh the countries although you know i i know you mentioned about the international context of uh the the backsliding uh like the great powers of china and russia but this is a different one because maybe the international uh the effect of on the backsliding okay yeah no i mean this this is this is a really interesting question you know of not only you know so so the way that the question was originally

posed by one business i understood it was the whole question of whether the international environment is becoming more conducive for backsliding to occur that is more permissive but what g1 is arguing as i understand it is he's asking the opposite question which is what happens in a context where you have either more backsliding countries or just more authoritarian countries and i think that i think that it contributes to a kind of global strategic polarization because because countries that are

autocratic have potential allies and will realign with other authoritarian countries and and you know i i'm a little skeptical of the idea of a coalition of democracies um but but you know it really is true that if if the united states western europe uh korea japan are standing up more strongly for human rights and are conducting a diplomacy which to some extent targets and tries to weaken autocratic countries or at least reverse their autocratic practices then naturally this incentivizes those countries to seek support

from other autocracies and so so um you know this is a i'm currently looking at the 1930s i have a paper about you know how i'm working on i have a draft about you know how the united states looked at this question of democracy and autocracy in the 1920s and 30s as you saw this wave of authoritarian reversals and it is interesting that over time this idea that world politics that the cleavages and world politics fell along regime-type lines became more and more pronounced now is this a good idea

well that's where i become a little bit more of a realist and less than a that less of a liberal because i'm not sure it really is a good idea if we're seeing a world politics through a regime-type lens because the united states has to uh interact pragmatically with countries that are autocratic including with china and if we're seeing the world divided along regime type through a regime type lands it may contribute to the hardening of these kind of cleavages and the re-emergence of a cold war setting to a greater extent than i might

prefer so i'm a democrat but you know liberals have to interact with illiberal countries in a productive way and and in some in some cases um you know pushing the human rights agenda to the fore and my south korean colleagues will know exactly what i'm talking about may or may not be the most productive thing to do honestly i mean i personally think that south koreans should be able to south korean ngos that are human rights organizations should have the freedom to speak but i can certainly imagine

why president moon or president no or kim dae-jong before him doesn't have an interest in putting human rights at the top of the agenda you know and interacting with with the north korea did am i am i making sense julian yeah thank you definitely yeah thanks a lot great um if i may i would like to throw in some questions as well um i'm not an i'm not an expert on democracy or democratic transition at all but reading your book which actually by the way um fascinating um i constantly had questions regarding the

definition and implications of the concept of backsliding actually so first uh regarding the definition of backsliding i have some worries about the conceptual stretch and equivalence between cases don't get me wrong i totally share your concerns about the threat even to the most advanced democracies including the u.s but i'm not really sure if we can throw in the u.s or the western european countries and for example the eight cases that eventually declined into competitive authoritarianism into a same category of backsliding

because if so i mean the question is how can we distinguish between the ebb and flow normal ebb and flow in political progress or democracy and backsliding because political progress is not a linear process right you can sometimes take two steps back and one step forward fluctuations take place everywhere so if it's true that we are looking at this phenomena that you call as backsliding but um are some of them simply the ebb and flow of the democracy or political process of course i noticed that you emphasize

that it is mistaken to think that nothing much has ultimately changed in the us i kind of agree but at the same time for example you call those elected duly elected leaders as autocrats in the cases of course you analyze but if you call trump an autocrat and both stalin and trump can fall into the category of autocrats i mean what's the use of the concept autocrat that that's my first question right conceptual stretching and the equivalence between cases and my second question is about the implications of this concept

backsliding um i really appreciate uh your effort uh put um in the first part of your book defining uh the concept of backsliding the defining characteristics of backsliding i love them but all these key characteristics of backsliding they are kind of ex post-facto depictions of the phenomena we are observing today so uh if this backsliding has this phenomena of backsliding have certain characteristics key characteristics that you have already explained very well why these particular characteristics at

this particular time and what will be the analytic importance of these key characteristics to us political scientists who are interested in democracy and backsliding phenomena these two will be my questions yeah these are these are great questions and and tough ones so so let me um let me address um let me address your first question which i think is related to your second one by by sharing my screen again if i could and and showing you some pictures because i think it'll help it'll help um uh you know

you know maybe not maybe not answer your question but clarify how we dealt with it right so so notice so these are thumbnails of all of the cases look at the united states right i mean for for for most of this period this this line you know these these liberal these you know electoral democracy scores these are liberal democracy scores i think um you know are just it's just sort of flat right there isn't very much change and then you get this statistically significant regress which is very small in this case

right and doesn't mean that the united states is no longer a liberal democracy but then you've got other cases like venezuela was considered for for decades a relatively consolidated emerging country democracy and then it starts this process but then it just continues right and so so clearly you know backsliding processes don't necessarily follow the same path nor do they end in the same place and i suspect when you look at vdem data going forward there's likely to be a bounce back here and we see other cases like ecuador for

example where correa ultimately was forced from office and you know the regime kind of bounced back and we've got north macedonia where we also had an autocrat who was voted out of office and someone else was put back in so so i don't think we're we're saying that there's any you know tendency for this process to end in the same place um and when we say that someone is an autocrat i think it's fair i think your criticism is fair that you know trump is not stalin but but what these are what these autocratic

leaders maybe we should call them something like that do have in common is they're willing to engage in what might be called reverse institutional engineering they're seeking and this gets to you know i think your second question which is what the component dimensions of this process are and we really go back to the kind of triad of what constitutes a liberal democracy which is it it has an electoral system with integrity it has a certain um element of guarantee of rights and particularly the core politic the core freedoms that

are necessary for political freedoms you know the right to assembly to petition the media freedom of speech and then you've got this um you know more complex component which is horizontal checks which is that you know executives are subject to some degree of check from the judiciary or from other independent agencies within the executive branch and so so i think that the the concept of backsliding is that is not that all of these things erode in tandem but that typically all of these simultaneously see some kind of erosion

you know some sort of deterioration and i think the reason why the concept is is difficult to grapple with is exactly because you're not dealing with an obvious regime change you're dealing with something which is more initially more incremental in scope and even if these declines are sharper in venezuela you know than they were in the united states i mean look at brazil i mean if you push this forward you know brazil would would be further along than we once thought right and again i'm not sure i'm

completely answering your question but i i think we're all i guess i'm saying is that we're aware of the fact that the initiation of this process doesn't necessarily either start or end in the same place and i think it's an open question about what the and several of the of the people on the call raised this you know what the political forces are which ultimately you know permit these systems to to bounce back okay thank you very much for your answers um i do appreciate them absolutely but i don't

think that was a good answer but it was a good question i can tell you that great answers um any other oh young one did you professor lee i think you're muted professor lee you're muted thank you sorry actually this wonderful talk and then uh your presentation and discuss discussion seems to be flying me back into graduate seminar i took a long time ago comparisons so i have one simple maybe a question maybe related or only that is about my long healthy question about the separation of powers and then there's a big story in your

text sliding narratives and descriptions and then that is um actually what is the basis or normative or logical basis upon which we we can claim that we have a separation of power when uh supreme court justice or justice not democratically elected actually you know executive branches appoint obviously we go through hearings and with uh we it requires congressional you know uh sort of you know approval but still they are appointed and we have a lot of politicking in korea about uh appointment of supreme court justice

and justice so i always think of the question whether or not we really have ever had good balance of separation of power even in advanced democracies so i don't know oh boy well i mean you know that'll be justified we really have separation of powers when you when we or executive branches appoint supreme court justice i don't know how this related or unrelated but that's my question that's a korea question i mean the prosecutor's office i mean you know this is the whole issue of the reform of the

prosecutorial power in korea of course has been just a central question and and the potential abuse of the prosecutor's office because of the fact that it combines the power to investigate and indict i mean i have been following you know the reforms which president moon has tried to introduce in that regard but but look you know i think i think the the answer to this question has to be pragmatic you know i mean no one including madison believed that you know the powers of these branches were going to be tightly separated

and i think it's in federalist 82 where he talks about the judiciary and and the fact that the judiciary is a weak branch and so forth but i think we do have what might be called realist theories about why political opponents might want to agree on a certain neutral arbiter and it's just simply because of the fact that you're in office today but you may not be in office tomorrow i mean that as simple as it sounds that carries tremendous theoretical significance because you know if you and i are political opponents even if we're

divided i would prefer to have an independent you know judiciary if i'm going to be out of office in the future and so you know there are limits i think they're practical limits to the extent to which competing parties in a democracy really want to see the judiciary fundamentally undermined you know and we're having this debate in the united states because there's i think the court you know here and i'm sure that there's similar debates in korea on the korean court is do we run a risk of delegitimation

if we're too closely and i'm not talking about judges that are corrupt and have been indicted i'm just talking about as an institution does the judiciary run risk if it's seen as basically being an instrument for for partisan ends so um you know look you know there there are a lot of details about the the korean case that i would actually like to discuss if you want to push them about how this issue has been has been addressed there but i don't think i don't think that anyone who believes in the separation

of powers don't you know believes that these branches are completely independent it's their independent in a sense by by a kind of acquiescence or an acknowledgement that there's utility for both sides to maintaining you know these kind of checks and i think the same could be said for legislative power frankly i mean you know the legislature doesn't want an executive that's too strong and you know the the executive doesn't want an executive does the legislature doesn't want an executive too strong and

then you know the the executive has an interest in in in freeing itself when it can you know from national assembly to take the korean case uh constraints right i mean korea is a strange case because it you know has an unusually strong executive and so you know these issues of checks and balances there are quite are are i think of a different order of magnitude than in the united states even where you know the the congress is very powerful and you know is not going to just acquiesce to shifting power to the

to the um to the executive but i should just note you know for those of you who who made the case that maybe maybe institutions matter here i mean you know back benchers in fidesh were willing to grant orban an incredible amount of power despite the fact that it was a parliamentary system you know so so i don't see you know unnecessary connection there between um the fundamental institutional form and and the capacity for these guys to uh to uh to do damage i mean you know you can even make the case that in

parliamentary systems it's easier to control two of the branches and interestingly in both hungary and poland one of the first signs of backsliding to go back to ju young's question were attacks on which branch the judiciary the judiciary because it was the branch which you know the parties didn't control okay thank you thank you for yourself thank you okay i think i have to ask one last question i think it's far uh past your dinner time you must be hungry so sorry for that i'm getting fed here what are you

talking about you got a feast you guys are are feeding me i have a very broad question you know most of the viewers are political scientists in south korea so i want to ask about your view of the discipline of comparative politics in the united states how your critical view of the scholarly landscape of comparative politics there because in ir i feel there is strong criticism against the american trend of studying international relations the absence of theory the depth of ir theory in general theory

as a hypothesis not really as a genuine theory so is there any opinion about your status oh boy i mean you know that you know comparative politics is such a diverse field because you know i mean here i am we're talking to one bin you know and my student inbox re is an african as you know korea korea's now got the whole world you know it's its rise as a as a significant middle middle income power and its global reach which means you're seeing comparative politics expand in in south korea so you're you're seeing

similar kinds of processes i'm gonna answer your question by um by deflecting a little bit i think one thing that concerns me it's not i'm not concerned about the development of method exactly i think it's appropriate and i always try to urge my students to train themselves and acquire the skills they need both quantitative and qualitative but i think one thing that that worries me a little bit about some strands of of uh north american social science the political science which is changing actually i think it's changing

for the positive is is encouraging graduate students and faculty to be engaged in in substantive debates in the public arena i mean i i if i worry about one thing it's not that people aren't doing good work or that it's too narrow but it's more that i think we should be encouraged as social scientists to speak to to issues of public policy and i mean you know i think i think for koreans this is much more natural i think i think many korean social scientists political science have always been engaged in politics maybe too much

they're engaged in politics too much too much drinking with their with their their bureaucratic friends you know rather than writing their articles but i do think that they're in the united states the risk is a little bit different you know that that there's a lot of concern in both international relations and comparative politics that that that the academy academic political sciences drifted away from from the political arena and um you know it's it's it's surprising the extent to which people who are

in the policy world rely so infrequently on what political scientists do and i think it's partly because they political scientists myself included are not necessarily good at communicating the value of what they do to someone who's a policy maker and so i guess i worry more about that you know that that if you're teaching your students or you're a junior faculty member write your papers get them in the ssci journals all those things you have to do but don't be afraid of commenting on um foreign policy issues or um that are

that your work speaks to i think that's i think that's not something that should be avoided i think it's an obligation of obligation on us yeah it's a great question chisel great we are way past the time and definitely this topic ignites the passion inside us political scientists and i would love to continue with the discussion but i guess we have to let go of the audience so let's at least wrap up this official part we can continue uh chatting afterwards but um thank you so much professor haggard

for sharing your insights and thoughts and your research with us uh we greatly appreciate this chance to learn from you uh and thank you a lot of fun you know to me that that's that's the that's the real measure of a good conversation as you walk away feeling like you've learned something and you've also had some fun so it's really good seeing those of you i know and meeting those of you i have thanks for having me yeah definitely definitely and thank you all the discussions for coming here today and thank you for all the great

comments so um we'll come back next month with the third book webinar and uh meet you again then goodbye thanks for having me okay thanks a lot