[Smart Q&A: Richard Bush] North Korea's 2014 Outlook and ROK-US Alliance Response: Effectiveness of the "Sharpening Choices" Policy

YouTube Link: video.eai.or.kr/140123_Sqa.flv

Richard Bush is the Director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies (CEAP) at the Brookings Institution in the United States, where he conducts extensive research on U.S.-China relations, cross-Strait relations, Korean Peninsula issues, and Japanese security policy. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.

The East Asia Institute (EAI) conducted a series of Smart Q&A interviews regarding the trajectory of the Kim Jong Un regime in 2014 following the execution of Jang Song-thaek. On January 20, EAI hosted Ezra Vogel, Professor Emeritus at Harvard University, and Director Jeon Sung-won (EAI Center for Asian Security; Seoul National University) for a discussion focusing on the implications of China's reform and opening experience for the choices of the Kim Jong Un regime.dialogueand subsequently interviewed Richard Bush, Director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, on January 23. Based on his outlook for the Kim Jong Un regime's strategic choices in 2014 and the possibility of resuming the Six-Party Talks, Director Bush offered recommendations on the future direction of North Korea policy for South Korea and the United States. The main points are as follows:

Kim Jong Un Regime's Strategic Choices in 2014

"It appears they will make every effort to pursue multiple objectives simultaneously and avoid situations that require choosing a specific path."

It is difficult to accurately predict the strategic direction of North Korea's Kim Jong Un regime in 2014. What can be said is that following the purge of Jang Song-thaek, First Secretary Kim Jong Un will make future decisions with greater confidence and autonomy.

The crucial issue is the extent of the burden First Secretary Kim Jong Un currently feels from the North Korean military. Even if the Kim Jong Un regime intends to focus on economic development and pursue policies throughout 2014, it faces the difficult challenge of appeasing the military's discontent, which has been prioritized as the supreme principle and guideline within North Korean society under the banner of the 'military-first' policy. To resolve these issues, they may be tempted to choose strategic options such as allocating more budget to conventional force enhancement, accelerating the nuclear weapons program through additional nuclear tests, or conducting limited military provocations against South Korea.

Even if the Kim Jong Un regime dedicates significant effort to economic development in 2014, it will be difficult to achieve short-term, society-wide results. Even if the military's discontent is successfully managed, achieving tangible economic growth will remain a formidable task. For this reason, North Korea has historically focused on concentrating the benefits of limited economic growth on Pyongyang and the core elite to highlight its effects. The problem is that Jang Song-thaek had been the key conduit for this distribution process, and it is crucial to closely observe what obstacles may arise in this process following his purge.

Throughout 2014, it is anticipated that the Kim Jong Un regime will pursue multiple objectives simultaneously, making every effort to avoid situations that necessitate choosing a specific path. The ability to continuously pursue multiple paths concurrently will be a key factor in forecasting North Korea's actions in 2014.

There are claims that Jang Song-thaek acted as a brake, opposing First Secretary Kim Jong Un's directives for nuclear tests or military provocations.

However, it is difficult to accurately ascertain his position and influence within the Kim Jong Un regime with the limited information available. Therefore, it cannot be definitively stated that the Kim Jong Un regime will more readily engage in nuclear and missile tests or limited military provocations following Jang Song-thaek's execution. Particularly, as the Chinese government is expected to make considerable efforts to deter the North Korean regime from further provocations, the likelihood of North Korea actually engaging in provocations appears low. Of course, it is prudent for South Korea and the United States to anticipate an increased possibility of military provocations by North Korea after Jang Song-thaek's purge and prepare accordingly. Both South Korea and the United States must not only strengthen their deterrence capabilities but also clearly communicate to North Korea that any provocation will incur severe consequences.

U.S.-China Cooperation and Prospects for Resuming Six-Party Talks for North Korea Issue Resolution

"The direction of U.S.-China cooperation on the North Korean issue ultimately depends on North Korea's actions."

"While the Six-Party Talks tend to be perceived as a conflict management tool rather than a problem-solving mechanism, the fundamental goal of denuclearization must not be abandoned."



The direction of U.S.-China cooperation on the North Korean issue ultimately depends on North Korea's actions. If North Korea refrains from further nuclear and missile tests, avoids military provocations against South Korea, and refrains from aggressive rhetoric towards South Korea, the United States will consider China to possess sufficient influence to restrain North Korea and will seek to cooperate with China in more areas.

The Six-Party Talks are increasingly perceived as a conflict management tool rather than a problem-solving mechanism. The fact that North Korea's recent official statements and actions are moving in a direction contrary to the fundamental goal of denuclearization within the Six-Party Talks, and that the possibility of North Korea pursuing denuclearization in the short term is low, are factors contributing to the spread of this perception. Dialogue can be an effective means of conflict prevention, as it allows both sides to gain a deeper understanding of each other's positions during the process of discussing conflict resolution and to build confidence that actual problem-solving can be achieved through negotiations.

The United States still maintains a high threshold for resuming the Six-Party Talks, imposing numerous preconditions. The reasons are twofold: First, the purpose of the Six-Party Talks is explicitly denuclearization, not conflict management, and there is no need to unnecessarily lower this fundamental objective for North Korean denuclearization. Second, even without the Six-Party Talks, various forms of dialogue and negotiation can be utilized as conflict management tools. Regarding the North Korean issue, conflict management measures are already being pursued through regular diplomatic channels across multiple avenues.

Direction of South Korea-U.S. North Korea Policy

"The U.S. government has considerable confidence in President Park Geun-hye's North Korea policy."

"The U.S. government's policy of 'sharpening choices' (carrot and stick maximization) is a fundamental approach that simultaneously strengthens incentives and disincentives to alter the North Korean regime's policy objectives, and it is not a method that can yield results in the short term."

"The more the international community, including the United States, increases pressure on North Korea, the more China's own security and economic growth will be impacted, leading to expectations of changes in China's behavior."

The U.S. government currently has considerable confidence in President Park Geun-hye's North Korea policy. The Park Geun-hye administration is pursuing a balanced policy that steadfastly pursues the long-term goal of denuclearization based on principles while simultaneously engaging with North Korean society through humanitarian assistance. The South Korean government can expect unwavering support from the United States in its future North Korea policy.

There are voices questioning the effectiveness of the Obama administration's

In the current situation, if adjustments are made to the "sharpening choices" policy, I believe there is a need to further strengthen disincentives and exert greater pressure on North Korea. The most effective way to achieve this is for the United States and "like-minded countries" to impose unilateral sanctions on North Korea. While it is uncertain whether relevant countries are currently preparing such policies, it is likely to be a feasible option at this juncture.

I do not agree with the assertion that sanctions against North Korea are meaningless without China's cooperation. Unilateral sanctions by the United States or its partner institutions also impose significant costs on China. The financial sanctions imposed on Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in 2005 were effective because such measures exerted considerable and complex pressure on Chinese society. Chinese banks had to choose whether to remain connected to the international banking system centered around the United States or to abandon this and support North Korean trade. The same applies to security. When response measures by South Korea and the United States to deter North Korean provocations create situations that undermine China's security, China has shown a greater willingness to cooperate with the international community to resolve the North Korean issue. This is a problem arising from China's shared border with North Korea. Thus, the more the international community, including the United States, increases pressure on North Korea, the more China's own security and economic growth will be impacted, meaning that policies pressuring North Korea can significantly influence changes in China's North Korea policy.■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) receives financial support for its research on middle power diplomacy from The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. EAI conducts Smart Q&A video interviews with domestic and international experts, aiming to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through Q&A sessions with experts in relevant fields. This manuscript was compiled by Kim Yang-gyu, a researcher at the EAI Center for Asian Security, from the interview content. The opinions expressed are those of the expert and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting from Smart Q&A.