Smart Q&A: Shin Beom-sik on the Ukraine Crisis: Putin's Diplomatic Strategy and Changes in the East Asian Strategic Environment

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/140321_Sqa.flv

Professor Shin Beom-sik holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and is currently a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University.

On March 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the ratification bill for the annexation of Crimea, officially incorporating the Autonomous Republic of Crimea into Russia. This occurred less than a month after the Ukraine crisis erupted, following the occupation of Crimean government buildings, parliament, and the airport by pro-Russian armed forces and the swift deployment of Russian troops to the Crimean Peninsula. Ukraine reduced its power supply to Crimea by nearly half, the European Union (EU) and the United States imposed additional economic sanctions on Russia as previously warned, and the leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) met at the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, Netherlands, resolving to exclude Russia from major international forums, including the Group of Eight (G8) summit, for the time being. Domestically, many experts voiced concerns about the repercussions of this crisis on the denuclearization of North Korea and the South Korean government's Eurasian Initiative. In response, the East Asia Institute (EAI) invited Professor Shin Beom-sik (Seoul National University) for an interview on March 21 to examine the background of the Ukraine crisis and its impact on the East Asian strategic landscape. Professor Shin explained Russia's strategic calculations regarding Crimea, analyzed the crisis's repercussions on the East Asian strategic environment, and outlined the challenges facing South Korea. The main points are as follows:

The Ukraine Crisis and Russia's Strategic Intentions

"The Ukraine crisis is an event signaling Russia's refusal to retreat further after being on the defensive since the end of the Cold War."

It is difficult to view the current Crimean crisis as a result of domestic political factors in Russia. While it is true that Putin's domestic support base has weakened somewhat compared to the past, it was not to the extent of becoming a factor of internal instability. It is also true that there was a need to reverse the trend due to a sharp slowdown in economic growth, but annexing Crimea was a choice that entailed the acceptance of excessively high economic costs, especially when major Western countries had warned of extensive economic sanctions against Putin's aggressive actions.

The full scope of this crisis cannot be understood without appreciating the accumulated sense of grievance within Russia at the international political level. Firstly, the United States, which has exerted decisive influence on the international stage since the end of the Cold War, did not actively pursue efforts to improve relations with Russia. Although the Obama administration initiated a "reset" effort to restore relations that had deteriorated significantly during the George W. Bush administration, the United States ultimately failed to take sincere measures regarding Russia's demand for the restoration of its great power status and role in the international community, which Russia had hoped for. This, combined with the emotional confrontation between the leaders of the two countries during Putin's third term and Obama's second term, led to a deterioration in relations. Putin and Obama did not accept each other's invitations to summits such as the G8, NATO, and APEC. Relations worsened further when the United States, in response to Russia granting asylum to Edward Snowden, who had leaked classified documents from the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), resumed its push for the deployment of a missile defense (MD) system in Eastern Europe, a sensitive issue for Russia. The situation was similar in Europe. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, yet the Western world continued to expand eastward economically and security-wise through the EU and NATO, reaching Georgia and Ukraine. In other words, it is appropriate to view the current Ukraine crisis as an event signaling Russia's refusal to retreat further after being on the defensive throughout the post-Cold War era.

From Russia's perspective, Ukraine is a region of core interest. Geopolitically, Ukraine is a traditional buffer zone between Eastern European countries and Russia. Geo-economically, it is a crucial region through which key energy transport routes to Europe pass. Furthermore, historically, culturally, and ethnically, it is a fraternal nation very close to Russia. Losing Ukraine would mean Russia directly bordering Western countries militarily and losing a vital corridor for easier contact with European nations. Considering that, as history shows in events like the Napoleonic Wars and Hitler's invasion of Russia during World War II, Russia's security has traditionally been protected by the deep strategic depth afforded by its vast territory, one can understand the security anxieties that the incorporation of Ukraine into Western influence would cause for Russia. In this context, some scholars argue that Ukraine is Russia's "Achilles' heel."

From a military and security strategy perspective, the Crimean Peninsula is a region of vital interest for Russia. Crimea has historically served as Russia's ice-free port since the Tsarist era and is the sole base for operating the Black Sea Fleet, Russia's main naval force in the southern theater. Losing such a crucial military base could lead to a loss of comprehensive influence over Russia's southern belt. The resulting strategic vacuum has historically led to invasions by Middle Eastern or European powers. Therefore, the loss of Crimea could simultaneously increase security vulnerabilities in Russia's western and southern regions, making it a matter of vital interest for Russia.

Putin's Medium- to Long-Term Strategic Direction

"Russia is fundamentally raising the issue of the need for 'democratization' of the international political order, rather than simply pursuing its own great power status."

Examining President Putin's policies pursued thus far from a national strategy perspective reveals that the Ukraine crisis was not merely a measure taken in response to a "defensive situation." First and foremost, Putin's overall policy orientation throughout his tenure has been to restore the Russian state order, which collapsed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and to regain Russia's status as a great power. In the 1990s, Russian society was in a state of extreme chaos, summarized as the "lost decade," characterized by normative confusion, clashes of extreme ideologies, weakening of the central government due to increased autonomy of regional governments, and excessive influence of oligarchs who expanded through illicit means. Putin was the leader who ended this period and restored state order and normalcy. His public approval ratings have consistently remained above 70 percent, reflecting overwhelming support for his prioritization of stability over democracy, which laid the foundation for Russia's rise as a great power.

Putin's first term foreign policy focused on restoring Russia's diminished status in the international community. While restoring relations with Europe, Russia realistically acknowledged its weakened position in terms of national strength but concentrated on defining and protecting its vital national interests, which it could never afford to abandon. With the former Soviet states in the Eurasian region, it secured multi-layered means to maintain Russian influence by utilizing bilateral relations, sub-regionalism, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) framework. Although efforts were made to improve relations with the United States during this period, when this proved difficult, Russia improved relations with China and sought to gain a certain stake as a balancing power in the international community by closely cooperating with China on a strategy towards the U.S.

By Putin's second term, the efforts of the first term had yielded certain results, enabling Russia to restore its influence in the Eurasian region, where its core national interests lay. It also succeeded in relatively reducing and repelling U.S. military and diplomatic influence in the Eurasian region. Relations between Europe and Russia also developed stably through energy diplomacy centered on natural gas.

The most significant characteristic of Russia's foreign policy in Putin's third term is the recovery of its confidence. This is evidenced by the unannounced full-scale military drills and readiness checks last year, the strengthening of strategic weapon systems in Russia's Far East and Eastern European regions, the demonstration of Russia's diplomatic capabilities in the Middle East crisis, and the expression of independent voices on various Northeast Asian issues, including North Korea, distinct from China's.

The Ukraine crisis also clearly demonstrates Russia's enhanced confidence in Putin's third term. Furthermore, it signifies Russia's public declaration of its intention to actively pursue a new role as a balancer in the ongoing debates about the international order and norms, advocating for the necessity of establishing a multipolar order within the international community. Russia has effectively entered the fray of various debates surrounding international legal principles such as the principle of sovereignty, self-determination of peoples, and the responsibility to protect (R2P). While the European Union respected Kosovo's right to self-determination and recognized its independence from Serbia in 2008, it took the opposite stance in the current Crimean crisis, which followed a similar process. Russia is raising the issue that it will no longer tolerate the West's double standards in interpreting and resolving issues in accordance with Western interests, even when clear international legal principles have not been established between the principle of sovereignty and international intervention. This clearly illustrates that Russia's foreign policy, as manifested in the Ukraine crisis, is fundamentally raising the issue of the need for "democratization" of the international political order, rather than simply pursuing its own great power status.

Repercussions on the East Asian Strategic Environment

"As U.S.-Russia and Europe-Russia relations deteriorate, Russia's room for maneuver in Northeast Asia diminishes."

Observing the trajectory of Russian diplomacy thus far, we can discern a tendency for Russia's room for maneuver in Northeast Asia to diminish as relations between Russia and the U.S. and Europe deteriorate. In Putin's third term, Russia, bolstered by its accumulated confidence, began to voice independent opinions that did not necessarily align with China's. This presented an opportunity for South Korea and its allies to improve relations with Russia and seek cooperation, thereby reducing China's influence in the North Korean issue and, furthermore, mitigating the confrontational dynamic between the North-China-Russia northern triangle and the South Korea-U.S.-Japan southern triangle in the East Asian strategic dimension. However, the Ukraine crisis has created a situation where Russia is compelled to align more closely with China due to its confrontation with the U.S. and Europe, which will inevitably have significant repercussions on the East Asian strategic environment, both directly and indirectly.

While the United States has not officially designated Russia as an adversary thus far, it appears increasingly likely that it will face Russia as an adversary in Europe and the Middle East in the future. This would necessitate the U.S. deploying more strategic assets to these regions, potentially hindering its pursuit of the Asia-Pacific rebalancing policy.

China's strategic discretion is expected to expand. Many refer to the current international order as the era of the Group of Two (G2) between the U.S. and China. However, when examining international politics from the perspective of the U.S.-China-Russia strategic triangle, it becomes clear that different dynamics operate in each region, with U.S.-Russia relations being the most crucial factor in Europe and Eurasia, and U.S.-China relations being the most crucial factor in East Asia. In this context, if Russia exhibits behavior leaning towards China rather than acting as a flexible player, China will have a greater opportunity to more easily achieve its objectives across various issues in its relationship with the U.S.

Under the Abe administration, Japan had been exploring the possibility of leveraging Russia as a card in Northeast Asia, but this situation is now becoming difficult. Since becoming Prime Minister, Abe has held five summit meetings with Putin. While there were territorial disputes between the two countries, a more significant consideration was Japan's calculation to use Russia as a counterweight to China in Northeast Asia through various Japan-Russia cooperative initiatives, such as the development of Russia's Far East and energy cooperation. These plans have been disrupted by the Ukraine crisis.

The Ukraine crisis has caused serious concern for North Korea. Ukraine, a nuclear-weapon state, gave up its nuclear weapons through the Budapest Memorandum in 1994, received economic assistance, and enjoyed its status as an independent nation. Witnessing its inability to effectively resist Russia and its subsequent loss of territory has forced North Korea to reconsider what ultimately guarantees national security. Furthermore, the fact that China's provision of a nuclear umbrella to Ukraine late last year failed to exert any deterrent effect during Russia's annexation of Crimea sends an even more negative message to North Korea. Consequently, the perception that security can only be guaranteed through self-help measures such as nuclear weapons development is likely to become more entrenched within the North Korean regime, and the Ukraine crisis will have a profoundly negative impact on the future resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.

South Korea's Challenges

"Overcoming the rigidity of the North-China-Russia northern triangle versus the South Korea-U.S.-Japan southern triangle by establishing diverse trilateral consultation channels and constructing overlapping networks."

To minimize the negative repercussions of the Ukraine crisis, South Korea needs to activate various trilateral cooperation mechanisms, including South Korea-Russia-Japan, South Korea-China-Russia, and South-North-Russia. The overlapping networks established through these efforts can make a significant contribution to alleviating the rigid regional structure in Northeast Asia, characterized by the confrontation between the northern and southern triangles.

In this context, improving South Korea-Japan relations is a priority. If South Korea-Japan relations remain strained, the range of network combinations that South Korea can establish will be significantly limited. Efforts to alleviate the confrontational structure in the Northeast Asian region must begin with resolving the rigidity in South Korea-Japan relations.■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) receives financial support for its research on middle power diplomacy from The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. EAI conducts Smart Q&A interviews with experts both domestically and internationally, aiming to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through question-and-answer sessions with experts in relevant fields. This manuscript was compiled by Kim Yang-gyu, a researcher at EAI's Center for Asian Security Studies, based on an interview. The opinions expressed are those of the individual expert and do not necessarily reflect the position of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting from Smart Q&A.