[EAI在线研讨会] 新冠疫情与新世界秩序 1. 美国民主，站在十字路口：2020美国大选，并非特朗普 vs 拜登的问题

YouTube链接 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z2v6W-uVEMg

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东亚研究所（EAI）以“2020美国大选展望”为主题，举办了“新冠疫情与新世界秩序”系列在线研讨会的第一场会议。即将到来的美国大选，其结果不仅取决于候选人之间的激烈竞争，更与美国当前面临的健康和经济危机紧密相关，因此预测其结果极为困难。在此次会议上，加州大学伯克利分校政治学系的Paul Pierson教授和李泰九（Taeku Lee）教授就选举结果以及选后美国国内和外交政策进行了讨论。

• 时间：2020年5月15日（周五），10:00–11:30 (KST)
• 演讲者：Paul Pierson （加州大学伯克利分校政治学教授），李泰九 （加州大学伯克利分校法学与政治学教授）
• 主持人：孙悦 (EAI所长；延世大学国际学研究生院教授)
• 讨论者：孙炳权 (中央大学政治国际学系教授)，全载成 (EAI国家安保研究中心所长，首尔大学外交学教授)

I. 摘要

不可预测的美国大选，比以往任何时候都更需要政治学家的审慎

• 美国社会和政治体系所面临的挑战已如实反映在美国政治中，其中，政治体系尤其倾向于受总统选举（结果）的影响。在经济、社会问题以及失业和新冠疫情等公共卫生危机接踵而至的当下，政治学家们主张，在预测美国大选前景时应持审慎态度。
• 根据 Helmut Norpoth 的“初选模型”（Primary Model）这一选举预测模型之一，特朗普有91%-95%的概率会连任。然而，根据 FiveThirtyEight 报告的所有A级民意调查显示，拜登的支持率比特朗普高出约7%-10%。不仅预测结果不统一，新冠疫情带来的社会、经济、政治及公共卫生层面的变化，使得预测更加不确定。就连预测特朗普当选概率为91%-95%的 Helmut Norpoth 也表示，由于新冠疫情带来的大规模变化，他可能需要修正预测。

寻求连任的特朗普，是否会沦为“弱者”（underdog）？

• 特朗普在下届大选中获胜有几个结构性优势。最典型的是他能够掌控和主导对话，并吸引媒体关注的独特能力。此外，他还非常擅长吸引和集中民众的注意力。更根本的优势在于特朗普在选举人票方面占有优势，并且共和党以乡村为基础，这比以城市为基础的民主党更有利。因为在赢者通吃（winner-take-all）的体系下，更广泛分布的政党在每个州都占有优势。
• 例如，从特朗普近期的竞选方式来看，他比任何人都清楚如何才能使竞选对自己有利。他运用民粹主义的修辞，指出选民应该憎恨和愤怒的对象是谁。特朗普正努力提高动员这些普通选民的强度，但由于经济状况严重恶化，许多普通选民遭受了严重损失，这可能会更加困难。
• 此外，值得注意的是，特朗普在老年白人选民中的支持率正在下降，而这部分选民曾是他成功的重要因素。鉴于老年选民在美国选举中是主要议题，这对特朗普尤为重要。尽管美国大选的投票率不高，但老年选民的投票率很高。然而，特朗普在老年选民中的支持似乎正在减弱，部分原因是新冠疫情，以及特朗普“不必太担心祖母，让我们发展经济”的愿望。
• 此外，特朗普的弱点在于，从历史标准来看，他的支持率一直很低，这对于寻求连任的总统来说无疑是危险的。不仅有许多人仅仅是不喜欢总统，还有许多人强烈反对他，这将使他面临困难。特朗普的连任面临批评，导致支持率下降，并且他将不得不应对经济不景气、失业率居高不下以及与疫情相关的持续性重大挑战。这很难说会如何发展。从这个角度来看，Paul Pierson教授认为，特朗普的独特优势将无法发挥巨大影响，并将特朗普描述为2020年美国大选的“弱者”（underdog）。
• 李泰九教授和Paul Pierson教授都同意，特朗普不会将中国视为敌人。这是因为特朗普未能找到足够有力的动机来疏远中国。此外，他们认为，在未来几年内，美国国内的反华情绪不会大幅上升。一项民意调查结果也支持了这一点，只有极少数美国人称“新冠疫情”为“中国病毒”或“武汉病毒”。

美国民主的衰退（democratic backsliding），进展到何种程度？

• 美国正经历着南北战争以来前所未有的严重两极分化。当前的两极分化之所以具有特点，是因为国家层面的两个政党高度分裂，这种分裂渗透到从上层到底层的各个层面，在美国各地普遍存在。特别是，在过去几十年里，美国共和党的政治精英及其内部的强大利益，越来越依赖于对白人劳动阶级选民的强烈和极端的呼吁。白人劳动阶级认为自己在国内失去了根基，因为美国正朝着一个长期以来逐渐威胁他们的多元文化民主社会迈进，他们在经济和文化地位上都失去了根基。
• 特朗普政府是美国一种非常新的类型，这可以被视为国际趋势的一部分，即走向威权主义的软版本，或者正如Daniel Ziblatt和Steven Levitsky在其著作《民主如何走向灭亡（How Democracies Die）》中所描述的民主衰退（democratic backsliding）一样，即选举可以继续进行，但国家变得越来越不平衡和不公平，朝着更具威权主义的方向发展。尽管一些美国政治学家可能对此感到反感，但有相当多的证据表明，美国的民主衰退已经发生。
• Pierson教授谈到了白人劳动阶级民族主义可能对本次大选产生的影响，他指出，共和党在本届大选中采取了吸引经济上处于劣势的选民的战略，并决定放弃扩大党内联盟的种族多样性。对此，李教授表示，特朗普曾一度作为“战略”利用的白人劳动阶级民族主义，如今已深深扎根于大选格局之中，成为一种“身份认同”。
• 李泰九教授认为，2020年大选将不是一个可以依赖政治科学预测模型或民意调查结果的典型选举。他举了2016年大选为例，当时所有主要的政治科学预测模型都预测希拉里·克林顿获胜，但她却败选了。2016年的选举提供了至少两个理由来怀疑预测模型在2020年是否仍然有效。一个原因是特朗普以一种独特而有效的方式干扰了政治规范和制度，其方式令人震惊甚至致命。另一个原因是美国非常容易受到“十月惊奇”（October Surprises）的影响，这些事件可能完全颠覆谁将获胜或失败的预测，例如海外干预或国内两极分化。
• 影响美国选民决定的基本要素是如何变化的，以及未来将如何继续变化，可以从四个主要方面——制度（institutions）、身份认同（identities）、意识形态（ideologies）和信息（information）——来理解。首先，在制度层面，两党之间的跨党派合作日益消失，两极分化加剧，并且不属于任何一方的美国人比例正在增加。
• 在身份认同和意识形态方面，美国政治越来越倾向于被“分裂线”（cleavage line）所定义。然而，传统上将国家分裂成不同政党、意识形态和身份认同的分裂线，正日益被重塑为亲特朗普或反特朗普的争论焦点。这里一个重要的趋势是，美国政治中的权力斗争正逐渐从政治学家所说的“权力的第一阶段”，例如在政策问题上谁占优势，转移到“权力的第二阶段”的斗争。也就是说，权力的第二阶段是围绕制衡的斗争，是对法律适用、总统部分行政执行的合宪性、以及谁如何投票等选举规则本身的斗争。
• 这一切最终将归结为围绕民主本身行使的斗争，这很可能是我们在未来将看到的。这很重要，因为2020年选举的胜负可能取决于围绕选举规则本身的斗争的胜负，而不是传统和我们熟悉的价值，如哪个政党组织得更好，哪个候选人有更好的想法，拥有更多的钱，选民从根本上想要什么，选民想要变革还是希望现任者连任。
• 在信息方面，民主社会的选民是否能够表达自己的意见，而不受制于他们为在制度和意识形态方面取得优势而使用的专业战术和策略，取决于提供准确信息的公平机构是否尽到了自己的职责。然而，主流媒体、学术界或科学界等追求公平的机构目前正受到攻击。

如果民主不再是“镇上唯一的游戏（Only Game in Town）”？

• 2020年美国大选将在决定美国社会发展方向上起到决定性作用。是继续走向一个不那么自由、不那么开放的社会，一个由政治恩惠而非法治主导的社会，正如过去几年所展示的那样，还是相反，走向美国在2016年前所走的、渐进式、缓慢演变的多元族裔民主（multiracial democracy）？这就是美国人民将在2020年投票决定的内容。
• 衡量民主稳定性的一个“试金石”判别法是，正如Adam Przewolski所言，“当民主是唯一的选择，并且没有人能想象在民主制度之外以非民主的方式行事，所有失败者都希望在他们刚刚失败的同一制度内再次尝试时”。然而，我认为，无论2020年大选的失败者是谁，他都不太可能希望在导致他失败的同一制度内再次竞争。
• 李泰九教授提出了四种情景：1）特朗普获胜，民主党接受结果。2）拜登获胜，特朗普接受结果。前两种情景是常规的，但李教授补充了另外两种假设：3）拜登获胜，特朗普不服从结果，将国家推入混乱和政治暴力之中。4）特朗普获胜，民主党不服从结果，将国家推入混乱和政治暴力之中。
• 李教授认为，失败者不承认失败的两种情景可能比想象的更现实。特朗普是一个与政治规范和制度对立的人物，他威胁要使通过民主程序举行的选举无效，这在他2016年大选时就已经有过预演，当时他公开质疑选举的合法性，因为他预计自己会输。同样，如果拜登候选人及其民主党因外国干预、选民压制或其他形式的舞弊或欺诈而败选，他们可能也不会像2000年Al Gore那样轻易地接受。
• 演讲者们预计，特朗普总统不会平静地离开白宫。在这个过程中，美国（政治）丑陋的一面将暴露出来，届时国会和法院的作用和意愿将变得相当重要。例如，并非不可能出现的情况是，在选举日，特朗普总统会说“这次选举被偷了！”。由于新冠疫情，缺席选票和邮寄选票将在投票结束后缓慢收集和统计，这个过程可能需要长达10天才能完成所有选票的统计。在这种情况下，特朗普很有可能声称选举过程不可信。

能否回归“特朗普之前的常态（pre-Trump normalcy）”：2020年大选对韩国的启示

• 拜登凭借其长期的政治经验，在外交政策方面具有相对优势。如果他当选，美国的对外政策很可能将以与奥巴马和克林顿时期相似的方式进行重组。除非拜登在党内面临来自桑德斯议员的强大左翼压力，否则他的首要目标将是在对外关系方面，在一定程度上将美国恢复到特朗普之前的常态。
• 展望未来的政府，拜登政府可能会广泛复制希拉里·克林顿或巴拉克·奥巴马所展现的外交政策。问题在于，打破特朗普政府的运作方式比重建基于信任的关系要容易得多。我认为，其他国家在与美国谈判时会更加谨慎，并且对美国作为可信赖的谈判伙伴的期望会更加怀疑。这将是拜登政府面临的另一个危机。修复过去四年造成的损害将是一项艰巨的任务。
• 恢复比破坏更困难，而回归特朗普之前的状态、恢复的关键在于重建失去的信任，Pierson教授和李泰九教授认为。拜登最大的优势在于其长期的政治经验所积累的外交政策功底。他作为外交关系委员会参议员，担任了八年多的副总统，拥有庞大的人脉网络，认识并与世界政治舞台上的许多人物建立了个人关系，这为重建美国作为前盟友和全球领导者的信任奠定了良好的基础。
• 如果回归“特朗普之前的美国状态”，像韩国这样的国家将期望美国扮演“值得信赖的盟友”、“坚定的贸易伙伴”和“全球领导者”的角色。此外，预计美国将重新重视联盟，并强调多边主义。
• 然而，需要注意的是，在经历变革的同时，其他国家也发生了变化。例如，北约（NATO）不再是特朗普之前的北约，英国也与以前不同了。在新冠疫情的背景下，重振《巴黎协定》似乎也并非易事。考虑到过去几年亚洲国家经济形势的变化，重新激活TPP（跨太平洋伙伴关系协定）也将是一项艰巨的任务。过去几年发生变化的不仅是美国，而是整个世界。即使拜登试图回归特朗普之前的常态，这些变化也将构成重大制约。

■ Paul Pierson_ 加州大学伯克利分校（University of California at Berkeley）政治学系John Gross教授。在美国耶鲁大学（Yale University）获得政治学博士学位。在《纽约时报》（The New York Times）、《纽约时报杂志》（The New York Times Magazine）、《华盛顿邮报》（The Washington Post）、《新共和》（New Republic）等媒体撰稿。曾任《美国政治学评论》（American Political Science Review）、《政治视角》（Perspectives on Politics）、《政治学年度回顾》（Annual Review of Political Science）的编辑委员，并担任加州大学伯克利分校政治学系主任。主要研究领域包括美国政治与公共政策、比较政治经济学、社会理论等。著作包括《Let Them Eat Tweets: How the Right Rules in an Age of Extreme Inequality》（即将出版，与Jacob S. Hacker合著）、《赢者通吃政治：华盛顿如何让富人更富，却抛弃了中产阶级（Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer and Abandoned the Middle Class）》（2010年，与Jacob S. Hacker合著）、《政治的时光：历史、制度与社会分析（Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis）》（2004年）等。其中著作《Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment （1994）被选为1995年美国政治学会（American Political Science Association）最佳美国政治学著作，《政治中的路径依赖、报酬递增与研究》于2000年获得美国政治学会最佳论文奖，并于2011年获得亚伦·怀尔德夫斯基奖（Aaron Wildavsky Prize）。

■ 이태구 (Taeku Lee)_ 加州大学伯克利分校（University of California at Berkeley）法学乔治·约翰逊教授（George Johnson Professor of Law）、政治学教授（Professor of Political Science）。在美国芝加哥大学（University of Chicago）获得政治学博士学位。曾任美国全国亚裔民意调查（National Asian American Survey）和海湾地区贫困追踪者（Bay Area Poverty Tracker）的联合首席调查员，亚裔决策（Asian American Decisions）执行董事，美国人口普查局国家咨询委员会（National Advisory Committee for the U.S. Census Bureau）成员。曾任美国全国选举研究（American National Election Studies）、综合社会调查（General Social Survey）指导委员会成员，美国政治学会（American Political Science Association）财务主管及执行委员会成员，加州大学伯克利分校系主任，哈斯学院（Haas Institute）副主任等职务。主要研究领域包括种族与民族政治、民意调查研究、身份认同与不平等、参与式民主等。著有《Oxford Handbook of Racial and Ethnic Politics in the United States (2015), Asian American Political Participation（2011）等。

■ 孙烈_ EAI院长·延世大学国际学研究生院教授。在美国芝加哥大学（University of Chicago）获得政治学博士学位。曾任延世大学国际学研究生院院长、联合学院院长、日本研究学会会长、韩国国际政治学会会长等职务。主要研究领域为国际政治经济、日本外交政策、东亚国际关系等。近期著作包括《低生育率和老龄化对外交和安全及政治经济的影响》（2019，合著）、《Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2018, with T.J. Pempel), 《한국의 중견국외교》 (2017, 공저), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia (2016, with Jan Melissen) 등이 있다.

■ 孙炳权_中央大学政治与国际关系学教授。在美国密歇根大学（University of Michigan）获得政治学博士学位。主要研究领域为美国政治、美国外交政策、比较议会与政党研究等。近期研究包括《美国国会政治是否仍是民主的典范：被政党政治俘获的美国国会》（2018）、“特朗普时代美国民族主义的兴起”（2017）等。

■ 全在成_ EAI国家安全研究中心主任、首尔大学教授。在美国西北大学（Northwestern University）获得政治学博士学位，并曾担任外交部和统一部的政策咨询委员。主要研究领域为国际政治理论、国际关系史、韩美同盟及朝鲜半岛研究等。主要著作和合著包括《主权与国际政治：近代主权国家体系的帝国性》（2020）、《东北亚国际政治理论：不完全主权国家间的国际政治》（2020）、《中美竞争下的东亚与朝鲜半岛》（2015）、《政治是否道德》（2012）、《东亚国际政治：从历史到理论》（2011）等。

■ 策划与编辑：李英贤 EAI研究员

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hi welcome to East Asia Institute I'm your host your son and I'm currently president of East Asia Institute and Yonsei University professor I'd like to thank everyone for joining us today this event is the first of the eai virtual seminar series titled the New World Order after coffee 19 today's topic is the u.s. presidential election which is arguably the most consequential election of the world in the years to come it is tremendously difficult to predict the upcoming election not just because it's

already a close race but also because of the extraordinary circumstances United States currently faces the crises of both health and economics will discuss election outcomes for selection domestic politics and foreign policy implications we have two speakers to present today followed by two designated discussion of customs and a Q&A session at the end which is open to all of you we encourage you to participate by asking questions you you type of question either English or Korean at any time during the talk

using the Q&A function at the bottom of the room seminar will keep track all the questions please remember also to include your name and affiliation when giving a question with that I'm pleased to introduce our two distinguished guests for pearson is john gross endowment chair and professor of political science at university of california berkeley paul authored many books including off-center politics in time the transformation of American politics and dismantling the welfare state question mark which is the winner of the

APSA best book on American politics Paul is also an active commentator for New Times and Washington Post our second speaker is Keiko Lee who is also UC Berkeley professor he is a George Johnson professor of law and political science Kaku is the author of mobilizing public opinion transforming politics transformed transforming America why Americans don't join the party question mark asian-american political participation among many others tegu also serves on the National Advisory Committee for the

US Census Bureau now Paul we are delighted to get your first guy you can speak about 12 to 15 minutes okay great thank you very much a professor son it's a pleasure to be with you I'm just going to start my stopwatch here so I can make sure I don't go on too long and it's a pleasure to have a chance even from this distance to speak with a South Korean audience I think Americans who are aware of the broader global picture are very conscious of the striking contrasts between the way that the South Korean

government society have dealt with this crisis and the way that the United States has dealt with this crisis or rather failed I think failed to deal with the crisis and I start by saying this not just to congratulate you and your countrymen but but also because I think the kind of dysfunction the political dysfunction that has been on display in the United States is unfortunately not just a one-off experience I think it's it's reflective some deep deep challenges and problems facing American society and the American

political system in particular that really hang over this presidential election and I think we need to understand that broader political context to to say anything helpful about about the election so a few quick remarks before I turn to talking specifically about about what's going on in the in the election this year and the first is just a caveat that we should be very humble I think after 2016 political scientists in the United States learned to be humble about predicting presidential elections and they should probably be

even more humble this time around because we've never experienced certainly in the modern era of polling and focus groups and electoral forecasting we've never experienced an election against a backdrop of this kind of economic and social crisis the US will almost certainly be facing 15 or 20 percent unemployment through through this year Congress is I think as it isn't on so many issues gridlocked and it's going to find it very challenging to respond forcefully to the economic crisis that we're facing and of course

at the same time there's a public health crisis which is also likely to continue to be severe even though the exact course of that is unpredictable so I any of the standard things that people who study presidential elections might say about predicting what's going to happen this fall I think need we need to approach that with enormous caution under the under these kinds of circumstances and the second thing I want to say is a little bit about the nature of the deeper political turmoil facing the United States the country is

extraordinarily polarized polarized in a way I would say it has not been since since the period leading up to the Civil War I know some political scientists argue that our the polarization is not that unusual in American politics but but I think the kind of polarization that we see now in which two political parties that are organized on a national level are coherent national political entities where the same kind of cleavages work all the way from the top all the way down to locations around the United

States and you see the same kinds that divides the same kinds of folks falling on opposite sides of those divides all across the country and you see a lot of rhetoric and a lot of behavior that suggests that people see the other side is not just their opponents but they're a threat a potentially existential threat to things that they value and I want to emphasize that I think that that is especially true on the political right in the United States I don't think that it's equally balanced in the same

way that I don't think that the Joe Biden represents a radical figure in American political life in the way that Donald Trump represents a radical figure in American life and you see that reflected in the coalition's and over the past generation what has happened in the United States is that Republican political elites and powerful interests within that party have increasingly found that they have to resort to sort it to increasingly intense extreme Appeals and particularly at white working-class voters who see themselves

as losing ground in America losing ground economically losing ground in terms of cultural status who cede the United States slow but steady shift towards being a multiracial democracy as something that is threatening to that and and powerful groups within the conservative coalition you can think about groups like the National Rifle Association right-wing media especially Fox News and talk radio evangelical Christians or as as an organized political movement I have really amplified this sense of threat

and and that development generated the the extraordinary presidency of President Trump and that's the other factor that I want to just talk about briefly before it turning to the election this is a new a very new kind of a presidency in the United States and it's one that I think should be seen as part of the the national trend that you sorry international trend I would say towards kind of soft versions of authoritarianism or what what Daniels applied and Steve Levitsky in their book how democracies die are described as as

democratic backsliding where you can have you can continue to have elections but they're increasingly unbalanced as unfair as a country slides towards something that looks more authoritarian and while some American political scientists would be resistant would say that me raising this is alarmist I think there's actually enormous evidence to suggest that the considerable Democratic backsliding has already taken place in the United States that since Donald Trump became president he has engaged in increasingly aggressive

attacks on any independent source of political mobilization in the United States or political organization in the United States whether it's the judiciary or the civil service right where he is systematically along with this allies and systematically tried to replace anyone who shows any kind of real independence with somebody who is going to be loyal to him the same thing is happening with the media the same thing is happening with the political opposition so just in the last 24 hours the president has indicated that he

thinks of both his immediate predecessor President Obama and his current opponent Joe Biden should be in prison which is something that he already of course has said repeatedly about his upon in the last election Hillary Clinton so even though they're people who wanted to dismiss this as this being loose talk if we look at other countries you know I think if Americans were to look at Hungary or Turkey or Brazil they would recognize this kind of behavior and the way in which president Trump's party has

embraced that behavior as something that we would call democratic backsliding and something that represents a real threat to the democratic practices that had been such a core part of American political history so I see 2020 as an absolute watershed election that it is going to be I think a moment where where the United States is going to decide what path it is going to be on whether it is going to continue on the path that has been on for the last few years of moving slipping towards a less free less

open society one that is not governed by the rule of law but is governed by whether or not one is in political favor or not or whether we will steer away from that from that direction towards the path that I think the United States was was broadly on before 2016 which was a gradual very difficult turbulent but gradual evolution towards a multiracial democracy that's what's on the ballot on in 2020 now I've already said there's enormous uncertainty about how this is going to how the election itself is

going to play out obviously a lot of things going to happen between now and November we've never had circumstances like this before president Trump has a couple of important structural advantages that I just want to mention quickly one is his unbelievable ability to control the conversation to direct the conversation and direct the attention of the media doesn't always do that to its benefit um but he is very good at attracting attention and getting people to focus on things that he wants people

to focus on and I think that that that is an advantage more fundamentally he has an advantage in the electoral college which decides who wins the presidency and the advantage that exists there is because the Republican base is more rural the Democratic base is more urban in the as when you have a winner-take-all system for each individual state that provides an advantage for the more widely dispersed party as you probably know a president Trump actually lost a popular vote by almost three million votes in 2016 but

won the electoral college the projections are that this time around because a lot of the that rural urban split is only intensified that it's possible that he could lose the popular vote by four or five percent and still win the electoral college by winning the more rural states and by winning some hotly contested states that that lean slightly Republican and that could carry him over over the top in the electoral college so he has those advantages against that he has the disadvantages that he's not popular by historic

standards his approval rating has always been pretty low it's it's definitely in the danger zone for a president running running for re-election and there there are lots of people who don't just disapprove of the president but who strongly disapprove of him so there is he's gonna have a hard time winning them over so he can't afford to lose much more support before his prospects for reelection election become really critical and and he now has to do that not with a decent economy at its back but with an economy that is going to be

probably with depression level unemployment in the fall and probably you know very significant continuing difficulties the pandemic very hard to know how this would play well play out on balance I think I would consider President Trump to be an underdog I think that those challenges at least somewhat outweighed the structural advantages that he has if we have open free fair elections where people feel like they can safely go to the polls in November I would say that he is likely to be a slight underdog but

I don't take it for granted that we will have those kind of electoral circumstances in November I feel like things have gotten to a point in the American polity where the level of conflict and now the level of social crisis is so high that we cannot be fully confident that that we will have a free open easily contested election in November I'll stop there thank you Paul excellent presentation you know before moving on to a tegu I just a quick question I'm I'm just curious I mean you said there's an uncertainty

about the free and open elections in America what what do you mean I mean it's not like you know you know but reading kind of thing whoa can you elaborate more on that last point well so so here I think I would I would point to the kind of argument that levissi and zeb lat make in their book which is that we need to recognize that democracies in the real world are not they're not all pure they're there they often have impurities in them and that often Democratic backsliding is about just increasing the amount of impurities so

like if you can make it more difficult for your opponents to vote then that gives you a big advantage and one of the things that's interesting in the United States now is that because the coal it the electoral coalition's are so predictable of the two parties there are all sorts of interventions that you can make and and conservatives have already been doing this and been in many ways to try to raise the thresholds make it more difficult for for voting to be carried out for further opposition's voters to

get to the polls and of course one thing that's very unusual about the United States is that local and state elections are often generally they are run by political officials not by neutral independent officials but by political officials who may be associated with with one party or another and there there are many decisions that they can make in Wisconsin there was a an election a few weeks ago in which in the middle of the pandemic Democrats were arguing that it was important that people have a chance to vote by mail to

but to vote remotely so that they wouldn't put their lives in danger by going to the polls well Republicans in Wisconsin thought that and the Republican a Republican dominated court prevented Democrats from from pursuing that that vote-by-mail strategy because they thought it was going to be their political advantage that the turnout among Democrats would be harmed more than the turnout among Republicans actually Democrats ended up winning that election voters weren't happy I think with with that but it

gives you an illustration of the kinds of things that potentially could be done okay thank you let's turn to pick ooh and those hoping to touch on as well in my remarks I'm for me in order to be able to keep to my time I have to read some prepared remarks but I wanted to first just sincerely thank presidents on for the opportunity and the honor to deliver some thoughts on the 2020 presidential elections in the United States the United States and South Korea are special allies with a linked history at

least throughout my lifetime and I very much look forward to sharing my house with you this morning I want to begin the same place that that all began in most of the u.s. presidential elections in my career as a political scientist there's a familiar cadence and rhythm between the moment that candidates declare their interest in running for president and the evening when results are counted and a winner is declared somewhere along that road political scientists like Paul and I might wager our forecasts as to who will win and all

the way along that road pollsters will gauge the sentiments of American voters with horse race polls that give us a further fine-grained sense of who is likely to win and why political science forecasting models using variations on a theme of indicators such as economic well-being and presidential approval can often predict who will win the labor day before the year of an election and even this year the first of the most commonly recognized half dozen or so forecasting models which is Helmut North's primary

model is already out with a prediction in case you missed it in January of this year nor quaff declared that donald trump had a 91 to 95 percent certainty of being reelected at the same time there are also poll aggregators like 538 the Princeton election consortium of automatic that are also remarkably good at not only predicting who will win but also estimating the margin of victory in a given election and here aggregators like five thirty eight.com currently predict the exact opposite outcome at

the present moment if you look at all the a grade polls reported by 538 they all show Biden ahead of Trump by about a seven to ten percent margin and that leads to my first key point which and this really not only should surprise nobody in this learned of audience but you've already heard this from Paul the 2020 election is unlikely to be a typical election in which we can rely on these political science forecasting models or polling aggregator predictions the first reason for this is that we only need to remember to 2016 election

when all the major political science forecasting models confidently predicted a win for Hillary Clinton and then Clinton lost the 2016 election gives us at least two reasons to be skeptical that forecasting models will be useful in 2020 one is the lesson that we continue to learn often in shocking and even lethal ways which is that Donald Trump is an uncommonly effective disrupter of political norms and institutions the other reason is that the United States for a whole host of reasons from foreign

intervention to domestic polarization is increasingly vulnerable to October surprises that could completely upend our expectations about who will win and who will lose and 2020 is shaping up to be an election in which there could be an unusually high number of potential October surprises from legal challenges to release Trump's tax returns which we're currently seeing constitutional challenges in terms of the emoluments clause tell-tale books that are currently being written and ready to be published by Trump's former confidants

and appointees not to mention the possibility of Russian interference again or the fallout from a another wave of COBIT 19 in the fall of course one major surprise is already upon us in the social economic and political and public health earthquake which is the corona virus pandemic and there's no understanding the extent to which covet 19 is a once-in-a century crisis with really unpredictable consequences on American politics so much so that even helmet nor paw the person who had the 91 to 95 percent prediction of a Trump win

has updated his website to say the massive disruptions caused by the corona virus outbreak may prompt me to revise my forecasts so how should we think about what is likely to happen in an upcoming election if existing models are unlikely to be useful and if we continue to face this unprecedented once in an epic crisis so here's my second point I think we should think about the coming election by identifying and understanding what has changed and what continues to change in the United States in terms of the basic

building blocks of border preferences and I'm going to refer to these alliterative ly as stories about institutions identities and ideologies and then information and a lot of my thoughts here a common thread with comments that Paul has already shared so I'll try to be a brief here each of these things could be an entire treatise by themselves so in terms of institutions political parties in the United States are really a a living organizational form that is currently undergoing major changes on

the right the Republican Party continues a metaphor Phasis that we started to see in 2016 if not before with the Tea Party movement from being the Grand Old Party that most of us grew up with - what could now be called the party of Trump one consequence of that is that we cannot continue to expect things like party leadership and party discipline independent of what Trump wants and where Trump is taking the party on the Left the Democratic Party is as much as it has been for a couple of generations

on the threshold of a deep divide between a Clinton obama-biden old guard and an angry insurgent mobilized Sanders Warren becauseö core-tex Cortes leftist wing one immediate consequence is that it is yet unclear whether Biden will or should try to win back independence and moderate Republicans by moving to the center during the election and maybe naming somebody like Amy Klobuchar as his running mate or whether he will or should tap the enormous potential of a reenergized left by naming somebody like

Warren Kamala Harris or Stacy aprons as his running mate and in this backdrop of parties reorganizing at the same time we also see norms of bipartisanship continue to erode polarization continue to grow and the proportion of Americans who I don't who don't identify with either party continue to grow my own personal view here is that Biden would do better to move to the left but I can save that for further in labor so that's institutions in terms of identities and ideologies American politics more and more is defined by

cleavage lines but the cleavage lines that have traditionally divided the country by party by ideology by identities are increasingly become becoming redrawn along a pro-trump or anti-trump axis one important trend here in American politics is that power struggles are increasingly moving from what political scientists would call the first face of power who wins or loses on for example a policy issue - struggles in the second face of power without getting too into the weeds of how political scientists think about

power in the United States the upshot here is very similar to president song's question to Paul about how this might not be a free and fair election which is the second face of power is all about battles over the rules of the game itself such as battles over checks and balances whether we will be governed by the rule of law or the constitutionality of certain exercises of executive power and conflicts over who gets to vote and how we get to vote and these all come down to likely battles we will see in

the future over the exercise of democracy itself so this matters because we need to expect in 2020 that who wins and how they win may very well be in a story about who wins the battle over the rules of the game and not so much what we're used to which is an election which is characterized by which party was better organized which candidates had the better ideas or more money and whether voters fundamentally wanted to change or more of the same then third the pro-trump anti-trump axis is also increasingly redefining and re sorting

Americans by social cleavages around race religion gender class citizenship and critically redefining and re sorting America around relatively new ideological beliefs such as the belief and fake news the prevalence of conspiracy theories and a renewed distrust of science and evidence this is the third key to understanding what may happen in 2020 and this is a story of information in terms of information the ability of Democratic voters to voice their opinions against elite level tactics and strategies over institutions and

ideologies depends crucially on the health and functioning of mediating institutions that inform the public and adjudicate facticity those institutions most prominently the mainstream media but I would also add universities and the scientific community have been under assault we are witnessing the lethal consequences of it this very moment in terms of kovat 19 and we will witness unfortunately I think much much more of this between now and November so so far I've stressed two key points about the

2020 election first that we should not look to traditional forecasting models for our expectations about what will happen this November and seconds that we instead need to understand how some of the fundamental elements of American politics its institutions identities ideologies and information channels are currently operating and evolving I want to make one last third key point about 2020 which is that we need to also keep in mind that for 2020 there are more than two possible outcomes to the presidential election in stable

consolidated democracies there are two outcomes to accompany two major party candidates either candidate a wins or candidate B wins and the litmus test for democracy stability as Adam svorski once famously put it is when democracy quote is the only game in town when no one can imagine acting outside democratic institutions when all the losers want to do is try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost to me it is unclear that in 2020 that all the losers on either side will

want to do is just try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost specifically I think we need to keep in mind that in 2020 there are probably four possible scenarios for what may happen the first two are familiar one Trump might win and the Democrats would accept that outcome to Biden could win and Trump might accept that outcome but they're also two other scenarios one where Biden wins and Trump refuses to accept that outcome throwing the country into disorder and political violence and fourth Trump

could win and the Democrats could also refuse to accept that outcome throwing the country into disorder and political violence this third and fourth scenario of the loser not conceding I think is more plausible than most of us would like to imagine possible as noted before Trump is a preternatural disrupter of political norms and institutions and for Trump the threat to delegitimize democratically held elections is already rehearsed in the 2016 election when he repeatedly voiced his worries publicly about the

legitimacy of the election anticipating that he would lose and he has been waving the flag of electoral fraud throughout his presidency as well for Biden if the Democrats lose because of things like foreign interference voter suppression or other kinds of corruptions or shenanigans it is entirely plausible to me that Biden and the Democrats also will not go as quietly into the night in defeat as Al Gore did in 2000 so the third key point is that we need to expect political potential scenarios in 2020 where our

constitutional electoral democracy itself is under threat in addition and I think this is a really important point in only one of those four scenarios will there be a strong impetus to return to some sort of pre Trump normalcy that is in particular for countries like South Korea a return to normalcy in which the United States can be a reliable ally a regular trade partner and a global leader only one of those four scenarios and even if Biden wins and Trump peacefully concedes the election this will only happen if Biden wins by moving

more to the center rather than fight and winning by moving to the Sanders Warren Aleksandra mikaze of Cortes wing of the Democratic Party in which we might return to something other than the Biden of the obama-biden years so this is a lot of doom and gloom but I think a realistic assessment at least on my part about the upcoming election for both personal and institutional reasons I am personally very invested in the scenario in which Biden might win and Trump might concede the legitimacy of that election

but I am also far from optimistic that that will actually be the outcome we are all faced with come Wednesday November 4th 2020 and I'll just stop there thank you thank you Teague for your excellent but gloomy presentation what would your poor trading what your trading America is not the country that we know so yeah with that let's turn to our designated discussants the first is I like to invite professor Sunbeam one of China University who is a leading spirit in American politics here in Korea mo please no to progresses thanks

for your presentation and it helped me a lot to have her understanding of the workings of American democracy and you were concerned about the prospect of future American democracy and I do not have much time so I recalled directory to the questions I have in mind the the first question I'd like to ask that of ask the first question to Professor Pierson and the second question to Professor Li okay and the first question is is about the you know the repetition of the 2016 white working-class nationalism and my question is is this

what would be the influence of the American white working-class nationalism and the anti-american sentiment in 2020 presidential election cycle compared with the 2016 presidential election would they be weakened or strengthened or late remain dust made above the same level and related to this you know rampant convey the nineteen chaos how would they convey the 19 effect the influence of the white working-class nationalism in this 2012 2020 presidential election that's my first question and the second question to this

time professor Lee is list about the satisfaction and you know in the team of the sender's faction within the Democratic Party and their relationship with are the old guard you know are by defection so my question is this what would be the prospect that the Sanders supporters and satisfaction in the Democratic Party also supports Joe Biden with the vase of pop Joe Biden and if they would why would they vote Joe Biden instead of being stuck at home on the election day and what kind of counteroffer

should the Joe Biden prepare for gaining their support center section and if Joe Biden embraces the left-wing agenda can there be risk of losing middle ground voters in the 2020 pressures Election Day that would be the my second question to Professor link and this is very trivial question the last one I hope professor terribly answered this question you you know dividing the old guard Democratic fraction and you know insurgent you know very very angry fraction let my cut okay so caucus and you know send us and

you you know categorized former President Obama as the old guard you know Democratic leader can you say that you know he's in between you know Joe Biden and Sanders so uh if you add more more you know explanation on that it would be fine for me that's my questions thank thank you pin one yeah I think you know each of you have questions and then the last question I think it goes to the polls so Paul who you want to start first sure thank you very much for that great questions and I'll just say a little bit

about Trump and the white working-class and you know it's part of a longer evolution right where this is the direction the Republican Party has been moving for some time is shifting in the direction of really bolstering its appeals to more down second ah mcclee downscale voters with less education pulling back from trying to expand the the racial diversity of the Republican coalition around you know becoming hard more hardline on immigration and so on and Trump just accelerated that process and what's interesting is that since the

2016 election he has just intensified that movement in the party you might have thought that he would actually maybe at that point sort of moderate a little bit and find ways to expand his electoral coalition and reach out to voters who traditionally had vote in Republican I'm thinking especially of white suburban college-educated people many of whom did vote Republican because they liked low taxes and so on and Trump has made no effort to expand his coalition in that direction quite the opposite and in fact there's been

movement away from him among those among those suburban voters which is partly why Republicans lost the House of Representatives in 2018 so during the current campaign I think we can see he only really knows how to play it this way which is to do the kind of red meat appeals populist kinds of kinds of rhetoric where it's all about who you who you should hate and and who you should be angry at and so trying to continue to mobilize and just increase and increase the intensity with which you try to mobilize these white

working-class voters now that's going to be more challenging now because the economy is performing so much worse right and many of those voters are going to be badly damaged by this change in the economy but but it's clear already I think that this is the direction that he's going to go in trying to generate hostility to China um you can see already that he's tried various rhetorical moves hostility to China being a prominent one that he's going to try to use to mobilize that that kind of sentiment

so he made continuing games after 2016 with these groups that were sort of offset by his loss of white suburban votes so the question is what will now happen over the next six months and I think one aspect of this that is really interesting to watch is that it appears like he's losing ground among white Americans who are over the age of 65 which had become a very strong voting bloc for him and that's a very important voting bloc because these are people who actually turn out as an issue in American

elections we don't typically have very high turnout in our elections but older people though so that's been a very reliable constituency for Trump among white White's over 65 and 65 year olds in the US or you know there's much higher proportion of people in that age group that are white in the US but that that support seems to be really softening and in part because in part I think because of the virus because his his his eagerness to essentially say let's not worry too much about Grandma you know let's get the economy going

going again that doesn't sound as good to some voters who who are grandmas and grandpas right so so I think that's going to be an interesting thing to watch and then and then the other aspect of it is that those voters mostly don't find Biden very threatening right Biden actually appeals he's well known by older voters so he he has more appeal to them than then Hillary Clinton did now now whether Biden can buy was gonna lose votes among younger voters it looks like he's not he's not as popular as either

Obama or Hillary Clinton was at this point among younger voters so that but that feeds into the question you ask takes you so I'll leave I'll leave that for him great I can't resist the opportunity to say I think Paul just predicted that Biden would win Florida well if I if I were them I'd be worried about if I were the Republicans I'd be worried about Florida for these reasons yeah I think I think I think those are great comments to think about the one edition I would say even though I know the question was mainly directed at

Paulus I think one thing that's happened during the Trump presidency is that he he's moved himself from white working-class nationalism as a strategy to win the election to white working-class national as an identity and I think in the process of that move I think the potential electoral base around white working-class nationalism has shrunk a little bit and in a close election that might that might matter you know in terms of the Sanders faction I you know I think the two important parts of that

question are you know will will they move over to Biden and will they actually turn out to vote so will they move over with enthusiasm I think the easy answer is to say you know it depends in large part on who he picks as his vice presidential candidate but that is also probably putting far greater weight on vice presidential candidates than that it deserves and I think on Biden's part if he picks a vice presidential candidate that really ought shines him as a presidential candidate that too can be a liability and if you

know about Joe Biden's performance as a political candidate it's probably not too hard for a vice presidential candidate to outshine him so I think he has to be very careful about weighing too heavily on that decision of a vice presidential candidate to do the work for him of bringing the Sanders voters over to his side I think potentially much more promising is the consequences of kovat 19 which I think it has been such a crisis in the United States that it really reveals a lot of structural problems in the United States both in

terms of its economy and the way in which politics works in the United States and if the core of the Sanders war on Alexandria or Kasich Cortez Wing is a structural critique of business power and American political economy I think voters are much more open to hearing that argument now even voters in the center arguments such as the need to universalize our healthcare system to something closer than what they have in the United Kingdom than what we've traditionally had the United States I think it's

inconceivable that we would have been at this particular place but for the fact of this crisis so I think to the extent that Biden uses that opportunity to move towards a to move the Democratic Party towards more of a structural critique of the American economy and a business power then I think that could do more work to bring Sanders voters over to to his side than picking the right vice-presidential candidate in terms of Obama you know I think I described Obama as part of the old guard in part because of my own personal views

of Obama where I thought he was a transformational candidate and a very old guard president so I think he was there was much more continuity in terms of how he governed with Democrats of the past such as the clinton-gore administration then there was anything that was distinctly different about it so I think he was very transformative in the way he thought about mobilizing voters to win elections in ways that I think we continued to see in the 2018 midterm elections when there was large-scale repudiation of Trump in

elections that usually see very low voter turnout and I think we'll you know remain to be seen whether Biden is able to tap into some of that as well so I think you know Obama as a candidate is quite different from who Obama was as a president and I would read Obama as President as part of the old Democratic Guard okay thank you now let's turn to check on Qian yeah please please go about it thank you I'm Jin Seong Chun thank you for your great insightful presentation I have two questions related to the u.s. foreign

policy it's not directly related to your presentation but there are many audiences in South Korea who are interested in you know u.s. point policy first question will be about the bilateral relations between ices in China the second one will be about the expecting foreign policy of the new administration from next year so what will be the top priorities of the foreign policy for the next administration whether you will be Biden or Trump administration both two professors if possible the first one is

well we expected that the coronavirus situation will be a silly teacher of the bilateral cooperation between us in China because that's the common threat to the public health in teacher terms but it turns out that for the virus is not bad enough or fatally enough to facilitate the bilateral cooperation so there are many discourses and never it is about blaming game who will be more responsible for this aggravation of the situation so do you expect this type of the escalation of confrontation starting

from both countries will define the short term bilateral relations until the election times will it be the short term president Trump's election strategy to blame China probably to aggravate that the trade tension in the coming month promised by starting the second phase of the trade deal or is it the result of the long term aggravation of American public's perception of China saying that China is the disseminator of the International global collective bats such as virus by mishandling a divided

situation the initial face so will it be the result coming from this generally aggravating American public's perception of China so what will be the long-term prospect of this Alero confrontation how will that define the American foreign policy becoming a month in years so that's the first one the second one when we go back to the 21st century in general under the US unipolarity many American s administration started with crisis we should measure with the terrorist attack an Obama administration

with the 2008 it can make it a concise recession and now the next administration will be confronted with a serious challenge coming from the Corbett situation and public health so we expect that top priorities of the next American administrations will be very much different from the past ones or exceptional so we can easily expect that the top priority is how to deal with this healthy situation the second one will be to revitalize American economy the question will be what will be the third well if there is a trump

administration of the second term will he be different in dealing with the foreign policy situations thinking probably the legacy in his mind is to change his courses to foreign policies there are a possibility of that the more interesting question will be what would be the foreign policy of the candidate Biden if he becomes the president so we expect that there might be turned to the pre trumpian normalcy by you know reassuming American global leadership and providing international collective goods to other countries but still there

is a concerns that in this very different situation even though he will pursue different foreign policy but there will be a continuing somehow trumpian american first type of foreign policy even under the Biden administration because there are a lot of lack of American capability to deal with the situations but in South Korea there is expectation that new American administration will put more emphasis on the importance of alliance and revitalizing the importance of multilateralism and what will be the

public support in those states about reassuming the American leadership generally for the next administration thank you very much thank you thank you for for those questions at this time why don't we start with Teague and then oh sure so I mean those are great questions I think in terms of bilateral relations between the US and China I'm thinking a bit about presentation I gave that a KAS conference in the fall where I thought out loud about this theory and international relations about domestic audience costs and why it is

that you would expect the idea behind a theory is that when leader makes a lot of threats empty threats and engages in a lot of cheap talk that's hostile towards another party oftentimes that leader has to bear domestic audience costs audience costs for having done so in Trump's case especially with respect to China there seems to be close to zero domestic audience costs for the kind of vituperative rhetoric he is engaged in with respect to China and there's a lot of reasons why that might be the case

but I think the upshot of if that's a fair characterization of the absence of domestic audience costs in Trump's case is that he is freer to basically move around as as he chooses to in terms of how he thinks about and uses us-china relations for his own personal political purposes and I think anything that concerns predictions about a second Trump administration I think has to start from observations about his record in his first administration which is in my reading not a administration that has

some grand design either with respect to domestic politics or foreign relations but really emanates from a the the personality himself of Trump and so from that perspective I think if Trump sees it necessary or expedient to try to cast China as an enemy for the purposes of political gain he's certainly going to do that between now and and November it's important to keep in mind though that to the extent that he has already done that in the last three years of his presidency for the most part it hasn't

had that much traction with American voters so in the polls that I've looked at for the most part Americans still value the idea of globalized economy they still like the idea of America being engaged in multilateral relations with other countries they certainly think of that as being the way forward in terms of how we move on from the current colvett crisis in terms of you know having coordination with the w-h-o for example and so there there's some slight uptick specifically in terms of how the US thinks about China in

slightly more negative terms but I don't think we are in a situation so far from based on the first three years of the trump presidency of Trump really being able to rail against China and against eugen thing and create this mass upsurge of angry Americans and angry sentiments towards China so for example if you try to project far far ahead to a worst-case scenario about whether or not US and China might be engaged in you know military conflict as a result of this kind of incendiary rhetoric I don't see

any appetite on the behalf of American voters for anything like that so even though I think Trump likes to opportunistically choose enemies for personal political gain and China certainly is low-hanging fruit from that perspective I don't really see him as being able to gain that much from from doing that you know I think that the and for the most part I've already touched on some parts of an answer towards your second question about top priorities the one other thing that I would add is you know I think Biden really sees foreign

policy as his strong suit that's really been one of his top priorities and one of his areas of you know unique policy expertise from his years as a senator and I think based on his record from those years unless there's a really strong pole towards the left from the Sanders wing of the party in a way that really compels Biden I think Biden's first goal if he were to win the presidency would be try to try to return the United States to some semblance of a pre Trump normalcy in terms of foreign relations thank you all

so it would be more interesting probably if I disagree with my colleague but I don't about about anything that he said there but those are both great questions let's it very quickly on the first one I agree I don't think president Trump would hesitate for a moment to turn China into a demon if he thought that it would help him electorally but I agree with Daegu I actually don't think the evidence so far suggests that that's likely to work all that well just as not seen polling for example on you know

what percentage of Americans have actually picked up this language of calling it the the China virus or the Wuhan virus and it's it's vanishingly small like you know it just and I think that in all their additional obstacles but like the fact that Trump is on video you know saying you know many of the things that he wants to accuse other people about with respect to being duped by China so I I just I he he wouldn't hesitate to play play that card and I'm sure that they will try it they'll try anything they can they wouldn't hesitate

但我我我我怀疑明年美国国内以及对华人的负面情绪会大幅上升。展望未来政府，我认为拜登政府会希望大致重塑希拉里·克林顿或奥巴马时期那种外交政策，他会努力实现这一点，但挑战在于

特朗普政府更容易搞破坏，而重建基于信任、信誉和可靠性的关系则要困难得多。我认为其他国家在与美国打交道时会更加谨慎，并且在未来会更加怀疑美国是否能成为一个可靠的谈判伙伴。因此，除了拜登政府将面临的所有其他危机之外，我认为这真的会非常

非常难以修复特朗普政府过去四年造成的损害。至于第二个特朗普任期，我直言不讳，我不认为他的外交政策是“美国优先”，我认为是“特朗普优先”。但是，退出国际协议和联盟的约束，是他将自己置于首位的一种方式。我认为美国目前面临的局势中，真正令人担忧的许多事情之一是，我认为第二个特朗普任期，而且我认为我们已经在特朗普第一个任期的最后一年看到了这一点，他现在不受约束，他很自信，美国政治体系固有的制衡机制不会约束他，他不必担心共和党参议员将他免职，他越来越不必担心法院的制约。如果他再执政四年，我猜他也不会

太担心媒体，他会觉得他对媒体有更大的影响力。特朗普优先或美国优先的外交政策的一个好处是，当他与外国谈判时，他可以接受巨额的私人经济利益回扣。这不会被公开，尤其是在所有制衡都被移除的情况下。有很多国家愿意与一个失能的

超级大国谈判，而这个超级大国愿意为了私人利益而做出让步。所以，我同意他的外交政策在很多方面是不合逻辑的，但我认为这种不合逻辑正是我们可能期望在第二个特朗普任期中看到的。好的，谢谢。我们已经进行了两次讨论和发言，现在转向观众。我们已经收到了很多观众的问题。第一个问题，这是我们收到的第一个问题，我猜是的，来自一位在美国

工作的韩国人，他问：托尼·托尼·R总统选举是否会仅通过邮寄缺席选票在所有50个州举行？这是一个技术性问题。第二个问题是关于，我们有三个问题问的是同样的事情：有多少独立候选人？独立候选人在选举中有多重要？我想，关于第一个问题，我认为一切都应该为仅通过邮寄缺席选票的可能性做好准备。但

我认为只有在疫情出现第二波并蔓延到所有50个州的情况下才会出现这种情况。正如保罗所指出的，将会有很多州会重演我们在威斯康星州看到的动态，即如果某个州的共和党当权派认为在投票站举行选举有价值，因为他们认为这会压制投票率，并以有利于共和党候选人和特朗普的方式降低投票率，那么即使出现第二波疫情蔓延到全国，我们很可能也会看到很多州坚持举行实际的选举。关于第二个问题，我认为通常会有一位自由党候选人，我认为今年贾斯汀·阿马什代表该党参选，但除此之外我没听说过别的。我认为到目前为止，最大的威胁将是像迈克尔·布隆伯格选择作为第三方

候选人参选。出于各种原因，尽管他作为民主党初选候选人可能受到了不公平对待，但也许他只受到了与他实际表现相符的不公平对待，但他似乎并不打算出于任何个人原因竞选第三方候选人。他似乎更想击败唐纳德·特朗普。谢谢。这里有一个来自成均馆大学的Maria Hiko的问题，这个问题是给Teague的。你说

拜登获胜，而特朗普拒绝接受，你认为会发生什么直接行动？我认为这些是政治科学家，尤其是在美国这样的发达工业化民主国家，真的没有受过训练去思考的情景。我认为部分答案在于特朗普经常，尤其是在他的集会上，谈论他得到了军队的支持，得到了警察的支持。我认为

我不会排除总统上演他不会和平卸任的剧本，这在美国国内会引发很多丑陋事件。其中许多情景并非我作为政治科学家所受的训练能够仔细思考的。很大程度上也取决于国会在这种情况下愿意扮演什么角色，法院愿意扮演什么角色。是的，我想说的是，首先，我

我也有和Teague一样的顾虑。这很不寻常。是的，我受训教授和研究的是一个非常和平、高度稳定（至少在其正式制度方面）的民主国家，现在不得不应对这些问题，感觉非常奇怪。但我认为我们不能回避。我认为现实是显而易见的，这并非意味着我们一定会

滑向这个方向，但发生的事情足够多，以至于我认为不试图应对它是不诚实的。举个例子，今天密歇根州立法机构宣布他们将休会，因为他们担心武装团体一直在抗议，包括在州议会大厦内，也就是立法机构开会的那个大楼。人们携带自动武器抗议居家令。

我知道我也有一些和你一样的困扰，我觉得这非常不寻常。是的，我接受的训练是教导和研究一个非常和平且高度稳定（至少在其正式制度方面）的民主国家，而现在不得不面对这些问题，这感觉非常奇怪。但我不认为我们可以，我认为我们不能回避它们。我认为现实是显而易见的，但这并不意味着我们必然会

密歇根州的局势如此严峻，以至于州立法机构，实际上是共和党占多数的州立法机构，决定他们必须躲起来，不能公开开会。现在想象一下，如果一位总统多年来一直说对方在作弊、窃取选举，并且得到了强大的媒体支持，而数千万美国人对此深信不疑。想象一下，在选举之夜，他宣布选举被窃取了，那会发生什么？我不知道，但这并非不可能的情景。如果选举很激烈，当然，在美国，由于病毒的影响，邮寄选票会很慢。加州的选票会很慢。我住在加州，

现在加州大多数人都是邮寄投票，需要十天才能计算完各选区的选票。所以，很有可能总统会宣布欺诈。谢谢。这是一个关于身份认同的问题，关于最近的韩国选举。一般来说，在选举中，我们看到选民之间的代沟越来越大。以美国为例，像千禧一代选民、年轻人，他们有什么政治特征？

他们特别支持美国的全球领导地位吗？我可以先说一点，听了这个问题后我想到的一点是，如果美国的年轻选民像韩国的年轻选民那样，特朗普就不会在2016年获胜，谁会获胜的争论也会少得多。即使在本周加利福尼亚州南部举行的一次选举中，是为了填补一位2018年当选的国会议员直到11月任期，这位议员因为与一名工作人员有染而被迫辞职，但这是一位民主党国会议员，她输给了竞选填补该职位直到11月的共和党候选人，这让很多人感到惊讶。但那次选举的部分原因，尤其是在疫情期间，是年长的美国人出来投票，而那个选区的年轻选民没有出来投票。这是美国一个非常古老的故事。2018年的中期国会选举确实是一个例外。我非常惊喜地看到年轻选民继续像2018年中期选举那样出来投票。我担心他们可能不会，特别是考虑到唐纳德·特朗普是民主党候选人的领头羊。拜登，我能说什么？我说的是

乔·拜登。是的，没错。我认为这是最大的问题之一，如果说这里有什么值得关注的竞选活动的话，我同意Teague的观点，这是最大的问题之一，那就是年轻选民会怎么样。他们不会投票给唐纳德·特朗普。近年来，年轻选民一直强烈倾向于民主党，而特朗普则加速了这一趋势。问题更多在于他们有多少人可能会支持第三方候选人，但这看起来并不像是一个大问题。更重要的是他们是否会出来投票。我不得不说，我仍然倾向于认为，最终

年轻人的投票率可能会很高，实际上可能会像2018年那样。如果只是因为，而且我认为这实际上可能更多地取决于唐纳德·特朗普是否在选票上，而不是乔·拜登做了什么。选举将是对他总统任期的公投，而这正是我所说的，这是美国政治中的一个传统，即当一位总统竞选第二个任期时，选举主要是关于人们如何看待总统的第一个任期，或者至少是第一个任期的结束。我认为有很多理由认为这对唐纳德·特朗普来说是一个大问题。谢谢。这里有一个问题，你们两位都提到了民主的衰退，这发生在世界各地，特别是在工业化发达国家。从比较的视角来看，你们是否看到了任何美国特有的因素？是的，这是一个很好的问题。我认为美国

的体制在某些方面很特殊，这与我们制度的性质有关。传统上，我认为我们的制度对这种动态提供了强有力的制衡，因为政治体系非常分散，以至于围绕像唐纳德·特朗普这样的人物形成一个真正的全国性联盟，而这个联盟不会受到其他拥有自己权力的政治体系部分的有效制衡，这似乎是一件很难办到的事情。所以，我

认为令人震惊的事情之一，也是需要解释的事情之一，我将与雅各布·哈克合作出版一本书，试图解释其中一些内容，那就是共和党真的已经屈服了，或者说，我看了《权力的游戏》，里面有一句名言，“你是否屈服？”“你是否向要求你效忠的人屈服？”基本上，共和党最终还是屈服了。这

在门罗式的权力分立政治体系中是不应该发生的。所以，理解这一点很有意思。另外，我认为美国的情况也很有意思，那就是你可能会出现雅各布·哈克所说的“少数派政府”。少数派可以统治多数派，因为他们的地理位置。参议院与美国人口没有可比性。所以，如果你是美国农村地区的一个强大政党，你将在获得参议院多数席位方面拥有真正的优势。因此，共和党在最近大多数参议院选举中都输掉了全国总票数，但由于农村优势，他们拥有多数参议员。同样的优势也帮助特朗普赢得总统职位，尽管他输掉了普选票。

然后，我不想深入探讨所有复杂性，但它甚至有助于共和党在众议院获得优势，因为民主党在城市地区浪费了太多选票。所以，你可能有一个体系，特别是如果你能够将最高法院塞满你的支持者，你就有了一个体系，你实际上并没有获得多数人的支持，但你可以执政。这与勒庞和西比勒谈论的民主衰退有所不同，但这也是美国正在发生的一部分。是的，我只想补充一点，我认为任何时候你问美国是否有什么与世界上其他国家发生的事情不同，你都必须考虑种族在美国政治中扮演的组织性角色的作用，而这在许多其他国家很少见。所以，我认为今天发生的一部分是，一个政党对似乎是

不可避免的人口结构变化做出的反应，这种变化很可能在全国范围内确保民主党的长期主导地位。共和党甚至在特朗普上台之前就已经为这种必然性做好了准备，那就是将竞争从谁输谁赢转变为关于游戏规则、谁的选票可以被取消、谁的选票可以被压制等等。现在，有了特朗普，它进一步演变成了，我

认为特朗普几乎不存在于奥巴马总统之前。因此，很难不至少考虑这一论点，即美国民主衰退的触发因素是奥巴马总统任期。茶党运动本身是否足以从根本上改变美国社会、政治和经济制度，就像特朗普总统任期三年所做的那样，这一点尚不清楚。而且我认为，如果没有奥巴马总统任期，特朗普总统任期就不会发生。好的，现在快到时间了，最后一个问题，你们每人回答一下。如果拜登获胜，在外交政策方面，这会是真正的、严格的回归特朗普之前的常态吗？还是说，他会努力，但基本上是延续当前的领导地位，即处于衰退之中？你想先回答吗？我不是外交政策专家，所以这非常有猜测性，但我也许可以从一个我更了解的角度来回答。

拜登政府在外交政策方面将面临的挑战是，你如何将这一切重新粘合起来，尤其是在美国实力被视为相对下降的背景下？我认为这是一个巨大的挑战。即使在有利的情况下，这对美国总统来说也是一项非常艰巨的任务。我认为有一件事可能会，如果人们希望看到这种

结果，那么有一件事可能会带来一些乐观情绪，这实际上遵循了Teague刚才所说的，那就是共和党在某些方面一直在与时间赛跑。他们奉行的政治策略在美国民主的长期背景下毫无意义。他们疏远了不断增长的少数族裔人口，疏远了所有45岁以下的人。正如参议员林赛·格雷厄姆所描述的，我们不再能产生足够愤怒的白人男性了，或者说，不再有足够多的年老愤怒的白人男性来维持这种策略。所以，如果你接受这一点，那么希望就必须是，共和党在某个时候将不得不改变方向。如果美国民主能够维持自身并度过这个黑暗时期，那么共和党为了保持竞争力，将不得不改变方向，远离它一直依赖的非常狭隘、有针对性的

选民群体。所以，如果你接受这一点，那么希望就必须是，共和党在某个时候将不得不改变方向。如果美国民主能够维持自身并度过这个黑暗时期，那么共和党为了保持竞争力，将不得不改变方向，远离它一直依赖的非常狭隘、有针对性的选民群体。因此，美国外交政策传统上依赖于这种两党合作和共识。这就是我对美国政治的总体看法。我们需要一个更健康的共和党，美国政治才能蓬勃发展。在我们的政治体系中，你不能让两大政党之一不是一个健康的政治政党，而让体系能够持久地维持下去。所以，如果

我想要描绘一幅拜登外交政策未来的乐观图景，那就是我和我确定他们也在考虑这些，他们确实想尝试推动共和党走向一个不同的未来，一个不那么依赖“烧毁一切”策略的未来。我认为保罗完全正确，破坏比重建容易得多。我也同意，重建的关键部分是重建许多已经受损的信任。

所以，我认为这里既有潜在的乐观迹象，也有潜在的悲观迹象。我认为，拜登的一个优势不仅在于他认为外交政策是他的专业领域，而且在于他多年来作为参议院外交关系委员会的成员以及八年担任副总统期间，他确实认识了许多国际政治舞台上的人，并与他们建立了私人关系。这是重建美国作为盟友和全球领导者所需的大量信任的一个良好基础。悲观的原因是，美国不是唯一一个近年来发生变化的国家。我认为北约已经不是特朗普上任前的北约了。英国也不是几年前的英国了。考虑到新冠肺炎，很难想象如何复兴《巴黎协定》。考虑到近年来亚洲经济的发展，很难看到如何

复兴TPP。所以，不仅是美国在过去几年里发生了巨大的变化，世界在过去几年里也发生了巨大的变化，这也将限制拜登将美国带回特朗普之前的世界状态的可能成功程度。谢谢。我们时间有点超了，所以是时候结束了。今天的讨论非常引人入胜，富有启发性。

感谢保罗和Teague分享你们的见解。很高兴和你们在一起。也要感谢Chesham以及观众们提出的精彩问题。很抱歉，你们的一些问题没有得到回答，但我们很快就会有另一次机会。最后，东亚研究所感谢韩国外交部赞助本次活动。在你们离开之前，我想问一下，

请填写一份关于本次网络研讨会的简短调查问卷。你们的反馈对于我们改进至关重要。调查问卷可以在下面的公共意见调查中找到。再次感谢大家今天的参与，下次网络研讨会很快就会举行。首尔再见。谢谢。

첨부파일:

[EAI在线研讨会]2020美国大选展望_200515.pdf

林赛·格雷厄姆曾说，我们不再培养足够多的愤怒的白人男性，或者说他们不再制造足够多的年老的、愤怒的白人男性来维持这种策略。好吧，所以，如果你接受这一点，那就意味着希望在于共和党在某个时候将不得不改变方向，对吧？如果美国民主能够自我支撑并度过这个黑暗的时期，那么为了保持竞争力，共和党将不得不改变方向，远离它一直以来所依赖的非常狭隘、有针对性的

有针对性的选民群体。而美国的外交政策传统上一直依赖于这种两党合作和共识。所以，这就是我对美国政治的总体看法。我们需要一个更健康的共和党，如果美国的政治体制要繁荣发展。在我们的政治体系中，你不能让两大政党之一不健康，而让整个体系能够持久地运作。所以，如果

我想描绘一幅关于拜登政府未来外交政策的乐观图景，那将是——我确信他们也在考虑这些——他们确实想努力促成一个朝着共和党不同未来方向的转变，一个不那么依赖于“摧毁一切”策略的未来。我认为保罗说得绝对正确，打破东西比重建它们容易得多，我也同意，重建的关键部分是重建许多已被削弱的信任。

因此，我认为这里既有潜在乐观的迹象，也有潜在悲观的迹象。我认为，拜登的优势之一不仅在于他将外交政策视为自己的专业领域，而且在于他多年来作为参议院外交关系委员会成员以及担任八年副总统期间，他确实认识了许多全球政治舞台上的人物，并与他们建立了私人关系。这是重建许多必要信任的一个良好基础，以便美国能够恢复其作为盟友和全球领导者的地位。我认为悲观的理由是，美国并非唯一一个在过去几年里发生变化的国家。我认为北约已不再是特朗普上任前的北约。英国已不再是几年前的英国。考虑到新冠疫情，很难想象如何复苏《巴黎协定》。很难看到你

如何复苏《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》（TPP），考虑到近年来亚洲许多经济体发生的情况。因此，不仅是美国自身在过去几年里发生了巨大变化，而且世界其他许多地方也发生了巨大变化，这也将是拜登将美国带回特朗普执政前世界状态的可能成功的一个制约因素。谢谢。我们已经超时一点了，所以是时候结束了。今天的讨论非常引人入胜，富有启发性。

感谢保罗和特格与我们分享你们的见解。很高兴和你们在一起，也要感谢申和彻申以及听众提出的绝佳问题。我很抱歉有些问题没有真正回答到，但我们很快将有另一次机会。最后但同样重要的是，东亚研究所（EAI）感谢韩国外交部和韩国政府赞助本次活动。在您离开之前，我想请您

填写一份关于本次网络研讨会的简短调查问卷。您的反馈对于我们改进工作至关重要。您可以在下面的公共意见调查中找到该问卷。再次感谢大家的参与，期待我们很快举行的第二次网络研讨会。首尔再见。谢谢。

您。

附件：[EAI网络研讨会]2020美国大选展望_200515.pdf